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ABSTRACT

ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY:
TOWARDS A CLASS-BASED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
by
Ashley W. Doane, Jr.
U n i v ers ity of Nev Hampshire, December,

This work

1969

is an attempt to d e v e lo p a theoretical model

useful for explaining the historical evolution of ethnic and
national identities.

Central to this framework are the
1

following assertions:

(1) that ethnic and national

i d en ti

ties are dynamic affiliations which undergo change through
intergroup resource competition;

(2) that given their

material base, a complete theory of ethnicity and n a t i o n 
a l i t y must consider these ties in relation to class;

(3)

that the evolution of group identities can ultimately only
be understood in the context of global capitalist d e v e l o p 
ment; and (4) that the uneven nature of capitalist d e v e l o p 
ment

(i.e., the core-periphery division) can be employed to

explain intersocletal variations
and national

identities.

propose a global,

in the evolution of ethnic

Drawing upon these assumptions,

we

historical and material approach to the

stud y of intergroup relations and ethnic change.
In the analysis of intergroup relations
specific circumstances,
class

in historically

our model employs the notion of eth-

(defined as social location in terms of both ethnicity

and class)

in order to explore the material
x

interests which

underlie gr ou p action.

We maintain that eth-class captures

both the interrelationship between ethnicity and class and
the rea lit y that et hnic groups c o n ta in internal class d i v i 
sions.

Thus,

ethnic and national mobilization are analyzed

as "alliances" of eth-class fractions; assimilation and
ethnic merger reflect strategic decisions to alter gro up
identity.
In addition to a conceptual discussion of et hnicity and
nationality =ind a critical review of both classical and
contemporary theories of ethnic change,
two case studies in whic h our model

this work contains

is employed to explain

the evolution of e thnic identities after 1800
United States and South Africa.
historical,

in both the

We find that the global,

and material approach presented in our framework

facilitates analysis of the development of intergroup r e l a 
tions and group identities in these two societies.

xi

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this work Is to d evelop a theoretical
model,

that Is, an inventory of the elements necessary for

understanding

(Mills 1962, p.

36), useful for explaining the

evolution of ethnic and national identities in the context
of capitalist development

in the post-1800 v o r l d - e c o n o m y .x

We will attempt to provide a framework
the question:
emerge,

in which to answer

What causes ethnic and national

persist,

change,

or d i sa ppe ar ?

identities to

To use the argot of

the social sciences, we are employing ethnicity and n a t i o n 
ality as dependent variables,

seeking to explain variations

in their form and nature across time a nd space.
approach stands

Such an

in contrast to the mai n current of ethnic

studies, which is to take ethnicity and nationality as
givens

(i.e., as independent variables)

and instead focus

upon their abil it y to explain other phenomena.

As we will

make clear below, we believe that a fuller understanding of
ethnicity and nationality as social processes is necessary
if we are to realize their full potential in explaining
human behavior.
At the same time, however, we must emphasize both the
exploratory and the theoretical nature of this work.

Our

objective is not to propose a "grand theory" of ethnicity
and n a tio na lit y— a task which we believe

is beyond the

2
current level o£ development of the fi e l d — but Instead to
construct a framework containing those processes w h i c h in
our opinion most strongly shape the evolution of et hnic and
national Identities.

Thus, this endeavor should be viewed

as an attempt to specify parameters and establish a program
for future study.

The theoretical orientation of this

undertaking will be manifest

in our concentration upon

broad, general trends in ethnic relations rather tha n the
explanation of specific phenomena.
two specific societies are provided,

Although case studies of
their

inclusion is more

for the purpose of exploring and illustrating our t h e o ret 
ical framework than to stand as substantial analytical
efforts in their own right.

Rationale
Our rationale for this undertaking has both theoretical
and substantive roots.

We believe that ethnicity and

nationality are fundamental concepts in the attempt to
understand and to explain human social behavior.

Th e y pro

vide an important context for individual and group identity
and action.

How we define situations and act on the world

around us is shaped by our ethnic and national affiliations.
On a broader scale,

ethnicity and nationality are a major

source of local and global conflict.

One need only peruse

the daily newspaper for examples of struggle and violence
rooted in ethnic and national cleavages.

Of equal signifi

cance is the role of ethnicity and nationality in serving as

a basis or socially constructed pretext for the unequal
distribution of scarce or valued reso urc es— i.e.,
mining

for d e t e r 

social stratification--thus affecting both i nd i 

vidual and group life chances and group interaction and
conflict.

Few societies exist without at least some degree

of ethnically-based inequality,

while the unequal d i s t r i b u 

tion of wealth among nations is a major global
mer ly First vs. Third World,
"North-South" conflict).

issue

(for

now popularly phrased as the

Clearly,

issues involving the

forms and evolution of ethnicity and nationality ma y hold
the key to understanding a diverse range of social
On a substantive level,

issues.

this work has its genesis

earlier study (Doane unpublished)

in an

exploring issues of ethnic

identity and stratification in the case of the FrancoAmerleans of N ew Hampshire.

During the course of this

research, we became convinced of the necessity of a h i s t o r 
ical and structural approach to the study of ethnicity.
that time,

At

it seemed fruitless— and it still d o e s — to

attempt to explain the current status of Franco-Amerleans
without reference to the past, which in turn was o nly und er
standable through the consideration of such factors as the
industrialization of New England and the need for cheap
labor in the textile industry;

American immigration and the

ebb and flow of natlvism and Americanization; and the oppor
tunities for mobility produced by the expanding Ame rican
economy.

In the context of these issues,

it was possible to

begin to explain both the assimilation and the persistence
of Franco-Amerlean ethnicity.
At the same time,

however, we became interested in the

issue of variations in identity within an ethnic group.

For

some Franco-Amer leans " le fait ..rancais" remains a vital
aspect of existence, while for others ethnic identification
has been reduced to a descent ca tegory in the course of
assimilation into the White American Hm e g a - g r o u p . "
addition,

In

we also became aware of historical and anecdotal

evidence of class divisions within the group
tional working class,

(e.g., a t r a d i 

a petty bourgeois elite which pro vided

both group leadership and a liaison with the larger society,
and a professional and academic intelligentsia which eme rge d
in the 1960s and 1970s),

each with different

implications

for the persistence or disappearance of Franco-Amerlean
ethnicity, w hic h led us to question the interrelationship
between ethnicity and class.

A final puzzle was presented

by the assertion of French-Canadian/Quebecois

identity in

Canada, a development w hic h stood in sharp contrast to the
experiences of Franco-Americans

in the United States.

This

led us to question w hy an identity which flourished in one
milieu disappeared or experienced a major transformation
another.

Bach of these considerations

central question of this work:
tional identities to_emerge,

in

is subsumed in the

What causes ethnic and n a 

pe r s i s t s . c h a n g e . or d i s a p p e a r ?

As ve began to search for answers to this question, ve
became Increasingly dissatisfied w it h the corpus of existing
works on ethn ici ty and nationality.

Traditionally,

social

science has tended to treat ethni ci ty and nationality as
undesirable preindustrial relics destined to fade awa y under
the relentless homogenizing pressures of modernization.
a result,

As

the primary contribution of the social sciences

has been a plethora of excellent descriptive studies of the
role and nature of ethnic identity for individual groups,
with a much more limited literature on what ve view as the
essential issue of intergroup relations and the evolution of
ethnic and national

identities.

Moreover,

the bulk of such

work suffers from tendencies towards ahistorlcal,
"empirical11 research;
their social contexts.

so-called

that is, the use of data torn from
In our opinion, studies of this

nature do more to obfuscate than to clarify the nature of
ethnicity and nationality.
A particularly harmful development in our view has been
the tendency to generalize from case studies of individual
groups to develop "universal" understandings of ethnicity
and nationality.

Given the prevalence of sociological

"ethnocentrism"— the tendency of social scientists to e x 
plain general social phenomena on the basis of their u n d e r 
standing of their own s o c i ety — and the intellectual hegemony
of Western social science,

the st u d y of ethnicity and

nationality has disproportionately reflected the experience

of Europe and the u n i t e d states

(c£. Amin's 1980, p.

discussion of "West-centered r e d u c t l o n i s m " ).

4,

This is m a n i 

fest in suc h practices as the emphasis on assimilation,

the

vie w of ethnicity as minor it y culture, and the use of race
as a master concept.
taken into account,

When non-western ethnicity as been
it has generally been via an "ant hro po

logical" emphasis on the "tribal"
trial cultures.

identities of p r e i n d u s 

From our vantage point, a global t h e o r y of

ethnicity requires a comparative approach derived from
concrete g r o u p experiences in a diverse a r r a y of settings.
The development of our approach to the study of et h n i 
city and nationality has been shaped by two major i n f l u 
ences.

F i r s t and foremost has been general Marxian p o l i 

tical economy.

Marx's observation

(1970, pp.

humans interact to produce their subsistence,

20-21)

that as

they enter

into social relations which in turn condition more general
social and political processes underscores the primacy of
class
ior .2

(i.e., m a t e r i a l ) interests

in analyzing social b e h a v 

This does not m e a n — as is often mistakenly assumed by

those work in g both inside and outside the Marxian framework-that all actions are reducible to class
referred to as "vulgar Marxism").
the material and the

(a position often

The relationship between

ideal is a dialectical one:

ideas such

as ethnicity and na tionality m a y assume an Independent e xi s 
tence and m a y in turn affect relations of production— or,
Weberian terms, non-economic elements m a y have economic

in

consequences.

Thus,

Ideas emerge from human productive

activities,

vhich means that class

production)

must be t a k e n into account as a k e y variable.

Folloving t h i s approach,

(i.e., relations of

our s ear ch for a theoretical f r a m e 

work for e t h n i c and national relations will emphasize the
material b a s i s of ethni cit y and nationality,

assuming t h a t

the ultimate utility of group affiliations lies in the realm
of Intergroup resource
competition.

(i.e., productive and distributive)

Such an approach w i l l necessarily focus u p o n

the structural

(as opposed to cultural, psychological,

or

even s o c i o -b iol og lca l) roots of ethnic and national i d e n 
tities (cf.
essence,

Yancey, B r i k s o n and Juliani 1976,

p. 392).

our quest is for what Bonacich (1980,

p. 12) has

termed a "class" theory of ethnicity and nationality;
is, an explanation of the

tha t

impact of class and the interplay

of class a n d ethnic interests on the emergence,
and evolution of group

In

persistence,

(i.e., ethnicity/ nationality and

class) affiliations.
A s e co nd

influence has been the super-macro or w o r l d -

system perspective and

its emphasis upon the world-system as

a unit of analysis in the study of social behavior.*
W a l l e r s t e i n 's

(1972, p.

222) insistence that national ca s e s

(and the s t u d y of ethni cit y therein) cannot be understood
apart from the world-system convinced us of t h e necessity of
a global a p p r o a c h to the study of ethnicity a n d nationality.
One cannot s t u d y the current e t h ni c conflict

in South

Africa,

for example, without taking into consideration the

effects of Eu ropean conquest and colonialism, the influence
of foreign investment, and the evolution of the capitalist
vorld-economy d u r i n g the post-1945 age of decolonization and
the P ax A m e r i c a n a .

From a global or world-system p e r s p e c 

tive, Wallerstein's

(1974a,

1974b) co nce ptualization of a

core-periphery division of labor suggests that experiences
of ethnicity and nationality may differ between the First
World and the Th ir d World;

however,

it simultaneously

reminds us that these experiences are

inexorably bo und

to ge t h e r — and therefore can only be understood in t e r m s of
each other.

This encourages us to v i e w the evolution of

ethnicity and n ationality in industrial and dev eloping
societies not as separate phenomena,

but as different yet

related outcomes of the process of g lob al capitalist
development.

Overview
As we stated at the outset, the objective of this work
is to develop a theoretical framework with which we can
begin to explain the evolution of ethnic and national

Iden

tities.

Yet the process of theory-building is c o m p l e x

indeed.

Before ve can present our model, ve must first set

conceptual parameters and evaluate the contributions of
previous efforts.

In this overview,

our purpose is to

introduce the reader to the core of our theoretical argument
in the hope that such exposure will enhance ap pr eciation of

the necessary intermediate steps.
sarily be truncated,

This synopsis will n e c e s 

as elaboration vill be forthcoming in

the following chapters.
In approaching the study of ethnicity and nationality,
ve maintain that these phenomena are not unique,
as one type of group affiliation,

but serve

one means through which

humans mobilize to produce and to compete for the means of
material existence.

As a basis for group formation, e t h n i 

city and n ationality belong to the order of communal a f f i l i 
ations; that

is, they are rooted in real or presumed c o mm on

origin and a sense of shared historical experience and joint
destiny (cf. Weber 1946, pp. 171-79;
Schermerhorn 1970, p. 12).

1968, pp.

385-98;

At the same time, these communal

affiliations take on social significance

in the context of

interoroup material rel a t i o n s — relations which emerge from
the specific conditions of economic and political life.
This suggests that ethnic and national

identities and the

structure of intergroup relations emerge and change as a
consequence of the exigencies of material existence.
Accordingly,

if we are to unlock the secret of h ow ethnic

and national identities evolve, then we must devel op some
conception of how the social organization of hu man produc
tive activities shapes the process of communal group
formation.
One central argument of this work

is that as group

phenomena, ethnicity, and.nationality can ul ti mately only be

10
u n de r s t o od in the context of the process of glob al c a p i t a l 
ist d e v e l o p m e n t — the evolution of the capitalist vorldeconomy.

This

is not to attribute mystical explanatory

powers to capitalism,

but to recognize that the dominant

means through which humans produce their subsistence will
have a significant effect upon other dimensions of social
existence

(cf. Marx 1970,

pp.

20-21).

We contend that the

expansion of capitalism into a global system transformed the
nature of group affiliations through such processes as c o l o 
nization,

labor migration,

producers,

proletarianization of independent

and the emergence of the modern state.

Thus,

the

process of capitalist development constitutes the most
general basis

for explaining e thnicity and nationality,

current context
pressed.

the

in which communal affiliations are e x 

Our choice of the post-1800 world-economy as the

focus for analysis permits us to concentrate upon an era

in

which capitalist production relations were unque sti ona bl y
dominant

in m uch of the world, while maintaining sufficient

historical scope to enable us to analyze the evolution of
group identities.'*
Although we maintain that global capitalist development
constitutes the overarching context
city and nationality,

for the study of e t h n i 

further exploration should take place

at lover levels of a nal y s i s — in particular,
state.

the nation

Social behavior occurs across a range of inter

related levels,

from world-system to dyad;

our task is to

mo v e between levels and to s pecify Interrelationships.

At

the societal level, ve believe that one dynamic of c a p i t a l 
i s m — uneven de v e l o p m e n t — has had a particularly profound
influence upon the evolution of ethnicity a nd nationality.
The core-periphery relationship

(cf. Wallerstein 1974a,

1974b) describes two va stly d ifferent yet intertvined t r a 
jectories of national social and economic development;
is,

that

the economically and po litically dominant core vs. the

underdeveloped and dependent periphery.

In our view,

this

c o re- per ip her y division can be linked to different e v o l u 
ti o nar y paths for ethnicity and nationality
b o l i c 1' e thnicity in the core vs.

(e.g.,

"sym

stronger ethnic ties and

et hn o-natlonallsm in the periphery).

Accordingly,

one major

thrust of this work will be to generate hypotheses about the
nature of ethnicity in the core and in the periphery.

As we

move to even lover levels of analysis, we recognize that
these processes may also be observed within a nation-state,
as uneven d e v e l o p m e n t — e.g., the domination of peripheral
areas within a country by a more developed m e t r opo li s— which
m a y again give rise to different forms of et hnicity (e.g.,
Wales, Quebec).

In this work, however, the bulk of our

analysis will be concentrated at the level of the n a t i o n 
state.
The third component of our theoretical framework

is an

emphasis upon the "e th - c l a s s w as a basic unit for the a n a l y 
sis of group action.

The term eth-class

(borrowed— but with

a different u sa ge— from Gordon 1964) captures the notion of
social location in terms of what ve believe are the two most
important social dimensions:
class.0

ethnicity/nationality and

From our perspective,

significant

(and interrelated)

groups themselves

this concept incorporates tvo
social facts:

(1) that ethnic

internally contain class divisions; and

(2) that social classes may be segmented on the basis of
"communal" affiliations such as ethnicity and n ati o n a l i t y . 0
When groups mobilize for action, mobilization will occur
along ethnic/national
Black middle class)

lines

(e.g., Black working class and

or class lines

(e.g., Black,

Hispanic,

and White working classes) within the context created by the
exigencies of capitalist accumulation.

As these eth-class

"alliances" struggle with other such entities,

group identi

ties and Intergroup relations are c ontinually created and
recreated.

Consequently, another of our theoretical tasks

will be to outline the types of eth-class "alliances" and to
begin to specify conditions under which these different
forms will actually emerge.
In sum, what ve are proposing is a class-based frame
work for the study of ethnicity and nationality, a model
which will be embedded
development

in the dynamics of global capitalist

(e.g., capitalist accum ula ti on— the search for

markets and cheap labor, exploitation, proletarianization)
and the consequences

(e.g.,

core-periphery relations,

tendencies towards crisis) of the uneven nature of this

development.

While material activities serve in our view as

the most general basis for social action, ve will plac e
particular emphasis upon competition and conflict between
eth-classes

(and constellations of eth-classes) as a key

explanatory factor
identities.

in understanding the evolution of group

It is our hope that what emerges from our

effort a t theory-building will be a useful means for addres
sing w h a t ve have posed as a core question:
ethnic identities to emerge,
If ve a re successful

persist,

in this endeavor,

What causes

change, or disappear?
we hope that this

work will make a contribution to both the sociology of
ethnic relations a n d the more general areas of s t r a t i f i c a 
tion and political economy.

Organization
Our attempt to develop a theoretical model u s e ful for
explaining the evolution of ethnic and national identities
will be organized around the following tasks:

ex ploration

of conceptual issues; critical review of existing theories;
development of a class-based theoretical framework;
application of the framework to two case studies.

and
E ac h of

these tasks is essential to the development of our the or eti 
cal po sition and will constitute one or more chapters

in

this work.
In Chapter II ve will explore conceptual issues related
to our central notions of ethnicity and nationality.

This

task is made necessary by the conceptual confusion a n d broad

range of variation which c u r r e n t l y exist In definitions of
ethnicity and nationality (cf.

Isajiv 1974;

Connor 1972,

h o w ve conceptualize a v a r i 

1978).

Moreover,

Burgess 1978;

able is closely linked to its theoretical usage (e.g.,
nic group qua c ulture group);

therefore,

eth

a conceptual d i s 

cussion is an essential first s t e p in the cons tr uct io n of a
theoretical

framework.

We w ill consider a variety of c o n 

ceptual Issues r el evant to our study Including:
of ethnicity;

"race";

the nature

ethnicity as a variable; e t h n i c i t y and

nationality; and nationality a n d ethno-nationallsm.
(and somewhat novel)

O n e key

component of our conceptual base will

be a distinction betw een e t h n i c i t y and nationality b a s e d
upon level of inclusiveness:

e thnicity will be d e f i n e d as a

communal affiliation expressed within a s o c i e t y (i.e.,

a

nation-state); nationality as a more Inclusive identity
asserted on a global

level.

Secondly, ve will adopt a

strategic perspective on ethnicity; that is, ve vill assert
that e th nic and national identities are link ed to the p u r 
suit of material interests and are thus inexorably l i n k e d to
issues of class, domination, a n d stratification.
The final preliminary s t e p in the development of our
theoretical model vil l be a cri ti cal review,

presented

in

Chapter III, of past and present theories of the ev o l u t i o n
of ethnicity and nationality.

Although classical s o c i a l

science seems to h a v e unequivocally assumed that e t h n i c
identities would v i t h e r away a s a result of the homogenizing
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effects of Industrialization and modernization,

m a n y contem

porary theorists have sought to evaluate ethnicity and
nationality in the context of the changes wrought b y indus
trialization and modernization.

We will classify a n d evalu

ate five types of theories which attempt to explain the
persistence of ethnicity in modern society:
the plural society approach,
theories,

reactive ethnicity,

primordialism,

modernization/competition
and class theories.

Our

critique of these approaches will emph asi ze their o v e r 
simplification of the relationship b e t w e e n ethnicity and
class, as well as their lack of a macro-level d y n a m i c which
a d equately explains the diversity of e t h n i c and national
phenomena.

Thus,

ve set the stage for the introduction of

our model, a class-based framework gr ou nde d in the dynamics
of uneven global capitalist development.
In Chapter IV, ve vill present our

framework

for under

standing the evolution of ethnic and national identities in
the post-1800 w o r l d - e c o n o m y .

As outlined above, ve attempt

to resolve the "dilemma" of the relationship between ethni
city and class by focusing u pon the eth-class as a basic
unit for the analysis of group action.

At the same time, ve

assert that the formation of eth-class alliances

(i.e.,

mobilization for action) can only be f u l l y understood in the
context of global capitalist development,

including the

uneven nature of this development re flected in the division
between core and peripheral areas of the vorld-system.
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Drawing upon this base, ve will pres ent a series of "working
hypotheses" wh i c h address the evolution of et h n i c i t y and
nationality in both the core and the periphery.

In a dd i 

tion, ve vill seek to s p e c i f y factors which ve believe p l a y
an integral role

in the evolution of ethnic and national

identities in specific circumstances.
Chapters V and VI constitute the
our framework,

first application of

where ve will seek to assess the analytical

utility of our model by employing our working hypotheses to
study the evolution of ethnic and national identities in two
case studies:
in each

the United States and South Africa.

Our goal

instance vill not be to produce an exhaustive case

study— indeed, we will r e l y upon the secondary analysis of
existing data— but rather to elaborate our a bst r a c t t he ore 
tical model by applying it to specific historical circum
stances.

Following the emphasis ve have placed upon the

core-periphery distinction,

we will devote one chapter to a

core nation (the United States) and one to a peripheral
society

(South A fri c a ) . 7

Our choice of the U n i t e d States

reflects both its location within the core and

its role as a

"data source" for many theories of ethnicity (e.g., a s s i m i 
lation).
acute

Similarly, South Africa s tands as perh aps the most

(and most analyzed)

contemporary world.

example of ethnic c on fli ct in the

We are confident that the opportunity

to reanalyze these cases while employing our framework will
allow for a particularly rigorous t e s t of its utility.
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In Chapter v i i , the final chapter,

ve will conclude our

presentation and evaluate our theoretical framework In light
of the data provided b y our case studies.

This should

enable us to highlight both the strengths of our model and
the areas requiring further elaboration.

Given the e x p l o r a 

tory or developmental nature of this undertaking, ve will
devote particular attention to the task of specifying issues
to be addressed by subsequent studies.

Indeed,

as much a beginning as it is an end product.

this work

Perhaps the

true measure of success vill be the degree to which ve
establish a useful foundation for future research.

is

CHAPTER NOTES

CHAPTER I

1.

Both of our central co nc ep t s— ethnicity and n a ti on al i
t y — will be discussed at length in Chapter II.
At this
stage, the reader should be cognizant of the fact that
ve are employing a somewhat unique co nceptualization of
nation al ity as a communal (i.e., ethnic-like) a f f i l i a 
tion linked to asserted claims of political and t e r r i 
toria l autonomy.
Stated simply, nationality is e t h n i 
city on a more inclusive level.

2.

The reference here is to Marx's famous statement in the
pref ac e to A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy:
In the social production of their life, men enter
into definite relations that are indispensable and
independent of their vill, relations of production
which correspond to a definite stage of d e v e l o p 
ment of their material productive forces.
The sum
total of these relations of production constitutes
the economic structure of society, the real foun
dation, on which rises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite
forms of social consciousness.
The mode of p r o 
duction of material life conditions the social,
political, and intellectual life process in
general.
It is not the consciousness of men that
determines their being, but, on the contrary,
their social being that determines their c o n 
sciousness .

3.

While key aspects of this work were inspired by the
writing s of Immanuel Wallerstein, ve would like to
emphasize that this does not constitute an unqualified
endorsement of world-system theory.
On the one hand,
ve believe that the world-system paradigm has made a
significant contribution to sociology by reintroducing
de ta il ed historical analysis to the stu dy of social
change (reflected in the de tailed historical analyses
in Chapters V and VI of this work) and by encouraging
us to consider the effect of global forces in the study
of individual societies (a core component of our th e o 
retical framework).
On the other hand, we believe that
much more needs to be done with respect to elaborating
the dynamics of the vorld-economy.
Moreover, ve would
agree with those critics of Wa llerstein (e.g, B r e n n e r —
1977) who complain that world-system theory downplays
18
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the role of internal class (not to m en tio n e t h n i c )
factors in shaping the ev olu tionary course of indi
vidual societies.
In this context, ve would consider
the eth-class based analysis presented herein to be an
implicit critique of the vorld-system approach.
For an
excellent summary and critical analysis of the vorldsystem perspective, see Shannon (1989).
4.

Clearly, communal identities existed prior to the
emergence of the capitalist mode of production and
vould be likely to exist in future social forms.
Our
analysis is limited to communal affiliations under
capitalism.
One complicating factor in such an
analysis is the slow emergence of capitalism from
feudalism (cf. Sweezy, Dobb, Takahashi, Hilton, Hill,
Lefebvre, Procacci, Hobsbavn and Harrington 1978) and
the length of time before capitalism penetrated the
entire globe.
This muddied the analytical waters by
giving rise to intermediate, contradictory forms of
communal affiliation containing components of p r e c a p i 
talist affiliations.

5.

While Gordon (1964) should be credited with inventing
the term eth-class, it should be noted that our usage
vill differ dramatically from his (e.g., our use of
Marxian class categories vs. Gordon's conception of
class in status terms).
Other writers (e.g., Leon
1970; Geschwender 1978; Bonacich 1980; Barrera 1987)
have also sought to integrate ethnicity and class as
bases for social action.

6.

Indeed, in the extreme circumstances of a "caste-like"
society, ethnic groups, as overall units, may c o n s t i 
tute class divisions w ith in a society.
See Leon (1970)
on the role of European Jews during feudalism and in
the early stages of industrial capitalism.

7.

We recognize that the choice of South Africa as an
example of a peripheral soc iet y may be somewhat
controversial.
From the vantage point of the vorldsystem perspective, South Africa vould be classified as
s em i p e r i p h e r a l ; that is, as exhibiting a mixture of
core and peripheral activities in the international
division of labor (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Martin
1986; Wallerstein 1979, p. 100; Milkman 1979).
In as 
much as (1) we view the semiperiphery-periphery
distinction as representing gradations within the
periphery (indeed, some— e.g., Chirot 19 7 7 — vould argue
that all peripheral societies are now semiperipheral)
and (2) South Africa was unarguably peripheral at the
beginning of the twentieth century, the South African
case is suitable for the purposes of our study.

CHAPTER II

ETHNICITY,

NATIONALITY AND CLASS:

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

In this chapter, ve propose to explore conceptual
issues of ethnicity and nationa lit y— and, more briefly,

of

social class-in order to provide a firm definitional foun
dation for the theoretical discussion in the following
chapters.

As we do so,

however,

we acknowledge the limita

tions of static, abstract definitions.

Prom our vantage

point, socio log y is the study of social change;
structure

is process

in slow motion"

to say); and definitions are,
process.

In other words,

"social

(as Robert E. Park used

in essence,

metaphors for

the theoretical concepts necessary

to comprehend society evolve with soci ety itself; that is,
present-day "ethnicity" does not necessarily have the same
sociological content as ethnic-like identities
societies.

Therefore,

in ancient

we remind the reader that our c on ce p

tual discussion is set in the specific context of the post1800 vorld-economy--the analysis of other times is left to
other works

(see,

for example,

Armstrong 1982).

Moreover,

the definitions offered in this chapter represent but a
first app roximation of ongoing social processes;

further

elaboration vill occur when ve link ethnicity and nationa l
ity to class and to specific historical circumstances.
Our reservations regarding definitions notwithstanding,
the di scussion which is presented in this chapter
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is made

necessary by conceptual problems which beset the field of
ethnic studies an d stand as an obstacle to analysis.
Indeed/

to pose a question such as:

What do ve me an by

ethnicity and nationality? is equivalent to battli ng the
many-headed Hydra.

In surveying the field, we find a basic

lack of consensus as to what

is meant by ethnicity and

nationality, a p r ob le m compounded by the presence of a host
of related terms such as race,
group,

and the like.

tribe,

status group,

Any r evi ew of social science

culture
litera

ture will yield broad variations in definitions of ethnicity
and nationality

(cf. the excellent summaries provided by

Isajiv 1974; Burg ess 1978;

Obidinski

1978; and Connor 1978),

differences wh i ch often reflect the specific research c o n 
text or ideological environment of the author.
Isajiv

as

(1974) observes, definitions of ethnicity are often

taken for granted and omitted entirely.
this

Moreover,

We will address

issue in mo r e detail as ve consider each individual

concept.
A second and

in our v i e w equally grave problem is posed

by the analytical separation of ethni cit y and nationality,
the artificial sundering of these fundamentally interrelated
concepts.

From a "sociology of knowledge" perspective,

this

unfortunate state of affairs reflects the compartmentalization of subject matter and units of analysis among the
social sciences.

In approaching ethni cit y and nationality,

sociologists have

traditionally concentrated upon "race
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relations" and minority groups wi thin a society,

a focus

which has been conducive to the s t u d y of ethnicity but not
(except in the case of anti-colonialism) to the study of
nationality--which requires a larger unit of analysis.
Likewise, anthropologists have tended to engage
graphic studies of individual groups,

only more recently

turning to the study of intergroup relations
pp.

380-83; Wolf 1982).

in e t h n o 

(R. Cohen 1978,

On the other hand, political s c i e n 

tists, with their emphasis on political
explored issues of nationality and

institutions,

"nation-building" but

have devoted less attention to aspects of ethnicity.
over, as Connor

(1978, p.

ences from articles
Review of Studies
has transpired.

have

More

387) found after comparing r e f e r 

in the journals Ethnicity and Canadian

in N at i o n a l i s m , little cross-pollination
This academic "division of labor" has

perpetuated the separation of ethnicity and nationality,
leading to conceptual confusion of the two terms
treating them as synonyms)

(e.g.,

and limitations upon the de v e l o p 

ment of an integrated framework.
Our major conceptual position,
chapter,

to be elaborated in this

is that ethnicity and nationality are analytically

separate yet related affiliations,

both belonging to the

larger order of communal affiliations based upon real or
flctive common ancestry and a shared sense of joint h i st or i
cal experience and destiny.

The distinction we draw is that

ethnicity (e.g., Franco-American,

Walloon)

is expressed

within a society or social system, while nationality (e.g.,
American,

Belgian)

represents a claim as a people to be a

politically autonomous society (i.e., a nation-state).

In

other words, nationality is a more inclusive identity, a
sense of citizenship in a nation-state which is expressed on
a global level, while ethnicity is asserted within the co n 
fines of the nation-state

(we will deal with ethno-national-

ism— the unattained claim of nationhood by an ethnic gr o up —
in the discussion of nationality).

Indeed,

ethnicity and

nationality represent but part of a continuum of a ff il ia 
tions ranging from kinship to pan-nationalism.
perspective of the individual,

Prom the

these affiliations or pot en

tial affiliations exist as levels within levels

(e.g., pan-

national- -n ati on al- -et hn ic --s ub eth ni c-- kin ), each identity
employed

in its particular social context

in International relations;
state;

(e.g., nationality

ethnic it y within the n ati on

sub-ethnicity within the ethnic group--cf.

Keyes

1976; van den Berghe 1971).
The other major component of the conceptual position
which we will develop is a strategic characterization of
ethnicity and nationality;
and national

that

is, the position that ethnic

identities are grounded in material

interests—

the production and distribution of valued r es ou rce s— in the
context of intergroup relations.

As we noted

in Chapter I,

this is not to assert that ideas such as ethnicity and
nationality cannot in turn influence material conditions,

but only to observe that they are ultimately grounded in
material life.

From the standpoint of individual group

members, assertion of ethnic and national

identities r e 

flects Individual perception of interests, wh i ch in turn
may be shaped by the grou p— and, as we will see shortly---by
other groups.

This linkage yet differentiation of indi

vidual and group interests leads us to another major point,
one which is often overlooked

in the literature:

ethnic and

national_groups are not monolithic entities,,. they can s u b 
sume considerable differences of interest, especially with
regard to class interests

(cf. Thompson 1979).

means is that ethnic and national
actions are shaped

(negotiated,

What this

identities and group

imposed)

on the basis of

interests and power relations within group boundaries

(e.g.,

longstanding political tensions within the Parti Quebecois).
This point will be developed further

in this and subsequent

chapters.
The organization of this chapter will be along the
lines of a topical discussion of the concepts of ethnicity,
nationality,
engage

and class.

In each case,

in an encyclopedic discussion,

our purpose

is not to

but rather to high

light key issues and to elaborate our position.

During our

discussion of ethnicity we will also consider briefly a
related concept--race--which we believe has been the source
of much confusion in the study of ethnicity and nationality.
We should also alert the reader to the fact that our consid-
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eration of class will ne cessarily be brief.
is inexorably intertwined with
nationality, and
clarification,

Although class

issues of ethnicity and

its conceptual ambig uit y requires some

a complete exposition of conceptual

issues

relevant to class would involve a separate work with a
focus considerably different from that of this undertaking.
Finally,

at the conclusion of the chapter, a summa ry will

emphasize this conceptual presentation to the material to
follow.

Ethnicity
Although it is by no means a new term, ethni ci ty has
only recently enjoyed widespread usage among social scien
tists

(Glazer and Moynihan 1975, pp. 1-4; R. Cohen 1978, pp.

379-80).
chapter,

Moreover,
there

as we noted at the beginning of the

is as of yet no consensus regarding a de fi ni

tion of ethnicity or its corporate manifestation,
group

(Isajiw 1974;

ethnic

Burgess 1978; Obidinski 19 78).1

The

reasons for this state of affairs serve as both an overview
of the conceptual problems

in the field of ethnic studies

and a case study in the sociology of knowledge.

As is

evident in the development of ethnic studies, definitions
reflect the "frame of r e fe r en ce ” and the research objectives
of the user, much to the detriment of a n y attempts to
develop a lingua franca for scholarly discussion.
The ideological and geographical

frame of reference of

the researcher has had a particularly profound influence on

26
how ethnicity has been conceptualized.
United States have
religion,

p. 28),

for years viewed ethnicity as race,

or national origin

"minority culture"

Sociologists in the

(e.g., Gordo n 1964)

or as

(e.g., Wirth 1938; Warner and Srole 1945,

thus reflecting the

ideological emphasis of hege 

monic groups upon resolving social problems through the
assimilation of ethnic minorities.

Fr om this perspective,

the dominant Anglo-Americans were not viewed as an ethnic
group,

thereby creating what Banton (1983, p. 64) has d e s 

cribed as "minus-one" ethnicity; that is, a co nceptual
ization of ethnicity as an attribute of minorities.
recently,

on the other hand,

More

"primordial" definitions of

ethnicity have be e n promoted by academic supporters of the
recent ethnic "resurgence"
Greeley 1974; Novak 1973).

in the United States

(e.g.,

Other examples further

illus

trate the sensitivity of definitions of ethnicity to the
research context.

The notion of ethnic group was often

discarded by Eur opean social scientists

in favor of nation,

a reflection of European historical experiences with the
national aspirations of ethnic groups
14).

(Isajiw 1974,

pp.

113-

Western scholars studying Africa have tended to use

"tribe" to describe ethnic gr ou ps— in what we interpret as
an ethnocentric,
p. 384)
1978,

p.

pejorative application

(cf. R. Cohen 1978,

which se rv es to legitimate core domination
392; van den Berghe 1983, p.

221).

(Connor

Definitions,
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then, roust be evaluated with respect to their social setting
and to the ideology of their promoters.
As

is the case with geographical or ideological con

text, academic environments have also shaped concept ual iza 
tions of ethnicity.

Anthropologists have tended to empha

size e th ni c groups as culture groups
Cohen 1978, pp.

(Barth 1969,

379-80), while sociologists outside of the

field of ethnic studies have

focused upon ethnicity as an

explanation for other social processes.
context,

p. 9; R.

In this latter

ethnicity is employed as a social category,

an

independent variable shaping such dependent variables as
achievement orientation, mate selection,
and occupational prestige
al. 1976,

p. 399).

(Obidinski

Unfortunately,

voting behavior,

1978, p. 213; Yancey et

such a methodological

approach has resulted in ethni cit y becoming "a matter of
research design"

(Obidinski

1978,

p. 219), a function of the

availability of data and the nature of operational defini
tions employed b y large scale survey operations such as the
United States Bureau of the Census and the National Opinion
Research Center.3
Mills*

Such "abstracted empiricism," to use

(1959) term,

has made ethnicity a term employed by

all and defined b y few (cf.
all too prevalent

Isajiw 1974,

p. Ill),

a practice

in current empirical works.

Ra ther than offer an abstract definition of what we
view as a social process,
question:

What_is

our preference

important,

is to address the

sociologically speaking, about
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et h ni ci ty ?

To begin with, ethnicity is an identity which

reflects a group affiliation;

thus,

it is endowed with all

the characteristics of social g ro u p s — e.g., collective
representations shaping the behavior of members;
in contrast to other groups;

persistence through the ability

to sati sf y the needs and goals of members,
material needs and goals.
types of social groups

the order of communal

pa rti cularly

Although similar

(e.g.,

tur es— cf. A. Cohen 1974b,

existence

pp.

in form to other

occupational groups,
ix-x),

identities;

subcul

ethnicity belongs to

that is, it is grounded

in

presumed common origin and a sense of shared historical
experience and joint desti ny (Weber 1968, p.

3 8 9 ).3

affiliation is not an "objective" social category,

This
it

requires some measure of collective solidarity on the part
of group members

(A. Smith 1981, p. 66).

differentiate themselves

Ethnic groups

from other such entities on the

basis of a configuration of socially defined
tiated,

imposed)

symbolic markers such as language,

gion,

customs,

1970,

p. 12) which define the "boundary"

group.

(i.e., n e g o 

and physical characteristics

In the contemporary world,

re l i 

(Schermerhorn

(Barth 1969) of a

ethnic identities exist

in relation to other such identities within a sociopolitical
system

(i.e., a nation-state);

make demands upon or resist

that

incursions by other groups

what becomes a political struggle
3 1 7 - 1 8 ).*

To summarize,

is, they are employed to

(cf. A. Cohen 1981,

we have tentatively described

in
pp.
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ethnicity as a social
istics:

identity with four central ch ara cte r

presumed commonality,

collective solidarity,

differentiation via symbolic markers,

and expression through

intergroup interaction within a social system.

Yet this

formulation only begins to capture the conceptual richness
of ethnicity;

thus,

we must continue our exploration.

The Nature of Ethnicity
A central focus of conceptual discussions of ethnicity
has involved attempts to describe the sociologically signi
ficant qualities or the " na tur e” of ethnicity.®
view,

this debate

In our

is best organized ar ou nd three subtopics:

"primordial" ethnicity vs. ethnicity as a variable;
city as culture vs.

ethnic boundaries;

ethni

and "strategic"

ethnicity.
"Primordial" ethnicity vs. ethni cit y as a v a r i a b l e .
speak of ethnicity as "primordial"
Greeley 1974;

Isaacs 1975)

basic gr oup identity,
social existence.®
involuntary;

(e.g.,

To

Geertz 1963;

is to view it as an irreducible,

one which is rooted in the

"givens" of

Such an identity is ascriptive and

group solidarity is based

in mysterious,

emotional sentiments linked to historical experience.

The

attraction of a primordial view of et hnicity is its seeming
ability to explain the emotional intensity of ethnicity,

the

"non-rational" emphasis upon symbols, a n d the ad option of
ethnocentric attitudes

(cf. Weber's— 1968, pp. 3 9 0 - 9 1 —

notion of "ethnic honor")

towards other groups.

Indeed,

it
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is this "primordial" aspect of ethnic groups which has

led

many observers to view them as unique a m o n g social g r o u p 
ings .
Alt h ou gh primordiality m a y at times be a useful
description of the apparent nature of ethnicity,

its

unidimensionality tends to obscure as m u c h as it explains.
Humans m a y exhibit a propensity for group membership and for
basing groups on presumed descent; however,

these g ro ups may

vary with regard to scope or permeability of their b o u n 
daries,

change,

or even d i s a p p e a r — phenomena which c o n t r a 

dict the notion of p r i m o r d i a l i t y .

In our view, primordial-

ism is be s t viewed as an ideological cl a im of ethnic groups,
a means of maintaining group solidarity.

This point

is

tacitly recognized even by writers sympathetic to the
primordialist position, as exemplified b y Nagata's

(1981, p.

94) dis cus sio n of "primordialized" cultural traits and
primordiality as "a matter of usage."
believe that the affective intensity,

Ultimately,

of

we

the seemingly as cr ip 

tive nature, and the symbolic demands of ethnicity a r e not
primordial— they stem from human material activities
(although ideas,

once established,

independent existence— hence,

can assume a s ee min gl y

"pri mor di ali ty" ).

In contrast to the primordialist conce ptu al iza tio n of
ethnicity,

many recent works have emphasized the variable

nature of ethnicity.
observed,

As Abner Cohen (1974b, p. xiv)

"ethnicity is a matter of degree.

There is

has

ethnicity and ethnicity."

The notion of ethnicity as a

variable subsumes a broad range of considerations.

First,

the assertion of ethnicity may exhibit considerable withinqroup variation in meaning and intensity

(Obidinski 1978;

Banks and G ay 1978, p. 245), even leading to the formation
of sub-groups emphasizing different cultural markers
1969; Lyman and Douglass 1973; Hannan 1979).7

(Barth

Moreover,

individual and group identities can be observed to vary
across time and space
cumstances

(A. Cohen 1981) and

in specific cir

(Lyman and Douglass 1973, p. 358; Okamura 1981).

For example,

Italian-American affiliation may have held one

subjective meaning for a Brooklyn laborer

in the 1930s, as

opposed to a Connecticut grocer during the same era,

or a

Portland,

inter

Maine, stockbroker

in the 1980s.

marriage between groups may produce

Finally,

"multiethnic"

viduals who may choose to accentuate one identity

indi
(T. Smith

1980) or create their own "ethnicity package" from the
alternatives available to them

(Lopata 1976, p. 117).

A second aspect of ethnicity as a variable pertains to
our earlier observation that ethnic-like affiliations exist
as levels within levels.

Accordingly, each individual may

have at his or her disposal several

identities

American, White-American, Franco-American,

(e.g.,

Cajun),

which may be activated in different circumstances
1981, pp.

70-71; Nielsen 1985).

each of
(Light

Perhaps the most signifi

cant aspect of ethnicity as a variable,

however,

involves
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the ability of individuals and groups to change this s e e m 
ingly most basic of all identities.

Individuals m ay "pass"

from one identity to another, usual ly higher-status a f fi li 
ation

(De Vos 1975,

assimilate

pp. 26-29),

while entire groups ma y

into and be absorbed by more dominant groups

phenomenon observed among White protestant
United States).
circumstances

(a

immigrants to the

Indeed, new identities may emerge from new

{e.g.. Creoles

in Sierra L e o n e — A. Cohen 1981)

or from the "pan-ethnic" fusion of smaller groups

(e.g.,

American Indians,

Italian-

Asian Americans--Trottier 1981;

Am er ic an s— Hannerz 1974; Slavic-Americans--Barton 1975;
Je wi sh-Americans— Teller 1970; Ar ab -A mer ic ans — Abrah am and
Abraham 1983, Naff 1985).
Although the dimensions of ethnicity as a variable
discussed above tend to refute the primordialist p er s p e c 
tive,

overemphasis of the mutability of ethnicity may be

equally problematic.
"subjective belief"

To reduce ethnicity to a p ure ly
(as We be r — 1968, p.

interpreted as having done; cf.
Burgess 1978, p. 269)

Isajiw 1974, pp. 116-17;

is to remove

its social and cultural

anchors and to d o wn p la y the persistence
they are not primordial,

389— is generally

of ethnicity.

While

neither are ethnic identities

donned and shed like a suit of clothes.
us the need to explore further,

This indicates for

to uncover the reasons for

both the persistence and the variabi lit y of ethnicity.
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Ethnicity as cult ure vs. ethnic " bo un d ar ie s" .
perspective of ethnicity as culture

The

includes an emphasis

upon ethnic groups as culture groups;

that is, as bearers of

a distinctive culture or symbolic s ys te m which is employed
by gr ou p members to guide and interpret behavior
1964;

Isajiw 1974;

A. Cohen 1974b).

(Naroll

This formulation has

the attraction of seemingly capturing the unique essence of
ethnicity,

the often striking cultural differences between

groups and the emphasis ethnic groups often place upon s y m 
bolic

issues.

collectivities

While ethnic groups,

like many other social

(e.g., occupational groups),

elements of culture,

share

in common

the notion of a direct correlation

between ethnicity and culture has been criticized

for p r o m o 

ting an overly static conceptualization of ethnic group and
for reducing ethnic groups to "trait inventories"
1969,

p. 12).

Moreover,

(Lai 1983, p. 163);

culture

that is,

(Barth

is not a unitary phenomenon

it is subject to intragroup

variation (Horowitz 1985, p. 69; A.P.

Cohen 1985,

pp. 15-19)

and intergroup similarity through contact and diffusion.
The "cultural diversity" between ethnic groups
fact of their past geographical separation

is an a r t i 

(i.e.,

different

material conditions and social contexts giving rise to
different cultures),

an isolation which

intergroup interaction.

is broken through

We believe that the erroneous

tendency to equate ethnicity with culture is due to over
emphasizing the use of relatively persistent cultural s y m 

bols

(which gives ethnicity both its seeming pri mordiality

and the appearance of being culture) as "markers" of group
membership,
markers

thus overlooking the possibility of changing

(e.g., the French language no longer being shared by

all F r a n c o - A m e r i c a n s ) or the existence of markers which are
shared by several groups

(e.g.,

ment for many ethnic groups

Catholicism as a common e l e 

in the United S t at es ). 8

may be an important element of ethnic identity;

Culture

however,

ethnicity is not culture I
From the standpoint of intergroup relations,

what is

important about culture, more than its content per se,

is

the use of cultural elements as markers or boundaries which
define and differentiate between groups.
seminal work of Barth

As noted in the

(1969), an ethnic group is an organi 

zational type, a ke y feature of which

is the maintenance of

a boundary allowing classification into in-group and out
group,

"us" and "them."

Inasmuch as culture is constantly

created and re-created as a consequence of material a ct iv i
ties and intergroup contact,

the persistence of boundaries

implies the conscious structuring of interaction so as to
maintain intergroup differences

(cf. Barth 1969,

pp.

15-16).

Accordingly, ve can view the seemingly "non-rational"

(from

an economic standpoint) emphasis of ethnic groups on cul 
tural symbols as attempts to maintain the organizational
basis of the group and to assert collective solidarity
(e.g., the attempts by ethnic groups in the United States to
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use bilingual education to preserve group distinctiveness).
Ultimately,

culture follows boundaries

(Horowitz 1985, p.

69) 1
For our purposes,
important points.
meaningful

the above discussion leads to several

First,

we see that ethnicity is only

in the context of interaction with other groups.

Without an "out-group" for contrast
ance),

(i.e., bo un da r y ma in te n

"in-group" identity becomes irrelevant.

Secondly,

the process of boundary formation and maintenance reflects
the results of self and other a s c r i pt io n— the change and
persistence of ethnicity occurs in the course of
interaction.

Thus, ethnicity becomes a negotiated identity

(Lyman and Douglass 1973,

p. 360) or, to the extent that

power relations between groups are unequal
important historical significance),
(cf. Banton's--1983,

(a fact with

even an Imposed identity

p. 31— discussion of "pariah groups").

It is in this context that

"cultural markers" become sign i

ficant in limiting the variability of ethnicity,
key markers

intergroup

(e.g.,

language,

physical

traits) are part of

one's make up or behavioral repertoire,
become impermeable

(i.e.,

for unless

ethnic boundaries

unless one looks or ac ts the part-

-and is perceived in such a manner by others--one cannot
pass or assimilate;

for example, a Fr anco-American with a

"French" accent cannot present him or her self as an old
stock Yankee).
relations

Consequently,

to the extent that

intergroup

(and boundaries) are linked to elements of culture
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whi ch are not ea s i l y manipulated, ethnicity appears to be
primordial and ascriptive.

What remains

for us, then,

is to

investigate why processes of ethnic change and pe rsistence—
of boundary maintenance and ma nip u la ti on — occur.
"Strategic" e t h n i c i t y .

Thus far, we have emphasized

the variable nature of ethnicity,

suggesting that group

boundaries and identities change as a consequence of inter
grou p contact.
still

As we have just observed,

faced with the question:

vary?

however,

we are

Why do ethnic identities

In response to this question,

we can stress the

importance of ethni cit y as s t r a t e g y ; that is, the view that
ethnic

identities are linked to material

interests— the

production and appropriation of valued resources--expressed
in an intergroup context

(cf. Worsley 1984, pp.

248-50).

This position is a logical extension of our emphasis on the
role of material

factors in human social existence outlined

in Chapter I; however, we should note that the notion of
ethnic it y as s tr at eg y has been given wide use by ma n y nonMa r xia n scholars

(e.g., A. Cohen 1974b;

Bell 1975; Keyes

1981; Light 1981) .
To consider ethnicity as strategy is to underscore the
situational, vol un ta r y nature of ethnicity,

to assert that

individuals and groups assert, mask, and alter ethnic

iden

tities in the pursuit of economic and political goals.*
Individuals manipulate identities and seek to restrict the
range of identities available to others

(Lyman and Douglass
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1973); while groups mobilize along ethnic lines in order to
demand greater

inclusion into social institutions,

or maintain the exclusion of other groups,
for survival as a group.
reaching:

The

to seek

or to struggle

implications of this are far-

the notion of ethni cit y as strategy suggests that

ethnic identities will ult ima tel y not be retained across
generations
(Barth 1969,

if they fail to provide material advantages
p.

1975, p. 199).

25; Glazer and Moynihan 1975, p. 9; Despres
In other words,

nic persistence and change

we can begin to explain et h 

in terms of strategic utility in

intergroup competition. As Keyes

(1981,

pp. 14-16)

observes,

individuals continually reassess social

identities

in light

of past social action and changing social contexts;
ties are shed,

reformulated,

identi

or retained and the process

begins an e w. 10
How do ethnic identities serve as strategies?
individual level,

On an

the cultural markers which comprise group

boundaries can be displayed or masked according to the per
ceived exigencies of the situation.
sized or altered,

descent asserted or kept hidden,

employed or discarded.
(e.g., nation,

Surnames can be empha
language

Individuals m ay also vary the level

group, sub-group) at which they express their

identity, ch oosing the identity which they believe will be
most advantageous
73).

(Bell 1975,

pp. 158-59; Light 1981, p.

Group mobilization and ethnic assertion can be em

ployed to make political demands

(e.g.,

"language rights,"
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increased representation),
(Light 1972),
ture

to create economic monopolies

or to establish an institutional

infrastruc

(Breton 1964) and informal social networks

al. 1976,

pp.

392-93).

(Yancey et

What is important in each instance

is that ethnic boundaries are manipulated in order to obtain
advantages in political and economic competition with other
groups.
Despite the attractiveness of a strategic concept ua li
zation of ethnicity,

we must recognize that at this juncture

the notion of ethnicity as strategy remains problematic.
First,

there are

limits to the abili ty to manipulate e th ni c

boundaries due to the fact that ethnic identities must be
negotiated

(i.e., accepted by both outsiders and other m e m 

bers of one's own group) and the cultural markers which
comprise group boundaries are not necessarily easily a d op ted
or shed

(Horowitz 1985,

p. 66).

In instances

of unequal

power and the domination of one group by another, se l f
definition may even become se condary

(De Vos 1975, p. 30)

identities may even by forcibly altered
1979, pp.

or

(cf. Mag ubane's—

55-70— description of the deliberate transfor

mation of native
South Africa).

identities by the European colonizers
Secondly,

in

to consider ethni cit y as an

isolated strategy at one point in time reduces ethnic groups
to interest groups and begs the larger issue of the e m e r 
gence and evolution of ethnic identities.

The simple a s s e r 

tion that identities persist or disappear in accordance with
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their strategic eff icacy becomes teleological unless it is
grounded

in larger social dynamics.

as personal strategy

To consider ethnicity

(e.g., Patterson 1975; Banton 1983)

is

unjustified reductionism which downplays group dynamics.
Accordingly,

while we

find the notion of ethnicity as

strategy to be useful,

our fuller exposition must include

issues of power and domination and attempt to explain the
evolution of ethnic

identities

in the larger socio-histori-

cal context of social and economic development.
Ethnicity and Race;

A Conceptual Comment

In our consideration of conceptual

issues of ethnicity,

it is necessary to discuss bri efl y the related concept of
race.

We will argue that race is a confusing notion best

omitted from the lexicon of the social sciences.
scientific standpoint,

race has little utility;

sents an arbitrary system of classification

From a
it rep re

(e.g., Cauc a

soid, Mongoloid, Negroid) based on phenotypical differences.
Underlying the notion of race was the fallacious belief that
humans could be divided
based upon the assumed

into separate species or subspecies
intergenerational transmission of

complexes of traits--and that these differences could be
employed to "explain” a vast a r r a y of human d if fer en ces .11
Current scientific theory,

on the other hand, holds that all

humans belong to the same species and share the same orig i
nal ancestry,

exhibiting only minor variations due to iso

lation and adaptation

(Montagu 1974).

Nevertheless,

these
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pseudoscientific explanations have exerted a d i s p ro p or 
ti o n a t e — and,

one might add, tragic--influence on human,

affairs.
Sociologically speaking,

we can describe race as a folk

concept or social "myth” (Redfield 1958, p. 67; Montagu
1974, p. 3) which is employed soc ially to distinguish
between human groups
to emphasize
origins.

(i.e.,

to mark ethnic boundaries)

and

intergroup differences by inferring separate

The social and arbitrary nature of this c at e g o r i 

zation is reflected in the varying treatments accorded p e r 
sons of "mixed" ancestry
in the United States,

(e.g., Black/White persons as Black

as a separate gr ou p- -Co lo red — in South

Africa, and distributed along a co nti nu um in Br a z i l — Harris
1964),

the legal definitions of racial membership (e.g.,

Phipps case in Louisiana,
South Africa),
an individual

Racial Classification Boards

in

and the legislative alteration of the race of
(Henriques 1953, pp.

gorization has its origins
diverse groups

the

49-50).12

"Racial" c a t e 

in interethnic contact between

(usually due to long distance migration)

a desire to "explain"

intergroup physical,

technological differences.

cultural,

and

and

A seemingly inevitable corollary

of this process was the deliberate creation of racist ideol
ogies

(i.e.,

of "superior" vs.

"inferior" human types)

legitimate the brutality of conquest,
enslavement

(Montagu 1974,

p. 39).

to

colonization, and

Indeed, as Hannah Arendt
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has observed

(1973, pp.

183-84; cite d in Montagu 1974, p.

31) :
It is hi g h l y probable that the thinking in terms
of race would have disappeared in due time t o 
gether wi t h other irresponsible opinions of the
nineteenth century, if the "scramble for Africa,"
and the new era of imperialism had not exposed
Western humanity to new and shocking experiences.
Imperialism would have necessitated the invention
of racism as the "explanation" and excuse for its
deeds even if no race-thinking had ever existed in
the civilized world.
Thus,

from a social scientific standpoint,

studied as an

ideology of domination,

relations of dispossession

race

is properly

as the reification of

(Chang 1985).

In our view, what remains problematic is that despite
its recognized scientific shortcomings,
used by social scientists

(e.g., the

cles and monographs containing "race"

race is still wi de ly

large number of art i
in the title; the use

of race to describe fields of st u dy — ethnic a nd racial
studies; race relations).

Those who distinguish

"racial"

groups from ethnic groups assume that race engenders unique
emotions and serves as a pa rt icularly visible and
marker of gr o up identity,

immutable

thereby producing qualitatively

different intergroup relations.

If we transcend the e x p e r i 

ences of former slaves in the Americas and the European
colonization >of Africa,

which seemingly provide the bulk of

the data for the sociological study of "race relations," we
find that neither of the above assumptions is valid.

Dif 

ferences of color have not always been stigmatized, there
exist instances of race-like divisions which do not rely
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upon skin color

(e.g., Tutsi vs. Hutu in Burundi),

and the

a bi lit y of individuals to "pass" as members of another race
belies any unique reliability of race as an incontrovertible
marker of group membership
1983,

p. 27).

(Horowitz 1985, pp. 42-43;

Banton

Even the perspective that race is a "special

case of ethnicity"

(e.g., van den Berghe 1983, p.

group boundaries are more rigid

222) where

is flawed in that a n y dis 

tinction is not qualitative but at best a matter of degree.
Skin color is simply one means of m a rk in g ethnic boundaries;
"race"

is a supporting ideology.

Inasmuch as we believe

that the notion of race has limited analytical ut i l i t y and
that its use perpetuates

its pseudoscientific standing, we

will henceforth subsume race under the aegis of ethnicity.
Ethnicity as a Dependent Variable
Thus far, we have conceptualized ethnicity as a com
munally based group identity which varies

in conjunction

with its strategic utility in intergroup material c o m p e t i 
tion.

We emphasized the point that ethnic ity is a v a r i a b l e .

that it persists,

evolves,

intergroup i nte ra cti on .

or disappears as a consequence of

While ex plication of the causes of

this variation will be pursued in following chapters,

we

believe that it is useful to expand our conceptual d i s c u s 
sion to include dimensions of ethnicity as a dependent
variable;

that is, how ethnicity and ethnic relations are

outcomes of intergroup competition.

In this respect,

will highlight conceptual aspects of two interrelated

we
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issues:

changing individual and group identities and

changes

in the structure of intergroup relations.

Changing identities:

assimilation and di s s i m i l a t i o n .

Within the field of ethnic relations,

the analysis of the

persistence or evolution of individual and group identities
is generally phrased

in terms of assimilation and d i s si m il a

tion

In a general sense,

(Yinger 1981).

cribes a process of boundary reduction,

assimilation d e s 
the whole or partial

absorption of one gr ou p into another or the merger of two or
more groups

into a more

inclusive identity.

sociological perspectives on assimilation
Srole 1945; Park 1950),

Traditional

{e.g., Warner and

based upon the experience of E u r o 

pean immigrants to the United States and the "Angloconformity" Ideology of the dominant group,
unilinear process wh i c h would lead to the
absorption of ethnic minorities

viewed it as a

inevitable

into the dominant gr o u p and

the subsequent loss of the distinctive cultural markers
which defined the g ro u p and its boundary.
however,

More recently,

with the proliferation of comparative studies and

the so-called "resurgence" of ethnicity in the United
States,

sociologists have come to recognize that the ethnic

experience

in the United States constituted a unique histo r

ical moment and that assimilation is a multidimensional
process which is neither
Gordon

inevitable nor irreversible.13

(1964) has demonstrated that assimilation ma y occur

at varying paces in different spheres of social life

(e.g.,

cultural vs. structural assimilation).

Others

(e.g.,

Banton 1981; Yinger 1981) have observed that assimilation
need not be total,

that it m a y be reversible, and that it

may involve changes

in the Identities of both groups.

Furthermore, assimilation m a y vary among members of a group,
as different material and political interests produce
different ethnic "strategies."

What is clear is that

assimilation as absorption is a complex phe nomenon shaped by
such factors as the time and nature of intergroup contact,
differential levels of power,
of intermarriage,
groups

the generational progression

and the competing goals

of different

(Scherraerhorn 1970; B an to n 1981).

In addition to the notion of ab sorption and "loss of
identity," assimilation has a l s o been u s e d to describe a
second process of boundary reduction,

the

temporary or

permanent amalgamation or fusion of seve ral groups

into a

larger, more inclusive identity (Horowitz 1985, p.

65; Sarna

1978).

Here,

intergroup competition has

expanding the "scope of identity"

the effect of

(Light 1981, p. 73), as

previously separate groups bl en d their boundaries by
employing more inclusive criteria (cf. C o s e r — 195 6— on
conflict functioning to reduce
example,

intragroup conflict).

For

ethnic competition a n d out-group hostility in the

United States encouraged Neapolitans, Sicilians,

a n d other

regional groups to vi e w themselves as Italian-Am eri ca ns
(Hannerz 1974), much as it facilitated t h e

formation of such
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"pan-ethnic" groups as As ia n- Am er ic a ns , Native Americans,
and Hispanic Americans

(Trottier 1981).

Such unification

often reflects an awareness of the strategic disadvantages
of relatively small,

fragmented groupings

socio-political arena.

Indeed,

in an expanding

some writers

(e.g., Hannan

1979; van den Berghe 1983) maintain that the organizational
requirements of modern societies produce more

inclusive

ethnic groupings.
The other side of the coin of changing ethnic identi 
ties

is dissimilation or differentiation.

We can describe

dissimilation as the maintenance or strengthening of ethnic
boundaries or the creation of new, more exclusive boundaries
(cf. Yinger 1981, p. 257).

Ethnic groups can persist d e s 

pite strong assimilative pressures and increasing cultural
convergence

(e.g., Pranco-Americans

-Doane unpublished,

pp.

in Northern New England-

46-79) and can even experience

ethnic "revivals"— the increased assertion of group distinctiveness-under certain conditions

(cf. Kh le if 's — 1978b—

description of the post-1945 revival of Welsh identity;
other examples would be Quebecois
Spain, and Sikhs in India).
towards more

in Canada,

Basques in

While the general trend ma y be

inclusive identities,

groups ma y still be

divided into more exclusive su bg r ou ps — Muslim solidarity
created Pakistan, subsequent Bengali dissimilation in East
Pakistan led to the secession of Bangladesh.

Indeed,

neither dissimilation nor assimilation are unilinear

46
processes;

groups may experience cycles of unification and

differentiation

(cf. Nag ata's— 1 9 8 1 — enlightening d e s c r i p 

tion of the expansion and contraction of Mal ay ethnic
b o u n d a r i e s ).
The structure of
fic ati on.

intergroup relations:

ethnic s t r a t i 

The structure of intergroup relations describes

issues of group access to economic resources and political
power; that

is, of systems of ethnic s t ra ti fi c at io n.

view, the structure of

intergroup relations

vening variable in the evolution of ethnic

In our

is a key int er
identities.

Individuals and groups reassess and reformulate identities
and goals

in light of group location in the ethnic structure

of society.

Group position conditions both available a l t e r 

natives and the probability of success of given strategies.
At the same time, group location

is constantly changing as a

result of the collective actions of group members,
sponses of other groups,

and changes in the

system (e.g., colonization,
graphic changes).
clude:
dancy,

immigration,

Types of changes

increased egalitarianism,

the r e 

larger social

economic and d e m o 

in group location

in

subordinate group a s c e n 

increased dominant group power, and rearrangement of

the subordinate hierarchy (i.e.,
group relative to others).
dynamic process:

gains for one minority

What we are describing is a

gr oup position shapes identities and

action wh ich in turn affect group position;

identities and
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goals are reassessed

in light of changes and the process

c on t i n u e s .
Systems of ethnic stratification can be depicted
variety of ways.

Conceptually,

such systems can be viewed

as distributed along a continuum between two
(1) a hierarchical,

in a

ideal t y p e s :

Mcaste-like" ordering of all groups

(i.e., all members of group A rank above gr ou p B, w h i c h

in

turn ranks above group C, etc.); and (2) a n unranked system
in which all groups are proportionately distributed across
all levels of society.
typical

Clearly,

neither of these ideal

forms reflect empirical reality.

exist between these polar opposites;
regard to degree of inequality,
society exhibits
p. 24) or

that

Instead,

societies

is, they v a r y with

and each gr oup within the

its own "status pyramid"

internal str a ti fi ca ti on .3''4

(Horowitz 1985,

Moreover, we mu st

emphasize the dynamic nature of such structures; syst ems of
ethnic stratification are constantly cha ng ing--becoming more
or less equal,
groups

or rearranging the relative position of

(cf. Light 1981)--as a result of intergroup c o m p e t i 

tion .
While we believe that the notion of the structure of
intergroup relations constitutes an excellent conceptual
basis for describing outcomes of ethnic interaction in
specific historical circumstances, two additional comments
are necessary.

First, we reject the position,

quently in the literature

(e.g.,

found f r e 

Horowitz 1985, pp.

22-
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36), that societies can be classified ca tegorically as
either stratified or plural, ranked or unranked.
society varies in terms of degree

of ethnic stratification;

however, as long as ethnicity is a factor
access to resources,

Each

in determining

a society is not unranked

(cf. Vallee,

Schwartz and Darknell 1957; Lenski and Lenski 1982, p.

330).

To insist that the internal stratification of groups--the
existence of an elite within each group (Horowitz 1985,

p.

25) --constitutes an unranked sy st em is to remove ethnic
stratification from consideration as a factor in human
affairs.

The internal stratification of groups does not

preclude the existence of stratification between groups
(e.g., the existence of some Black members of the capitalist
class would not make the United States an ethnically "unranked" s o c i e t y ) .

Indeed, as we shall see in subsequent

chapters, a min ority elite may often play a key role in the
maintenance of systems of ethnic stratification.
A second observation pertaining to our position is that
any attempt to depict a system of ethnic stratification is
an extremely general characterization of ve ry complex r e l a 
tionships.

To describe ethnic stratification at the s o c i 

etal level is to smooth over regional variations
Croatians
slavia)

(e.g.,

in Croatia vs. Croatians in other parts of Y u g o 

which can be vital in determining social action.

Moreover,

social stratification

phenomenon.

is in itself a complex

As we will note later

in this chapter,

social
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class constitutes a matrix of relationships,

it is not

m er ely described by economic position or any other univari
ate measure

(Poulantzas 1975).

Accordingly,

the relationship between ethnicity and class

the totality of
(i.e.,

systems

of ethnic stratification)

transcends an y simple character

ization

pp.

(cf. Marger 1985,

42-43).

Nationality
As a focus of study,

nationality poses perhaps even

more of a dilemma than ethnicity.
agree with Tilly (1975, p.

Indeed,

it is easy to

6), that nation is "one of the

most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexi
con."

For some social scientists

(e.g., De Vos 1975, p. 11;

Newman 1973; Said and Simmons 1975),
as identical with ethnicity,
the same phenomenon.

nationality is viewed

as another means of describing

In contrast,

a second perspective

defines nationality as si mp ly a c a t e g o r y — citizenship within
a particular political s t a t e — with little or no social c on
tent.

From this vantage point, Obidinski

(1978,

pp.

215-

16), after properly criticizing the tendency of many social
scientists to equate ethnicity with nationality,

continues

on to describe nationality as having attribute qualities--a
formally designated "either-or" classification.

Both pe r

spectives effectively eliminate consideration of nationality
as a key social process, with the result that it has been
underutilized by sociologists.
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In our opinion, the conceptual ambiguity involving
nationality is rooted in an academic division of labor whic h
has tended to discourage sociologists
state as a uni t of analys is

from us i ng the n a t i o n 

(cf. M i l l s ' — 1 9 5 9 — critique of

sociology for a lack of societal vision) and has prevented
proper specification of the link between ethni cit y and
nationality.

Such a shortcoming is all the mo r e puzzling

inasmuch as the basic n ot io n of nat ion ali ty --a n ethnic-like
identity linked to political a u t on om y (i.e.,
was presented by Weber

(1946, pp.

state p o w e r )--

1 7 1 - 7 9 ) . In any event,

the limitations of contemporary approaches are clear.
one hand,
identical,

if national a n d ethnic groupings are viewed as
t h e n virtually all ex is t in g geo-political e n t i 

ties are not nations but multi-national states
p.

320).

(Connor 1972,

The effect of this position would be to define

nation (or the ethnic group) out of existence.
hand,

On

the

On the other

if nationality is equated wi t h citizenship,

then the

richness of group identification is lost or diminished.
What

is needed,

nationality,

therefore,

is a n ew conceptualization of

one which considers the underlying similarity

of ethnicity and nationality while at the same time r e t a i n 
ing a distinction (and specifying the linkage)

between the

two identities.
In contrast to the above approaches, we propose a s o m e 
what unique formulation of nationality as a g r o u p a ff ili a
tion, a communal

identity linked to asserted political an d
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territorial autonomy

(i.e., to state p o w e r ) . 1"

A nation,

then, becomes a politically autonomous social group sharing
the same nationality

(cf. Finer 1975, p.

is akin to ethnicity in that it, too,

88).

Nationality

is grounded

in pre

sumed common origin and a sense of shared historical experi
ence and joint destiny.
nationality,

Given the more

inclusive nature of

the putative aspect of c om mo n origins and

experience comes to the fore.

Indeed,

one of the tasks of

nation-building has been to create national "myths"--a
history of the past capable of promoting solidarity in the
present

(Worsley 1984,

ethnicity,

pp. 273-75; Khleif 1985).17

Like

nationality also relies upon cultural markers to

define group boundaries and upon cultural symbols and
rituals to promote group solidarity.
168)

has observed,

As Gellner

(1964, p.

"nationalism is not the awakening of

nations to self-consciousness:

it invents nations where

they do not exist— but it does need some pre-existing
differentiating marks to work on."
sense,

In this most basic

nationality and ethnicity are similar.

Yet ethnicity and nationality are not the same.

The

difference is that nationality is linked to geo-political
autonomy,

to state power

(yet, as Connor--1978,

p.

3 79—

reminds us, the na ti on — a social gr ou pin g— is not the same
as the state-~a political r el a t i o n s h i p ) .

While ethnicity is

expressed within a socio-political system

(i.e., a na ti on

state),

nationality constitutes a political claim vis-a-vis
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other such entities in an interstate system.
tion is crucial,
added)

for as Abner C o h e n

(1974b,

This d i s t i n c 
p. xi, emphasis

observed in dis ti nguishing between ethnic ity and

nationality:
The term ethnicity will be of little use if it is
extended to denote cultural differences between
isolated societies, autonomous regions, or inde
pendent stocks of populations such as nations
within their own national boundaries.
The differ
ences between the Chinese a n d the Indians, con
sidered within their own respective countries,
are national not ethnic differences.
Thus, we view nationality as an ethnic-like
more inclusive level,

as a special

attached to the state

(cf. Wors ley 1984, p.

identity on a

form of ethnicity
247).

more than a formal category such as citizenship;
internalized identity which,
intergroup material
Nationality;

like ethnicity,

It is
it is an

is employed

in

Interaction.

A Modern.Phenomenon

If we are to understand fu l ly the significance of
nationality in the modern vorld-system, then we must realize
that it is a modern phenomenon,

on e which is linked to

global capitalist development and which fully emerged in the
post-1800 era
1969,

pp.

(cf. Ehrenreich 1983,

145-46;

previous loyalties

W or sle y 1984,

pp.

(e.g., religion,

even absolute monarchs),

p. 9; Rejai and En lo e
252-53).
estate,

Unlike
feudal lords,

modern nationality is a political

identity (Weber 1946, p. 172) grounde d in ma s s allegiance to
the idea of the na ti on — a people sharing a co mm on heritage,
interests, and d e s t i n y — with the belief that ultimate
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sovereignty resides in the people as a whole
Declaration of Independence;
of Man and Citizen).
(and nationality)

the Declaration of the Rights

In W es ter n Europe,

the rise of nations

was concurrent with the emergence of c a p i 

talism and the capitalist state.
social system,

(cf. the

If it was to prosper as a

capitalism required a political structure

capable of social and economic integration (e.g., public
education,

common language,

common standards),

a potential

which was made possible by urbanization and the Improvements
in transportation and communication which were concomitants
of capitalist development.
legitimation)

The political

"cement"

(i.e.,

for this process was provided by the ideology

of nationalism demanding loyalty to a nation-state in which
(according to the tenets of bourgeois liberalism)

the people

were sovereign— although some would be more sovereign than
others.
149),

Such loyalty was not "natural"

(Gellner 1964, p.

but was often created through coercive homogenization

or "nation-building";
on ethnic minorities
Nevertheless,

that

is, cultural conformity imposed

(Khleif 1978b; Ti ll y 1975, p.

nationalist

ideology--the

s el f- det er min ati on — spread rapidly,
Revolution,

43).

"right" of national

fueled by the French

the Napoleonic Wars, and late nineteenth century

Eur opean global domination.
In this context,

the issue of how nationalism emerged

in different historical circumstances becomes important.
According to the

"nation-building" school

(e.g., Deutsch

1953;

Deutsch and Foltz 1963), all nations would evolve

along the same path as modernization led to increasing
social and political mobilization and the development of
supraethnic "na ti on al ” identities.

Yet even a cursory

examination of twentieth century hist ory is enough to assure
us that this "nation-building" did not universally come to
pass

(cf. Connor 1972; Horowitz 1985,

failure of the nation-building school,

pp.

566-68).

The

like the failure of

the developmentalist/modernization school

in sociology,

is

grounded in mistake n generalization from the experience of
Western societies.

Nation-building ma y describe the slow

evolution of nations
ment)

(concurrent with capitalist d ev elo p

in core societies;

however,

it is much less applicable

to the periphery in that the very existence of the core
changes the international context

(Tilly 1975, p.

81), not

to mention the effects of colonialism and uneven development
(Amin 1980).

Na ti on al ity assumes different forms

in

different historical circumstances.
What begins to emerge
ent types of nationalism.
core,

is a picture of two v e r y differ
In the developed nations of the

we find that some sense of national

identity generally

preceded the emergence of a state structure, while

in the

periphery the existence of a politically independent state
generally preceded any meaningful national integration and
solidarity.

Thus,

following Rejai and Bnloe

(1969, p. 140),

on one hand we have "nation-states;" on the other hand,
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"s ta te-nations."x *

This distinction

is crucial,

for it

foreshadows differences between nations in degree of
national

integration

(and ethnic conflict)

and it begins to

explain the subsequent "fragility" of peripheral societies.
Amin

(1980, p. 20),

in drawing a parallel distinction

between more complete
societies,

(core) and less complete

(peripheral)

reminds us that this division is inexorably

linked to the uneven development of the capitalist worldeconomy (i.e., to core-periphery relations).
explore the fuller

We will

implications of this issue in subsequent

chapters.
Na ti ona li ty and Nations:__ Homogeneity vs.

Heterogeneity

A major source of confusion in the study of nationalism
is the issue of homogeneity,
(e.g., A.

Smith 1981;

the insistence by many writers

Connor 1978; van den Berghe 1983) that

"nations" must exhibit substantial ethnic and cultural h o m o 
geneity.

Connor

(1972, p. 320) correctly observes that few

contemporary states can be described as ethnically h om o g e n e 
ous

(i.e.,

one group accounting for more than 90% of the

pop ul ati on — e.g., Germany, Japan);

however,

this fact often

leads analysts to the position that "nation-state
misnomer"

(A. Smith 1981, p.

multi-nations.

is a

10), that existing states are

We believe that this misses the point:

nation need not be a monolithic entity,
considerable ethnic va ri ati on .x*

a

it may subsume

As we noted earlier,

ethnicity and nationality exist as levels within levels

(cf.

56
K ey es' — 1976— n ot io n of "nested segments") and are employed
in relation to specific others.
asserted

Ethnic

identities are

in opposition to other ethnic identities within a

nation-state;

national identities are employed vis-a-vis

other nations in an interstate system.

Thus, a na ti on may

contain considerable ethnic het erogeneity and confli ct as
long as it possesses some measure of similarity and s o l i 
darity in its dealings with other n a t i o n s — a matter of
within-group vs. between-group va ria nc e.30
ing Khlei f

(1978a)

and Park and Burgess

Indeed,

follow

(1921, p. 665), we

believe that most nations in the contemporary world can be
viewed as coalitions of compe tin g ethnic groups whose
balance

is continually subject to change.

This

internal heterogeneity of nations has an

implication.

If a national

identity is negotiated or

posed through intergroup interaction,

im

th en we must take into

consideration issues of power and domination.
ethnic groups

important

Hegemonic

(i.e., a Staat svo lk — Glazer and Moy ni han 1975,

p. 4) and classes control the means of cultural reproduction
(e.g., schools, media) and m a y construct or shape the
national

identity in their own image and

interest

(e.g., the

confluence of "American" national

identity with the dominant

Anglo-American ethnic identity).

Nationality, then,

may

largely reflect the culture of dominant ethnic groups.
Consequently, as Weber

(1946,

pp. 172-74)

noted,

and g r o u p attachments to a nation may vary,

individual

generally being
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strongest in more powerful groups and weaker
ferent or even opposed)
nicity,

(i.e.,

in less powerful groups.

indif

Like e t h 

nationality is a variable 1

To illustrate the heterogeneous nature of nationality,
let us briefly consider a question which has prompted much
debate:

Is there an "American” national

answer to this question is that there
can" national

identity.

of a common past

identity?23-

Our

i_g. indeed an "Ameri

"Americans" possess a shared sense

(more recent arrivals seemingly adopt the

past) and joint destiny;
(vis-a-vis Iranians,

identify themselves as "Americans"

Soviets,

or other nationalities);

and

employ cultural symbols and rituals to define the group
boundary and maintain solidarity.
the process of assimilation
nor inevitable)
identity.

For

immigrants,

(which is neither

part of

irreversible

involves assuming an American national

For example,

a Cambodian migrating to the United

States would at first (in terms of orientation)
bodian residing in the United States;

however,

be a C a m 
over time

(the duration of which is determined by a variety of fac
tors) we might expect adoption of "American" nationality,
with Cambodian

(or Asian-American)

becoming an ethnic

identity asserted

in competition with other "American"

ethnic gr ou ps .22

At the same time,

"American" national

identity exhibits considerable variation, due to both the
continuous

influx of immigrants and the reaction of other

groups to the attempts of the dominant Anglo-Americans
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(joined, after I960,

by some

"White Ethnics")

to define

"American" national

identity in their own image.**

Ethno-Nationalism:

Ethnicity or Na tio na lit y?

Whil e we believe that the di stinction specified above
resolves much of the conceptual confusion surrounding et hn i
city and nationality,

it remains problematic in that there

is no cle ar line of demarcation separating et hn ici ty and
nationality.

Individual ethnic groups within a nation-state

can aspire to separate nationhood,

an event which has hap

pened so often as to appear commonplace
era (e.g.,
Corsica,
Tamils

Quebec,

Biafra,

Basque Provinces,

Katanga, Eritrea,

in the post-1945

Wales, Brittany,

Sikhs in the Punjab,

in Sri Lanka--to name a few).

Although the existence

of these would-be nations seemingly represents an anomaly in
our conceptual schema, we believe that this phenomenon can
be accounted for.

Ethnicity and nationality are not rigid,

mutually exclusive

identities but dynamic affiliations

capable of movement along a continuum of inclusiveness.24
National

identities are socially constructed and m ay

experience moments of waxing and waning--cycles of national
so li darity— in response to specific circumstances.
speaking,

Strictly

these separatist movements are neither ethnic

groups nor nations,

but con tradictory social groups which

contain elements of both forms
become one or the other).

(and will probably eventually

Consequently,

although many

observers use the word "nation" to describe these social
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groupings,

we will reserve the word nation for politically

autonomous entities

(cf. W or sl ey 1984,

p. 252) and denote as

"ethno-nat ional11 those movements for national a ut on om y on
the part of ethnic groupings within existing n a t i o n 
states .29
Also problematic is the treatment of ethno-national
movements in the study of ethnicity and nationality.
some

(e.g.,

Said and Simmons 1975; Connor 1972; A.

For

Smith

1981), ethno-nationalism represents the decline of nation
states amid competing loyalties and the proliferation of
nationalist movements.
situation;

We believe that this overstates the

that ethno-nationalism is better understood as a

response of ethnic groupings

(some wit h memories of past

autonomy or "failed" nationhood)
nation by other groups

to such phenomena as domi

(perceived "second-class" status and

feared loss of autonomy) and the increasing emphasis on
national self-determination amidst the break-up of colonial
empires.

While some ethno-national movements ma y succeed in

establishing separate nations
only recent example)

(although Bangladesh

is the

and others may persist or periodically

resurface for generations,

they must overcome substantial

obstacles such as state resistance and lack of external
support for altering the interstate s y s te m. 2"

Moreover,

ethno-national groups may not possess unanimity of purpose;
some may be willing to accept improved social,

political,

and economic po sition within existing states rather than
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undergo a protracted struggle for national liberation
the divisions among French-Canadians

in Quebec).

{e.g.,

While

ethno-nationalism will r ema in a significant social force for
the foreseeable future, we suspect that many ethno-national
movements wil l eventually become movements of ethnic a s s e r 
tion within existing states, with national aspirations held
in reserve in the event of "intolerable" conditions at some
future time.

class
The final conceptual
chapter is class.

in this

For our approach to the study of e t h n i 

city and nationality,
as

topic to be considered

class

is an important concept

inasmuch

it describes human relations in the production of m a t e r 

ial life, a process which in turn conditions social e x i s 
tence.

Analytically,

the changing conditions of the p r o d u c 

tion of ma ter ial life constitute the basic context

in which

social re lations

occur.

(e.g.,

ethnicity and nationality)

Moreover, we adopt the perspective that class struggle is a
basic motor force of history;
tween conflicting groups

that is, that the tension b e 

in the production of material

is a fundamental social change dynamic.

life

Thus, any attempt

to understand the evolution of ethnicity and na tionality
must be linked to issues of class.
While a detailed exposition of issues of class

is

beyond the scop e of this endeavor, we believe that some
consideration

is necessary in light of the varying

(and,

in
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our view,

often misleading) uses of class by mainstream

social scientists.

We refer here to the attempts to create

social order by defining class out of existence;

that is,

removing class from the realm of social action by reducing
it to an attribute of individuals
Prom this perspective,
of social relations,

(cf. Page 1969, p. 128).

class becomes part of a seamless veb

but one

(and declining in influence)

of

many possible bases for ad hoc group formation and social
action (Bell 1975).

As a result of this ideological po s i 

tion and the

"abstracted empiricism"

is prevalent

in American sociology,

operationalized as occupation,
style"

(cf. Mills 1959) which
class is too often

income,

prestige,

or "life

(none of which measure class I) and turned into a

smoothly graded "status hierarchy"

(e.g., Warner,

Ells 1949; Hollingshead and Redlich 1958;
1967; Sewell,

Haller and Portes 1969).

Meeker and

Blau and Duncan

Accordingly,

much

contemporary research which purports to treat social class
instead measures non-class economic variables which may be
loosely correlated with class

(Wright, Costello,

Hachen and

Sprague 1982).
Although long neglected by mai nstream social science,
useful basis for the study of class existed
Marx.

Unfortunately,

lation (e.g.,

a

in the work of

the incomplete nature of Marx's formu

the unfinished Chapter 52--"Classes"--in

Volume III of Capital--Marx 1981) and the existence of
mechanistic applications of Marxian class categories have
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contributed to the persisting a mb igu it y in con ce p t ua li za 
tio ns of class.

More recently,

ma n y excellent attempts have

b e e n made to construct more refined definitions of class
(e.g., Poulantzas 1973,
Perrone 1977;

1975; Anderson 1974;

Wright et al.

1982;

Wright and

Resnick and Wolff 1981);

however, a complete conceptual iza tio n remains an elusive
goal.

It is not our purpose here to attempt such a task;

Instead, we will briefly consider those issues most relevant
to our subsequent analysis.
Our ap pr o ac h to class

is es sentially Marxian;

that is,

we emphasize relations of production and distribution as the
definitional

basis of class.

Thus,

a class can be d i s t i n 

guished in general on the basis of common economic position
(i.e.,

in the production process)

cl as s is not an economic category,
ti o n to other classes.
potential ba si s

and int ere st s.27

Yet a

it exists only in rel a

Like ethnicity,

class stands as a

for gr oup formation and action,

which in

tu rn provides an orientation for individual behavior.
Al though any potential basis for group membership is p r o b 
lematic in t h a t
a ti o n s
c la ss

it may come into conflict with other af fil i

(Nielsen 1985),

we can attribute a certain primacy to

inasmuch as material

interests.

Nevertheless,

interests are fundamental human
class-based action requires a

cert ai n level of consciousness

(Marx's Klasse an s i c h —

K la sse fur s i c h dis tinction)— perhaps ranging along a
continuum (cf.

Giddens 1973, pp. 1 11 - 1 3 ) --thereby rendering
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class action a variable,

not a given.**

important issue for class analysis
which class shapes human behavior

Consequently,

an

involves the degree to
in historically specific

ci r c u ms ta nc es .
A central concern of class analysis
specific class structures.

is the nature of

Marx's general analysis of the

capitalist mode of production employed a two-class model
(bourgeoisie-proletariat); however,

the analysis of hi s t o r i 

cally specific social formations requires more complex
schema

(e.g., Anderson 1974; Wright et al.

than two classes.
divisions

classes may contain internal

(cf. Poulantzas 1973 on fractions,

social categories)
forces

Moreover,

1982) with more

(e.g.,

strata, and

which may function as effective social

intelligentsia,

tions of the bourgeoisie)

hi ghly skilled labor,

in specific circumstances.
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Thus,

we must conceptualize class structures as dynamic re la t io n
ships which vary over time and from nation-state to na t i o n 
state, as processes which reflect historical
material conditions.

forces and

Each soci ety has a unique class s t r u c 

ture which must be analyzed as such.
Finally,

the analysis of specific class structures must

ultimately be conducted on a global level.

This is not to

assert that global classes exist--although they potentially
could

(Connell 1984, pp.

430-35).

What we mean is that

given the international nature of capitalist accumulation,
and the linking of economies effected by core

imperialism.

the analysis of historically specific class structures must
include classes external to the national economic a r e n a —
e.g., U.S.

capital

in the Third World

17-21; Bonacich and Cheng 1984).

(Bonacich 1980, pp.

In addition,

external ties

may in turn transform indigenous classes or f ra cti on s— e.g.,
the emergence of a comprador bourgeoisie linked to foreign
capital

(Poulantzas 1973, p.

38).

Thus,

class relations

within nation-states must be linked to global processes.

Chapter Summary
Our purpose in this chapter has been to present an
outline of our conceptualization of ethnicity,

nationality,

and class

in the modern world-system.

This undertaking had

its roots

in what we perceived to be the shortcomings of

approaches to the study of ethnic relations which focus
upon individual groups and nation-states torn from their
social context rather than intergroup relations,
change and global dynamics.
contain several major

flaws:

In our view,

social

such formulations

they place an incorrect empha

sis upon such notions as primordiality,

culture, and race;

they confuse ethnicity and nationality;

and they constitute

an incomplete basis for explaining the evolution of group
identities.

Consequently, we found it necessary to create

our own conceptual base before we could embark upon our
exercise

in theory-building.

Towards the end of this chapter,
conceptual

issues pertaining to class.

we briefly considered
The importance of

class to our analysis lies in the fact that there exists a
critical

interface between ethnicity/nationality an d class.

Like class, ethnicity and nationality emerge as humans
mobilize

in opposition to other groups to produce and to

compete for the resources necessary for existence.

Indi

viduals and groups possess potential affiliations with
others

in the same productive circumstances

same communal order

(class)

(ethnic group or n a t i o n ) .

and the

Yet these

potential ties represent different and possibly c o n t r a d i c 
tory social realities

(e.g., ethnic gr ou ps and nations

contain internal class divisions, while classes m a y be riven
by communal ties).

Accordingly, a ke y

issue for a n y attempt

to explain the evolution of ethnic and national identities,
becomes explication of the relationship between the ethnic
or national structure and the class structure of a social
system.
As we frame this question,

however,

we must recognize

that the relationship between ethnicity/nationality and
class
ality,

is neither static nor abstract.

Ethnicity,

and class describe dynamic relationships

social processes)

nation

(i.e.,

in historically sp ec i fi c circumstances.

History describes the evolution of e t h n i c and national
identities and class relations.
another,
life and,

As hu man s interact with one

they alter conditions of the production of material
hence,

change society.

Thus,

any class-based

theory of ethnic and national identities must n ec es sar il y be

66
a theory of social change:

that

is, of changes in social

groupings effected by the changing patterns
power and access to resources.

Moreover,

of relative

if we are to

analyze the evolution of ethnic and national

identities,

then we must consider them in the context of the current
form of the production of material life--the capitalist mode
of production.
chapter,

This process will begin in the following

as we review the literature on the relationship

between ethnicity,

nationality,

capitalist development.

and class

in the context of

CHAPTER NOTES

CHAPTER II
Indeed, a review of recent literature in the field of
ethnic studies finds researchers offering substitutions
for the somewhat unwieldy "ethnic group" (e.g., e t h n e —
De Vos 1975, p. 9; e t h n y — van d en Berghe 1983, p. 222;
ethnie--*A. Smith 1981, p. 66).
The process of t e rm in o
logical evolution may yet be unfinished.
For a discussion of methodological Issues an d the
conceptualization of ethnicity, see Doane (unpublished,
pp. 88-103).
Weber's definition of ethnic group
merits quotation in its entirety:

(1968,

p.

389)

We shall call "ethnic groups" those hu m an groups
that entertain a subjective belief in their common
descent because of similarities of physical type
or of customs or both, or because of memories of
colonization and migration; this belief must be
important for the propagation of group formation;
conversely, it does not matter whether or not an
objective blood relationship exists.
Ethnic
membership (G e m e l n s a m k e l t ) differs from the
kinship group precisely by being a presumed
identity, not a group with concrete social action,
like the latter.
In our sense, ethnic membership
does not constitute a group; it only facilitates
group formation of any kind, pa rti cularly in the
political sphere.
On the other hand, it is
primarily the political community, no matter how
artificially organized, that inspires the belief
in common ethnicity.
This belief tends to persist
even after the disintegration of the political
community, unless drastic differences in the
custom, physical type, or, above all, language
exist among its members.
To assert that behavior occurs withi n a so ci al system
or society is somewhat problematic inasmuch as we agree
with Wallerstein (1974b, pp. 347-48) that the only real
(i.e., self-contained) social sy st em in conte mpo rar y
society is the world-system.
Nevertheless, it is also
true, at least from the perspective of social actors,
that political boundaries tend to provide the context
in which intergroup relations occur (Horowitz 1975, p.

121 ).
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5.

For summaries of this debate, see Isajiv (1974);
Burgess (1978); Yinger (1985).

6.

The concept of p ri m ord ial it y is generally credited to
Edward Shils (1957), alt hou gh he did not dir ectly apply
it to ethnic groups.

7.

For a discussion of methodological issues involving the
variability of ethnicity, see Plax (1972); Obidinski
(1978); T. Smith (1980); Darroch and Marston (1969).
For applications of measures to specific groups, see
Segalman (1967); Simirenko (1964); Masuda, Matsumo and
Me rid eth (1970); Sandberg (1974); Driedger (1975); and
Montero (1981).

8.

From a sociology of knowledge perspective, it would
seem that the confusion of ethnicity with culture is at
least in part attributable to the historical tendency
of sociologists and anthropologists to study indi
vidual, culturally distinctive groups.
To vi ew ethni
city as culture may seem appropriate when studying
isolated peoples or newly arrived immigrant groups;
however, it is clearly m uc h less useful in u nd er sta nd 
ing mo dern societies or third-generation immigrants.

9.

Our emphasis upon the political as well as the economic
is intentional.
Following Poulantzas (1975, pp. 6466), we seek to avoid ov erl y economistic con cep tu ali za
tions of social relations and to recognize that
political relations (i.e., relations of domination) are
an integral aspect of material life.

10.

At thi s point, it is appropriate to enter a caveat with
regard to rationality as a n explanation of human
behavior.
Individuals m a y pursue a course of action
even if it has significant economic costs (Billig
1976), while affective, "non-rational" motives
undoubtedly shape human behavior (cf. Nielsen 1985, p.
140ff.).
Furthermore, perceptions of situations may
vary a n d actions may have ’'unintended consequences."
While resolution of this issue is beyond the confines
of t h i s endeavor, for our purposes it is sufficient to
suggest that material rationality exerts a strong
influence on hu man behavior.

11.

For detailed accounts of the evolution of the concept
of race, see Banton (1977); Montagu (1964; 1974);
Gossett (1963).

12.

In the Phipps case, a Louisiana wom an in 1982 failed in
her attempt to overturn a Louisiana law which defined
as B la ck anyone with 1/32 "Negro blood."
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13.

By "so-called resurgence of ethnicity," we are suggest
ing that in many instances ethnic identity never dis 
appeared, that the "resurgence" of ethnicity was the
rediscovery and glorification of diver sit y by a school
of American social scientists (e.g., Glazer and
Moynihan 1963; Novak 1973; Greeley 1974).
See co mmen
taries on this phenomenon by Steinberg (1981) and
Yinger (1985, pp. 152-53).

14.

Thus, as Chang (1985, p. 42) observes, ethnic s tr at i
fication becomes "a case of statistical correlation
rather than a categorical certainty."

15.

Indeed, Weber's entire discussion (1946, pp. 171-79) of
"nation" is in our opinion well wo r t h reading inasmuch
as it considers several k e y aspects of nationality:
the link to the state; th e existence of internal
heterogeneity; and varying degrees of national solidarity.

16.

Nationality was used w i t h this meaning both in the
drafting of the U.S. Constitution and in its more
recent interpretations ( c f . Norton 1952).

17.

This can even be applied to the subsequent incorpora
tion of immigrant groups into a national identity.
See
Steinberg (1981, p. 86) for a description of attempts
by ethnic "insiders" to link newcomers to national
experiences by intertwining the h is tor y of the group
with that of the host nation.

18.

Similar formulations have been suggested by other
writers (e.g., Francis— 1976, p. 3 8 7 — demotic vs.
ethnic nations; A. Smith--1981, p. 1 8 — territorial vs.
ethnic nationalism); however, we prefer the political
(as opposed to cultural) emphasis of Rejai and Enloe
(1969).

19.

For example, Dutch-speaking Flemings in Belgium think
of themselves as Belgian— as opposed to Nederlandic or
Dutch--in nationality.
The existence of ethnic d i v i 
sions (e.g., Fleming vs. Walloon) in Belgium does not,
in our view, make Belgian any less a national identity.

20.

As many writers have not ed (e.g., Weber, Simmel,
Coser), external conflict (in this case, war with
another nation) can lead to increased internal
solidarity (in this case, reduced ethnic conflict and
increased national solidarity).

21.

For example, Connor (1978, p. 381) maintains that
Americans are not a nation, while Amin (1980, p. 129)
asserts that they are.
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22.

Thus, a national identity in one setting (e.g., Italian
in Italy) can become an ethnic identity in another
setting (e.g., the United States) and could even be
reactivated upon return to the original context.

23.

Many members of the dominant Anglo -Am er ica n (i.e.,
WASP) group simply identify themselves as "American"
(cf. T. Smith 1980) .

24.

This continuum of inclusiveness need not sto p at state
boundaries but can also encompass supranational iden
tities (e.g., Pan-Slavism, P a n - A r a b i s m ) . While the
history of pan-nationalism to d a t e is a h i st or y of
failed attempts (see the excellent summary provided by
Snyder— 1984), it is conceivable that changing st ruct
ural conditions could facilitate some form of supra
national political organization at some future time.

25.

In this sense, then, we follow the French sociologist
Alain Touraine (1981) in assert in g that sociologically
speaking there is no such thing as society as an
entity, only social movements 1

26.

For a discussion of the factors shaping the outcome of
separatist movements, see H or ow it z (1985, pp. 265-81).

27.

In this respect, we find ourselves generally in agree
ment with Poulantzas (1973, p. 27, emphasis in the
original) who asserts that cl a sse s are "defined principallv but not exclusively by t h e i r place in the pr odu c
tion process;" that ideological and political factors
are also significant.

28.

The development of class consciousness w it hi n the core
working class has not reached th e revolutionary level
anticipated by many Marxists (moreover, I would ques 
tion whether this or any process is a historical inevi
tab i li ty — as opposed to a historical potentiality).
Indeed, a higher de gree of class consciousness seem
ingly exists among the bourgeoisie.
This can be a t t r i 
buted to a variety of factors:
the cultural and ideo
logical reproduction of capitalism; the limitation of
the relative deprivation or impoverishment of the core
working classes due to their privileged pos ition vis-avis other working classes in the world-economy; reform
(vs. revolution) resulting from non-revolutionary class
struggle (i.e., conflict not oriented towards overturn
ing the system); and the at ti m es confounding influence
of ethnic and national ties (Ehrenreich 1983; Amin
1980, pp. 28-30).

CHAPTER III

ETHNICITY/ NATIONALITY,

AND CLASS:

EXISTING THEORIES

At the conclusion of the preceding chapter, we posited
a fundamental
of material

interrelationship— grounded in the production

life— between ethnicity/nationality and class.

This led us to assert that a complete understanding of
ethnicity and nationality requires that they be considered
with respe ct to class;

that is, that a complete theory of

ethnicity and nationality must be a class-based theory.

In

this chapter, we will review existing theories of the r e l a 
tionship between ethnicity/nationality and class.

Such a

review should serve as a useful preliminary to presentation
of our own model,

thus enabling us to highlight key issues

as well as to benefit from the corpus of existing works on
ethnicity,

nationality,

and class.

In our consideration of existing formulations,

we

adopt the position that all theories of ethnicity and
nationality either explicitly or implicitly contain a theory
of social change and assumptions regarding the relationship
of ethnicity,

nationality,

and class.

ffhat we mean by this

is that e v e r y attempt to understand ethnic-like phenomena
has sought to explain the emergence,

persistence,

or d i s 

appearance of ethnicity and nationality in the context of
the changes wrought by industrialization,
urbanization, and bu rea ucratization.1
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modernization,

Moreover,

each
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approach considers ethnicity/nationality in relation to
class, whether as an epiphenomenon of class or as a co m 
peting or even more basic source of group affiliation.
Consequently,

issues of social change and of class will

serve as a focus for our evaluation of past and present
theories of ethnicity and nationality.
Our review of theories of ethnicity and nationality
will necessarily be critical,

for in many respects the study

of ethnicity and nationality constitutes one of the weak
areas of social science.

From classical theorists who

viewed ethnicity as a remnant of primitive society to modern
observers who have chronicled the ethnic "revival," social
scientists have been unable to explain in a satisfactory
manner why ethnic identities emerge,
disappear.

persist,

change,

or

One cause of this problem has been a tendency to

view social change as technological change or "moderniza
ti on ” rather than as an integrated process grounded
dynamics of global capitalist development.

in the

In addition,

theorizing has been limited by the ethnocentrism of Western
social science

(i.e., a tendency to generalize from the

experiences of Europe and the United St ate s— cf. Amin 1980,
p. 12); by ideology (the incompatibility of ethnicity with
Western liberal thought); and by methodo log y
of labor

(the division

in the social sciences; the sociological emphasis

on community studies).
throughout the chapter.

These themes will be developed

73
This chapter will be organized in a manner consonant
with our purpose,

which is a critical evaluation of attempts

to explain the persistence of ethnic and national
in contemporary s o c i e t y . 2

Accordingly,

identities

we will not provide

a detailed de scription of each perspective,

but rather will

attempt to highlight the contributions and shortcomings of
each approach.

We will begin wi t h an overview of the

development of theories of ethni cit y and nationality,

for

man y of the strengths and weaknesses of present approaches
are grounded

in past formulations.

Following this,

we will

evaluate existing theories of ethnicity and nationality,
which we have organized
(1) primordial ism;
tion;

into the

following rough typology:

(2) pluralism;

(4) reactive ethnicity;

a nd

(3) com pe tition/moderniza
(5) class theories.

Development of Theories of Ethni cit y and Nationality
The tendency of social scientists to downplay ethnicity
has deep roots which reach back
In general,
Durkheim,

into the nineteenth century.

mainstream classical sociologists

Toennies,

Simmel, Weber) accorded little relevance

to the role of communal
these theorists,

(e.g.,

identities in modern society.

industrialization, modernization,

For

and

urbanization would lead to the weakening and eventual
destruction of preindustrial forms of social organization
and the emergence of rational social bonds--a transition
captured in such dichotomies as mechanical vs. organic
solidarity (Durkheim),

Gemelnschaft vs. Gesellschaft

(Toennies), and status vs. contract

(Maine).

This t r a n s f o r 

mation of society would be brought about by such processes
as the

increasingly differentiated and interconnected d i v i 

sion of

labor (Durkheim), the emphasis on bureaucratic and

market rationality
of urb ani sm

(Weber), and the homogenizing influence

(Wirth 1938).

Given the grounding of s oc iol og y

in the conservative reaction to the perceived loss of order
stemming from urbanization and modernization
1968; Nl s be t 1978;

Wolf 1982,

pp.

7-13),

(cf. Zeitlin

the classical

social theorists did not necessarily approve of these
changes;

instead,

t h e y sought to uncover new sources of

social solidarity w h i c h would counteract the loss of t r a d i 
tional communal ties.

As we shall see, the emphasis of

mainstream classical sociology on order and new "rational"
social ties was to have a profound influence on subsequent
social thoug ht— to the detriment of the study of ethnicity
and nationality.
The

legacy of the classical social theorists can be

clearly se en among the functionalists who later came to
dominate mainstream sociology.

From the functionalist

perspective, the s ea rch for order would be resolved by
universalistic goals and values stemming from the functional
prerequisites of m o d e r n society.

Indeed, even inequality

was vi e we d as contributing to the maintenance of society
(e.g., Davis and Mo o r e 1945).

Thus, the outcome of m o d e r n i 

zation wa s a functionally integrated society possessing
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common goals and a common culture,

a society where social

position was based upon universalistic achieved criteria
rather than particularistic ascribed statuses such as
ethnicity {Parsons 1966, pp.
and Rokkan 1967;

22-23;

Benedict 1962; Lipset

Smelser 1969).

By this juncture,

the misgivings towards modern society

of the classical theorists had disappeared and mainstream
sociology became a glorification of modernity.

Traditional

society was no longer lamented but viewed as rigid and
inflexible,

while modern society was extolled as efficient

and liberating of human potential.

Consequently,

ethnicity

was viewed as an artifact of preindustrial society, d y s 
functional

in that it was incompatible with mod er niz ati on

and bureaucratization,
viduals made

and doomed to disappear as indi

"rational" social decisions.

Furthermore,

with the emergence of the modernization/development alist
perspective— that is, the

(ethnocentric) assertion that all

societies would evolve along the model of the "most a d 
vanced" Western societies

(Rostow 1 9 6 0 )®— it was assumed

that ethnicity would disappear even in peripheral nations
once sufficient and inevitable levels of modernization had
been attained.

Later,

the persistence of ethnicity even

became an "explanation" of the "backwardness" of peripheral
s o c ie ti es .
Closely paralleling the functionalist approach was the
"nation-building" school in political science

(e.g., Deutsch

1953; Deutsch and Foltz 1963; Almond and Coleman 1960; Jacob
and Toscano 1964; Hoselitz 1960).

This perspective expanded

upon the effects of moderni zat io n to include the observation
that social mobilization,
tion and transportation,

facilitated by modern co mmunica
led to political

the assimilation of et hn ic groups
"national11 identity.

integration and

into an interethnic

S u c h a process,

already occurred in the core nations,

it was assumed, had
where democratic

institutions and common interests had created new "national"
loyalties.

Furthermore,

like the functlonalist/developmen-

talist approach, adherents of the nation-building pe rs pec 
tive also held that national integration would be a ne c e s 
sary concomitant of mod ernization
(e.g., Coleman and Rosbe rg 1964).
classical foundations,

in less-developed nations
Thus, drawi ng upon its

a dominant theme of mainstream social

science was that industrialization and modernization inev i
tably led to the disappearance of ethnicity in favor of more
"rational" ties.
The effects of this theoretical monophony were r e f l e c 
ted in early attempts to study the relationship between race
and class.

Fo r Robert E. Park and others who studied "race

relations"

in the United States at the time of the "great

migration"

(1880-1924),

emphasis was placed upon the issue

of integrating immigrants and minorities into the common
culture of the

larger society.

Following the classical

social theorists. Park v ie we d modernization and European

expansion as resulting in the ''emancipation" of individuals,
the formation of more

inclusive groups, and the reduction of

social distance through nev economic and political ties
(Park 1974a,

p. 205;

1974b,

p.

149); however, he also ma i n 

tained that modernization created "race relations" by
increasing intergroup contact

(Park 1974c,

seeming an om al y was resolved in Park's

p. 116).

This

(1974b, p. 150)

famous "race relations cycle" of "contact,

competition,

accommodation, and assimilation," a cycle characterized as
"progressive and irreversible."'*

Thus, while a short term

effect of modernization might be to increase intergroup
conflict,

inevitably such ties as ethnicity and race would

be superseded by class conflict
Following the lead of Park,

(Park 1974c,

p. 116).

sociologists in the United

States d uri ng the middle decades of the twentieth c en tu r y
continued to emphasize the assimilation of minorities.
Although subsequent writers suggested that assimilation
might occur at varying rates for different groups

(Warner

and Srole 1945), at different levels in various dimensions
of social

life

(Gordon 1964),

or even into a "triple melting

pot" along religious lines (Kennedy 1952;

Herberg 1960),

the

underlying assumption of inevitable assimilation remained
unchallenged.

Even the "caste-like" position of Black-

Americans was viewed as amenable to assimilation once
"dysfunctional" White prejudice and discrimination were
eliminated

(Myrdal 1944; Dollard 1937; Go rdon 1964,

p.

114).
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This overemphasis upon assimilation led mainstream U.S.
sociologists to view any r ela tionship between ethni cit y and
class as a reflection of "entry status" in the United
States, a temporary phenomenon awaiting the homogenizing
influence of individual mo bil ity and assimilation.
Even more than the influence of classical social
theorists,

the assimilationist bias of U.S. and European

sociology reflected the prevailing ideological climate of
dominant groups

In Western society.

During this period,

social thought was dominated by what some

(e.g., Greeley

1974; Gordon 1975, p. 88; A. Smith 1981, pp. 2-3)

have

termed the "liberal expectancy"--the belief that the homo
genizing influences of mass education,

the media,

and the

marketplace would eliminate social cleavages and conflict
based upon "irrational" communal ties.

Indeed,

the most

optimistic thinkers envisioned that the culmination of this
process would be the disappearance of nationalities
face of social
1981,

integration on a global level

p. 3; Said and Simmons 1976,

p. 9).*

in the

(cf. A. Smith
Thus,

the

decline of ethnicity was viewed as not only inevitable but
also socially desirable, even,
themselves.

it was assumed,

by minorities

Their protestations of "value-free" science

notwithstanding,

most social scientists uncritically

accepted assimilation not only as a prediction,
a prescription

but also as

(cf. critiques by Metzger 1971; Greel ey 1974)

for social Integration

(to be achieved through a reduction
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of prejudice and increased mass education).

What was

unsaid, however, was that the nature of this

ideal" a s s i m i 

lation was not the more
theory (i.e.,

inclusive

the melti ng pot),

identity postulated by

but rather the adoption of

the culture and values of the dominant ethnic group (cf.
Gordon— 1964--and Gr eeley--1974--on assimilation in the
United States as " An g lo -c on fo rm it y" ).

In essence, main

stream sociological thought was a reflection of
mation for)

(and l e g i t i 

dominant group ideology.®

A seco nd development in the study of ethnicity and
class by mai nst re am sociology in the United States involved
the above-mentioned

(cf. the discussion of class in Chapter

II) extension of the emphasis on social integration and
achieved s ta t u s to the
stratification
position).

(i.e.,

"individualization" of class and
class as a description of

As applied to ethnicity,

individual

this reduction of

social processes to individual careers lowers ethnicity to a
characteristic of individuals
affecting social status),

(i.e., a descent category

thus totally r emoving

realm of a c t i o n or from accounting for action.

it from the
Given the

all-too-prevalent practice of "abstracted empiricism"
1959, pp.

50-75) by U.S. sociologists,

tion" of ethnicity permeated the field,

this "individualiza
its influence r e 

flected in such notions as the "culture of poverty"
1966; Banfield 1970),

"status attainment"

1968; Featherman 1971),

(Mills

(Lewis

(Duncan and D u n c a n

and the "human capital" perspective
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(Becker 1971;,

Sovell 1975;

1978;

1981).

These reductionist

approaches towards ethnic stratification subsume do mi na nt
ideological assumptions concerning the free market an d the
blessings of individual competitiveness,

while ignoring such

factors as the structural "reproduction"

of inequality

(cf.

Bordieu 1977), power differentials, and gr ou p influences.
Unfortunately,

this tendency to view e t hn ic it y and cl a s s as

individual attributes remains
direct in g so-called

influential,

particularly in

"empirical" research on stratification.

The study of the relationship between ethnicity and
class has fared little better outside the mainstream of
sociological thought.

Interestingly,

perspective, which usually s to od
sical theorists,

in opposition to the c l a s 

contained a strikingly similar view of the

fate of ethnicity in modern society.
68-69;

the Marxian/conflict

1973, p. 163),

For Marx

(1964,

pp.

ethnic ties were o n l y significant

in

precapitalist societies and wo ul d wither a w a y under the
force of capitalist production relations and the emergence
of class-based conflict.
emphasis

Likewise, Lenin

(1968, pp.

20-21,

in the original) v ie we d nationalism as a phenomenon

of e a r l y capitalism,

doomed in the face of

"capitalism's

world historical tendency to break down national barriers,
obliterate national distinctions,
n a ti on s. "7
(i.e.,

and to assimilate

Although remaining vestiges of nationalism

"false consciousness"

from the M a r x i a n perspective)

could serve as an obstacle to working cla ss solidarity

(cf.
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Marx and En ge ls— 19 72 — on "the Irish Question"),
be swept away during the class struggle
tariat would emerge victorious.

they would

in which the pr o le 

To the extent that Marxian

theory contained a sense of ev olu tionary inevitability,
issues of ethnicity and nationality were generally d e 
emphasized .
Where ethnicity and nationality did figure in Leninist
thought,

however,

In this case,

was with respect to political strategy.

the focus was upon the "national question"--

the issue of the socialist position on the right of selfdetermination of nations

(e.g., the famous debate between

Lenin and Rosa L u x e m bu rg ). tical purposes,

For our more limited t heo re

what is most interesting about this

issue

was the inclusion of the notion of the different class
bases of nationalism
136-38),

(Lenin 1968, p. 65; Luxemburg 1976, pp.

the recognition that different classes may possess

different "national" interests.
purposes),

Unfortunately

(for our

the development of this theoretical point was

lost in the larger tactical

issues.*

Later,

the nuances of

this debate were overshadowed by such concerns as the
national unification of post-rev olu ti ona ry societies and the
construction of grand alliances to capitalist nations.
The Crisis of Classical Theories
By the middle of the twentieth century,

however,

major theoretical schools had reached a paradigmatic
"crisis"

(cf. Kuhn 1970) with respect to ethnicity and

the
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nationality.

Wi t h i n the most developed core societies, the

proposition that ethnicity was no longer a relevant

factor

was be l i e d by the persistence of su pposedly assimilated
groups,

the emergence of ethno-national movements seeking

political autonomy, and the
"racial" cleavages

intensification of existing

(Glazer and Moynihan 1963; McRoberts and

Postgate 1976; Carmichael and Hamilton 1967).
the po st-colonial nations wh ich emerged
after

Similarly,

in the periphery

1945 found that ethnic divisions and conflict

bited attempts at
1985).

"nation-building"

From a Marx ian perspective,

(Connor 1972;
the

inhi

Horowitz

ideal of proletarian

internationalism failed to overcome nationalist sentiments
during world wars and in the foreign policies of socialist
states

(Davis 1978,

pp. 17-22), while m u c h anti-imperialist

resistance emerged on a national basis
Clearly,

(Ehrenreich 1983).

theories of modern society wh i c h fail to account

for et hni ci ty and nationality as bases

for social action

have become rather obs ol e te .
F r o m the vantage point of the present,

it is evident

that the classical assumption of progressive and uniform
effects of modernization and the disappearance of ethnicity
is empiric all y untenable.

Indeed, most contemporary works

begin wi t h a critique of thes e earlier theories.

On a

global scale, the belief tha t all societies would follow the
path of the most developed societies c a n be viewed as an
unjustified generalization

(a case of "West-centered reduc-

tio ni sm "— Amin 1980, p. 12) which ignores the impact of
developed core societies upon the evolution of lessdeveloped peripheral soci et ies .10

At the societal

have found that the increased contact
geneity via diffusion)

(and increasing homo

is as likely to lead to increased

conflict as it is to assimilation
1974; Khleif 1978b),

level, we

(Blumer 1965; G r e e l e y

thus undercutting the underlying

assimilationist assumptions of most sociological studies.
As a consequence of the crisis of classical theory and

its

successors, much recent literature has been devoted to
rethinking issues of ethnicity and nationality.

What

is

emerging are formulations which explicitly seek to explain
the persistence of ethnicity and nationality in mo d e r n
society.

Ib S PE i&S. <?£

Ethnicity and yatiPireUfcy;

The final s t e p

Recent Trends

in our survey of existing perspectives

on ethnicity and nationality is an assessment of the corpus
of "new" theories of ethnicity and nationality;
formulations whi ch have their genesis
"crisis" of classical theories.

that

is,

in the abovementioned

We believe that the great

majority of these new perspectives are best viewed as
attempts to revise or modify earlier theories in light of
new realit ies — and can only be fully understood in this
context.

Indeed,

these new formulations share as a common

point of departure the rejection of the classical assumption
that communal Identities would wither a w a y in m od er n socie-

ties.

Accordingly,

each perspective seeks to address the

same basic question:

How can we account for the persistence

of ethnic it y and nationality in modern society?

In order to

analyze the diverse attempts to answer this question,

we

have organized existing approaches into the following rough
taxonomy:

(1) primordial ism;

(2) plural society theories;

(3) the modernization/competition perspective;
ethnicity;

and

(5) class theories.

(4) reactive

This taxonomy is not

intended to provide a definitive system of classification,
but is instead employed as a heuristic device for the
analysis and criticism of existing theories prior to the
presentation of our own framework.
Primordialism
This perspective seeks to address the problems of
classical and functionalist theories by changing the
properties of ethnicity.

For primordialists,

sistence of ethnicity is due to the strength
primordial nature)

the p e r 
(i.e.,

the

of communal ties which are grounded in

precapitalist society but are able to resist the effects of
modernization.

As a primordial

identity,

ethnicity is a

non-rational, affective, ascriptive tie rooted in the
presumed "givens" of social existence
factors as descent,
name,

(Geertz 1963)— such

biological features,

language, and religion.

"basic gr oup identity . . .

place of birth,

Thus, ethnicity becomes a

a ready-made set of endowments

and identifications which every individual shares with
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others from the moment of birth by chance of the
which he is born"

(Isaacs 1975, p. 31).

bond which exists prior to action,
primordialist perspective,

family into

As a primordial

ethnicity is,

from the

an immutable phenomenon which

must be considered sui generis as a fundamental explanation
for human behavior.
In its role as a corrective to traditional

theory,

primordialism assumes several different forms.

For Edward

Shils, who is credited with coining the term "primordial"
(1957), such ties could assume a functional role
grating modern society;

however,

Shils assumed

45-45) that ethnic identities would diminish

in inte

(1975, pp.

in favor of

the more inclusive primordial tie of n at i o n a l i t y . 11
Similarly, Geertz

(1963) sought to account for the p e rs is t

ence of ethnicity in post-colonial societies,

thus leaving

unchallenged the hypothesis that moderniz ati on resulted
the diminution of ethnic ties.
recent writers

On the other hand, more

(e.g., Novak 1973; G r e e l e y 1974;

1975; Keyes 1976),

in

Isaacs 1974,

particularly those examining the pe r s i s t 

ence of ethnicity in core nations,

have extended the p r i m o r 

dialist position to encompass the existence of ethnicity as
a significant tie in modern societies.
approach,

In this

latter

the traditional thesis regar din g the effects of

modernization upon ethnic it y is expl ici tl y rejected and
ethnicity is considered as basic to social a c t i o n — or, one
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might add, as a "permanent artifact" of preindustrial
society.
As an explanation of ethnicity,
w ide ly criticized

primordialism has been

(e.g., Bonacich 1980; McKay 1982)

for the

unidimensional nature of its characterization of et hni cit y
as a primary motor for social action as well as for its d e 
emphasis of structural

factors.

The at tribution of primor-

d i a l i t y does little to explain variations in the existence
and

intensity of intergroup conflict or times when ethnicity

is sublimated to other gro up ties.
of intragroup conflict

Moreover,

the existence

(e.g., B r et on ' s— 1972— descrip tio n of

intergroup differences among Quebecois/French-Canadians
Canada)

in

constitutes a phenomenon to ta lly outside the bounds

of the pr i m o r d i a l 1st perspective.

Furthermore,

an emphasis

on p ri m or dia li ty is an emphasis on the psychological as
opposed to the structural,

thereby placing intergroup

conflict in a "political and economic vacuum"
p.

(McKay 1982,

399).
Perhaps the most fundamental

as noted in Chapter II,

failing of primordialism,

is that it provides a static and

deterministic picture of ethnicity wh ich ignores the v a r i a 
bi lit y of ethnic ties

(e.g., assimilation vs. assertion;

changing group boundaries).
mordialism are

in fact variable

or socially defined
birthplace).

The "presumed givens" of p r i 

(e.g.,

(e.g.,

religion,

biological features,

language)
descent,

This shortcoming has been recognized by some

primordialists

(e.g., Geertz 1963, p. 109;

33-34; Keyes 1981);
circumstance,

however,

Isaacs 1975,

pp.

if identities vary according to

then primordiality is reduced to a de s c r i p 

tion— a metaphor for the emotional intensity of ethnic
affiliation.

This is captured by Nagata's

(1981, pp. 92-94)

observation that primordiality is a matter of usage,

that

traits undergo "primordialization" in opposition to specific
groups

in a particular context.

Thus,

pr imordialism consti

tutes an ideoloaical claim, not a social

fact.

The major contributions of the primordialist p e rs pe c
tive are its critique of traditional approaches and

its role

in calling attention to the affective aspects of ethnicity.
Ironically,

the primordialist approach ma y be viewed as a

form of propaganda for pluralism and dissimilation;

that is,

it has a tendency to overstate ethnic persistence and to
extol the virtues of diversity in the same manner that
traditional sociology emphasized and glorified a s s i m i l a 
tion.13

It is as e xt rem e— and as err on eo us — a position as

the view that et hnicity would disappear

in modern societies.

Ethnicity and nationality may be primordial to the extent
that humans are social animals and tend to form groups on
the basis of perceived similarities
territorial); however,

(whether cultural or

prlmordiality is ultimately no more

than a somewhat useful metaphor.

More complex perspectives

are necessary if we are to understand the variable and
material nature of ethnic and national

identities.
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Plural Society Theories
This heading is employed to describe two dramatically
differ en t— and,

one could say, di am et ric al ly opposed—

perspectives on ethnic phenomena in modern societies.

While

both perspectives emphasize the "plural" nature of society,
analytic distinctions have been draw n between equilibrium
and conflict pluralism
1969a, pp.

8-16) and

(van den Berghe 1969, p. 72; Kuper

"pluralistic" vs. plural societies

(Kuper and Smith 1969,

pp. 3-4).

The equilibrium or p l u r a l 

istic society approach is more compatible with mainstream
social science;

however,

it does attempt to address the

issue of ethnic persistence.

On the other hand, the c o n 

flict or plural society perspective constitutes a more
radical break with the assimilationist assumptions of
classical sociology and, hence, a more serious attempt to
come to grips with issues of eth ni ci ty in modern society.
The "pluralistic society" approach to ethnicity is an
offshoot of the pluralist model of power employed by m a n y
political scientists and sociologists.

Grounded in de

Tocquevillean political theory (cf. van den Berghe 1965,
270; Burawoy 1974, p.

p.

521), this perspective views mo der n

society as an entit y in which power

is dispersed among

interest groups based on multiple or overlapping ties,

with

competitive balance achieved via compromise or shifting
coalitions

(see,

Polsby 1980).

for example, Kornhauser 1960;

Societal

Dahl 1961;

integration is achieved,

in a manner
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similar to the functionalist perspective,

by adherence to a

shared set of common values and political principles.
Although the traditional pluralistic society approach e m u 
lated classical social theorists

in postulating "rational"

economic interests as the basis for
tion,

interest group forma

it has more recently been extended to include e t h n i 

c i t y — perhaps as a reawakened primordial ti e— as a basis for
political mobilization
1975).

(Bell 1975; Glazer and Moynihan

In this scenario,

social order

is maintained through

mutual toleration of ethnic differences

(i.e.,

pluralism"),

identity and po l i 

tical

along with shared national

institutions.
From our vantage point,

the "pluralistic society"

approach towards ethnicity is not a theory,
tion.

"cultural

but a d es cr ip 

It requires an additional mechanism (e.g., primor-

dial ism or modernization)

to account

emergence of ethnic ties.

Moreover,

for the persistence of
we believe that the

notion of a pluralistic society is flawed even as a de s c r i p 
tion.

Like functionalism,

has been criticized
Andersen,

the pluralist approach to power

(e.g., Parenti

1978, pp.

Friedland and Wright 1976;

27-37; Esping-

Whitt 1982)

for

ignoring or obfuscating the realities of the distribution of
power and for overemphasizing the degree of consensus
modern society.

With respect to ethnicity,

in

the pluralistic

perspective constitutes an ideal-typical description of a
cult ura lly plural society

(e.g., the

"melting pot" as it was
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meant to b e — cf.

Zangwill 1 9 0 6 — in contrast to assimilation

or "A ngl o- c on fo rm it y" ), one wh ic h recognizes ethnic di v e r 
sity but retains a n emphasis on social equilibrium--in
essence an ideological statement/
tion.

not an empirical d es cr ip 

Although in some respects the pluralistic approach

represents an advance over classical formulations/

it

ultimately offers no solution to the problem of explaining
ethnicity in modern society.
In contrast/

the plural society approach represents a

more dramatic departure

from the classical tradition.

essentially a response to the

It is

failure of functionalism,

grounded in the ob servation— first made by J . S. Purnivall
(1948)— that there existed societies which were not
grated by a consensus on co mmon values,
divided by sharp cleavages
together through coercion
Furnivall,

but were instead

(e.g., ethnicity) and held
(Kuper and Smith 1969, p.

3).

For

a plural society was a "tropi cal ” society under

colonial domination,

a diverse

"medley" of peoples forced

into a common political unit b y a colonial power.
causal factor in this case is economic,
(i.e., colonial exploitation)
social pluralism.
(1948, p.

inte

for economic forces

both created and maintained

In such a society,

304, cited

The

in Kuper 1969a,

according to Furnivall
pp.

10-11),13 groups:

mix but do not combine.
Bach group holds its own
religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas
and ways.
As individuals they meet, but only in the
marketplace, in buying and selling.
There is a plural
society, with different sections of the community
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living side by side, but separately,
political unit.
With respect to functionalism,

within the same

this "plural society" c ons ti 

tutes a pathological social form, with more or less func
tionally integrated subsocieties bound together

in an

involuntary and unha ppy relationship.
This formulation was later expanded by M. G. Smith
(1965; 1969a;

1969b)

to encompass societies outside of the

colonial situation and bases for differentiation beyond
ethnicity (cf. M. Smith 1969b,

p.

436).

In addition Smith

viewed plural societies as emerging not from economic
exploitation, as did Furnivall,

but from cultural d i f f e r 

ences manifest in different institutional practices
kinship,

religion).1-*

necessary,

(e.g.,

This institutional separation was a

but not sufficient basis for Smith's plural

society;

what was al so required was the differential

(i.e.,

unequal)

incorporation of these distinct culture groups

into

a common political structure under the dom ination of a
cultural minority (Kuper 1969a,
this tradition
1969a, pp.

(e.g.,

p. 12).

Other writers in

van den Berghe 1965,

p. 270; Kuper

15-19) embrace less rigid conceptualizations of

"plural society"

by introducing the notion of pluralism as

a variable

(i.e., societies exhibiting varying levels of

pluralism)

and by s ee kin g to elaborate factors which affect

this variation.

Used

in this sense, a plural society is a

society containing substantial
(Thompson 1983, p. 127).

ethnic cleavage and conflict

In our view, the major contribution of the plural
society approach is the recognition of the structural basis
of ethnic persistence

(and the reproduction of this basis),

particularly Furnivall's recognition of the role of c o l o 
nialism in expanding ethnic conflict.

On the other hand,

the development of the notion of plural society has been
rather limited.

The insistence by Smith upon institutional

separation reduces plural society to an ideal type or a
description of an empirically rare extreme form of an
ethnically divided society.

Yet if Smith's assumptions are

relaxed to Incorporate pluralism as a variable
den Berghe, Kuper),

(e.g., van

then "plural society" becomes e s s e n 

tially a descriptive term for an ethnically divided society.
Moreover,

given the multiethnic nature of modern societies,

virtually every society would be a plural society in this
broader sense,

thus removing any descriptive or analytical

utility (cf. R. Cohen 1978, pp.
plural society perspective

398-99).

Consequently,

the

is best viewed as a set of

"sensitizing c o n ce pt s” (van den Berghe 1973, p. 970), a
framework

for study which employs ethnicity as a basic

explanatory variable,
class

one which is ana ly tically coequal with

(Thompson 1983, p. 128).
Even as a framework

for research,

however,

we believe

that the plural society approach contains several serious
deficiencies.

First,

nature of ethnicity;

little attention is devoted to the
instead,

it is viewed as e xt r i n s i c — but

not in a primordial sense--in that group cultural d i f f e r 
ences precede any particular social setting
1983, p. 93).

As a consequence,

are downplayed and
Secondly,

(cf. Banton

intergroup commonalities

intragroup variation

is neglected.

other than Furnivall's emphasis upon colonial

domination,

the plural society perspective lacks a motor

force for conflict and change,

especially in that primacy is

given to political domination and economic issues are seen
as derivative

(Greenberg 1980,

envision "differences
1969a,

p. 18).

It is difficult to

in institutional practice"

(M. Smith

p. 27) as being the root cause of ethnic conflict in

such "plural societies" as South Africa and Sri Lanka.

In

sum, while the plural society approach recognizes the short
comings of classical sociology and properly views ethnicity
as linked to social structure,

it offers little beyond ex

tended description as an explanation for ethnic phenomena.
Mo der nization/Competition Approaches
This is less an organized paradigm than a convenient
heading for a group of approaches which we believe share the
same underlying assu mpt ion s. 1 ®

The crux of the mo de rn iz a

tion/competition thesis addresses the "crisis" of classical
theories of ethnicity by asserting--in direct contrast to
earlier the or ie s— that modernization results in increased
ethnic conflict and, hence,

the persistence or even resur

gence of ethnic identities.1 ®
and functionalist theories,

Like the earlier classical

the modernization/competition

model vievs modernization or industrialization as
urbanization,

bureaucratization, and the ascension of

"market" criteria.

What is different about the mo de rn iz a

tion/competition perspective,
modernization,
each other

leading to

however,

by bringing groups

is the view that

into closer contact with

(e.g., via expanded markets and improvements in

transportation and communication) and by destabilizing
exi sting interrelationships
demographic balances),

(e.g., productive activities,

creates competition between groups,

competition wh ic h heightens ethnic solidarity and sharpens
gr o up boundaries
De u tsc h 1966,
Moreover,

(Barth 1969;

pp.

125-26;

Blumer 1965; Despres 1975;

Banton 1983; Nielsen 1985).

these effects of mo dernization are felt not only

in peripheral societies undergoing rapid change,
the most modern societies

but also in

(Khleif 1978b; Nielsen 1980; Olzak

1982) .
Unlike the primordialist and plural society approaches
w h i c h emphasize the persistence of cultural differences
betw ee n groups,

the modernization/competition perspective

maintains that ethnic identities can flourish despi te the
reduction of intergroup cultural differences
pp.

32-33).

What

(Barth 1969,

is essential for the persistence of ethnic

identities is resource competition between groups
1975,

p. 199; Ba rt h 1969, p.

25; A. Cohen 1974a,

competition ste mm ing from modernization.

(Despres
1974b),

Given the seem

ingly inevitable acculturation which results from intergroup
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contact,

the continuation of ethnic boundaries implies the

conscious structuring of interaction and rearranging of
identities to maintain distinctions between groups
1969, p. 16).
they" sense,

(Barth

Thus, ethnic identities may persist in a "weregardless of diminished cultural differences

between groups,
for doing so.

as long as there exists a conscious reason
Indeed,

in instances of ethnic resurgence,

the symbolic content may be revived or invented from the
past in order to facilitate mobilization for competition
(Gellner 1964;

Khleif 1985).

In light of the postulated connection between m o d e r n i 
zation and ethnic persistence or resurgence,

many of those

who follow the modernization/competition approach have
sought to elaborate mechanisms through which modernization
increases ethnic mobilization and conflict.
such mechanisms

Examples of

include the following:

Transformation of social s t r u c t u r e .
changes traditional economic activities
markets) and relations of domination,

As modernization
(i.e., production,

the process of e s t a b 

lishing new arrangements may lead to increased intergroup
competition and ethnic assertion
Khleif 1978b;

Gellner 1964,

(Despres 1975, p. 202;

p. 171).

With the dis in te gr a

tion of empires and the post-1945 wave of decolonization,
the ensuing power vacuums led to increased intergroup
conflict

(c£. Banton 1983, pp.

193-95; this

premise of the Hplural society" model).

is also a basic

Furthermore,

this
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wave of anti-colonialism and nationalism spread from the
periphery to the core,

triggering a rise

among historically subjugated groups

in ethnonationalism

(i.e., the "Third

World within the First World"--Khleif 1985; that is, groups
such as the Welsh and the Quebecois who were previously
assumed to have assimilated;
25).

see also A. Smith 1981, pp.

19-

Ethnic mobilization within the core was also s t i m u 

lated by the relative gains of minorities vis-a-vis p r e 
viously hegemonic groups

(e.g.,

"White Ethnics" vs. WASPs

the United States--Burgess 1978,

in

p. 277; Khleif 1978b) and

by the emergence of an ethnic intelligentsia or middle class
(i.e., cultural entrepreneurs)
to the assertion

(as opposed to masking, which had been the

previous route to mobility)
1964, pp.

168-70;

of ethnic identity (Gellner

A. Smith 1981, pp.

Doane unpublished,
Migration.

who saw further gains as tied

108-33; Khleif 1984b;

p. 73).

One significant phenomenon of the modern

era has been large scale migration in response to changing
labor markets

(Hechter 1976; Castles and Kosack 1973;

Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982; di Leonardo 1984).

Although

often underemphasized by earlier students of ethnic r e l a 
tions

(cf. Burgess 1978,

p. 279),

one effect of migration

has been to bring together--often within a short time sp a n —
previously separated groups under conditions of economic
competition or domination of one group by another.

More

over, the process of International migration continues

(al-
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though the identity of the participants may change),
constantly changing

(and often sharpening)

ethnic relations within societies
of Hispanics and Asians

(e.g.,

thus

the nature of

the recent influx

into the United States).

Changing role of the s t a t e .

With modernization,

the

state has assumed an increasingly important role as an
economic actor, both in terms of social capital expenditures
(e.g., education,

infrastructure)

programs of the "welfare state"
addition,

and the social need

(cf. O'Connor 1973).

In

the state serves as a source of valued resources

(e.g., public sector employment and expenditure--Khleif
1984b; Horowitz 1985,
political claims
Indeed,

pp.

(e.g.,

224-25)

and an arbiter of

civil rights,

affirmative action).

if groups occupy separate territories within a

nation-state,

the geographical

"patchiness" of the effects

of political decisions m a y give virtually any state action
an ethnic flavor

(Nielsen 1985,

p. 144).

Consequently,

ethnicity m a y be activated as a means of mobilizing to press
gr o up claims for inclusion or preference and for a share of
social resources

(Bell 1975; Khleif 1978b).

Mass s o c i e t y .

Another outgrowth of modernization has

been the expansion of the scope of markets,
institutions,
interconnected

organizations,

and media--the emergence of an increasingly
"mass society."

While the classical and

functionalist perspectives held that these processes would
lead to assimilation an d more inclusive

(e.g., national,
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global)

identities,

modernization/competition theorists

emphasize ways

in which mass society may facilitate ethnic

mobilization.

For example,

increased

{i.e., the merging of subgroups) and

intragroup homogeneity
improved communication

may increase the effective size and scope of ethnic m o b i l i 
zation,

while expanded labor markets and the enhanced role

of education increase the potential value of large scale
organizations

(Nielsen 1985;

Burgess 1978, p.

279).

At the

same time, pressures for societal homogenization may spur
ethnic assertion as a reaction to perceived external
dominance

(Khleif 1985; A.

Smith 1981).

Finally,

a sense of

alienation or rootlessness due to a loss of traditional ways
may spark an ethnic resurgence as a "quest for community," a
search for Gemeinschaft in the midst of Gesellschaft
1984b;

1985).

(Khleif

In each instance the claimed effect of

modernization is an increase in the assertion of ethnic
ties.
Competition theories:

a critical c o m m e n t .

In our

view, modernization/competition approaches constitute a
significant improvement over classical theories of ethn i
city.

They address the reality of the persistence of e t h n i 

city by locating
society.

it squarely in the dynamics of contemporary

Moreover,

competition serves as a plausible c o n 

text for ethnic persistence;

even the

"non-rational" a f f e c 

tive elements of ethnicity can be explained in terms of
perceived interests or group solidarity.

At the same time,
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however,

the mo dernization/competition perspective has some

serious shortcomings.
differences

It does not easily expla in intragroup

in ethnic assertion or why some groups might

assimilate while others persist.

Furthermore,

competition

theory is circular to the extent that it cl aims that while
competition

is et hnically based,

it is in turn essential

the maintenance of ethnic affiliations
p. 199).

(e.g.,

Without an additional mechanism

Despres 1975,

(e.g.,

prlmordial-

ism, modernization following pre-existing cleavages),
city and competition would appear

for

ethni

inexplicably as both cause

and effect of each other.
Reactive Ethnicity
According to this approach,

ethnically based action

actually a reaction to structural discrimination;
’’cultural division of labor” wher e

that

is

is, a

individuals are assigned

to specific occupations on the ba sis of e thn ic affiliation
(Hechter 1974,

p. 1154).

Inasmuch as ethnic assertion

is a

reaction to migration or to the differential effects of
modernization

(i.e.,

unequal benefits) upon ethnic groups,

the reactive ethnicity perspective could see mi ng l y be viewed
as a variant of the modernization/competition approach,
except that it emphasizes senaration of groups as opposed to
contact

(Nielsen 1980;

additional mechanism,

1985).

On the other hand, unless an

such as internal colonialism (Hechter

1975), which creates and perpetuates ethnic divisions
specified,

there

is

is little to distinguish reactive ethnicity
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from the functionalist assertion that ethnic persistence is
merely the result of the "a cci d en ta l” coincidence of ethnic
and functional cleavages and s ho ul d disappear with complete
modernization

(Nielsen 1980, p.

reactive ethnicity model per se

78).

Accordingly,

is of rather

the

limited utility

in explaining ethnic phenomena.
Class Theor ies .11
Given that Marx provided no systematic writings on
ethnicity and nationality and t h a t the orthodox Marxian
position has always maintained that ethnic ties would fade
away in the face of capitalist relations of production,

many

attempts have been made to " r e v i s e ” Marx in light of the
obvious persistence and salience

of et hn ic ity .1 "

While

there is no integrated body of theory, we will divide
existing formulations

into the following rough taxonomy:

(1) ethnicity as class strategy;

(2) ethnicity as class;

and

(3) ethnicity as colonized nation.
Ethnicity as class s t r a t e g y .
theory,

In this variant of class

it is claimed that the capitalist class employs

ethnicity (i.e.,

"precapitalist divisions")

to create an

underclass which can be paid ar ti fi cia ll y low wages
increasing the rate of surplus v a l u e — i.e.,

(thus

"superexploita-

t i o n " ) and to create political divisions within the working
class

(Reich 1970,

quently,

1981; Baran an d Sweezy 1966).

Conse

ethnicity is not a meaningful social reality per

s e r but rather a deliberate c r ea ti on

(albeit based on p r e 
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existing categories)

of the bo urg eo is i e. 1*

but in our opinion related— perspective

An al te rn at iv e —

is split or s e g 

mented labor market theory (Bonacich 1972;

1979),

a class

theory which emphasizes ethnic competition within the
working class,
ca pit al. 20

but which also retains a key role for

According to the split labor market perspective,

ethnic conflict results from the efforts of relatively
advantaged dominant group labor to defend its position
discrimination,

immigration restriction,

etc.)

(via

in the face

of attempts by capital to replace highly paid labor with
"cheaper"
grou ps .21

(i.e., su pe r ex p l o i t e d ) labor from subordinate
In this schema, ethnicity is once again relegated

to a secondary role--by "historical accident"
be correlated with labor market status
14).

Indeed,

it happens to

(Bonacich 1980, p.

if ethnic antagonism is a result of "acciden

tal" cleavages,

then there is little to separate split labor

market theory from the reactive ethnicity approach.
Ethnicity as c l a s s .
than a capitalist device,

In this context,

ethnicity is more

ethnic groups are essentially

"blurred collective representations of classes"
1972, p. 222).

This formulation is most often applied when

class and ethnic boundaries coincide,
"middleman minorities"
situations

(Wallerstein

(Bonacich 1973)

as in the case of
or "caste-like"

(South Africa, American Blacks

era), to produce a "people-class"

in the Jim Crow

(Leon 1970) which c ont ri

butes to the persistence of ethnicity,

yet is in essence a
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class.

Prom the vorld-system perspective

(Arrighi,

and Wallerstein 1983; Wallerstein 1972), class and

Hopkins
"status"

(i.e., ethnicity) are two manifestations of the same p h e n o 
menon of group formation,
precedence
pear,

except that class takes logical

in that if underlying class differences d i s a p 

then the status-group conflicts would also eventually

disappear

(Wallerstein 1972,

p.

221).

Ethnicity as "colonized n a t i o n " .

This perspective

is

closely linked to the debate on the "national question"--the
self determination of nations as an intermediate re v ol ut io n
ary step--mentioned earlier
dents of the world-economy

in the chapter.
(e.g.,

For some s t u 

Cox 1959; Magubane 1979)

racial/ethnic/national domination is an effect of the s u p e r 
exploitation manifest
ism.

Likewise,

Fanon, Cabral)

in Western colonialism and

imperial

Third World revolutionary theorists

(e.g.,

emphasized the national basis of resistance

to capitalist colonial rule .22

By extension

(or by a n a l 

ogy)/ this analysis was applied to ethnic groups within
nations so that ethnic stratification became colonialism and
ethnic assertion became national liberation
1972; and Omi and Wi n an t -- 19 86, pp.

(cf. Blauner--

38-47--on Black

nationalism in the United States and the use of internal
colonialism to facilitate ethnic m obi li zat io n). 23
consequence,

As a

many analysts spoke of internal colonialism;

that is, the political and cultural domination and economic
exploitation of a geographically discrete ethnic enclave
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within the boundaries of the nation-state.

The notion of

internal colony has been employed to study South Africa
(Wolpe 1972); Blacks and Hispanics in the United States
(Blauner 1972; Barrera 1979); Quebec
Celtic Fringe of Great Britain
Frisians

in the Netherlands

American nations
a few.

(McRoberts 1979);

the

(Hechter 1975; Khleif 1978b);

(Khleif 1985);

and various South

(Casanova 1965; Stavenhagen 1970)--to name

In each case,

internal colonialism was employed as a

tool to facilitate the analysis of ethnic interaction in the
appropriate historical,

comparative,

and structural

c o nt ex ts .
Class theories:

a critical c o m m e n t .

zation/competition perspective,

Like the m o d e r n i 

contemporary class theories

represent a significant advance over classical and mai n
stream approaches to the study of ethnicity.

Class theories

emphasize the importance of understanding the link between
ethnicity and class and the role of class interests
vating "ethnic" behavior,

in m o t i 

while encouraging a perspective

which is both macroscopic and comparative.

Nevertheless,

existing class approaches contain ma ny limitations.

While

both the superexploitation and the split labor market
approaches pinpoint key group interests,

neither

"bourgeois

machinations" nor labor market competition provide a s a t i s 
factory explanation of the complexity of ethnic identities
and intergroup conflict.

Similarly,

as latent class might be applicable

the notion of ethnicity
in special cases where
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class and ethnic boundaries coincide;

however,

it has little

utility in other situations where the proliferation of
"people-classes" would dilute the explanatory value of
"ethnicity as c la s s . " 24
a useful metaphor
structural forces,

Internal colonialism,

in sensitizing analysts to historical and
lacks an explanation of change,

interconnections between sectors,
phasis on political domination,
homogeneity (Burawoy 1974,
1969;

pp.

Omi and Winant 1986, pp.

extreme,

while perhaps

minimizes

and leads to an ov e re m

nation ali sm and in-group
523-27; Khleif 1985; Frank
49-50).

Carried to an

internal colonialism mystifies social relationships

by confounding ethnicity and nationality and by ignoring
intragroup class di v i s i o n s — it becomes a class theory from
which class has been je ttisoned.23

Ultimately,

the class

approaches seemingly provide little explanation for why
ethnic identities persist or evolve;
either viewed

indeed, ethnicity is

(by the superexploitation,

and ethnicity as class approaches)

split labor market,

as epiphenomenal to class

(with the ultimate goal being the attenuation of ethnic
affiliations in the name of class unity)

or

colonialism) as a replacement for class.

(by internal

Thus, we believe

that current class theories of ethnicity grossly o ve rs im 
plify the reality of intergroup relations.

Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have conducted a critical review of
existing theories of ethnic change

in an attempt to assess
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their utility for our own endeavor.

From the outset, we

characterized theories of ethnic change as one of the
"failures” of social science, a state of affairs which w<-;
traced back to pre-1960 social theories which posited the
diminution of ethnic ties in modern industrial society.
we described above,

however,

As

the basis of these theories

(i.e., the decline of ethnicity)

was contradicted by the

persistence of ethnicity, a phenomenon which became pa r t i c u 
larly evident during the post-1945 era.

In response to this

"crisis” of classical theory,

(i.e., post-1960)

the modern

study of ethnicity has been dominated by the emergence of
new theories which attempt to explain the continuing s i g n i 
ficance of ethnicity in contemporary society.
progression of theories of ethnicity,
this chapter was to evaluate

our central task

(4)

(2) plural

(3) modernization/competition approaches,

reactive ethnicity,

and

(5) class theories--in terms of

how they addressed our basic question:
and national

in

five current perspectives on

ethnicity and nationa li ty— (1) primordialism,
society theories,

Given this

identities to emerge,

What causes ethnic

persist,

change,

or

disappear?
Despite the contributions of these contemporary p a r a 
digms in addressing the persistence of ethnicity,

our c o n 

clusion was that they contained several significant limita 
tions.

All of the perspectives analyzed above treat et h n i 

city as u n id im en si on al , thereby failing to explain the

phenomenon of vithin-group variation discussed
II.

Moreover,

in Chapter

several a p p r o a c h e s - - e .g ., primordial ism,

plural soci ety theory,

reactive ethnicity,

and

internal

colonial is m— lack any dynamic for social conflict or change.
As a result,

they are reduced to little more than descrip-

tions of ethnically divided societies.

Even those pe r s p e c 

tives which we viewed as most promising--competition and
class t he or ie s— remain flawed.

The competition perspective

seemingly lacks any grounding in larger structural and
historical dynamics,

thereby leaving it susceptible to

reduction to an individual phenomenon.
meanwhile,

Class theories,

suffer from a failure to take ethni cit y s e r i o u s 

ly, a belief that in the final analysis ethnicity remains an
epiphenomenon of class.

Consequently, we feel the need to

look elsewhere for a theory of ethnic change.
In our view, what

is needed

accomplish the following tasks.

is a perspective which can
First, ethnicity must be

taken seriously as an explanatory concept in its own right,
rather than viewed as a given or as an epiphenomenon.
Secondly,

a n y perspective on ethnicity and nationality must

be able to address the

issues of within-group variation;

that is, it must provide a theory of assimilation as well as
persistence,

and it should be able to account

actions by members of the same ethnic group.

for different
Thirdly,

it is

necessary to develop a more explicit link between ethnicity
and class;

to explain the

interrelationship between these

two affiliations,

rather than to declare one as conceptual

terra firma having analytical precedence.

Finally,

any

theory of ethnicity and nationality must have a macrostructural dynamic;

that is,

it must be grounded

in global

processes capable of explaining both the evolution and the
broad variation of ethnic and national phenomena.
the development of a framework
will turn in Chapter IV.

It is to

for such a theory that we

CHAPTER NOTES

CHAPTER III

1.

We view these phenomena as integrated components of the
larger process of global capitalist development.

2.

The reader may observe that relatively little me nt io n
is made of nationality in this chapter.
This reflects
the reality--described in Chapter II— that na tionality
has for the most part been overlooked by students of
race and ethnic relations.
The few exceptions to this
(the nation-building school, the national liberation
variant of Marxian thought) will be addressed b r ie fly
below.

3.

For summaries and critiques of this perspective, see
Barringer, Blanksten and Mack (1965); Moore (1960);
Parsons (1964); Eisenstadt (1970); Be n di x (1967);
Weinberg (1969); and A. Smith (1973).

4.

For Park (1974d, p. 354), even slavery was a case of
temporary accommodation prior to assimilation.
On the
other hand, Park's race relations cycle was not as
unilinear as has often been portrayed, as he observed
(1974b, p. 150) that various social processes (e.g.,
racial barriers, immigration restriction) could slacken
or even temporarily halt the process of assimilation.

5.

Interestingly, this viewpoint was presaged by Park
(1974c, p. 116) who observed that:
Looking at race relations in the long historical
perspective, this modern world w hi ch seems d e s 
tined to bring pr esently all the diverse and
distant peoples of the earth together within the
limits of a common culture and a common social
order, strikes one as something not merely unique
but millennial!
Nevertheless, this new c iv i l i z a 
tion is the product of essentially the same h i s 
torical processes as those which proceeded it.
The same forces which brought abo ut the divers it y
of races will inevitably bring about, in the long
run, a diversity of peoples in the modern world
corresponding to that which we have seen in the
old.
It is likely, however, that these d i v e r s i 
ties will be based in the future less on i n h e r i 
tance and race and rather more on culture and
occupation.
That means that race conflicts in
the modern world, which is already or presently
108
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will be a single great society, will be more and
more in the future confused with, and eventually
superseded by, the conflicts of classes.
6.

For an excellent discussion of this point and a
critique of the mai nstream e th ni cit y paradigm, see Omi
and Winant (1986, pp. 15-24).

7.

Lenin did adopt the position that nationalism could be
a progressive force to the extent that it enabled
"backwards" nations to resist core imperialism (i.e.,
"reactionary" nationalism) and commence the process of
capitalist development necessary for the emergence of
class struggle (cf. Davis 1978, p. 73).

8.

For original positions in this debate, see Lenin (1968)
and Luxemburg (1976).
An interesting summary is
provided by Davis (1978).

9.

For a brief discussion of this point,
(1980, p. 16).

10.

The literature on dependency t h e o r y (e.g., Frank 1967;
1969) served as a first major critique of the mod ern i
zation/developmental ist perspective.
For critical
evaluations of de pendency theory, see Palma (1978);
Brenner (1977 ) .

11.

While Hechter (1974, p. 1153) places Shils squarely
within the traditional functionalist camp, I believe
that Shils* efforts constitute a n attempt to "update"
functionalism to explain the persistence of ethnicity.
His writings on the "crisis of national integration"
(Shils 1975, pp. 50-63) exhibit an awareness of the
persistence and resurgence of ethnicity.

12.

See the critiques of prim or dia lis m by Patterson
Steinberg (1981); and Yinger (1985).

13.

Furnivall's observation was anticipated by Robert E.
Park (1974d, pp. 353-54) who wr ot e in 1928 that:

see Bonacich

(1975);

Under such circumstances peoples of different
racial stocks m a y live side by side in a relation
of symbiosis, each playing a role in a common
economy, but not interbreeding to any great
extent; each maintaining, like the gyp sy or the
pariah peoples of India, a more or less complete
tribal organization or so c i e t y of their own.
14.

Thus, for Smith, the United States would not be a
plural society.
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15.

In a most general sense, intergroup resource co mp et i
tion could be viewed as underlying most theories of
ethnicity (cf. Nielsen 1985, p. 134ff.).

16.

Indeed, some theorists (e.g., Bell 1975) go so far as
to maintain that ethnicity, with its affective inten
sity, now supersedes class as a basis for organization.

17.

While some authors would include the discrimination
theories of Becker (1971) or the human capital theories
of Sowell £1975; 1978; 1981) under the aegis of class
theories, we hold that Becker provides a theory of d i s 
crimination, not of ethnicity, while the work of Sowell
is too reductionistic to merit serious consideration.

18.

Indeed, Marx is seemingly co ntradictory on this issue.
On one hand, in The Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels
(1964, pp. 5-8) describe the dissolution of nations
amidst the revolutionization of production and the
expansion of the world market.
On the other hand,
their analysis in Ireland and the Irish Question (Marx
and Engels 1972) shows an inclination to take ethnicity
into account as a factor in class struggle.

19.

Superexploitation theories have also been applied on a
global level; for example, the assertion that racist
ideologies emerge as a result of (and as legitimation
for) core imperialism and colonial domination (cf. Cox
1959).

20.

Bonacich (1980, p. 14) would disagree with our linking
the superexploitation and split labor market a p 
proaches; however, we believe that the s up er exp lo ita 
tion and split labor market theories describe the
responses of two different eth-classes (dominant group
capital, dominant group working class) to the same
circumstances.
We will develop this argument in
subsequent chapters.
For an insightful critique of
labor market segmentation approaches, see Hodson and
Kaufman (1982).

21.

For those working within this paradigm, a major issue
of contention is the role of dominant-group industrial
workers:
whether they are manipulated "victims" who
suffer due to working class fragmentation or willing
participants who benefit from the exploitation of the
ethnic underclass (cf. Lenin's "labor aristocracy").

22.

For a discussion of Fanon and Cabral on this issue, see
David (1978, pp. 212-228).
This "anti-imperialist"
model was often linked to a two-stage theory of re v o l u 
tion in which national liberation is viewed as a
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n ecessary preliminary to proletarian revolution
1973, p. 41; Southall 1983, p. 12).

(Davies

23.

For example, Blauner (1972, p. viii) explicitly grounds
his analysis in the social movements of oppressed
groups.

24.

For example, in the United States, with its myriad of
ethnic groups, potential "people-classes" could number
in the dozens— an unwieldy basis for a "class" system.

25.

As
a guiding metaphor, internal colonialism overlooks
one essential fact; that is, that "a co lo ny can become
independent, while an internal colony is integrated
into a larger society" (Burawoy 1974, p. 523).
In a
particularly trenchant critique of internal coloni
alism, Southall (1983, pp. 10-17) notes that the
colonial analogy has been used by the South African
state to support "separate development" and the
"independence" of Black homelands.
Similarly, in an
analysis of the U.S. case, Omi and Winant (1986, pp.
48-51) note that the nationalist analogy and demands
for "community control" were used by dominant groups to
resist minority demands.

CHAPTER IV

THEORETICAL M O D E L
In this chapter,

ve will pr es en t our theoretical model

for understanding ethni cit y and nationality in the post-1800
vorld-economy.

As we noted in Chap ter

I, a mo d el can be

defined as a list of interrelated e l em e nt s— and some st a t e 
ments of relations among them--useful
given phenomenon.
beyond this,

In actuality,

we

introducing notions or

in understanding a

intend to proceed
"working hypotheses"

which we believe are helpful to the development

of a global

theory of ethnicity and nationality.

Nevertheless, our use

of the word model is intentional,

it underscores the

for

preliminary nature of this work; tha t

is, the fact that we

view this undertaking as an initial attempt to

indicate a

new direction in response to what we have d es cr ibe d as the
shortcomings of existing works.

In this context,

is to establish a general theoretical
study of ethnicity and nationality,

framework

our goal

for the

one which stresses both

the importance of analyzing the relationship be tw ee n e t h n i 
city and class and the necessity of grounding theories in
global dynamics.
will, we hope,

If we are successful in this effort,

have established a "base camp"

for

we

future

explorations.
The presentation of our model w i l l begin w i t h a brief
consideration of our bas ic sociological assumptions regard112
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ing the nature of groups and the issue of levels of a n a l y 
sis. We believe that exposition of our position on these
issues will provide the reader with a broader context within
which our framework can be more easily understood.
ing this,

Follow

we will embark upon a discussion of the rel a ti on 

ship between ethnicity and class,

introducing the

class" as a key analytical concept.
the chapter,

"eth-

In the third section of

we will explore the significance of the process

of global capitalist development and the uneven nature of
that development

(especially the core-periphery distinction)

for the evolution of ethnic and national
this general discussion,
"working hypotheses";

that is, notions regarding the d i f f e r 
in core and periphery

which will guide our subsequent analysis.
"flesh out" our framework

subsequent case studies)
(e.g.,

From

we will then turn to a series of

ential evolution of ethnic relations

will also

identities.

In addition,

we

(and facilitate our

by listing aspects of nation-states

nature of the political system)

which we believe

exert a particular

influence upon the nature of ethnic r e l a 

tions and national

identities

circumstances.

Finally,

in historically specific

at the conclusion of the chapter,

we will provide a brief summary of our model.

Underlying A s s u m ptions:__ Social Groups and Society
Underlying our approach to issues of ethnicity and
nationality are some

fundamental assumptions concerning the

nature of social groups and society.

We believe that humans

create social groups and,

hence, society as they interact in

order to pursue goals and produce the necessities of m a t e r 
ial existence.

Affiliation with such groups

source of human identity

is a basic

(i.e., the "reference group"),

while group participation shapes how humans perceive and act
upon the world around them.

Human social groupings are not

static entities but ongoing processes;
assume significance

moreover,

in relation to other groups

they only
(i.e.,

"ingroups" vs.

"outgroups"— Sumner 1906).

group setting,

group membership operates through processes

of inclusion and exclusion

In this

inter

(i.e., maintenance of a boundary

via some diacritical characteristic)

and the group itself

persists through its utility to at least some of the actors
involved.

Groups compete with each other for valued r e 

sources as they seek to improve their relative position or
to maintain the status quo.
Ethnicity and nationality are not unique phenomena,
they represent one type of possible group affiliation which
may or may not be asserted

(Nielsen 1985).

In other words,

ethnicity and nationality m a y be potent, even central bases
for group formation, yet they nevertheless remain a basis
for group formation along with class,
sex, and other potential affiliations.

occupation,

religion,

Such a formulation

is somewhat at variance wi th the prevailing tendency to
ascribe

"special status" to ethnicity and nationality;

however, we believe that it is necessary to remove the
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mystifying veil of "un iq ue ne ss ” in order to ask the proper
questions concerning the nature of ethnicity and n at i o n a l 
ity.

As organizational

forms,

communal affiliations grounded

ethnicity and nationality are
in real or putative common

origin and a sense of shared historical experience and joint
destiny

(nationality is distinguished from ethnicity by its

link to political and territorial autonomy;
n at io n- sta te ).1

Yet we also hold that ethnicity and natio n

ality are more than communal ties.
groupings,

i.e., to a

As a basis for social

ethnicity and nationality are

ideological/cul

tural constructs stemming from the conditions of mater ial
life.

While other services to members

m a y become significant,
survival)

of groups

(e.g., psychological)

the ultimate relevance

(and, hence,

is linked to their mater ial utility;

that is, their role vis-a-vis challenging or maintaining the
system of ethnic s t r a t i f i c a t i o n .
and nationality are communal
base.

Thus,

and national
assertion,

ethnicity

identities with a material

during intergroup resource competition,

ethnic

identities continually evolve;

the

masking,

voluntarily,

In other words,

that is,

or change of identities occurs--whether

via negotiation,

or through ascription--in

response to the changing exigencies of intergroup c o m p e t i 
tion and conflict.

A ke y question then,

is:

What effects

do different types of intergroup interaction have on ethnic
and national

identities?3

In the study of the role of ethnicity and nationality
in human affairs,

one important consideration

level of analysis;

is that of

that is, determination of the level at

which the evolution of ethnic and national
most fruitfully explained.

identities

is

This is a difficult question,

inasmuch as society is best viewed as a series of concentric
contexts

(Khleif 1985) and ethnicity and nationality are

asserted

in a variety of milieus ranging from super-macro

(global) and macro
and micro

(nation-state)

(local or household).

to meso

(institutional)

As we stated

in Chapter

I,

we begin from the premise that the ultimate level of a n a l y 
sis for the study of ethnicity and nationality is the
world-svstem:

however,

we will tend to emphasize the n a t i o n 

state as a focal unit for analysis.
is simple:

Our rationale for this

in the contemporary world-system,

the nation

state is the primary arena for intergroup competition,
the state itself plays a key role
tions and national

identities.

while

in shaping ethnic re l a

In other words,

state, while a "subunit of the world-system"

the n a t i o n 

(Khleif 1985),

becomes the practical context for the analysis of ethnic and
national phenomena.

At the same time,

we will retain our

global emphasis by anchoring our analysis
the world-system,

in processes of

thereby employing these processes as ke y

contextual variables in the study of ethnicity and n a ti on al 
ity.

Furthermore,

we will seek to remain sensitive to what

we might term "lower-level" processes occurring within the
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nation-state;

for example,

the impact of uneven regional

development on intergroup relations.
building nature of this work,
be preliminary;

however,

Given the model-

our efforts will necessarily

one component of a complete theory

of ethnicity would be the ability to articulate
interaction at the global,

national,

regional,

intergroup
and local

l e ve ls .

Eth-Class;

A Tool for Un d er standing Group Action

In the macro-level analysis of human affairs,
nicity/nationality and class,

eth

both of which are rooted in

material relations, are perhaps the most salient bases of
group affiliation.

As we observed in Chapter II,

uals possess potential affiliations with other
in the same productive circumstances
communal order

individ

individuals

(class) and the same

(ethnic group or nation).

Most contemporary

perspectives on ethnicity have attempted to speci fy the
nature of the relationship between ethnicity and class, the
conditions under which intergroup relations emphasize
communal ties as opposed to class distinctions
1974; Levis 1974).

For some theorists

and plural society theorists),

(e.g.,

(cf. Mast
primordialists

ethnicity and class have been

viewed as c o m p e t i t i v e . mutually exclusive affiliations, with
one asserted at the expense of the other.
other perspectives
and class theories)

(e.g., competition,

In contrast,

reactive ethnicity,

have depicted ethnicity and class as

largely c o i n c id en ta l; that is, as drawing upon the same
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membership, with one affiliation considered an epiphenomenon
of the other, more basic tie.

Thus, to accord analytical

primacy to either ethnicity or class is to take, either
explicitly or implicitly, a theoretical

position

in the

above debate.
F r o m our perspective,

the competitive-coincidental

dichotomy is a mi sleading oversimplification.

E th ni cit y and

class are neither competing nor coincidental forms of group
affiliation; such conceptualizations are
than empirical r e a li ti es .3

Ea c h individual has both an

ethnic and a class position;

each class/ethnic group con 

tains ethnic/class differences.

Thus, ve will assert that

ethnicity and class are interrelated
grounding in material practice)

and class

(via their commo n

in a manner much more

complex than is suggested by the
and coincidence.

ideal types of competition

In other words,

we cannot study ethnicity

independently of one another,

affiliations
therefore,

Ideal types rather

(cf. Marger 1978,

p. 21).

but as integrated
What is needed,

is an analytical device which will enable us to

explore the intricacies of the

interrelationship between

ethnicity and class.
Accordingly,

we believe that a basic unit of analysis

for gr o up action is the "e t h - c l a s s " (adapted from Gordon
1964, p.

51); that is, social

ethnicity and class

location in terms of both

(e.g., British capitalist class,

Italian-American w o rk ing class.

Black middle class).

In
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our view,

the major advantage of the notion of eth-class is

that it allows us to analyze both class interests within
ethnic groups and ethnic divisions within classes--the
different material bases for actio n for different eth-class
segments.

At the same time,

it is essential to emphasize

that we are employing eth-class

in a sense which is d r a m a t 

ically different from that of Gordon--or Abram Leon's

(1970)

similar notion of "people class".'*

Is an

For us, eth-class

analytical tool, more valuable as an objective category than
as a concrete basis for action or the subjective
which ipso facto accompanies such a category.®

identity
Indeed,

it

is rare that an individual or group would develop an "ethclass consciousness" along the lines of class or ethnic
co n sc io us nes s.0

For example,

likely to vi e w themselves

working class Blacks are more

(and to mobilize

for action)

as

Black or working class rather than as Black working class.
If we assert that eth-class
category,

is primarily an objective

h ow do we make the tr ansition from eth-class to

group action along ethnic or class lines?

In general,

we

accept the proposition that individuals and groups act to
pursue material interests and to ensure survival
Patterson 1975).

(cf.

Each eth-class segment has unique material

interests which reflect a blend of ethnic and class int er
ests.7

Depending upon whether

class or ethnic terms

interests are defined

(see T ho m p s o n — 1983,

class vs. ethnic economic interests),

in

pp. 129-30— on

mobilization for group
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a c t i o n (and the assertion of identity)

can occur along

either ethnic/national or class lines,

involving ad hoc

combinations or "alliances'1 of eth-classes

(e.g.,

the

alliance between the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and working
classes).

Furthermore,

e thn ic and cla ss

the differing constellations of

interests may impel various eth-classes to

a d o p t different strategies,
m a y be cloaked

even though the ultimate action

in similar ethnic or class terms with regard

to other groups

(cf. Se e-- 19 86— on different material

interests of Protestant capitalist and working classes

in

Northern Ireland, yet the similarity of their ethnic as se r
t i o n vs. Catholics).

In modern society,

the general goal of

eth-class alliances is to advance interests by seeking to
a t t a i n or to

influence state power

(i.e., to realize greater

inclusion or exclusion of subordinate groups);

that is,

mobilization will occur within a national context
and Engels 1964,

(cf. Marx

p. 22).®

On a general level,

a rough typ olo gy of potential eth-

cl as s alliances might be as follows:
1.

Ethnic m o b i l i z a t i o n .

This would involve group

mobilization al ong ethnic lines, a cross-class alliance
(elite, working class, etc.)
particular et hn ic group.
the

of the eth-class units of a

Such an alliance could occur in

face of real or perceived oppression or ethnic-based

challenges to the status quo.

To some extent,

it may also

reflect the a bi li ty of the ethnic elite to manipulate the
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symbolic content of group identity (or, from a Marxian
standpoint,

"false consciousness" on the part of the ethnic

working class).

One concomitant of ethnic mobilization is

increased assertion

(i.e., strengthening)

of ethnic

identity.
2.

National m o b i l i z a t i o n .

at the level of the nation-state;
cross-ethnic" alliance.

Like

This

is ethnic mobilization

that is, a "cross-class,

its ethnic counterpart,

national mobilization may reflect real or perceived material
and political
eth-classes
group).

interests and/or manipulation by hegemonic

(i.e.,

the bourgeoisie of the dominant ethnic

One outcome of national mobilization may be the at

least te mporary muting of ethnic identities
tion);

however,

national

(i.e.,

assimila

attempts by dominant ethnic groups to cast

identity in their image may trigger ethnic m o b i l i 

zation on the part of subordinate groups

(e.g., the Civil

Rights Movement by Black Americans during the 1960s and the
ethnic resurgence among White Ethnics as responses to the
hegemony of WASPs
3.

in shaping "American" national

Ethnic m e r g e r .

identity).

A third type of mobilization

entails the super imposition of eth-class matrices upon one
another,

either via the absorption of one group by another,

or through the merger of two or more groups
ethnic" group.*
band together

into a new "p an 

Mergers would generally occur as groups

(or are

forced together)

to assert interests
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vis-a-vis other entities.

In this case, the outcome

is the

change of one or more ethnic identities.
4.

Class m o b i l i z a t i o n .

This

is a "cr oss-ethnic”

alliance— the unifying of eth-classes and the assertion of
interests along class lines.
outcome here is a diminution
irreversible)

For

our purposes,

the key

(although not necessarily

of ethnic ties.

At this abstract level, we have little more to add to
our conceptual discussion of eth-class.

The eth-class

alliances we have described above should be viewed as
temporary arrangements,

as social movements which seek

to

alter the institutional and ideological contexts of group
relations,
ings

including the redefinition of ethnic u nd er sta nd

(cf. Omi and W i n a n t — 1986--on racial formation).

More

over, these alliances are not necessarily mut ua lly e x c l u 
sive, more than one may occur si mul taneously within a
society (the United States is a prime example

of this).

With respect to the conditions under which eth-class a l l i 
ances emerge
ethnic lines,

(i.e.,

whv mobilization occurs along class vs.

or vice-versa,

or along both lines), much

remains unaddressed at this juncture.

In addition, we have

yet to assess the impact of such factors as the number and
relative size of eth-class units and the dur at ion of ethclass alliances.
analyze

These

issues will be developed when ve

intergroup relations in his to rically specific

c i rc um st an ce s.
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Structural Context;

Capitalist Development

Our attempt to address issues of ethnicity and
nationality begins with our central thesis:
The evolution of ethnic and national identities
(i.e.. the formation of eth-class alliances) can
only be understood in the context of the process
of global capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t .
This is not to assert that capitalist development per se
"explains” the evolution of ethnic and national

identities,

but that capitalist development constitutes the structural
context,

the most general basis for explanation.

In our

opinion,

current theories of ethni cit y and nationality

(which we criticized in Chapter III) either lack a basic
motor force or employ processes

(e.g., modernization,

industrialization) which we believe are corollaries of
capitalist development.

Thus,

are to be better comprehended,

if ethnicity and nationality
then they must be d e l i b e r 

ately linked to the dynamics of global capitalist d e v e l o p 
ment .
Why are we emphasizing capitalist development as the
most general explanation for the evolution of ethnicity and
nationality?

As we noted earlier,

the dominant means

through which humans produce their subsistence
1800 world,

(in the post-

this is the capitalist mode of production)

will

have significant effect upon social existence

(cf. Marx

1970, pp.

this influence

20-21).

In the case of capitalism,

has been particularly pervasive.
millennium,

Over the past half

capitalism has revolutionized the production of

material

life, which

in turn has transformed social

through such processes as proletarianization;
of market relations;

life

the domination

the emergence of mass institutions,

mass society, and even mass communication on a world scale;
and the production and dissemination of new technologies and
ideologies.

Unlike other social

talist empires),

formations

(e.g.,

precapi

capitalism transformed entire societies,

destroying previous systems of production

(either de li be r

ately or by dint of superior productivity)

and increasing

the sw ay of market relations.

Furthermore,

process of capitalist expansion

the ceaseless

(i.e., a c c u m u l a t i o n - - c f .

Marx 1906) and the advances

in technology

tion, arms)

internationalization of capital

facilitated the

(e.g.,

tr an sp ort a

ism to the extent that by the end of the nineteenth century,
the effects of capitalism had occurred,

in varying forms, on

a global level.
For the purposes of this analysis,

the most

important

effect of capitalist development was its effect upon the
nature of the human penchant
formation.

for communally-based group

The revolutionization of relations of pr odu c

tion and the development of a generalized system of domina
tion via the market and civil society led to the
cation and extension of socio-economic systems,

intensifi
the erosion

of traditional social bonds, and the creation of n ew forms
of group affiliation.

What is important to understand is

that the impact of the emergence of capitalism was not a
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simple matter of the disappearance of "non-rational" commu
nal identities in the face of the logic of market criteria.
Instead,

it involved a complex interaction between the

dynamics of capitalist development and the human propensity
for group formation.

In other words,

the transformation of communal
"ethnic" affiliations

what transpired was

identities:

pre-existing

(relatively autonomous Gem einschaft-

like social relations, with a Durkheimian "collective con
science")

became means of domination and exploitation;

of

competition; and of mobilization and mutual aid--in each
case reflecting material and political claims vis-a-vis
other groups.

Thus,

the symbolic and cultural content of

ethnicity became a means for group mobilization and boundary
maintenance in the course of

intergroup competition in a

social system shaped by capitalist production, ma rket rela
tions, and the capitalist state.
Yet perhaps the greatest
ment on communal identities
global

level.

The

impact of capitalist develop

involved its effects on the

internationalization of capitalism--the

expansion of the Western European economy into a worldeconomy

(cf. Wallerstein 1974a;

1974b;

19 80 )— brought

together previously separate groups through such processes
as colonization and voluntary and involuntary labor
migr at ion .3-0

This intergroup contact occurred between

continents and across oceans,

a quantitative change

in the

number of meetings between people on a scale thereto unseen

126
(Stavrianos 1982,

p. 140).

was the qualitative change

Even more significant,

however,

in the nature of intergroup

relations brought about by the exigencies of capitalist
accumulation on a global scale.
see Hughes

(1971,

Catholic Germans
deliberate

pp. 73-86)

Historical examples abound:

on the mixing of Protestant and

in the Ruhr valley;

importation of Indians

(1961)

on the

into Uganda and other

African possessions by the British;
African slave trade; and Magubane

Koebner

Williams

(1944)

on the

(1979, pp.

55-70)

on the

forcible alteration of native culture by the British in
South Africa.

Furthermore,

modern capitalist state,

with the ascendance of the

interstate competition,

imperialism, and anti-colonial resistance,
ties emerged,

thereby adding yet another

to intergroup rel ati on s.11

Clearly,

core

national

identi

level of complexity

capitalist development

has radically altered both the context and the nature of
communally based group formation.
Inasmuch as we have asserted that capitalist d e v e l o p 
ment constitutes the main context for the evolution of
ethnic and national identities,

it is essential that we

specify those processes inherent in capitalist development
which shape this evolution.

The main dynamic propelling

capitalist development

(i.e., expansion,

productive activities)

is a c c u m ul at io n— the expanded re p ro 

duction of capital.

As Marx

(1906)

is motivated not by acquisitiveness,

intensification of

observed, accumulation
but by sur v iv al — the
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need to increase size or produ ct ivi ty in order to withstand
competition from other capitalist entities.
of capitalist accumulation is not smooth,
contradictions
tion;

(e.g.,

profit squeeze;

Yet the process

it is rife with

falling rate of profit;
state expenditure)

under co nsu mp

which become ma n i 

fest during periods of c ri si s--the disruption of a c c um ul a
tion

(cf. Wright 1977;

Shaikh 1978; A lca ly 1978).

Thus, we

can understand the seemingly ceaseless quest for markets,
resources,

investment opportunities,

and cheap labor po we r—

the internationalization of capital and the formation of the
global e c o no my — as the v irt ual ly inevitable outcome of the
basic motor force of capitalism.
Uneven Development and Ethnic/National
For our purposes,
capitalist development
world-system.

what

Identities

is particularly important about

is the nature of its expansion into a

In this context,

our next key proposition

is:

A major factor in the evolution of ethnic and
national identities has been the uneven nature of
capitalist development as characterized by the
core-peripherv d i v i s i o n .
Uneven development

(i.e., periods of relative advantage

different regions)

is endemic to capitalism

9); that is,

it is grounded

in the competitive,

nature of commodity production.
uneven development

(Frank 1967,

for
p.

privatized

This is not to assert that

is unique to capitalism;

indeed,

the

technological advances linked to capitalism enabled Western
Europe to "leapfrog" past more developed Middle Eastern and
Oriental societies and to create a European-dominated world-
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economy {Stavrianos 1982, p.

35; Wolf 1982).

uneven capitalist development

Nevertheless,

is a qualitatively different

phenomenon due to the internationalization of capitalism and
the degree to whic h capitalist production relations altered
the nature of social life.

Moreover,

to speak of uneven

capitalist development is not to describe
isolated empires,
w o rl d- ec on o my .

but between societies

As a consequence,

inequality between

integrated

into a

the experiences of peoples

in developed and less-developed areas are

inexorably inter

twined .
How is uneven development
ethnic and national

linked to the evolution of

identities?

Historically,

uneven

development--and the domination of less-developed countries
by more powerful o n e s — has followed existing social cleav
ages,

particularly geographic and cultural boundaries

(Wallerstein 1974b,

pp. 86-87),

and at the societal

level.

both within nation-states

Thus,

ethnic and national

identities became relations of domination and exploitation-and of resistance.
tion

Through social and ideological reproduc

(cf. Bordieu 1977),

these ethnic and national divisions

became an aspect of material life;

indeed,

intergroup

differences were often reified as an "explanation"
inequality (Chang 1985; Genovese 1968,

p. 32).

for

As we will

argue below, these different material experiences produced
different trajectories of ethnic and national relations.
essence,

In

then, one could assert that ethnicity and national-
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ity in the current world-system are a reflection of the
interaction of uneven development and previous s o c i o 
cultural cleavages.12
The notions of core and p er iph er y

(cf. Amin 1974,

1980;

Wallerstein 1974b) are useful for describing two fundamen
tally different paths of capitalist development--and the
resulting differential evolution of ethnic and national
identities.12

Core describes those nation-states

United States, Western Europe,

Japan)

high level of economic development,
fied economy,

characterized by a

a complex and d i v e r s i 

and a relatively high level of national

gration in terms of political and social
contradistinction,
America,

(e.g.,

institutions.

periphery describes areas

Africa, Asia)

(e.g.,

In

Latin

which exhibit relatively low levels

of economic development and diversification
centration on relatively few products)
levels of national

inte

integration.

(i.e., c o n 

and relatively low

Yet core-periphery is more

than a description,

it is a relationship in which one pr e 

supposes the other.

Core-periphery relations are those of

economic and political domination and subjugation,

relations

which are reproduced through such mechanisms as c o l o n i z a 
tion, dependent development,
unequal exchange.

capital repatriation,

and

Wh at we are confronting are two different

paths of capitalist development:

the core, where the p r o 

cess of capitalist development was relatively slow and
autonomous and fueled by the exploitation of the resources
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and labor power of the periphery; and the periphery,

whose

process of capitalist development was introduced by the core
and subsequently distorted to conform to the needs of the
core

(e.g., the destruction of the Indian textile industry

by the British concurrent with the construction of an
infrastructure to facilitate the export of raw materials-Stavrianos 1982, p.

277).

What remains to be explored

is

how this core-periphery division was manifest in the
evolution of ethnicity and nationality.
Communal

Identities and Post-1800 Capitalist Development

At this juncture,

we have discussed in general terms

the revolutionary impact of capitalism on pre-existing
social relations and the expansive forces propelling the
internationalization of capitalist production relations.
addition,

In

we have observed uneven nature of the process of

capitalist development which in turn resulted in an i nt e g r a 
ted world-economy structured for the benefit of the powerful
core nations.

As we enter the post-1800 era, we find this

uneven internationalization proceeding apace, as the c a p i 
talist world-economy expands rapidly from its European base.
By the nineteenth century,
overseas exploration,

the age of "plunder"

(i.e.,

the

slaving, and l oo ti ng --M ar x's " p r i m i 

tive ac cum ul at i on "— which served as a source of capital

for

European expansion) and mercantilism had largely passed,

and

the industrializing core powers were embarking upon an era
of colonization of the periphery

(i.e., Asia, Africa,

the
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Caribbean) which met the need for new markets,
raw materials,

and outlets for investment.

need to overcome domestic obstacles

(i.e.,

sources of

Driven by the
contradictions)

to continued capitalist ac cum ulation and by

interstate

competition among colonial p ow ers ,14 core imperialism
resulted in a wor ld-economy which by 1900 was virtually
completely dominated by Western Europe and the United
States.1 *

Again,

what must be emphasized is both the scope

of nineteenth century European expansion and

the u n p r e c e 

dented nature of its e f f e c t s - - i .e ., the transformation of
peripheral social structures to serve the ne e ds of core
capitalist accumulation.
One noteworthy aspect of the expansion of the c a p i t a l 
ist world-eco no my was that it was neither a uniform nor
unitary process.

Instead,

per iphery relations)

core

imperialism

(i.e., co re -

and global capitalist accumulation

involved the articulation of a va ri et y of subprocesses,
with different

each

implications for intergroup contact and the

evolution of ethnic and national
purposes,

a

identities.

For our

we will consider briefly two issues most c l o s e l y

linked to intergroup relations:

colonization and labor

migration.
Colonization.

Political and economic domination of

periphery by the core took several

forms, e a c h with--as

will discuss later in the chapter--different
ethnic and national

identities.

effects on

the
we
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1.

Settler c o l o n i e s .

United States,
Australia)

Canada,

These were societies

Palestine-Israel,

(e.g.,

New Zealand, and

created by core conquest and the replacement of

the indigenous population

(often eliminated via genocide)

through large scale migration from Europe.
several purposes for the core:
unwanted population

This served

a safety valve for excess or

(thereby reducing domestic conflict);

locus for investment;

a new market for core commodities;

a source of raw materials and agricultural goods.

a
and

Varia

tions on this pattern include societies where settlers
constituted a small but dominant min ority
Africa)

(e.g.,

South

or a smaller majority partially amalgamated with

native peoples

(e.g., Latin America).

Given cultural and

institutional similarity to the colonial power,
colonies tended to achieve political
earlier stage.

settler

independence at an

Following independence,

indigenous peoples

were often subject to domination by settler groups.
2.

Traditional c o l o n i e s .

These were peripheral

societies conquered by the core and governed di rectly by a
colonial administration for the economic and strategic
benefit of the core.

Overall migration from the core was on

a much smaller scale,

consisting of administrators and

support personnel,

military,

representatives of core c a p i 

tal, and independent entrepreneurs and adventurers.
the vantage point of the colonized nation,
colonization included:

From

the impacts of

distorted or inhibited development
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{i.e.,

economic development consonant with the needs of the

core--e.g.,
products);

export of selected raw materials or agricultural
partial proletarianization

(i.e./ creation of a

wage labor force through disruption of traditional ac ti vi 
ties,

enclosure,

taxation,

etc.— yet with wages often below

subsistence levels); and inhibition of the development of
indigenous economic and political

institutions.

The bulk

of these "traditional colonies" only became independent

in

the post-1945 era, most remain on the periphery of the
worId-economy.
3.

Autonomous but dominated s o c i e t i e s .

These were

semiperipheral or peripheral societies which escaped con 
quest and colonization

(often due to intra-core rivalries),

yet were economically (and occasionally politically) d o m i 
nated by the core
Europe,

(e.g., China,

Ottoman Empire,

post-independence Latin America).

Eastern

One result of

this core economic domination was underdevelopment
distorted capitalist development);

however,

these effects

were mitigated somewhat by political autonomy.
extent,

(i.e.,

To some

there exist parallels between these societies and

the post-colonial experience of the traditional colonies
(i.e.,

political

independence but eco nomic domination by

core-based transnational corporations).
Labor m i g r a t i o n .

Core colonization and the evolution

of the world-economy also provided the context for mass
movements of peoples from one area of the globe to a n 
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other.1®

As mentioned above,

settler colonies provided an

outlet for economically displaced persons, adventurers,

and

political and religious refugees from both the colonial
power and other core nations

(e.g., Ge rm an and Scandinavian

immigrants to the United States).

Within "traditional

colonies," migrat io n from the core was more limited;
ever,

the labor

force was of te n supplemented by the

t at ion of workers

from other colonies

(e.g.,

h ow
impor

Indians and

A sia ns as contract laborers within the British empire).
The plantation economies of the Southern United States,
Caribbean, and South America were buttressed by the
tary

importation of African labor--i.e.,

the

involun

the slave trade.

A subsequent but analytically related phenomenon
involved "reverse" migration from the periphery to the core.
Incomplete proletarianization

in the periphery and s e m i 

pe ri phe ry disrupted traditional economic pursuits
agriculture);

however, development

(e.g.,

(distorted by core

domination) was not sufficient to absorb this surplus
population.

Gi v e n the lower historical

levels of wages in

peripheral societies and the need of core capital
labor,

for cheap

a frequent result was mass migration from the peri

ph ery to the core,
gro up relations.1-7

thus cre at in g a new setting for

inter

Whatever the direction of movement,

each of these processes is grounded in core capitalist
expansion, each ca n be linked to different experiences of
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intergroup relations and both class-based and ethnicallybased

identities.

Capitalist D e v e l o p m e n t ;

A Summary

Thus far, we have presented a brief outline of those
aspects of capitalist development which we deem most rel e
vant to understanding the evolution of ethnic and national
identities.

We have emphasized the need to view the global

evolution of capitalism as a constellation of Integrated
p r o c e s s e s — capitalist accumulation,
core-periphery relations.

Indeed,

uneven development,

and

one problematic aspect of

m a n y works is the artificial sundering of such fundamentally
interrelated processes.
dent development,
events,

For example,

colonization,

depen

and labor migration are not isolated

but threads

in a larger historical tapestry.

post-1800 world-economy,

In the

what transpired was the expansion

of Western Eur opean capitalism,

an event which effected an

unprecedented transformation of social relations on a
worldwide scale.
With respect to ethnicity and nationality,

our argument

is that the emerge nc y and evolution of capitalism has tr an s
formed the nature of communal relations.

Given the uneven

nature of global capitalist development and the broad and
dive rs e contacts between peoples,

ethnicity and nationality

became an aspect of material relations, a tool for d om in a
tion,
have

competition,

and r e s i s t a n c e .x*

In other words, we

intimated that the specific nature of intergroup
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contact,

along wi th position in the world-economy/

the nature of subsequent

intergroup relations;

evolution of ethnic and national

identities.

shaped

that is, the
Accordingly,

in the next section we will seek to link specific outcomes
to the world-system processes described above.

Working Hypotheses
Although we have asserted that the evolution of ethnic
and national

identities has been shaped by the dynamics of

global capitalist development,
has been rather general.

our discussion to this point

Consequently,

in this section we

will present a series of "working hypotheses"

in which we

will attempt to link different historical experiences of
ethnicity and nationality to processes of the world-system.
The ter m "working hypotheses" has b e e n selected

intention

ally so as to underscore the exploratory nature of this
work.

By working hypotheses we do not mean specific,

empirically testable propositions,

but rather more general

statements which represent a first attempt to describe
relationships between our key concepts.

In other words,

these working hypotheses will serve as guideposts for the
application of our framework to spe cific cases.

Further

development of our framework will of course necessitate
elaboration of these notions.
As will soon become evident, a major basis for o rga ni 
zation of these hypotheses

is the core-periphery division.

Within the context of global capitalist development in the
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post-1800 world-economy,

the radically different experiences

of core and periphery led to different historical patterns
of ethnic and national relations.

We are in essence de 

scribing two different types of et hn ici ty and nationality
(core and peripheral) which are linked together by the
dynamics of the capitalist world-system.

This

is not to

assert that the core-periphery distinction explains all
variations in ethnic and national

identities,

but rather

that it constitutes a first cut with our analytical scalpel.
Indeed,

these hypotheses are grounded

issues raised in Chapter
the world-system

in the conceptual

II, as well as the subprocesses

(e.g., types of colonization,

tion) described above.

of

labor m i g r a 

Additional de tai l will be provided

at the end of the section,

when we d is cus s the evolution of

ethnicity and nationality in historically specific circum
stances .
Ethnicity and Nationality in the Core
Nationality.
1.

In the core,

the emergence of nations wa s roughly

concurrent wit h capitalist development and the forma
tion of the modern s t a t e — an e n t i t y which would fa cil i
tate

(as opposed to control) m a r k e t relations and

maintain the basis of bourgeois domination.

This

process of national emergence included the evolution of
nationalism

(the ideological ass er t io n of national
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self-determination,
the nation-state)
2.

mass sovereignty, and loyalty to

and nationality.

Given their relatively slower and more autonomous

process of nation-building,
more complete

core societies tend to be

(Amin 1980, p. 20); that is, they exhibit

higher levels of national integration and national
affiliation
3.

(Horowitz 1985;

Till y 1975).

The process of nation-building facilitated core

capitalist development by homogenizing and unifying
societies,

by providing mass support for imperialism,

and by reducing class conflict

(by providing an a l t e r 

native— national mobilization--to mobilization along
class lines).

Capitalist development in turn f aci li

tated nation-building by increasing the role of the
state, by allowing subordinate eth-classes to enjoy
some of the benefits of colonial exploitation via
increased standards of living,

and by stimulating

nationalism through rivalries with other core nations
(cf. Ehrenreich 1983).

A.

National

identities do not emerge de n o v o , but

rather through intergroup interaction (i.e.,
mobilization or nation-building).
identities are negotiated and/or

national

Thus, national
imposed;

relations of power between eth-classes.

they reflect
The ho mo g en i

zation inherent in national mobilization often means
the creation of a national identity in the

image of the
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dominant ethnic group, with consequent variation in
intensity of affiliation a mo ng subordinate groups
(e.g.,

the attempt to base "A mer ic an1* identity on

Anglo-American ethnicity--and
engendered
5.

from other groups).

At the same time,

nations

the responses this

uneven development within core

(or annexation of a contiguous area,

by uneven development),

the

ideology of the right of

self determination of peoples,
through coercion)

followed

and the attempt

(often

to create homogeneous national

iden

tities gave rise to ethno-national movements on the
part of subordinate but not assimilated peoples within
the core

(e.g., peripheral areas within core nations

such as Wales, Quebec,

and Corsica).

Thus,

nationalism contains a contradictory element

core
in terms

of facilitating capitalist development.
Ethnicity.
1.

In general, ethnicity in core societies has u n d e r 

gone a transformation from a Gemei nsc ha ft-like culture
group to a Ge sel lschaft-like

interest group

Steinberg 1981, pp.

Modernization and pr o le 

52-57).

(cf.

tarianization did not lead to the disappearance of
ethnicity,

neither did increased cultural similarity

necessarily result

in assimilation

(both of which had

been assumed by pre-1960 sociologists).
ethnic groups have

Instead,

increasingly become symbolic or ga ni 
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zational types,

the role of vh ic h is to assert ma ter ia l

and political claims

(cf. G a n s — 1979— on "symbolic

e t h n i c i t y " ).
2.

W it hi n this overall pattern,

"submerged nations";

one subtrend involves

that is, hist or ica lly autonomous

regions within the core which were annexed or conquered
by more powerful groups,

but not totally assimilated

into the larger nation-state
Quebec,

Native Americans).

(e.g., Wales,

Corsica,

In these cases,

ethnic

identity has pe r s i s t e d — although considerable a c c u l 
turation may have occurred--due to uneven economic
development and economic and cultural domination

(i.e.,

what some would term "internal colonialism") and m a y
even give rise to ethno-national movements seeking
autonomy.
3.

A second subtrend has occurred within

societies"

"settler

(i.e., Canada, the United States, Australia,

New Zealand, and pre-1967 P a l e s t i n e - I s r a e l ) where the
indigenous population was vi rtu al ly eliminated and
replaced by European migrant groups.

In these cases,

successive waves of voluntary migrants
migration from periphery to core;

(i.e., labor

the involuntary

importation of labor to the core — i.e.,

African sl aves

to the United States--is a special case and will be
treated later) underwent either

full assimilation an d

absorption into the dominant group or partial assimila-
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tion and evolution into a "symbolic"

identity.

This

trend was the result of the effects of class and
national mobilization;

the economic,

political,

and

cultural hegemony of the dominant settler group and a
period of internal settlement and economic expansion
(i.e., movement into the core)

which facilitated

(and

relied upon) the absorption of large numbers of
i m m i gr an ts .
4.

A new phase of intergroup contact and ethnic rela

tions has resulted from the

(largely) post-1945 labor

migration from the periphery to the core.
cases

(e.g.,

"guestworkers"

wealth immigrants
Asians

In these

in Western Europe;

in Great Britain;

in the United States),

Co mm on

Hispanics and

assimilation m ay be more

problematic due to changing conditions of accumulation
(e.g.,

emergence of the service economy and labor

market segmentation).
Ethnicity and Nationality in the Periphery
1.

With regard to nationality in the periphery, a key

factor appears to be the specific nature of contact
with the core

(e.g., colonialism vs. relative autonomy

under the suz erainty of a core power).

Indeed,

very nature of peripheral capitalist development
subsequent ethnic and national relations)

the
(and

is different

if for no other reason than the existence of the core
(e.g., dependent development;

increased ethnic contact-
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-due to infrastructural development--prior to any
significant national mobilization).

In general,

soc ie

ties experiencing higher levels of core penetration
(i.e., depth, duration)

tend to be less ,,co m p l e t e ,,

nation-states with lower levels of integration and
national mobilization.
2.

The effect of core colonial domination of the

periphery upon the evolution of ethnic and national
identities was shaped by such forces as:
a.

the nature and level of development of p re

colonial society
b.

(cf. Rex 1981).

the identity of the colonial power and the

time and duration of colonial occupation
example,

the earlier

(for

independence of Latin America

due to its colonization by weaker powers such as
Spain and Portugal).
c.

specific colonial policies

of foreign laborers,

(e.g.,

importation

reliance upon specific groups

for soldiers or state of fi c i a l s - - c f . Horowitz
1985; political boundaries which reflected the
interests of the colonial power rather than the
ethnic divisions of subjugated peoples).
d.

the exigencies of capitalist accumulation

(e.g.,

labor requirements of specific enterprises,

specific forms of labor control--plantations,
labor,

e t c .).

wage
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e.

the structuring of post-colonial society

(e.g., the deliberate
ethnic interests

institutionalization of

in L eb an on and Malaysia;

existence of colonial "settlers"

the

in Latin Ameri ca

and South Africa).
3.

Nationalism in the periphery emerged largely as a

response to core domination an d
nation of the core
nation."

ideology of

in part to the d i s s e m i 
"national sel f- de te rm i

Thus, nationalism is a contradiction of

capitalism:

on the

one hand,

it facilitated

(via the

rise of powerful states based upon the nationality of
the majority) core domination of the world-economy;
the other hand,

it has served as a means

on

of resisting

and ultimately limiting core hegemony (via "anticolo
nial" n a t i o n a l i s m ) .
4.

In peripheral a r e a s which experienced core d o m i n a 

tion, attempts at nati on- bui ld ing often followed the
establishment of a po litically autonomous state

(cf.

Rejai and Enloe's— 1 9 6 9 — notion of "s tat e-nation").
Thus, the cultural and

institutional basis

for national

integration tends to be more fragile, w i t h nationality
based upon resistance to core

imperialism.

To the

extent that nation-building occurs, national identities
are created through
flict)

intergroup

interaction

in a manner similar to the core.

(and c o n 
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5.

Peripheral ethnic identities tend to be stronger

and more salient, almost in inverse proportion to the
strength of national

identity

(e.g., Guyanese primary

identification vith the ethnic group— Creole or East
Indian--as opposed to the nation).
the core,

ethnic

In contrast with

identities tend to have a stronger

Ge mei ns ch af t-like component and to be less
Given lower levels of national
conflict

is often "national"

Sikhs and Hindus

interethnic

in character as groups

strive for self-determination
between Tamils and Sinhalese

integration,

"symbolic".

(e.g., current conflicts
in Sri Lanka;

between

in India).

Ethnicity and Nationality in Specific Circumstances
Although the above working hypotheses provide a general
framework for explaining the evolution of ethnic and
national

identities,

t h e y cannot account for all variation.

While we have suggested that the co re -pe ri phe ry distinction
reflects two different trajectories

of ethnic and national

relations, each of which contains considerable similarity of
experience,

each category nevertheless subsumes considerable

differentiation.
national

Clearly,

the evolution of ethnic and

identities in the United States has been different

from that of Great Britain;

the experience of South Africa

is different from that of India or of Peru.
spective,

From our p e r 

explanation of such differences can only come

from

an analysis of the historically specific circumstances sur-
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rounding each case or constellation of interrelationships.
Accordingly,
must

the development of our theoretical

framework

include a consideration of those aspects of social

systems which we believe are

important

evolution of ethnic and national
the nation-state.

in understanding the

identities at the level of

In our examination of particular cases,

we will emphasize the following factors:

the nature of the

eth-class system;

the nature of the political system; and

the nature of the

intergroup "are na .”

The nature of the eth-class s y s t e m .
unique eth-class system;
structure,

that

is, ethnic composition,

class

and the distribution of ethnic groups across the

class structure

(i.e., eth-classes).

concrete situations,

In the analysis of

a key co nsideration

material and political

inclusion vs. autonomy;

involves the

interests of eth-class units and the

strategies selected to advance these
exclusion vs.

vs. ethnic mo bil ization).3-*
First,

Each society has a

interests

(e.g.,

incorporation;

class

Two factors seem crucial here.

the number and relative size of groups and classes

(and eth-class units) affects strategic perceptions and
possibilities

(e.g.,

polarized relations

in Northern Ireland

vs. the multiethnic nature of the United States;
proportion of Native Americans
proportion of indigenous Blacks

the small

in the United States vs.
in South Africa).

the

The

second factor is the existence of certain eth-class units
(e.g., minority intelligentsia,

elites,

and working class)
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which have historically assumed a k e y role in ethnic mo b i l i 
zation

(cf. See--1986--on the role of the French-Canadian

clergy in supporting English-Canadian rule in nineteenth
century Q u e b e c ) .

For our purposes,

the crux of the matter

is whether or not interests are perceived and articulated

in

ethnic terms.
With respect to the evolution of eth-class structure,
it is essential to examine the reproduction of such systems.
Inasmuch as the

institutional superstructure of a society

tends to reflect existing relations

of power and domination,

these relations tend to be reproduced

intergenerationally

through differential access to key resources
tion, networks).

In this context,

economic mobility,

(e.g., e d u c a 

such factors as degree of

permeability of ethnic boundaries,

and

the degree of mobility possible while maintaining minority
group affiliation

influence the selection of assimilative

vs. assertive strategies.
would

Rigid boundaries,

for example,

increase the likelihood and intensity of intergroup

conflict.

Thus,

strategic options

(e.g., the formation of

eth-class alliances and the manipulation of group ties) are
constrained by structural realities.
The nature of the political s y s t e m .

Given our a s s e r 

tion that eth-class alliances occur within a national c o n 
text,

that is, within a nation-state,

state is essential to understanding
(cf. Khleif 1985).

then a theory of the

intergroup relations

To speak of the state in modern capi ta l
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ist s o ci et y is to speak of concentrated social and economic
power

(e.g., military and police powers, state expenditures)

in an institution w h i c h affects virtually ever y sphere of
social

life.

Without undue elaboration,

our view of the

stat* is as a tempo rar y accommodation which represents
relations of power between social groups.

State actions

reflect the interests of dominant classes and groups,
constrained

(to va ry in g degrees)

of subordinate g r o u p s . 20

by the oppositional power

Moreover,

the state is not a

monolithic entity but consists of subinstitutions which
reflect different constellations
In essence,

of interests.

the state is both an actor

of ethnic and class struggle.

On one hand,

in and an object
socially defined

ethnic meanings are embedded in political processes,

while

state decisions have varying impacts on different eth-class
segments.

On the other hand, gro up claims are political

claims made towards the state;

group mobilization is a

social movement aimed at altering the political balance of
power.

Thus,

in an ethnically divided soci ety the state

shaped b y current et hn ic ideologies;

however,

is

these ideolo

gies ma y change in response to challenges to the established
order

(cf. Omi and Wi nan t-1 98 6— on the response of the U.S.

state to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s
and to the

"White backlash" of the 1970s and 1980s).

short, the

"balance" between groups, as both mediated by and

reflected

in the state,

is con sta nt ly changing.

In
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Accordingly,
key factor

the nature of the political system is a

in intergroup relations.

The relative power of

groups and the perceived legitimacy of the dominant grou p
will shape both demands on the state
absolute power might

(e.g.,

relatively

inhibit subordinate g r o u p mobilization

b y lowering the perceived chances of success)
res ponses.21

and state

Similarly,

the balance between group claims

and the claims of others

(e.g.. White suprem acy vs. Black

equality in South Africa) will condition both the incidence
and the intensity of group c on f l i c t . 22
of the formal political structure
if ethnic cleavages are
state st r u c t u r e — e.g.,
al representation,

Finally,

the nature

itself is important,

for

institutionalized in the formal
ethnic political parties,

pr o p o r t i o n 

e thn ic "niches” , legitimacy of ethnic

based claims--then gro up identities will remai n a salient
basis for action

(cf. M a r g e r ’s--1985,

pp. 81-81--notion of

corporate p l u r a l i s m ) .
The nature of the

interaroup a r e n a .

If we are to

attempt to explain the evolution of ethnic and national
identities

in historically specific circumstances,

then

it

is useful to take inventory of factors which vary from
milieu to milieu and which affect
Historically,

intergroup interaction.

aspects of the physical environment have

shaped material activities and gr o up relations.
example,

For

location al o ng trade routes or the existence of

valued resources were reflected

in patterns of exploration,

149
colonization,

and subsequent social relations

discovery of gold

in South Africa).

(e.g.,

Likewise,

the

environmental

changes which have a significant impact upon productive
activities may dramat ic all y alter the nature of
relations

(e.g.,

intergroup

the Irish potato famine and subsequent

Irish emigration to the U n i t e d States).

Even a factor such

as close proximity of immigrant groups to the
effect the evolution of g r o u p

identity

"home lan d” may

(cf. B a r k a n - - 1 9 7 7 — on

the "commuter migration" of Mexicans and French-Canadians to
the United States).
Of equal or greater importance
ethnic and national

for the evolution of

identities is the social context

which intergroup interaction occurs.
to here

in

What we are referring

is the specific so ci al structural setting in which

groups meet, as well as the particular qualities of groups
involved.

Such factors as d e m og ra ph y

the relative sizes of ethnic groups
1984a);

economy

(e.g., the changes

in

in Lebanon— Khleif

(e.g., the ability of expanding American

industry to absorb relatively unskilled immigrant labor at
the beginning of the twentieth century); economic cycles
(Weber 19S8, p.

938; Cross 1978, p.

group structure

(e.g., the

40;

Khleif 198 4b) ;23

institutional supports which

contributed to the persistence of Frenc h-C an adi an identity
in Q u e b e c — Breton 1964): and external actors

(e.g., the

impact of India on the Tami1-Sin ha les e conflict
Lanka) all influence the n a t u r e and outcome of

in Sri
intergroup
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conflict.

In each case,

it is essential to examine p ar t ic 

ular historical circumstances

in order to discern which

factors have shaped the trajectory of intergroup relations.
Our purpose

in discussing aspects of the physical and

social environment which affect

intergroup relations

to provide an exhaustive listing,
important theoretical point:
relations must be explained

is not

but rather to make an

that specific intergroup
in the context of a specific

social and spatial environment--that the evolution of ethnic
and national

identities takes place

group arena"

(Doane unpublished,

in a specific "inter

p. 17).

This

is not to

suggest that the stud y of ethnicity requires idiographic
explanations;

indeed,

our framework remains grounded

processes of the world-system,

in

for many of the variables

which operate at the level of the nation-state are shaped by
global forces.

Instead, we maintain that global processes

are mediated by the forms which they assume

in particular

circumstances and by the nature and actions of specific
social entities.

In other words,

if we want to understand

the evolution of ethnic and national
example,

the United States,

identities

in, for

then it is necessary to study

the specific course of capitalist development and the
nature of the particular groups

involved in the American

intergroup a r e n a — whether forcibly imported in chains or
peacefully recruited by steamship companies.
paraphrase Marx

(1978, p. 595),

Thus,

to

ethnic groups and na tio na l
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ities may make their own history;

however,

th ey do not make

it as they please, but under specific historical ci rcum
stances conditioned by the dynamics of global capitalist
ac cumulation.2 "4

Yet the evolution of ethnic and national

identities is a dynamic,

recursive process,

of intergroup "struggle" will
the

for the outcomes

in turn shape the nature of

"intergroup arenas" of the future.

Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented our theoretical
model

for the study of the evolution of ethnic and national

identities,

our

framework

for answering the question:

causes ethnic and national
change,
model

or di s a p p e a r ?

identities to emerge,

persist,

As we asserted at the outset,

is preliminarv in nature;

What

this

it is an attempt to recast

the study of ethnicity and nationality in the macrosociological context of global capitalist development.

Rather than

the last word on the subject, we view what we have just
presented as a preamble.

Necessary elaboration must come

through the rigors of the process of theory construction,
and by employing data from case studies and from comparative
research.
To summarize briefly,

our model rests upon the

following core assumptions:
1.

E th nic it y and nationality are one basis for group

affiliation,

Ideologies of community which may be
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asserted in intergroup resource competition.

Thus,

ethnicity and nationality have a material basis.
2.

Ethnicity/nationality and class are intertwined

inasmuch as every individual potentially possesses both
affiliations and every ethnic group/nation or class
contains divisions based upon the other affiliation.
Rather than to attempt to separate these two identi
ties, both of which are grounded

in material life, we

suggested that the eth - cl as s— social

location in terms

of both ethnicity and cl a ss — provides an objective
basis for understanding the material
lying group mobilization.
interests are perceived,

interests u n d e r 

Depending upon how material
group formation may be along

either class or ethnic lines, resulting in ad hoc
alliances of eth-classes and the assertion or masking
of ethnic and national
3.

identities.

The ultimate context for explaining the evolution

of ethnic and national

identities

global capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t .

is the process of

We suggested that

capitalism has brought about the transformation of
social life,

increased the level of interaction between

diverse peoples, and effected the metamorphosis of p r e 
capitalist communal identities into group affiliations
imbued with material content which serve as a basis
domination,

competition,

and resistance.

for

Furthermore,

the expansionist dynamic of capitalist accumulation and

the need to overcome contradictions

inherent in the

process of accumulation led to the internationalization
of capitalism and the transformation of social

identi

ties on a global scale.
4.

The uneven development of the capitalist world-

economy is an important factor
tion of ethnic and national

in explaining the ev o lu 

identities.

Manifest

in

the core-periphery relationship of domination and
exploitation,

uneven development emerged and was r ep ro 

duced on a global scale.

Inasmuch as uneven capitalist

development tended to follow existing geographical and
socio-cultural cleavages,
aspects of material life.
capitalist development

these divisions became
Thus, different levels of

are reflected

in different h i s 

torical patterns of ethnic and national relations.
Building upon these central notions,
anchor our framework

we then sought to

in the dynamics of the post-1800 world-

economy--the era of industrial capitalism and an in creasing
ly integrated world-system.
two

processes,

In particular,

we focused upon

colonization and labor migration, which we

deemed most salient to the evolution of ethnic and national
identities.

At this juncture,

we introduced our ttworking

hy potheses"— a series of rough propositions describing the
different historical paths of ethnicity and nationality in
core and peripheral societies.

These notions will serve as

organizing assumptions for the study of specific social
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settings.

As a further elaboration of our framework,

recognized that other aspects of social systems
our purposes,

(i.e.,

we
for

nation-states) also affect the evolution of

ethnic and national identities and must be taken into
consideration in explaining variations
between similar societies

(e.g.,

in ethnic experience

core-core).

we attempted to provide an initial

Consequently,

inventory of those

aspects of nation-states which we believe are most likely
to affect the course of intergroup interaction and group
identit i e s .
In sum, what we have presented

in this chapter

is a

first outline of what we perceive to be the key factors in
explaining the evolution of ethnic and national

identities.

We have sought to redirect the study of ethnicity and
nationality al ong lines which we believe will yield more
fruitful results.

At the same time,

we recognize that our

framework requires considerable elaboration and development.
As a first step

in this process,

we will attempt in the next

two chapters to employ our framework to explore the nature
of ethnicity and nationality in two case studies:
United States and South Africa.

the

CHAPTER NOTES

CHAPTER IV
1.

Although ve have maintained that ethnicity and
nationality are g r o u p phenomena, ve recognize the
problem of the link between gr o up affiliations and
individual behavior, the level at which sociological
abstractions become human experience.
This issue--the
so-called macro-micro problem (Collins 1981; Blalock
and Wilken 1979; Hechter 19 8 3 ) — involves specifying the
relationship between individual action and social
determination.
While the nature of this linkage
remains unclear, we embrace the Durkheimlan notion that
the social whole is more than the sum of its parts
(i.e., the actions of individual actors); that society
and social groups have a real ity sui g e n e r i s ; that the
group itself provides a context (i.e., shared rules and
understandings) for individual rationality and action
(Khleif 1985).
Indeed, following Berger (1963) we
posit that the relationship between individuals and
society is interactive, perhaps dialectical in nature;
that is, individual actions shape society, which in
turn conditions Individual behavior.
With respect to
the study of ethnicity and nationality, this implies
that while individual actions are shaped by group
membership, the combined (in a manner more complex than
mere addition) impact of individual experiences and
actions in turn changes the nature of group membership
(e.g., if enough individuals see no utility in group
membership and act accordingly, then the group m ay
disappear).
Although our investigation will focus upon
group relations at the macro level, we recognize that a
complete theory must include linkage to micro level
phenomena (e.g., linkage via informal social networks
which ma y affect opportunities for education, e m p l o y 
ment, e t c . ) .

2.

For a more detailed exposition of our conceptual
position, see Chapter II.

3.

See our earlier discussion of ethnic stratification in
Chapter I I .

4.

Gordon (1964) uses eth-class in the tradition of m a i n 
stream U.S. sociology; that is, as a combination of
two individual attributes.
In contrast, Leon (1970)
employs "people-class" to describe the fusion of e t h n i 
city and class among American Jews.
Our formulation
differs from both:
we use "eth-class" as a configura155
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tion of both relations of production (class) and
communal/political groupings in the context of the
nation-state.
The concept of eth-class enables us to
look within both ethnic groups and classes and to take
into account the division of one by the other.
5.

I am indebted to Professor Richard England for
directing ray attention to this issue.

6.

For an exception to this, see our description in
Chapter VI of the actions of the South African white
working class during the Rand Revolt of 1922.
See also
Cruse (1967; 1968) on abortive attempts by the Black
working class in the United States to mobilize the m 
selves during the Depression.

7.

For purposes of this analysis, there is little to be
gained by attempting to assign analytical primacy to
ethnicity (e.g., p r i m o r di al it y) or class (e.g., e t h n i 
city as an epiphenomenon of class).
The "ethnic" and
"class" material interests of an eth-class segment are
fused together, although they are expressed politically
in ethnic or class terms.
Indeed, even if we assign
analytical primacy to class (via its grounding in the
economic base of society) as opposed to ethnicity (an
ideology located in the social superstructure), their
interrelationship confounds the causal cha in in the
analysis of historically specific circumstances (i.e.,
the superstructure— ethnic rel at io ns — in turn influ
ences the b a s e — class).
If class has any determining
influence over ethnicity, it is across longer time
spans (e.g., the impact of the transition from feudal
to capitalist class relations on ethnic and national
identities).
For a discussion of this issue as it
pertains to ethnic relations, see Burawoy (1974).

8.

This is not to overlook the possibility of class or
pan-national mobilization on a level broader than that
of the nation-state (e.g., Trilateral Commission,
Second International, Pan-Arabism, "the West");
however, such processes are not, in our judgement, a
major determinant of ethnic/national identities at the
current historical moment.
With the increasing inter
connectedness of the global economy, it is likely that
such identities will become more salient in the future.

9.

See our discussion of this point

in Chapter

II.

10.

Such contact effected a decrease in the cultural
differences between groups (via diffusion), while often
increasing the social distance between groups (due to
economic and political competition).
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11.

For example, in the Near East, such factors as (1) the
incursion of the British into Egypt in the 1880s to
control, among other things, its cotton production and
the Suez Canal; (2) the incursion of both the British
and the French in the post-WWI era into the countries
of the Fertile Crescent in order to control the oil
resources of the region; and (3) the U.S. presence in
the region as successor to British hegemony in the
post-WWII era all contributed to the downplaying of the
"Millet System," the decline of the religious commu nit y
as the mainspring of identity, and the evolution of a
new community based on language and culture.
In other
words, "Christian" and Muslim" as distinct identities
were fused into something n e w — "Arab" na tionalism—
esp ecially during the 1880-1960 era.
More recently,
the destabilization of Lebanon in the 1970s was a
reversal of the usual sort of nationalism, a boost to
"confessional" divisions and the Balkanization of the
Arab countries into religious B a n t u s t a n s . Here e t h n i 
city, class, nationality, and pan-nationality become
ingredients in an imperial and sub-imperial "melting
pot" (Khleif unpublished; Rodinson 1973a, 1973b; Locke
and Stewart 1985; Semyonov and Lewis-Epstein 1987).

12.

This is not to imply, in the manner of the funct io nal 
ist perspective, that ethnicity and nationality are
historical artifacts reflecting different levels of
development.
On the contrary, we view ethnicity and
nationality as key as p e c t s — both process and o u t c o m e —
of uneven capitalist development.

13.

While world-system theory (e.g., Wallerstein 1974a;
1974b) also describes a semiperioherv (i.e., an
intermediate position wherein a state has core-like
relations with the periphery and peripheral relations
with the core), we view the se miperiphery-periphery
distinction as one of gradations within the periphery.
For us, the key distinction is the one between core and
per i p h e r y .

14.

This is not to suggest that all colonization was
dir ectly economic in nature; for example, colonization
was also an attempt to establish spheres of influence
in opposition to other core nations (see Chirot 1977,
pp. 49-54; Sweezy 1942, pp. 302-03).

15.

As Magdoff (1978, p. 29) observes, effective Eur op ean
control (including former colonies in the Americas)
increased from thirty-five to sixty-seven percent of
the land surface of the earth during the period 18001878 .
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16.

For an excellent discussion of international labor
migration, see Bonacich and Cheng (1984).

17.

Perhaps the first instance of this "reverse migration"
involved Irish workers in England (Bonacich and Cheng
1984, p. 29); other examples include Irish, Southe rn
and Eastern European, Hispanic, and A s i a n mi gr ati on to
the United States; "guestvorkers" in Western Europe;
and Commonwealth migrants to Great Britain.

18.

For an example of this point,
race in Chapter II.

19.

Thus, we are describing objective i n t e r e s t s , 'subjective
perceptions, and concrete actions.

20.

In brief, our view of the state is neither pluralist
nor elitist/instrumentalist.
While w e believe tha t
state power is in general wielded by the dominant
segments of a society (e.g., in modern capitalist
society, this would be the capitalist class of the
dominant ethnic group) for their own benefit, we
recognize that the power of subordinate segments (e.g.,
working class, ethnic minorities) acts as a constraint
on dominant group hegemony.
Thus, s t a t e power a nd
actions are shaped by class/ethnic struggle, which, in
modern society, is increasingly d ir e ct ed towards the
state.
For an in-depth exploration of this point, see
Esping-Andersen et a l.— 1977; W h i t t - - 1 9 79.

21.

See Omi and Winant (1986, pp. 72-82) on variations in
subordinate gr oup strategies (i.e., wa r of man eu ver vs.
war of position) and state responses (e.g., repression
vs. absorption or insulation) in rel a ti on to dif fe r in g
levels of power.

22.

See S c h e r m e r h o r n 's (1970,
goal definition."

23.

Interestingly, these writers disagree on the n a t u r e of
the effects of economic cycles.
Webe r (1968, p. 938)
and Cross (1978, p. 40) posit that e t h n i c identity will
become more salient during periods of slow econom ic
growth, while Khleif (1984b) describes the reawakening
of We ls h nationalism in the midst of th e post-1945
expansion of the world-economy.
This suggests for us
both the importance of social structural effects and
the need to examine these effects in relation to a
specific context.

p.

see our discussion of

78) n o t i o n of "reciprocal
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24.

Cf. Ma r x

(1978, p.

595):

Men make their own history, but they do not make
it just as they please; they do not make it under
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under ci r
cumstances di rectly found, given and transmitted
b y the past.

CHAPTER V

ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY IN THE CORE:

THE UNITE D STATES

In this chapter we will employ our theoretical frame
work to analyze the course of intergroup relations
United States.

Our purposes

in the

in doing so are twofold.

F i r s t , we believe that the framework outlined

in the p r e 

ceding chapter will enable us to attain a fuller,

more

comprehensive understanding of American ethnic history.
Such an endeavor should be the ultimate objective of any
attempt at theory development.

S e c o n d l y r we hope that

application of our hitherto abstract

framework to a concrete

historical case will provide us with an opportunity to
"flesh out" our model
usage.

Thus,

laboratory,

in the face of the demands

of actual

this chapter represents both case study and

as we seek to demonstrate the utility of our

framework while at the same time subjecting it to test and
elaboration or modification.
Our selection of the United States as our core nation
case study reflects a variety of considerations.

As we

noted in Chapter I, the United States has served as "data"
for many theories of ethnicity,
cized in Chapter III.

theories which we cri ti

Moreover,

these data have been

subjected to diverse if not diametric al ly opposing interpre
tations,

from the view of the United States as an open

society or "nation of nations"
160

(Glazer 1967) to its
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characterization as a country marked by fundamental racial
inequality

(Takaki 1987a).

Accordingly,

we

find it p a r t i c u 

larly challenging to "reanalyze” this case using our own
theoretical

model.

In addition,

American ethnic hi st or y

contains a wide va ri et y of interethnic experience,
terms of t y p e of interaction

(e.g., colonization,

both

in

migration,

involuntary migration and slavery) and number of groups
involved,

thereby providing us with the greatest possible

breadth of material

for analysis.

If our model can address

the diversity of the American case, then it should be able
to contend wi t h the analytical problems posed by ethnic
relations

in other perhaps less complex core nations.

In our
objective

examination of American ethnic history,

our

is not to produce a hist ory per s e . but rather to

undertake a theoretical

interpretation of the development of

ethnic relations in the United States.
wi l l employ our model

we

for the secondary analysis of existing

sociohistorical studies,
interpretation of these
undertaking,

Consequently,

providing a distillation and
"data."

Given the scope of this

our analysis will necessarily be painted with

broad strokes on a m ac ro

(in this case, national)

level,

emphasizing major themes and dynamics rather than specific
groups, facts,

or figures.

In keeping with the focus of

the model outlined in the previous chapter,
our discussion in the

following assumptions:

we will anchor

1.

The development of ethnic relations

in the United

States was ultimately shaped by the nature of American
capitalist development

(set,

of course,

of global capitalist development),

in the context

particularly the

exigencies of capitalist accumulation and the uneven
nature of development.

This

is especially true of the

post-1840 era.
2.

The major factor shaping the evolution of ethnic

identities was not culture,

ideology,

or values,

but

rather the strategic demands of intergroup resource
competition.
sistence,

Thus,

the emergence,

metamorphosis,

or disappearance of ethnic identities

United States

per

in the

is best interpreted as an outcome of eth-

class alliances and struggles.

For example, we would

attribute the initial persistence of Irish-American
identity to eth-class struggle

(in which various Irish-

Amer ican eth-classes banded together)
Anglo-American group.

vs.

the dominant

The more recent attenuation of

Irish-American ethnicity could be interpreted as the
result of an alliance
"ethnic merger"

(of the type which we termed

in Chapter

IV) with Anglos and other

"old stock" groups to defend their position in the face
of challenges
alliances and

from newer arrivals.

These eth-class

struggles led to the creation of s p e c i 

fic ethnic systems

(i.e., a system of stratification

and a related set of understandings governing the rela-
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tions between specific groups)--a temporary "balance of
imbalance"--which in turn provided a context for su b s e 
quent struggles

(as well as those forces which tended

to reproduce the system) and the further evolution of
ethnic identities.
Additionally,

as we develop our analysis of the American

case, we will also seek to highlight those variable aspects
of societies

(i.e., nature of the eth-class system;

of the political system;

nature

nature of the intergroup "arena")

which appear significant to an explanation of the evolution
of ethnic and national

identities.

Our examination of the course of intergroup relations
in the United States will be divided
segments:

the colonial era

century (1800-1890);

into four historical

(prior to 1800);

the nineteenth

the early twentieth century (1900-

1945); and the modern era

(1945-present).

this format will best enable us to take

We believe that

into account the

evolving nature of both the American economy and American
ethnic relations,

as these historical divisions roughly

correspond to major economic epochs
early industrialization;

(colonial;

expansion and

industrialization and movement into

the core; and the modern era), as well as eras of intergroup
relations

(settlement,

old immigration,

new immigration,

modern).

For each chronological period, we will attempt to

link the dynamics of capitalist development
tion,

uneven development)

(e.g., a c c u m u l a 

to specific forms of contact

(e.g.
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conquest, migration)
groups.

and the appearance of particular

We believe that an understanding of these initial

patterns of migration and

intergroup contact is essential,

for the events of each era shaped the context for subsequent
intergroup interaction.

Following this initial discussion,

we will then retrace our steps,
relations between groups.
posed

this time focusing upon

In keeping with the model p r o 

in the previous chapter,

the American ethnic experience

we will seek to interpret
in the context of eth-class

struggles, with particular attention devoted to the a s s i m i 
lation, persistence,

or evolution of ethnic

identities.

the conclusion of our chronological discussion,
briefly examine the role of an important actor
struggles— the s t a t e .

At

we will
in eth-class

Because the role of the state has

expanded exponentially (especially after 1945), we elected
to present consideration of the impact of the state upon
intergroup relations as a separate discussion, as opposed to
incorporating it into the historical narrative.

Finally,

in

the chapter summary, we will review our key findings and
draw some preliminary conclusions.
The Colonial Era:

1609-1800

Capitalist Development and Interaroup Contact
The origins of the American ethnic experience are
grounded in the emergence and expansion of a capitalist
world-economy centered in Western Europe
1974b,

1980).

Beginning

(Wallerstein 1974a,

in the fifteenth century, Western
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European nations began a process of conquest,
mercantilism,

plunder,

and colonization which brought about dramatic

social change on a global scale.

Driven by the expansionary

nature of capitalist accumulation and fueled by competition
between core powers,

the quest for raw materials,

markets,

and cheap labor resulted in a world which by 1900 was
virtually completely under the sway of Western capitalism.
This expansion was physical as well as political and e c o 
nomic, as the impact of capitalist agriculture

(e.g.,

enclosure,

increased

increased rents, decreased prices),

manufacture and trade,
displacement

and a population boom led to the

(i.e., proletarianization)

the European peasantry.

of vast sectors of

Acting in concert with one another,

the expansion of market relations and the creation of a
European "surplus population"
resulted

(relative to resources)

in an historically unprecedented movement of

peoples and transformation of societies.
Within these larger global processes,

the fate of the

area which was to become the United States was determined by
several

factors related to English colonization.

victorious colonists were English,
an indelible
States.

First,

the

a fact which would leave

imprint on the future shape of the United

The eventual emergence of British hegemony within

the capitalist world-system led to the absorption or removal
of competing

(e.g.,

Dutch, French,

Spanish)

European claims

to North America and ensured Anglo-American dominance.

Of
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equal significance were the absence of instant wealth

(un

like South America) and the particular economic needs of
Great Britain.

These forces combined to create an English

colonial policy which emphasized self-sustaining settlements
which would provide markets,
for Britain's

raw materials,

and an outlet

"surplus" population--a sharp contrast to the

French and Spanish policies of plunder and limited se tt le 
ment.

Finally,

the indigenous Native American population

was not economically exploitable

(Archdeacon 1983, p.

4), a

situation which when combined with their mil itary v u l n e r 
ability would

lead to displacement via conquest.

American colonies emerged as a quintessential
cist "settler society," a colonial outpost
indigenous peoples were outnumbered,
by European peoples

(cf.

Thus,

the

race s up re ma 

in which the

decimated,

S t a v r i a n o s 1--1982,

p.

and replaced
319--notion

of "Europeanization").
As a British colony,

the future United States developed

a dualistic nature which in turn would shape the course of
subsequent
colonies

intergroup contact.

On one hand,

the Northern

(New England and the mid-Atlantic states) were of

relatively limited economic value to Britain and experienced
a relatively low degree of economic and political control by
the colonial power

(Frank 1979).

became a region of small

As a result,

farmers and

the North

independent artisans,

"refugees" from the process of British capitalist d e v e l o p 
ment who hoped to return to an essentially precapitalist
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mode of production
these

(Bonacich 1984, pp.

81-82).

Alongside

"independent" classes emerged an increasingly p r o s p e r 

ous merchant class

(fostered,

at least

initially,

by British

colonial trade policies and economic power) and the b e g i n 
nings of an urban working class
1980,

pp.

47-51).1

(Dowd 1974,

In addition,

policies--stimulated by needs

p.

203;

Zinn

liberal British immigration

for labor,

defense and the desire, after 1661,

settlement,

and

to limit British e m i g r a 

t i o n - e n c o u r a g e d the migration of non-English peoples such
as Scotch-Irish,

Germans,

and

(in smaller numbers) French

Huguenots to the American colonies
1966, pp.
Thus,

30-32;

(Nevins and Commager

Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982,

pp. 1-2).

the Northern colonies became an outlet for the excess

population of not only England,

but also the prospective

core nations of Western Europe--the beginning of a pattern
of immigration whi ch would persist throughout the nineteenth
century and become a dominant theme
The South,

in American history

on the other hand, possessed greater a g r i 

cultural potential and rapidly evolved into a predomina ntl y
plantation society producing tobacco
for the world market.

(and, later,

cotton)

Success of this economy was based

upon the availability of cheap labor;

however,

the c on

straints upon wages exerted by relatively low world market
prices for such commodities as cotton and the existence
competing opportunities

(i.e.,

of

"independent" agriculture)

inhibited the emergence of a wage-labor workforce

(Bonacich
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1984, p. 80).
servants,

Initially,

this gap was filled by indentured

but this source proved unstable

competing opportunities

(e.g.,

farming) and post-1660

English restraints on immigration
Reimers 1979,

pp.

12-15).

in the face of

(Dinnerstein,

Nichols and

Given the seeming unsuitability

of the Native American population as a labor force
1985,

p. 136),

(Marger

Southern plantation owners turned to the

importation of African slaves as a source of cheap and
controllable

labor, a step which would have dramatic i mp li 

cations for the course of subsequent ethnic relations
United States

(Quarles 1969,

pp.

in the

34-35; Williams 1944).

Establishment of a system of plantation slavery left the
South with a radically different economic base

(the c o n s e 

quences of which will be discussed below) while discouraging
European immigration by limiting opportunities for inde pen 
dent small farming or wage labor employment
Commager 1966,

(Nevins and

p. 239).=

Such was the colonial pattern at the time of the
American revolution and the establishment of the United
States as a sovereign nation.

At this juncture,

the United

States already exhibited several components of its su b se 
quent ethnic structure.

Nearly two centuries of British

colonialism had left an Anglo imprint upon American culture
and institutions;

however,

Anglo-Americans existed alongside

other European groups, as well as Blacks and Native Am e r i 
cans.3

At the conclusion of the eighteenth century,

the
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United States stood as a relatively veak peripheral society
engaged

in a process of nation-building amidst a de bate

(North vs.
shape.

South, English vs.

Nevertheless,

non-English)

over its eventual

the United States al s o stood at the

threshold of a series

of processes which would result

in the

total transformation of American society.
Interqroup Interaction and Et hn ic Identities
Althoug h the period prior to 1800 is beyond the stated
purview of this work,
tion was established
action.

it was du ring this time that a founda
for subsequent ethnic and class

Accordingly,

it is necessary for us to examine

briefly the central ethnic/class
this analysis,

issues of this era.

In

one ke y consideration is the fact that the

United States was established as an English colony,
meant that

inter

its political economy,

which

ethnic composition,

and

class structure were shaped by the exigencies of Engl ish
economic and political
English

interests.

The importance of this

influence cannot be overstated:

initial colonizers were English,

the bulk of the

the colonies adopted

English institutions and culture, and subsequent events
(e.g.,

immigration,

slavery,

revolution)

were results of

English colonial policy.
With respect to ethnic relations,

the

first intergroup

conflicts can best be described as national
the English vied with the French,
Americans

for control

Dutch,

of the New World.*•

in nature,

as

Spanish, and Native
These interactions

would set the stage for

future ethnic

interaction.

example/ w h e n England absorbed Du tch New Netherland
1660s

(a national conflict),

For
in the

the residents of New Netherland

were required to accept English law and language and to
swear allegiance to the British Crown

(Archdeacon 1983,

p.

12), thus establishing the basis for Analo-c onf or mit v--the
expectation that non-English settlers would conform to
English practices.
conflict,

Perhaps the most significant

"national"

however, was between English colonizers and Native

Americans.

From the beginning,

this was a case of resource

competition between peoples, as existing Native American
settlements were incompatible with English colonial e x p a n 
sionism.®

Facilitating this process of conquest and d i s p o s 

session was a "national"

ideology in which Native Americans

were characterized as heathen savages with no legitimate
cla im to land
perceived

(Fredrickson 1981,

pp.

7-13).6

Given the

limited economic utility of Native Americans

(e.g., as trading partners or as a labor force)

to White

settlers a nd the emergence of increasing conflict over
land, massacres and dispossession became standard practice.
A n y resistance on the part of Native Americans only led to
harsh retaliation and the creation of new stereotypes
"treacherous

Indians," the "Indian threat")

further conquest.

(e.g.,

to justify

While coastal Native American peoples

soon s u c cu mb ed — in a genocidal reduction of population--to
warfare, disease, and economic displacement and marginaliza-
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tion,

this experience established a pattern of ethnic or

national
turies

interaction which would be repeated for two c e n 

(cf. Zinn 1980, pp.

anti-Black sentiments,
Initially,

12-16).

It is,

at the core of White racism.

ethnic conflict

groups within a society)

(i.e., conflict between

in the English colonies was limited

by the homogeneity of the first settlers.
however,

in concert with

This changed,

with the post-1660 decline of English emigration

and the adoption of liberal policies with regard to immi
gration from other European nations."7
ical accounts

(e.g.,

Archdeacon 1983,

According to h is to r

Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982,

pp.

2-6;

p. 20), early non-English immigrants such

as the Scotch-Irish and Germans did experience some ethnic
hostility as a result of et hnocentrism and a fear of "for
ei gn ” domination on the part of the English settlers.
Nevertheless,

the level of intergroup conflict was low,

reflecting the fact that English hegemony within the c o l o 
nies was never seriously challenged and, more importantly,
the existence of a preindustrial,

precapitalist class system

which was not conducive to interethnic conflict.

What we

mean by this is that the system did not foster resource
competition--labor was regulated via

indenture or slavery

rather than a competitive market, while land
dent agriculture)

was plentiful.

isolation of communities

(for indepen

Furthermore,

the relative

(as opposed to the integration of

industrial society) enabled groups to avoid conflict and to
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maintain a distinctive

identity and customs.

Indeed,

the

most virulent intergroup conflicts among European immigrants
during the colonial era involved religious differences
(Protestants vs.
sects),

Catholics,

Quakers,

reflecting the historical

and other Protestant

intolerance which h ad

characterized the European experience of many groups
Archdeacon 1983,

pp.

(cf.

20-21).

At the same time, assimilation did occur among no n English groups,

reflecting the operation of the c o n t r a d i c 

tory forces of assimilation and pluralism which characterize
much of American ethnic history.
level of resource competition,

The aforementioned

l ow

the economic utility of

acculturation to English customs, and dominant group p r e s 
sures to conform were certainly key factors
ing" of groups.
support

In addition,

the lack of institutional

for non-English culture made

retain group identities
66-67--on religion,
German identity;

in the " b l e n d 

it more difficult

(cf. Dinnerstein et al.— 1979,

to
pp.

language and the decline of Dutch a nd

Dinnerstein and Reimers--1982, pp.

7-8--on

the lack of trained Presbyterian clergy and the d im in ut ion
of Scotch-Irish ethnicity).
teristics of the
groups,

Also significant were c h a r a c 

intergroup arena--the proliferation of

the small size of individual groups,

and the

geographical mob ility encouraged by colonial expansion-each of which served to inhibit the persistence of e t h n i c
communities.

What is important for our purposes is the
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existence of a complex interplay of forces promoting both
ethnic persistence and change.
Given the preindustrial class structure and the pr o li 
feration of the
mers,

independent class

(i.e.,

small-scale

far

many with limited market ties; artisans engaged

petty production)

in

in the pre-1800 United States, class

conflict was relatively absent

(as opposed to industrial

capitalist society) and eth-class divisions were therefore
of lesser importance

(i.e., the relative

isolation of inde

pendent farmers tended to inhibit group mobilization--the
Shay's and W h is ke y Rebellions standing as notable e x c e p 
tions).

Nevertheless,

increased contact,

unrest, particularly among workers,
proletariat

in urban areas,

competition,

and

servants, and a lumpen-

resulted in a growing concern

(on the part of the elite) with the lower class "threat" and
a ten d en cy to equate "poor" with "foreign"
50-53;

Dinnerstein et al.

1979, p.

(Zinn 1980,

pp.

28)--the beginning of a

tendency to blur together notions of ethnicity and class
(Takaki 1987b,

p.

105).

In response,

established self-help societies,

immigrant groups

thus employing ethnicity as

a str ategy for economic survival and advancement.

Also

evident during this period was the relationship between
class position and ease of assimilation

For example,

upper

middle class French aristocrats and planters who fled to the
United States during the French Revolution or as a result of
Caribbean slave revolts

found that their higher status
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enabled them to blend in much more q ui ckl y with the dominant
Anglo-American group

{Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982,

These various patterns would become

p. 9).

increasingly evident

in

ethnic relations in the post-1800 United States.
A final piece in the early American eth-class mosaic
was the introduction of Blacks
noted earlier,

into the colonies.

the political economy of the South

tion agriculture,

scarce labor)

emergence of slavery.

(planta

provided the context for the

While initially Southern labor needs

were met by indentured servants,
laborers to enter

As we

the tendency of such

into farming or the labor market upon

expiration of their term of service left the South with a
perpetual shortage of agricultural labor.
seventeenth century,

social unrest

By the

(e.g., Bacon's Rebellion)

and the fear of a landless lower class of former
servants created an opening which was

Blacks

Zinn 1980, pp.

37-47).

indentured

filled by the co in ci 

dental English entry into the African slave trade
1987;

late

Interestingly,

in the colonies were term servants;

(Breen

the first

however,

the

economic benefits to plantation owners and the social
stability stemming from lifetime servitude

(one concern of

the planter elite was that Black free labor would ally
itself with the White lower class)

facilitated the spread of

the institution of slavery

(Quarles 1969,

pp.

35-36).

restriction of manumission

(for economic reasons)

The

and the

absence of a large Black free class in turn gave rise to
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caste-like distinctions between Blacks and Whites and the
emergence of a social order held together by racist ideology
(Fredrickson 1981, p.

87).8

A key event in the course of intergroup relations was
the American Revolution.

On the most general

level,

the

American Revolution can be viewed as a case of national
mob il iz at io n--a cross-class,

cross-ethnic alliance between

most segments of the merchant,
working classes

planter,

independent and

(cemented by appeals to an ideology of in d i

vidual rights and freedom)

which emerged in response to

English colonial practices

(e.g.,

tion,

taxation,

trade restric

limitation of s e t tl em en t— c f . Nevins and Commager

1966, pp.

66-80),8

The success of the American Revolution

changed the nature of the United States as an ethnic arena.
Perhaps the major outcome was the shedding of "English"
affiliation and the emergence of an
identity

(cf.

"American" national

the discussions by B o o r s t e i n — 1965,

9 0 — and Nevins and Commager--1966,

pp.

168-81).

pp. 325At the same

time, while the revolution removed the basis of EnglishAmerican group dominance,
was successful

the hegemonic Anglo-American elite

in casting national

(i.e., Am er ic a n= An gl o- Am er ic an ) and
institutions.10

identity in its own image
in retaining Anglo-based

This determination was reflected

early legislation as the Naturalization Act,

the constitu

tional restrictions on foreigners holding office,
Alien and Sedition Acts.

in such

and the

Thus, while the new bourgeois
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national

ideology promoted individual sovereignty and

allegiance to the nation as a set of ideals, both indi
viduals and the nation were expected to assume a certain
form--one which assured the dominant position of the AngloAmerican elite

(Zinn 1980, pp.

88-101). 11

The process of national mobilization which began in the
late eighteenth century had a significant effect upon nonAnglo ethnic groups.
a muting of ethnic

First,

national mobilization entailed

identity and the adoption,

of the Anglo-defined

"American" national

over, the economic and political

at some level,

identity.

Mor e

institutionalization of

Anglo dominance ensured the absence of some of the
tional supports

(e.g., a somewhat separate

was permitted to French-Canadians

institu

legal s y s t e m — as

in Quebec)

which would

facilitate the persistence of minority ethnic identity.13
These forces,
conformity

along with dominant group pressures

(at least for Whites),

for Anglo-

provided a strong

impetus

towards assimilation for non-Anglo European immigrants.
the other hand, Anglo hegemony
American

(i.e.,

identity in Anglo terms)

On

the effort to define

often triggered a c ou nte r

vailing ethnic mobilization as immigrants sought to improve
their economic position and preserve their traditional way
of life

(cf. Dinnerstein et al.--1979,

p.

23— on German

resistance to Anglo attempts to establish free schools to
"Americanize" German students).
tory,

Throughout American his

these two contradictory forces--assimilation and
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resistance-were

influential in shaping the course of in t er 

group relations.
Expansion and Industrialization;

1800-1890

Uneven Development and Ethnic Contact
The nineteenth century was a period of rapid change for
the United States.

As the processes of capitalist d e v e l o p 

ment and nation-building continued,

the United States began

its emergence as a world economic and political power,
moving from the periphery to the core of the w o r l d - s y s t e m .
This era brought with it the upheaval of industrialization
and the proletarianization of independent producers,

the

Civil War and the destruction of the slavery-based p l a n t a 
tion economy,
crease.

and massive immigration and population in

During the century from 1790 to 1890,

tion of the United States
million,

the p o p u l a 

increased from 3.9 million to 62.9

including more than fifteen million new immigrants

and their descendants

(Archdeacon 1983, p. 27).

States also expanded territorially,

The United

as the conguest and

annexation of North America continued

inexorably across the

continent from the original states on the Atlantic seaboard
to the Pacific coast.

Each of these processes had a s i g n i 

ficant impact upon the development of the American ethnic
structure and the subsequent course of ethnic relations
the United States.

in

In this discussion, we will seek to link

these macro level components of capitalist development to
specific patterns of migration and intergroup contact.

As we examine the emerging ethnic structure of the
United States

in the nineteenth century,

we find that a

central causal mechanism for su ch structure is the uneven
nature of American capitalist development.
the colonial era was the dual

One l eg a c y of

nature of the new nation, the

different and contradictory political economies of the North
and South,

the conflict between which wo u l d dominate the

first two-thirds of the nineteenth century.

Initially, the

South was the more advanced a r e a due to the slave-generated
wealth of its plantation economy;
base contained tendencies which
absence of a large

however,

led to stagnation.

independent sector

sans) and the non-wage nature

this economic
The

(small farmers,

of coerced slave labor

the development of a local m a r k e t and discouraged

limited

non-export

production beyond plantation needs and luxury items .
addition,

arti

In

the nature of the s l a v e labor system inhibited

specialization,

diversification,

productivity at low levels
Genovese 19 66) .1:1
much qualitative

and mechanization and kept

(Boorstein 1965,

pp. 171-79;

Thus, pre s su re for expansion was not as
(intensification of the

tion) as it was quantitative

forces of produc

(expansion of the slave

force and of agricultural land)

labor

and investment opportunities

were limited.
In contrast,
would,

the North benefitted

over several decades,

f r o m forces which

a l l o w it to

South and dominate American society.

"leapfrog” past the

The dispersed

nature

of the economic base of the North facilitated the slow
development of an indigenous market,

while the high relative

cost and general scarcity of labor encouraged technological
innovation and the emergence of manufacturing.

A second

source of advantage for the North was its greater par ti ci pa 
tion in international trade, which enabled the accumulation
of wealth

(capital)

(Frank 1979, p.
advantages

through mercantilism and transportation

61).

In addition,

the North derived several

from its economic ties with the South:

it p r o 

fited from its role as intermediary in the export of So ut h
ern raw materials;

it was able to use cheap Southern cotton

to develop its textile manufacturing capacity;
nated Southern markets with lower priced
able) goods
91).

(Genovese 1966,

Nevertheless,

pp.

158-65;

and

it d o m i 

(but more pr of it 
Bonacich 1984,

p.

the pace of development was relatively

slow even in the North as the United States remained d e p e n 
dent upon European
and markets.

(especially British)

Eventually,

however,

investment,

imports,

the ultimate effect of

these pr oc es se s— the Southern tendency towards stagnation
and the economic dynamism of the North--was the ascendancy
of the North and North-South political conflict
upon such issues as tariffs,
territorial expansion),

slavery,

(centered

and the nature of

the denouement of which was Northern

victory in the Civil War and the dismantling of the Southern
slave economy.

With respect to ethnic contact and intergroup re l a
tions,

the dual nature of the United States was reflected

two dramatically different historical patterns.

in

The nature

of the Southern plantation economy continued, with the
exception of a few port cities,
European immigration
Consequently,

to discourage large scale

(Nevins and Commager 1966, p.

the ethnic structure of the South was d o m i n a 

ted by the Black-White division with
relations embedded
economy.
ing attack

239).1,4

As the

its caste-like social

in the slave labor base of the plantation

institution of slavery came under

in the nineteenth century,

increas

racist ideology

emerged as a moral

justification for this system of d om i n a 

tion

pp.

hand,

(Marger 1985,

137-38).

In the North,

on the other

immigration from Europe was the significant

shaping ethnic relations.

factor

in

Although the pace of immigration

was slow prior to 1820 and modest prior to 1840--due to the
slow economic and territorial expansion of the United States
and to the difficulties of the transatlantic passage--the
United States

(primarily the North) attracted a steady flow

of newcomers,

the bulk of whom were from Great Britain,

Germany, and Ireland,

but whose ranks also included smaller

numbers of immigrants from other areas of Europe and from
French Canada.

As the United States became more

ized and began to expand territorially,

industrial

the pace of this

immigration began to increase--from 143,000

in 1821-30 to

181
600,000 in 1831-40 to 1.7 million in 1841-50
and Reimers

{Dinnerstein

1982, p. 156).

Both the scope and the nature of European immigration
to the United States were intimately connected to economic
processes.

On the "push" side,

European capitalist d ev el op 

ment resulted in the displacement of small
sans

farmers and ar ti 

in numbers far beyond the absorptive capacity of the

expanding industrial

labor market.

States offered an opportunity

For some, the United

(although it would prove te m

porary) to attempt to escape the sway of capitalist pr od uc 
tion relations by re-establishing themselves in agriculture
or crafts,

while for others the

labor needs of American

industry provided employment opportunities superior to those
at home.

Interestingly,

the source of immigrants often

shifted within sending nations,

as the processes of ca p i 

talist development and proletarianization touched more peri
pheral areas within the core
On the "pull" side,
tion was reflected
nomic cycles

(Archdeacon 1983, p.

4 9 ) . 1S

the economic nature of European immigra
in the sensitivity of migration to ec o 

in the United States--increased immigration

du ring periods of prosperity and lower levels during rece s
sions

(Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp.

11-13).

In a d d i 

tion, migration patterns tended to follow existing trade
routes and economic opportunities,

thereby creating c on ce n

trations of immigrants and of specific groups in particular
areas

(e.g.,

Irish in Boston and New York,

Germans

in the
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Mi dw est ). 1"
continued,

As the industrialization of the United States
immigration was encouraged by the recruiting

activities of employers and the promotional activities of
states and shipping companies
Once established,

(Archdeacon 1983, pp.

immigration generated

34-37).

its own mom ent um and

created its own patterns as kin networks and ethnic agencies
aided the flow of newcomers.
In addition to the uneven development and dualistic
ethnic patterns of the North and South,

a third component

was added to the picture by the westward territorial e x p a n 
sion of the United States.
tory of the American West

From our perspective,
is best viewed

periphery" r e l a t i o n s — the Northern states
tition with the South,

the h i s 

in terms of "core(first in c o m p e 

then on a hegemonic basis after

Civil War) dominated the West

the

in the same manner and for

the same reasons that European core nations colonized much
of the rest of the w or ld .17
by purchase,

treaty,

Whether territory was acquired

or conquest,

expansion served two purposes:
markets,

United States westward

(1) to provide raw materials,

and new outlets for investment; and

(2) to serve as

a haven for members of the independent class who were d i s 
placed by capitalist development and who sought such o p p o r 
tunities as homesteading or mi n i n g — the latter driven by the
Gold Rush of 1849
Barrera 1979;;

(Nevins and Commager 1966, pp.

Bonacich 1984,

pp.

95-96).

201-21;

Thus, the West

emerged as a peripheral area within the United States in
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which major economic activities--ranching,
culture,

railroads,

and mining--were dominated by external

ag r i

(Northern)

capital.
Given the different nature
States West,

of development in the United

it is not surprising that

pattern of ethnic contact and

it exhibited

interaction.

its own

Territorial

expansion and colonization involved the conquest and dispos
session of Native Americans through war,

treaty, and the

destruction of the economic base of Native American soc ie
ties.

By the time their last resistance was crushed

in

1890, Native Americans would experience a genocidal decrease
in numbers and would

find themselves confined to a marginal

existence on reservations in the most desolate areas of the
West

(Brown 1971;

Zinn 1980,

pp.

of genocide and pe ripheralization

124-46).18

These processes

(i.e., relegation to such

fringe activities as subsistence farming--cf.
pp.56-57)

Barrera 1979,

can thus be viewed as an outcome of capitalist

development and expansionism,

Native-American resistance and

increased White racism, and the perceived disutility
their resistance to settler
as a source of labor.

incursions)

(due to

of Native Americans

This experience was to a degree

paralleled by that of Me xic an - Am er ic an s.
expansion of the United States

The southwestward

in 1848 resulted in the

absorption of some 75,000 Mexicans who became American
citizens

(Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982,

guarantees of pro per ty rights,

p.

89).

Despite

Mexican-Americans were slowly
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but steadily dispossessed by a combination of Anglo p u r 
chase,

taxation,

legal and political

lence and intimidation
the

decisions, and v i o 

(Barrera 1979,

pp. 24-31).

While

lack of Mexican- Ame ri can m i li ta ry resistance enabled

them to avoid the extreme
cans,

fate whic h befell Native A m e r i 

the end product of United States annexation of the

Southwest was relegation of Mexican-Americans

to subsistence

farming or to serve as a source of cheap labor

in mining and

agriculture.

following

decades,

As would become evident over the

these events had a determining effect upon the

subsequent experiences of Native and Me xi ca n- A me ri ca ns .
Immigration also played an important role

in shaping

the ethnic structure of the Western United States.
the

initial

"settlers" m a y have b e e n

Eastern states,

While

"Americans" from the

they were soon joined by ma ny other groups.

The slow pace of development,
American resistance,

the danger posed by Native

the greater distance from Eastern s e a 

ports, and competition from superexploited labor combined
to make the We s t

less attractive to European

immigrants;

however, small numbers of many groups did migrate to is o
lated settlements
et al.

1979,

p.

(e.g.,

90).

Germans,

S ca nd i na vi an s— Dinnerstein

At the same time, the Pacific seaports

of the West facilitated

immigration

from China,

1850 became a significant source of cheap labor
roads, mining,

and agriculture.

While Chinese

which after
for r a i l 
immigration

was numerically less significant th a n that of other groups
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during the mid-nineteenth centu ry
Scandinavians)

(e.g., Germans,

Irish,

and was largely confined to a peripheral

region within the United States,

it assumes an important

historical role as a harbinger of a new phase of immigration--the movement of peoples

from periphery to core

(e.g.,

the United States by 1900) as the scope of global capitalist
development expanded--which would become the dominant p a t 
tern by the end of the century.
1865-1890.

The Civil War serves as a useful checkpoint

in the discussion of American capitalist development and
intergroup contact.

The conclusion of the war cemented the

ascendancy of the emerging industrial capitalist order

in

the North over the plantation economy of the South and
effected the dismantling of the slave labor s ys te m. 3-9
Nevertheless,

the South was slow to change.

The pace of

Southern economic development and industrialization co ntin
ued to lag behind the North,
"Jim Crow"

while the

imposition of the

laws in the post-Reconstruction era kept Blacks

in the position of superexploited labor.
however,

In general,

the post-Civil War era saw the continuation and

intensification of processes of capitalist development which
were alrea dy underway.

Immigration kept pace with industri

alization and territorial expansion:
resumed after the Civil War and
1880 (cf.

the flow of immigrants

increased markedly after

Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 156-59).

Like

wise, conquest and settlement of the West proceeded such
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that by 1890,

little room remained for territorial ex p an 

sio n — at least on the North American continent itself
opposed to the 1898-1900 expansion which resulted

(as

in a U.S.

"empire of islands"--Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico,
Guam, and Samoa).
The post Civil War era also saw the rapid tra ns fo rm a
tion of capitalist development

in the United States and,

hence, a period of rapid social change.

Although the seeds

of industrial development has already been planted,
confluence of cheap labor, technological
dant natural resources,

innovation,

abu n

and investment capital contributed

to the rise of the United States as a major
power.

the

industrial

Concomitant with this process was the emergence of

monopoly capi ta lis m--the rise of corporations,

the c on ce n

tration of economic power, and the increased organic compo
sition of capital
Nevins 1966, pp.

(Bonacich 1984,
291-310).

pp. 98-99;

Commager and

One outcome of these processes

was the transformation of American society:
anization of the population

the pro le ta ri 

(i.e., an increasing proportion

of wage laborers and a declining proportion of agricultural
workers),

the increased sway of market relations,

and

in

creased class struggle and the rise of the union movement
(Zinn 1980,
further

pp.

247-75).

These changes

in turn provided

impetus for the expansion of the American economy,

creating a need for cheap labor which could only be satis
fied through further

immigration.

This demand for labor
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would combine with processes of the world-system
uneven development)

to trigger a new phase

(e.g.,

in American

ethnic relations.
Interqroup Relations and Ethnic
With respect to intergroup

Identity
relations,

a key factor

during the nineteenth century was the changing nature of the
eth-class arena, a process which was shaped by the course of
global capitalist development.
alization,

urbanization,

Processes such as industri

proletarianization,

mass immigra

tion, and territorial expansion

dra ma tically

the ethnic and class structures

of the United States and

context in which intergroup interaction occurred.

altered

both
the

Also

significant was the continued uneven development of the
United States,
separate

a process which

intergroup arenas:

in effect created three

North,

this rap idl y changing setting,

South, and West.

our task

Within

is to explore the

implications of intergroup relations for the evolution of
group identities.
obvious--namely,

For reasons which will soon become
the dramatic differences

in their e xp er i

ences du ring the nineteenth century--we will consider

issues

involving European immigrants separate from those of nonWhite ethnic groups.
Eur opean immigrants:

assimilation and p e r s i s t e n c e .

During the first part of the nineteenth century,

several

factors operated to reduce conflict between Anglo-Americans
and European immigrants and to facilitate the slow as sim il a 

tion of the

latter.

The slow rate of

immigration prior to

1820 reduced both the physical and cultural reinforcement of
non-Anglo ethnic groups as well as a n y perceived threat
which they posed to Anglo hegemony
More significantly,
changing)

(Archdeacon 1983, p. 61).

the preindustrial

(albeit slowly

social structure of the United States with its

large independent agricultural class provided a context
which,

in concert with opportunities afforded by territorial

expansion,

served to limit class conflict and,

salience of group identity.

At the same time,

hence,

the

the low level

of urbanization and the absence of the high level of inte r
connectedness characteristic of later mass soci ety also
contributed to reduce potential conflict by allowing groups
to exist

(and

identities to persist)

in relative

isolation.

With continued dominant group pressure for conformity,
result was assimilation,
England,

thus creating an

the

particularly among immigrants from
ideological model of assimilation

which would be applied to subsequent

immigrant groups.

this juncture,

what we are describing

precapitalist,

preindustrial type of ethnicity;

At

is still largely a
that is, one

in which ethnicity is a w a v of life as opposed to a co m p e t i 
tive s t r a t e g y .
push/pull

factors described earlier

in immigration,
and Irish.

This would soon change,

however, as the

led to a rapid

increase

particularly the post-1840 influx of Germans

With the alteration of the class structure

(i.e., the expansion of the urban proletariat)

as a result
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of industrialization in the North,

the stage was set for

increased intergroup interaction and the emergence of
"modern" ethnic identities.
In the context of rapid
intergroup contact,

immigration and increased

a key factor

in determining subsequent

interaction was the relative position of newcomers within
the working class
"fractions").

(cf. Poulantzas--1973,

Furthermore,

p. 38— on class

given that skilled

immigrants

were often initially forced to occupy unskilled positions,
we must take into consideration not only current occupa
tional position,

but also the potential

even class m o b il it y. 20
were homogeneous

for occupational or

To the extent that social groups

in terms of class,

lifestyle,

and culture,

differences between them and the dominant group were often
defined

in ethnic terms--that

is, ethnicity served as

"shorthand" for describing ethnic and class d if f e r e n c e s — a
practice

fostered by dominant group association of immi

grants with urban blight,
lems.

poverty,

and other social p r o b 

This was particularly noticeable

Irish Catholics,

in the case of

whose colonial experience under British

rule in Ireland and urban location channeled them towards
work as unskilled
addition,

labor or in domestic ser vi ce .21

In

Irish immigrants encountered particularly virulent

dominant group resistance wh i ch was grounded both in r e l i 
gious differences
and,

later,

(the historical Anglo fear of Catholicism)

in political conflict

(i.e., the real or p e r 
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ceived political threat posed by the urban concentration of
the Irish).

This

in turn fostered ethnic mobilization on

the part of the Irish as the best means for realizing group
material Interests.

It also meant s u rv i va l— albeit

in

changed form due to the power of Anglo-American institutions--of Irish ethnic identity.
Standing in contrast to the Irish was the experience of
German-Americans.
tended to locate

Unlike the Irish,

German immigrants

in the rural agricultural areas of the

Midwestern United States,

thereby avoiding the intensified

ethnic/class conflict of the Eastern urban network.
importantly,

More

German-Americans exhibited both a higher

over

all class position and more class diver sit y than the Irish,
which enabled them to avoid ethnic labeling based upon class
position,

but which also provided less basis for ethnic

mobilization.
persistence,

Our point here is that despite some cultural
intragroup class divisions opened the door to

the influence of assimilative forc es. 22

This assimilation

was neither unitary nor irreversible as dominant group
resistance could trigger ethnic mobilization

(e.g.,

the

reaction of German Catholics to legislative attacks on
German language parochial schools--Archdeacon 1983,

p. 109);

however, the general trend was towards assimilation.
Also relevant to our analysis

is the generally nativist

reaction of the dominant Anglo group
lated non-Anglos).

(now including a s s i m i 

While undoubtedly ethnocentric reactions

to cultural and religious

(especially Catholic)

differences

were a contributing factor, we believe that the key issues
were political and economic.

As we observed during our

discussion of the colonial era,

fear of political domination

by non-Anglos gave rise to fear of foreigners and insistence
on An gl o- co nf or m it y.
nineteenth century,

This dynamic persisted during the

as acceptance of European immigrants was

tied to acculturation to American

(i.e., Anglo-American)

ways

111).

(Dlnnerstein et al.

1979,

p.

Increased u r ba ni za 

tion and economic competition also fostered nativism,
reflected
1850s.

as

in the Know-Nothing movement of the 1840s and

This mobiliztion also underscored the divergent

class interests within the dominant group:

workers,

arti

sans, and the independent cl as s— those who felt the brunt of
foreign competition or economic dislocation--provided the
basis for the movement,

while capitalists

railroad m a g n a t e s )--who benefited from the
labor— tended to support immigration
81-82; Dinnerstein et al.

1979,

pp.

(industrialists,
influx of cheap

(Archdeacon 1983,
117-118).

Indeed,

pp.
the

Know-Nothing phenomenon is nicely explained by split labor
market theory

(Bonacich 1972) with its emphasis on labor

competition--in this case, the real or threatened d i s p l a c e 
ment of "native"

labor by "new arrivals"--leading to a n t a g 

onism and exclusion.
Closely linked to processes of ethnic mobilization or
assimilation were the strategic decisions of individual

group members, decisions which were made in a group context,
but which transformed both individuals and groups.
over,

Mo r e 

individual and group action took place within a

general

institutional framework which emphasized

(and tr ans 

mitted) dominant group culture while devaluing the cultural
practices of non-Anglos.

As we suggested

in earlier ch ap 

ters, strategic decision making was a complex undertaking
that non-material

(e.g.,

historical,

factors could affect the process;

cultural,

however,

political)

such decisions

were strongly conditioned by economic forces.
wealthy newcomers

For the few

(or those who attained wealth)

tion seemed the best strategy

in

ass im il a

(e.g., as in the case of

French aristocrats or planters),

for there was little to be

gained by retaining a non-Anglo ethnic identity, while the
assimilative route offered increased status and opportunity.
In contrast,

strategic options for the middle class were

less clear-cut:

one path involved using class position to

assimilate and thereby enjoy (as permitted)
of dominant group membership;

however,

the advantages

a countervailing and

often easier alternative was to retain ethnic identity and
pursue material goals by attaining status and wealth through
exploiting communal ties

(e.g., professionals,

working within the enclave)

merchants

or by serving as a broker or

emissary between the group and the larger society.
final segment, the working classes,
strategic options.

The

had the most limited

Opportunities for mobility were c irc um
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scribed by both ethnicity and class

(essentially

barre ll ed” process of social reproduction).
tions,

a "double-

With few e x c e p 

the optimum working class strategy was to group

together and use ethnic ties for adjustment and survival
(e.g.,

informational networks,

mutual aid).

As suggested in Chapter IV, a significant factor d e t e r 
mining the persistence or disappearance of group identity is
the nature of the intergroup arena.

In examining the m i d 

nineteenth century United States as an arena,

key variables

affecting ethnic identity are urban vs. rural, enclave vs.
isolated, and nature of minority status
only vs. one among many groups).

(large vs. small,

These factors shaped

individual and group strategies both d i r e c t l y - - e .g ., the
feasibility of ethnic
clave s) — and

institutions

(more possible in e n 

i n di r ec tl y- -e .g ., increased competition in

urban areas triggering ethnic mobilization;

increased

nativism directed towards the only significant minority in a
particular area.

The

interaction between these factors

could often be complex.

For example,

while the settlement

of Scandinavians in isolated rural communities made it
possible for them to retain their ethnic identities without
significant conflict,

this same lack of conflict also

inhibited ethnic mobilization and facilitated eventual
assimilation.

In another case, the urban location and

dominant m i no ri ty status of Franco-Americans

in the mill

towns of northern New England provided both demographic
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support for ethnic institutions and a basis for ethnic
mobilization

(because of the triggering of dominant gro up

hostility).

As a final example,

the Irish of Minneapolis-

St. Paul, who constituted a re latively small proportion of
the population and who were outnumbered by Germans and
Scandinavians,

found it best to pursue a more assimilative

strategy (Archdeacon 1983, pp.

102-03).

What appears to be unique about the U.S.

eth-class

system is the interplay between ethnicity and class.
Frederickson

(1981,

ethnic divisions
lower classes.
groups

p.

200), among others,

As

has observed,

impeded class consciousness among American
At the same time,

the number of ethnic

(and the relative weakness of any one) and the e x i s 

tence of class and other

(e.g., demographic)

differences

within groups tended in many cases to discourage ethnic
mobilization.

Indeed,

due to labor market competition and

to Anglo policies of divide and rule, minorities were often
as likely to compete with other minorities
Northern Blacks for service jobs,

(e.g.,

Irish vs.

Irish vs. German Catholics

or French-Canadians for control of the Catholic church in
the United States) as with the dominant group,
selves diffusing the focus of conflict.

thus t h e m 

Accordingly,

while

nineteenth-century European immigrant groups were able to
preserve some aspects of ethnic distinctiveness,

cr os s

cutting influences and Anglo institutional hegemony encour-
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aged acculturation and,

in some cases, eventual absorption

into a dominant "White American" group.
Non-White groups:

superexploitation and e x c l u s i o n .

ve consider nineteenth century intergroup interaction
United States,

in the

it is essential to realize that the pattern

described above--immigration,

varying degrees of conflict,

mobilization,

persistence,

the picture.

In sharp contrast to this process was the

experience of non-White
and those groups

or assimilation--is only part of

immigrants

(e.g., C hi ne s e - A m e r i c a n s )

involuntarily incorporated

society through conquest or forced
Native,

Black,

As

into U.S.

immigration

and Me xi c a n - A m e r i c a n s ).

What

(e.g.,

is different

about non-White groups

is not me re ly their means of "entry"

into American society,

but the nature of their subsequent

experience.
integrated

In each case,
(i.e.,

these groups were not fully

p r ol e ta ri an iz ed ) into the economic

mainstream--whether as wage labor or as independent
agr ic ul t ur al is ts — but were restricted to the margins

of the

economy as "superexploited" eth-classes whose labor power
was appropriated via ethnically-based slavery,
or labor market segmentation
Africa and in Israel).23

(cf.

Thus,

debt peonage,

current practices

the

in South

interface between

ethnicity and class for superexploited groups was d r a m a t i 
cally different from that of European

immigrants--indeed,

ethnicity and class were virtually isomorphic
like manner where

"race" served as the basis

in a c a s t e 
for the
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organization of social relationships
1986,

pp. 66-67— notion of "racial

(cf. Omi and W i n an t' s—

formation").

This in

turn led to a different pattern for the evolution of ethnic
identity, one in which subordinate group identities were
maintained by "racial" exclusion on the part of the dominant
group.
For Native Americans,

interaction with Whites followed

the pattern established during the colonial era of conquest
and removal in the face of settler expansionism.
noted before,

this was a "national"

conflict

As we

(the United

States viewed Native Americans as separate nations to be
dealt with via treaty or warfare--Schaefer 1988,

p. 177);

one in which Na ti ve American resistance was weakened by
"ethnic" divisions.

From the White perspective,

capitalist or settler,

the ultimate

of Native A m er i ca ns — was clear.
ever,

whether

objective--displacement

What was less clear,

how

was the me an s by which this was to be accomplished.

In ter ms of p o l i c y objectives, White attitudes varied from
the paternalism or assimilationism of Jefferson--who foresaw
eventual acculturation and assimilation--to the

implacable

racism and adv oc acy of violent removal epitomized by Jackson
and western settlers
1987c).

(Fredrickson 1981, p. 44;

These differing views were manifest

policies ranging

from the incorporation

of Nativ e Americans via mission schools
1983,

pp.

67-68)

and the development

Takaki

in a variety of

(proletarianization)
(cf. Archdeacon

of individual pro perty
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rights
cf.

(often followed by systematic defrauding by Whites--

Takaki 1987c,

p. 64) to denial of citizenship and open

aggression (Fredrickson 1981, p.
1979, pp. 227-28).

45; Dinnerstein et al.

Given strong Native American resistance

(and continued exp ansionary pressures),
cies coalesced

these various po li 

in military subjugation and removal which

progressed inexorably from the Indian Removal Act
of the Mississippi River)

in 1830 to total conquest and

marginalization on reservations by 1890
46).

(from east

(Zinn 1980,

pp.

124-

After conquest and creation of the reservation system.

Native Americans remained largely outside of the American
class structure

(or,

if one prefers, a lu mp en pr ol et a ri at ).

struggling in isolation to eke out a marginal existence.
A second superexploited minority, Mexican-Americans,
were absorbed through the conquest of the territory which
would become the Southwestern United States.
granted American citizenship,

Mexican-Americans were driven

off the land via a variety of devices
ment grants to railroads,

Despite being

(laws,

taxes,

institutional practices,

go ve rn 
non

recognition of land tenure— cf. Barrera 1979) each of which
favored Anglo corporations and settlers in what could be
described as a form of "primitive accumulation"

in which

individual producers were separated from the means of
production

(cf. Marx 1906, pp.

784-87).

Dispossessed

Mexican-Americans were then available to serve as a source
of "superexploited" labor for mines, railroads,

and large

agriculture.

At the same time,

superexploited
Anglo workers

their status as low wage

labor earned Mexican-Americans the e nm it y of
(who resented perceived economic competition

and downward pressure on wages)

and small farmers

(who had

to compete with large farms using superexploited labor),
both of whom sought to exclude Mexicans from the labor
market

(Barrera 1979,

Anglo workers,

pp.

50-55).

Given the weakness of

this situation does not in our judgement fit

the split labor market interpretation of a caste system
created by the working class of the dominant group
Bonacich 1972);

however,

(cf.

economic competition un doubtedly

fostered Anglo racism and attempts at exclusion.

These

social arrangements tended to reproduce themselves
generation to generation,

as Mexican-American mob il ity was

inhibited by both their superexploited status
economic disadvantage)

from

(and ensuing

and the effects of institutionalized

Anglo racism
An experience somewhat similar to Mexican-Americans was
that of Chinese

immigrants.

The preponderance of Chinese-

Americans entered as indentured servants or as contract
labor on the railroads

(Dinnerstein et al.

1979, p.

193)--

and experienced ethnically-based restrictive circumstances
closer to the superexploited end of the continuum.
Mexican-Americans,

Like

Chinese-Americans served as a low wage

pool for the benefit of Anglo capital,
wrath of the White working class

while incurring the

(Barrera 1979, p.

52).
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Similarly,

anti-Chinese antagonism can be attributed to

competition

(e.g., downward pressure on wages, the use of

Chinese-Americans as strikebreakers) and to the spreading
ideology of racial

inferiority of non-Whites.

legal exclusion of Chinese immigrants after

The eventual

1882 reflected a

range of eth-class concerns.

Clearly,

the White w o rk in g

class agitated for exclusion;

however,

passage of r e s t r i c 

tive legislation was as much a strategy of capital
course of eth-class struggle--discarding a weapon

in the
(Chinese-

American labor) which was serving as an organizing issue for
the labor movement
purposes,

(Takaki 1987b,

the essential point

interaction--conflict,

For our

is that outcomes of intergroup

exclusion,

stellations of eth-class

pp. 107-08).

denigration--reflect con

interests.

For the other superexploited minority,

Black-Ameri-

cans, the nineteenth century was a tumultuous one as they
were caught up in the class/regional conflict between the
North and the South.

The expansion of c ott on production

cemented the role of slavery in the Southern political
economy and

increased the isolation of Black-Americans

the American mainstream
confines of slavery,
isolation,

(Quarles 1969, p.

forced acculturation,

63).

from

W ith in the

and social

Black-Americans forged a new ethnic identity

which reflected both their historical heritage and their
economic status
al.

1979, pp.

(Boorstein 1965,

57-59;

pp. 190-99;

Schaefer 1988, pp.

Dinnerstein et

218-19).

Following
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the termination of the slave trade

in 1808,

heightened

Northern criticism of the institution of slavery, and an
ever-growing Southern fear of slave revolts,
suffered increased restrictions

Black-Americans

(e.g., slave codes) as

plantation owners sought to secure their position in the
social order
66).

(Zinn 1980,

pp. 168-76;

Archdeacon 1983, p.

The effects of this expanding racist ideology--a

philosophical

justification for the

were also felt
free Blacks,

institution of slavery--

in the form of increased restrictions upon

who were viewed by Southern Whites as a threat

to the maintenance of the slave sy stem

(Quarles 1969, pp.

8 6 - 8 8 ).
The situation of the Northern Black-American population
also deteriorated during this time.
(and therefore

less threatening)

Confronted by a smaller

population which did not

play a significant economic role, Northern Whites exhibited
what Fredrickson

(1981,

p. 151) has termed an "aversive"

racial order--one which sought to exclude Black-Americans,
which encouraged their

"repatriation" to Africa, and which

envisioned the eventual extinction of Blacks through an
inability to compete on an equal basis with Whites.

Thus,

Northern Black-Americans experienced legal attempts to
prohibit their entry and to restrict their civil rights
(Archdeacon 1983, p. 66).

With respect to the labor

market, most Northern Blacks served as superexploited labor
in a manner similar to Mexican and Chinese-Americans in the
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Western United States;
desirable

that is, they were excluded from

jobs and labor unions and limited to the most

unskilled posit io ns- -fr om which they were
displaced by immigrants
this context,

(Quarles 1969,

pp.

92-93).**

In

the Northern attack on slavery was not

grounded in an ideological belief
in economic

in turn often

(class)

in equality,

but instead

competition between North and South, as

the North was fearful that any westward expansion of slavery
would both limit capitalist development and undermine the
position of free White
1980,

labor

(Fredrickson 1981,

p. 156;

Zinn

p. 1 8 2 ) . 25
The triumph of the North in the Civil War shattered the

slave-based Southern social order.

Post-war

"Recons tr uc

tion" saw the extension of some civil rights to BlackAmericans;

however,

class disadvantages

racism,

the lack of land reform,

instilled by slavery (e.g.,

education and vocational skills)
opportunities.

and the

lack of

limited their economic

While the first decade after the Civil War

contained considerable class struggle over the shape of the
new post-slavery social

order,

the White rural elite

(essentially the former plantation class) was able to r e 
establish first its economic power and then--after the Hayes
deal and the collapse of Reconstruction--its political
hegemony (Bloom 1987,
Even then,

p.

33; Zinn 1980,

pp.

198-2 00) .20

the planter class feared the potential threat

posed by free Blacks in alliance with working class Whites
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(particularly given the popularity of the populist movement
among lower class Whites--Dinnerstein et a l . 1979,
92) and sought to preserve
tural labor.

91-

its control over Black a g r i c u l 

Consequently,

populist movement,

pp.

following the collapse of the

the Southern elite engineered the di s en 

franchisement of Black-Americans and instituted the "Jim
Crow" system of legal segregation.
this meant subjugation

For Black-Americans,

in a system of superexploited labor

(e.g., debt peonage and exclusion)

which was maintained

through both legal and extralegal coercion.
What emerges from this picture

is the notion that the

hegemony of the Southern White rural elite and emergence of
the post-bellum racial

order were not inevitable,

that they evolved via eth-class struggle

but rather

in an arena shaped

by the legacy of slavery and the existence of a polarized
ethnic structure

(i.e.,

opposed to the North).

containing two major groups,

as

The "Jim Crow" system was the result

of White ethnic mo b i l i z a t i o n , as the rural elite employed
racial ideology to build a cross-class alliance--one which
enabled them to retain power.
observes,

As Bloom

(1987, p. 18)

"racism did not overwhelm class;

organizing principle

racism became an

for social strata fearful of class-

based political action."

In our view, this outcome

is not

compatible with the split labor market interpretation of a
caste system

(i.e., the exclusion of minority labor from

high-paying jobs and the emergence of racially-based wage

differentials)

created by a labor "aristocracy"

(as would be

maintained by B o n ac ic h- - 19 72 ), inasmuch as the Southern
White working class did not have the power
might have had the interest)

(although they

to force such ch an ge s. 2 "7

While

the White working class may have benefitted from reduced
economic competition

(as well as the psychological benefits

of higher social status),

the major beneficiary was

the

rural planter class which both assured a supply of cheap
labor and eliminated any potential cross-ethnic working
class alliance.

Thus,

the interests of the White elite were

cast as "ethnic"

interests in order to mobilize all Whites

and to maintain the subjugation of Blacks.
making this statement

Our intention in

is not to depict ethnicity as an

epiphenomenon of class-- cer ta inl y racist

ideology had become

a social fact and was well institutionalized in the South-but

instead to assert that without the underlying class

interests,

the Southern racial order would not have emerged.

Also relevant to this analysis is the link between the
Southern racial order and the national eth-class structure.
As long as its political hegemony was unchallenged,

the

North was unwilling to employ costly control measures

(e.g.,

using the full power of the federal government to push the
South) to protect Blacks

(Fredrickson 1981,

much as Northern capital did not need Black

p. 183).
labor

Inas

(European

immigrants provided an alternative source of cheap labor for
industrial e xp ans io n— Bonacich 1984, pp.

112-13),

it was

thus more

interested

in maintaining social harmony and

continuing the flow of profit from the Southern "pe riphery”
to Northern industrial and financial

interests than in

improving the welfare of Black-Americans
25; Zinn 1980, pp.
beneficiary,

{Bloom 1987, p.

201-03; Quarles 1969, p. 141).28

the North had no interest

Southern racial order.

In addition,

As a

in overturning the

the social climate in

the North was evolving in ways which made

it more s y m p a 

thetic to Southern p r a c t i c e s - - e .g ., the

late-nineteenth

century spread of Social Darwinism,

increased racism

directed towards new immigrants,
rationalize

imperialism,

the

the use of racism to

and the view that segregation was a

necessary "ap prenticeship” before Black-Americans could
attain full citizenship (Fredrickson 1981,
Closely linked to this was the
(i.e., strikes,
century,

increased class conflict

populism)

which in turn fostered

consciousness
allies

unions,

pp. 188-91).

of the late nineteenth

increased capitalist class

(including viewing the Southern elite as

in the struggle against the working class) and a

general retreat from ideologies of equality (Zinn 1980, pp.
235-46;

Fredrickson 1981, p. 189).

In this context,

could be argued that Northern capital

it

feared the fusion of

the newly-formed Black-American underclass with the b u r 
geoning union movement and was therefore quite willing to
accept the Southern racial order

(Steinberg 1981).

Thus,

the post-Reconstruction rapprochement between Northern
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capital an d the Southern agricultural elite can be vi ewed as
both class

(capitalist) and national

(White American)

mobi

lization which occurred at the expense of B l a c k - A m e r i c a n s .
In this manner, the Southern racial order was integrated
into the national social system--a "peripheral" and coercive
form of labor control

linked to core

through commercial and
Summary:

(Northern) capital

financial ties.

1800-90.

Before continuing with our analysis

of the evolution of intergroup relations
States,

in the United

let us briefly summarize the trends of the years

between 1800 and 1890.
change:

This was an era of rapid social

immigration and territorial expansion had increased

the size and population of the United States;
development,

industrialization,

capitalist

and proletarianization had

altered the nature of production;

and the Civil War a nd the

emergence of monopoly capitalism had restructured the pol i
tical economy.
nature of

These developments

intergroup relations,

to describe

in turn transformed the

an outcome which we sought

in terms of two processes.

these--the European

In the first of

immigrant ex pe ri en ce — increased

inter

group co nt ac t and competition in the context of industriali
zation led to a comp lex set of outcomes.
competition and conflict
their po sit ion against

On the one hand,

(as "natives" sought to defend

immigrants)

encouraged ethnic m ob il i

zation and the persistence of g r o u p identity as a strategy
for survival

in unfamiliar settings.

On the other hand,
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several facto rs — the link between acculturation and social
mobility,

overall economic expansion,

permeability of boundaries

and the relative

(among White g r o u p s )--produced

strong pressures towards assimilation, albeit at different
rates

for different eth-classes.

Meanwhile,

the second

tre n d— the non-White expe rie nc e— resulted in a different set
of outcomes.

These groups were relegated to a subordinate,

"superexploited11 social and economic position which was
reinforced by rigid, almost caste-like "racial" boundaries
imposed by the dominant group
European immigrants).

(including newly-arrived

While specific group experiences

d i ff er ed — Native Americans were decimated and marginalized
on reservations;

Black-Americans suffered under slavery

prior to 1865 and from the Jim Crow system of segregation
thereafter;

and Mexican-Americans were faced with debt

peonage and extreme labor market segmentation--the result of
this overlapping of ethnicity and class
dominant group exclusion)

(in the context of

was to concretize group boundaries

and thereby effectively preclude any assimilation.
effects of these patterns would continue

The

into the next

century.

Core Status and Monopoly Capitalism:

1890-1945

The first half of the twentieth century saw the c o n t i n 
uing evolution of the process of U.S.
ment.

capitalist d e v e l o p 

Industrialization and proletarianization proceeded

apace, as evidenced by rapid economic expansion and the

reshaping of the class structure.

On a global level, this

era also marked the movement of the United States
core of the capitalist world-economy,

into the

a dramatic change from

the weak, new ly emergent nation which existed at the begin
ning of the nineteenth century.

Closely linked to this

transformation was the emergence of the United States as an
imperialist power, a development attributable to the expan
sionary nature of capitalism
markets,
ment)

(e.g.,

sources of raw materials,

the guest for new
and outlets for

and its inherent tendencies towards crisis

disruptions of accumulation,
1870s and 1 8 90 s) .2*
activities

invest

(i.e.,

such as the depressions

For the United States,

of the

imperialist

included the Asia trade and the Open Door policy,

the Spanish-American War and territorial acquisitions in the
Caribbean and the Pacific,

and the political and economic

domination of Latin A m e r i c a . 30

In addition to serving as a

sign of the increased power and

influence of the United

States, many of these ventures would later provide
of immigrants to the United States
Central America),

sources

(e.g., Puerto Rico,

particularly during the post-1945 era.

With respect to intergroup relations,

the years between

1890 and 1945 stand as a period of transition between the
patterns of the nineteenth century (immigration and compe
tition, domination and superexploitation)

and those of the

modern era (migration from periphery to core, ethnic asser
tion vs. the state).

The already complex ethnic structure
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which was the legacy of the nineteenth century would become
even more varied,
surge

which in turn would lead to a sharp u p 

in intergroup conflict as new groups sought to e s t a b 

lish a niche in American society.

Underneath the surface,

increasing class differentiation would intersect ethnic
boundaries
trigger

(leading to a proliferation of eth-classes)

intergroup processes ranging from assimilation to

mobilization,

although in many cases these effects would not

be evident until the post-1945 era.
ning to anticipate events.
tions

and

Yet here we are b e g i n 

The story of intergroup r e l a 

in the first half of the twentieth century begins

with variations on a traditional theme:

immigration.

Ethnic Contact
For the first half of this era--i.e.,

from 1890 until

1924--immigration continued to serve as a source of cheap
labor for rapid economic growth.

After 1880,

the number of

immigrants per decade roughly doubled from two and one-half
million to five million

(with the exception of only 3.7

million during the depression-ridden 1890s),

reaching a peak

of 8.8 million in the first decade of the twentieth century
(Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 158).
immigrants"--English,
continued to come,
impact by a flood
tion")

of "new"

Irish, Germans,

While the "old

and Scandinavians--

they were surpassed in both numbers and
(often referred to as the "Great M i g r a 

immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe-

-primarily Italians,

Jews, and Slavs,

but also including

smaller numbers of Greeks, Finns,
many other groups

Magyars,

(Nevins and Commager 1966,

Lithuanians, and
pp.

3 3 3 - 3 5 ) . 31

In contrast with the original American settlement pattern
which persisted through the nineteenth century,

this m i g r a 

tion reflected a new pattern--movement from the periphery
(or the semiperiphery)
phenomenon was the
development,

to the c o r e . 32

increasingly global

Underlying this
impact of capitalist

as new areas experienced the same upheavals

(e.g., rapid population growth,

decline of small a g r i c u l 

ture, political co n f l i c t — the collapse of the Russian,
Austro-Hungarian,

and Ottoman Empires)

which had previously

stimulated emigration from Western Europe.

Indeed,

this

"new" immigration is best viewed as part of a worldwide
pattern

(migrants also moved to other "settler" societies--

e.g., Canada,

Australia, New Zealand)

States was the primary destination
113).

For our purposes,

in which the United

(Archdeacon 1983,

p.

what is most significant about this

"new" immigration was that by introducing many new groups
into American society,

it effected a dramatic change

in the

ethnic composition of the United States.33
As was the case

in the nineteenth century,

immigrant

and labor patterns were shaped by the uneven development of
the United States.

Bonacich

(1984, p. 108)

observes that

the United States at the turn of the century contained
aspects of both peripheral

formations and advanced capital

(e.g., exporting both raw materials and manufactured goods;

investing overseas while remaining an outlet for European
capital).

In the Northeast--the advanced capitalist

"core”

of the United S t a t e s — immigration followed the "modern"
pattern of peripheral

(Southern and Eastern European)

p e asa nt ry becoming a core urba n industrial proletar i a t .3“*
The Un ite d States

"periphery",

different patterns:
(i.e.,

on the other hand, exhibited

core-periphery migration in the West

"settlers" emigrating from the Northeast in search of

o p p or tu ni ti e s- -e .g ., agriculture, mining--to join the
pendent class) and

limited migration to the more established

agrarian society of the South.
"core"

inde

Both areas were dominated by

(Northeastern United States) capital and possessed an

economy based on superexploited
the South, Mexican-Americans

phery"

(Black-Americans

in the West),

less attractive to immigrants.
has its

labor

hence, both were

This core-periphery metaphor

limits, as some immigrants did settle
(especially the West,

economic

in the

with its opportunities

independence); however,

for understanding the different

in

"peri
for

it provides a useful basis
immigration and ethnic

labor

patterns of the earl y twentieth century.
This

"new"

a few decades.
bers)

immigration,
While

however,

would persist

for only

(despite their larger absolute n u m 

smaller relative to the existing resident population,

the new

immigrants

had a significant social

impact,

probably

due to the increased economic and cultural distance between
the U ni t ed States and the sending societies.

One effect of
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this increased "social distance" was an upsurge in nativism,
ethnic conflict, racism, and pressure
r e s t r i c t i o n .3a

for immigration

By the 1920s, American nativist sentiment

was sufficiently strong to bring about legislation which
strictly limited immigration from Southern and Eastern
Europe and continued the exclusion of Asians

(which began in

1882 with the Chinese Exclusion Act and was extended by the
"Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1907 which limited Japanese
gration ). 37

The roots of this exclusionary process were

m a n y and varied,

including racism,

general

political and economic competition;
size the economic factors,
for unskilled labor

the

however,

(cf. Archdeacon 1983,

(Bonacich 1984,

xenophobia,

we would empha

p.

152) and the

into domestic workers'

p. 116).

move

What is significant about

immigration restriction legislation of the 1920s

it was deliberately

and

particularly the declining need

absorption of new immigrants
ments

immi

is that

(in a racist manner) designed to reverse

the trend of the previous thirty years by restoring Northern
and Western Europeans to the pre-eminent position among
immigrant groups.
national quotas,
War

Moreover,

the restrictive system of

in concert with the Depression and World

II, served to limit drastically all immigration to the

United States

(e.g.,

from 4.1 million

in the 1920s to

500,000 in the 1930s--Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982,
Yet the story of ethnic contact

in the

p.

158).

first half of

the twentieth century does not end with immigration r es tri c

tion,

the Depression,

tion.
Act

and the decline of European im mi gra 

Mexicans were not affected by the 1924 Johnson-Reed

(neither were French-Canadians,

began to migrate in greater numbers,

for that matter)

and

filling the labor void

created by restrictions on Asian and European immigration.
Emigration from Mexico was encouraged by rapid population
growth and the displacement of the peasantry
due

(the latter

in part to the effects of United States investment),

while continued development of agriculture,
railroads

mining,

and

in the American Southwest created a demand for

cheap labor to the extent that companies actively recruited
in Mexico

(Barrera 1979,

proximity of Mexico

pp.

6 9 - 7 1 ) . 38

Moreover,

the

(via improved railroad links) and the

seasonal nature of agricultural work created a pattern of
temporary or "commuter" migration

(cf. Barkan 1977) which

was compatible with both Mexican economic patterns and the
needs of American capital
Indeed,

(Archdeacon 1983,

p. 129).

the economy of the United States Southwest was so

dependent upon Mexican labor that agricultural and mining
interests successfully resisted a n y attempts to restrict
Mexican immigration.3*
Also significant during this era was the

internal

migration of American Blacks from the "peripheral" Southern
United States to the urban areas of the North.
immigrants during this period,

Black-Americans

economically less developed area for the wage

Like other
forsook an
labor market
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and expanding econo my (particularly d uri ng wartime)
Northern "core."

Giving further

of the

impetus to the Black-

American exodus from the South was the decline
production and the mechanization of agriculture

of cotton
(the same

disruption of small producers which propelled so m a n y
Europeans across the Atlantic),

as well as the onerous

nature of the Southern system of racial segregation
(Archdeacon 1983, pp.
Northern capital,

130-32).

From the perspective

of

Southern B la ck s provided a ready source of

cheap labor after the restriction of European immigration
and during the labor shortages
Wars.

of the Fi rs t and Second World

Although the migration of Blacks from South to North

was not in itself international

in scope,

it continued the

restructuring of the ethnic composition of the Nor th and
expanded Black-White

intergroup contact beyond the confines

of the South.
Thus,

the half-century preceding Wo r ld War II saw the

continued evolution of United States capitalist development
and the American ethnic structure.
former,

this era witnessed the

With respect to the

emergence

of the U nit ed

States as a full fledged core power, which

in the context of

the early twentieth century ent ailed industrial mon opoly
capitalism

(i.e.,

increased ra ti on a li za ti on of production,

the expansion of ma rket relations, the concentr ati on of
capital,

the formation of trusts and cartels, and the

systematic recurrence of economic crises)

and imperialist
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activities.

Ethnic contact was shaped by the demands of

economic expansion which encouraged continued labor m i g r a 
tion.

Indeed,

European immigration reached its zenith

during the first half of this period.

This pattern of labor

migration was Qualitatively different:

it dramatically

broadened the ethnic structure of the United States by
introducing a diverse array of new groups which were nonProtestant and non-Western European.

Even when the flow of

immigrants from overseas was curtailed by the immigration
restriction legislation of 1924,

the migrations of Mexican

and Black Americans continued the reshaping of the American
ethnic mosaic.

By the onset of the Second World War,

the

ethnic composition of the United States had begun to assume
many of the characteristics of its present configu rat io n— a
mixture of Native Americans,

the descendants of the British

"original settlers" and of the "old immigrants"

from

Northern and Western Europe,

the "new immigrants"

Southern and Eastern Europe,

Asians,

from

the "superexploited"

Mexicans and Blacks, and an assortment of "micro-groups"
from virtually every corner of the globe

(indeed, U.S.

ethnic groups are estimated to number more than 200).
Eth-Class Struggles and .Group Identity
European

immi gra nts .

As we have just described,

the

addition of the new immigrants greatly increased the d i v e r 
sity of the American eth-class structure.

For the old

immigrants and newcomers from Northern and Western Europe,

the arrival of groups from Southern and Eastern Europe
triggered a process of "ethnic succession"

(c f. Light 1981);

that is, the displacement of earlier immigrants from the
bottom of the

(W h i t e ) ethnic hierarchy.

several different ways.

First,

This occurred

the new immigrants tended to

deflect the nativist sentiments of Anglo-Americans
perhaps towards Irish-Americans)
groups,

from older

thereby enabling the latter

objectionable)

to move

in

(except

immigrant

(now seen as less

into a "middle" position in the

ethnic structure--a benefit realized even by newcomers from
these groups

(e.g., Protestant

Scandinavia,

etc.).

with "new"

immigrants from Germany,

In addition,

intergroup competition

immigrants often induced older

to accentuate their "American"

immigrant groups

(i.e., Anglo)

affiliation as

a strategy to exclude newcomers or otherwise gain c o m p e t i 
tive advantages
hand,

(Archdeacon 1983,

pp.

151-52).

old immigrants occasionally found

ties with newcomers,

On the other

it easier to develop

which in turn allowed them to improve

their status by serving as "brokers"

(e.g.,

increased Irish

political power through incorporating Southern and Eastern
Europeans

into the Democratic Party and urban political

"machines"— Dinnerstein et al.
1983, p. 157).

This movement

ethnic structure,

1979, pp.

176-77;

Archdeacon

into the middle of the White

coupled with economic mobility

(and s u b s e 

quent intragroup class variation and divergent eth-class
interests)

in the midst of the expanding American economy,
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continued the assimilation of the old,

pre-1880

immigrant

groups.
For

immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe,

the

situation was markedly different from that of earlier ethnic
groups.

First,

periphery)

their migration was from periphery

(or se mi 

to core, as opposed to the cor e-p eriphery (or

semiperiphery) pattern of the old immigrants.

This meant

that rather than entering American so ci et y with occupational
and literacy skills that could be dir ec tl y utilized

(as was

the case with the old immigrants, whose skills were roughly
equal to that of the resident population),

the new immi

grants tended to be relatively disadvantaged
Commager 1966, p.

297; Archdeacon 1983,

(cf. Nevins and

p. 152).

Secondly,

post-1890 new immigrants encountered a different class
structure,

one which was increasingly industrial as opposed

to independent agriculture and petty commodity production,
and one in which the modal labor form was urban and semi or
unskilled as opposed to agricultural.

As a result,

new

immigrants assumed a relatively low class position upon
entry into an intergroup arena marked by increasing inter
action,

competition,

and differentiation.

Another characteristic of the American intergroup arena
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was
an upsurge in eth-class struggles.
union assertion,

This was the era of

socialist movements,

of anti-capitalist small producers

and the mobilization

(e.g.,

the Grange,

rural
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populism),

all class-based forms of group organization

Zinn 1980,

pp.

369-75).

237-46,

314-49;

(cf.

Nevins and Commager 1966,

pp.

Given the increasingly complex ethnic structure of

the United States,

ethnicity both cut across and was

inter

sected bv class d i v i s i o n s , a factor which tended to limit
the utility of both affiliations.

Moreover,

new immigrants

were simultaneously interacting and competing with Anglos,
old immigrants,

and other new immigrants,

which meant that

intergroup conflict was not bipolar but multi-headed and
more diffuse

in nature

(and,

therefore,

less salient).

Thus, the new immigrants were confronted by contradictory
forces which encouraged both accentuating and attenuating
ethnic identity.
In this context,

new immigrants faced a wide range of

strategic alternatives with respect to ethnic identity.

For

the many sojourners who viewed their stay in the United
States as temporary (see note 33 above),
incentive

for acculturation.

in enclaves

there was little

Urban location and clustering

facilitated the emergence of ethnic

and informal networks,

institutions

thereby increasing the value of group

affiliation as a means of survival for both sojourners and
permanent

immigrants.

For some group members,

survival entailed partial withdrawal
or specialization

from the larger society

in an economic "niche"

concentration or ethnic enterprise)

enclave

(i.e.,

occupational

as an ethnic-based

strategy for improving class p o s i ti on .40

Competition with

218
other groups often encouraged ethnic mobilization,

manifest

in new immigrant affiliation with the Democratic Party and
with urban political machines
Archdeacon,

(Handlin 1951,

1983, pp. 189-92).

pp.

209-24;

Given the initial economic

homogeneity of the new immigrant groups,
ethnic strategies resulted in the

the broad use of

initial persistence of

group identities.
Another

factor in the equation was the reaction of the

dominant classes and ethnic group to the new immigrants.
Monopoly capital

(which was predominantly Anglo)

was see m

ingly the greatest beneficiary of continued immigration,
the continued

influx of cheap labor both increased profits

(by reducing labor costs)
darity.

as

and undercut working class sol i

On the other hand,

the Anglo/old

class tended to be antagonistic,

immigrant working

fearing competition via

lower wages and the deskilling of jobs and resenting the use
of newcomers as strikebreakers.
independent producers,

Similarly,

the class of

still fighting a losing battle

against capitalist development and proletarianization,
viewed new immigrants with suspicion as tools of monopoly
capital

(Bonacich 1984, pp.

121 -22 ). •*1

Fanning the flames

of economically rooted intergroup conflict was existing
racial ideology (e.g.,
movement)

Social Darwinism,

the eugenics

employed to explain the social problems stemming

from industrialization and the economic and cultural gap
between residents and new immigrants from the periphery
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(Handlin 1951, pp.
describing
inferior

279-80).

This was manifest

in works

Southern and Eastern Europeans as racially

(e.g., Grant 1916) a nd by a Congressional C o m m i s 

sion repor t

(i.e.,

the Dillingham Commission) which

described them as an

"undesirable addition" to American

society (Archdeacon 1983, pp.
and Commager

1966,

p.

336).

163-64;
Thus,

exacerbated by existing ideology,
from ea rl ie r

Gossett 1963; Nevins

material conflict was
which in turn had emerged

intergroup resource competition.

As a result of these divergent interests and attitudes,
there was

considerable variation

gies towa rds new immigrants.
in the nineteenth century;
only limited success

in dominant group s t r a t e 

Pressures

however,

for exclusion began

initial efforts met with

(e.g., exclusion of contract laborers

and Chinese) as restrictive legislation was vetoed by
Presidents

Cleveland,

immigrants

had entered the Un it ed States, dominant group

strategies

for maintaining su pr em ac y included exploitation,

discrimination, and

Taft, and Wilson

intimidation

(Higham 1955).

(Dinnerstein et al.

Once

1979,

pp. 145-56).

One alternative st rategy involved attempts to

"Americanize"

(i.e.,

social w o r k

Anglicize)

immigrants,

(e.g., settlement houses),

most signific ant ly- -t he public schools
184-85)‘42
World War

as manifest

the workplace,

in

and—

(Archdeacon 1983,

pp.

This movement gained momentum with the onset of
I and char ges of divi ded loyalty among "h yp he

nated Americans"

(charges promulgated by no less than
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President Wilson himself);

however,

Americanization increased pressures

the limited success of
for e xc lu sio n.43

Given

the lessened opposition of the capitalist class to immi gra 
tion restriction--due to the declining need for unskilled
labor,

the absorption of new immigrants

movement,

into the union

and the perceived link between newcomers and

radicalism

(Bonacich 1984,

p. 115; Archdeacon 1983,

-Anglo cross-class ethnic mobilization
Americanism)

p. 152)-

(under the guise of

gave rise to the restrictive immigration

legislation of 1 9 2 4 . 44
interests were visible

Nevertheless,

differing eth-class

in the lobbying for immigration

restriction legislation--the National Association of M a n u 
facturers opposed quotas, while the American Federation of
Labor strongly supported them

(Handlin 1951,

pp.

289-90;

Archdeacon 1983, p. 174).
The 1924 restriction
the virtual cutoff)
context for

(in the case of new immigrants,

of immigration changed the strategic

intergroup interaction.

While the enclave or

ethnic niche strategy which had provided an initial foothold
remained feasible for some, the absence of the physical and
cultural reinforcement previously provided by sojourners and
new arrivals

limited the effectiveness of ethnic mo b i l i z a 

tion and encouraged ac cu l tu ra ti on .4 *

One strategy--which

became increasingly appealing given the intolerance of the
dominant group for cultural diversity,

the large number of

groups in the American ethnic structure,

and the existence
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of conflict between ethnic minor ities--was ethnic m e r g e r :
that is, the enhancement of group strength by blurring e t h 
nic identities from the country of origin and creating a new
supra-ethnic identity based on previous national
(e.g.,

It ali an- Am eri ca ns— Hannerz 1974;

Barton 1975).

identity

Slavic-Americans--

Given declining dominant group hostility

immigrants were perceived as less of a threat after
tion restriction),

access to rights of citizenship

immigra
(the 1790

Naturalization Act extended citizenship status to all
Whites"--Bonacich 1984,
tutional hegemony,

p. 116),

(new

"free

and continued Anglo insti

assimilation became an increasingly

viable individual strate gy .40
vidual psychological

At the same time,

the

indi

"costs" of assimilation--separation

from commu nit y and family (cf.
made it a process more

Child 1943;

Handlin 1951)--

likely to occur over generations.

Thus, while acculturation and decreased intergroup conflict
paved the wa y for assimilation,

ethnic identity persisted

for the ne w immigrants.
Non-White G r o u p s .
enced by the

The problems and conflicts ex pe r i

"new immigrants" paled by comparison with those

superexploited groups not of European origin.
Native, and

Black,

Asian,

Mexican-Americans were forced to confront both

the extreme racism of American society in the early t w e n 
tieth century and the disadvantage of location at the bottom
of the class structure.

With the exception of Native A m e r i 

cans, who for the most part were kept on the margins of the

economy,
severity,

these groups served,

with varying degrees of

as superexploited labor generally located

the exception of Northern Blacks)
(i.e.,

the South and the West)

much as colonial

in the peripheral regions

of the United States.

labor systems are grounded

enance of rigid ethnic boundaries,
permitted to assimilate;

(with

that is,

In a s

in the ma i n t 

non-White groups were not
intergroup boundaries and

status differentials were str ictly enforced by the dominant
Anglo-American group.

This did not preclude

of intragroup class divisions,
White group members remained
of the working class,
American

the emergence

for while the bulk of non-

in the superexploited segment

the limited permeability of the

"caste” system allowed for some mo bil ity and the

emergence of a small middle class

(e.g., professionals or

small business owners serving the minority c o m m u n i t y ) .
ethnicity remained a determining factor,

Yet

for although the

minority "middle" class enjoyed a higher economic position,
it shared the pariah social and political status of its
fellow group members.
For non-White groups,
turation
culture),

(i.e.,

exclusion did not

inhibit a c c u l 

the adoption of aspects of Anglo-American

it m ere ly assured— given the rarity of "passing"

as a dominant group member and the impossibility of classbased strategies--the persistence
and group identity.

In essence,

of ethnic stratification
minority ethnic identity in

the earl y twentieth century evolved as an adaptation to
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White domination

(e.g. Black accommodation to Southern White

racism/paternalism--Bloom 1987, pp.
meters set by the dominant group.

122-28) within para 
From the other side of

the fence, dominant group exclusionary practices reflected
the eth-class

interests of both the elite

and Western agricultural interests),
superexploitation and general
colonial

(e.g.,

Southern

who benefitted from the

labor control

inherent in

labor systems, and the White working class,

sought to exclude competition.

These economic

were buttressed by the now-entrenched racial

who

interests

ideology of

White superiority.
Within the general context of superexploited
experiences of different groups varied.

labor,

Black-Americans

the
in

the post-Reconstruction South experienced relegation to
agricultural debt peonage

(i.e., sharecropping)

lowest ranks of the working cl a s s . 47

or to the

This caste-like social

status was maintained by the "Jim Crow" system of legal
segregation

(which was given national sanction by the U.S.

Supreme Court

in the Plessy v. Ferguson decision),

informal exclusion,

and by extralegal coercion such as

lynching (Fredrickson 1981,
social order

by

pp.

268-74).

What emerged was a

in which Blacks were economically,

and psychologically dominated by Whites,

politically,

a social order in

which the White rural elite were the prime b en ef ic ia ri es .11
Although "caste-like",

this social system was not as rigid

as slavery, as evidenced by the emergence of a small

22 4
enclave-based Black middle class and of a range of ethnic
institutions

(e.g., chu r ch es ). 4*

economy was rocked by crises

Although the Southern

(e.g.,

the boll weevil

infestation and the decline of cotton agriculture),

the

emigration of Blacks to the North provided a safety valve
which allowed the racial order to persist.
Black-Americans in the Northern "core" of the United
States experienced a different form of superexploitation
during the early twentieth century.
always

lived in the North,

While some Blacks had

their numbers were swelled by the

immigration of Southern Blacks during World War I and after
the restriction of European immigration
193-95).

In some respects,

(Quarles 1969,

pp.

Black northward migration can be

viewed as a case of "ethnic succession"

in that they r e 

placed the "new immigrants" at the bottom of the class
structure; however,

the position of Black-Americans was

qualitatively different from that of Southern and Eastern
Europeans due to racial exclusion--which seemingly increased
in response to the
1980,

p.

375).*°

influx of Southern Blacks
At the same time,

the Northern racial

order was different from that of the South:
state-sanctioned segregation;

(Lieberson

there was

Blacks were more

into the mainstream urban industrial sector;

less

integrated

the system of

ethnic stratification was relatively more permeable;

and the

local political economy did not depend on racial segregation
(Bloom 1987, p.

187).

Nevertheless,

the position of Black-
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Americans was superexploited

in that they constituted a

separate segment of the working class
ethnic occupational stratification,
amidst an "aversive"

(different wages,

exclusion from unions)

(cf. Frederickson 1981,

p. 151) racial

order characterized by segregation in employment,
and education

(Dinnerstein et al.

1987, p. 188;

Blauner

1987, pp.

1979, pp.

149-60).

housing,

171-72;

Bloom

In response,

Northern Blacks developed their own social and cultural
networks and

institutions,

utilizing group ties as a means

of survival.
Given our assertion that no one dominant eth-class
segment benefitted from the exclusion of Blacks to the same
degree as in the South,

it becomes necessary to examine the

basis of the Northern racial order.
asking the question:

In essence,

Why were Northern Blacks treated

differen tl y from European immigrants?
classical economic thought
status discrimination

we are

(e.g.,

According to n e o 

Friedman 1962,

is eco nomically irrational

context of advanced capitalism;

however,

p. 108),
in the

it has not been

market forces which have reduced d i s cr im i na ti on .01
the power of the capitalist class,

Given

it is also not feasible

to accept the split labor market suggestion that a White
working class

fearful of competition was unilaterally able

to establish a restrictive racial

order.

that racial discrim in ati on is not

incompatible with

trial capitalism,

We would argue
indus

and that the capitalist mode of production
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can adapt itself to pre-existing ideologies.
that there is little incentive
racial order due to both the

This suggests

for capital to change a

influence of racial

ideologies

and the economic advantages of discrimination (e.g.,
from superexploitation,

increased labor control through

working class di vis io ns— cf. Reich 1981).
racial

profits

ideology is widespread,

afford not to discriminate
perceived danger thereof,

Indeed,

if a

individual actors cannot

(e.g., the economic loss,

or

experienced by the first employer

to hire racial minorities as professionals,

managers,

sales

staff, e t c . ) .
In the Western United States,

Mexican-Americans exper

ienced yet another superexploited labor pattern.
consequence
shortages,

of agricultural expansion,

As a

World War I labor

and the restriction of European immigration,

the

existing Mexican-American population was augmented by an
influx of immigrants from M e x i c o . 32
economy of the Southwest,
labor

Mexican-Americans served as cheap

(with varying degrees of superexploitation)

economic niches:

in agriculture;

in mining or as railroad labor;
tion in the

wage discrimination

and occupational stratifica

industrial labor force

Despite

in several

extreme superexploitation via debt peonage

or wage discrimination

90).

Within the political

(Barrera 1979,

pp.

78-

increasing White ethnic antagonism stemming

from economic competition

(e.g., White labor, White

competing with employers of Mexican-American labor),

farmers
the
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economic role of Mexican-American

labor was central to the

extent that Southwestern capitalist
inclusion of Mexicans
lation of the 1920s

interests prevented the

in the immigration restriction le gi s

(Dinnerstein et a l . 1979, p.

Barrera 1979, pp. 7 3 - 7 4 . ) . 83

Nevertheless,

217;

the tenuous

economic position of M exi ca n-A mer ic ans was reflected in
their reserve role

(which was enhanced by the proximity of

M e x i c o )--Mexican-Americans were dep or ted during the D e p r e s 
sion or were replaced b y White labor
07). 8"®

Although some

(Barrera 1979, pp.

internal di fferentiation existed

within the Mexican-American community
based middle class),

105-

(e.g., an enclave-

th e ir ethnically-based margina lit y- -an d

the later emergence of the contract-labor bracero program-stood as a barrier to mobility.
A somewhat similar
American immigrants

experience was encountered by Asian-

(i.e., Chinese,

the Western states.

Japanese,

Filipinos)

in

E a c h group was welcomed by employers as

a source of cheap labor,

yet experienced hostility, d i s c r i 

mination

jobs, citizens hi p rights),

(e.g., housing,

eventual exclusion as a result of the

interaction of eco 

nomic competition and racist ide ol og y. 88
immigration was pr ohibited in 1882,
retreated

into enclaves,

Japanese,

After Chinese

Chinese-Americans

using grou p solidarity as protec

tion against White hostility.
followed the Chinese,

and

Both the Japanese,

a n d the Filipinos,

experienced similar receptions

who

who succeeded the
(Japanese

immigra

228
tion was first limited by the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907,
then explicitly halted in 1924; Filipino immigration was
halted by the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924).
Americans prospered in agriculture and

Japanese-

in small businesses

(e.g., Japanese-Americans operated one-half of the truck
farms

in California by 1940);

however,

this success further

fanned the flames of White racial antagonism.
ity came to a head with the

This h os ti l 

internment of Japanese-Americans

in the Western United States during World War II,

which,

although rationalized as a military necessity in the context
of national conflict with Japan, was grounded
ideology and economic c o m p e t i t i o n .ss
farmers supported
competitors,

in racist

For example,

White

internment as a mea ns of removing Japanese

while Japanese-Americans

in Hawaii,

although

closer to the war zone, were not interned due to the
centrality of their position in the local economy
1988,

(Schaefer

p. 393).
The final non-White group, Native Americans,

placed in a unique social and economic position.

were
Following

the end of the White-Native American national conflict in
1890,

surviving Native-Americans were placed on reservations

and remained

largely on the outside of the White capitalist

economy (indeed,

the economic marginality of reservation

land reduced most residents to economic dependence on the
federal government).

At this juncture,

the White objective

for Native Americans entailed socio-cultural

incorporation

into the larger society and proletarianization into the
labor force.
first,

This was attempted via two vehicles.

the Dawes Act of 1887, established

property rights

(vs. communal

The

individual private

landholding)

within r e s e r v a 

tions, with the expectation that Native Americans would fail
at farming and be forced to sell their land enter the
market, and assimilate
p.

into "American" soci ety (Zinn 1980,

514; Dinnerstein et al.

180 -81 ).97

labor

In addition,

1979,

p. 228; Schaefer 1988,

pp.

many Native American youth u n d e r 

went removal and forced acculturation through the notorious
boarding schools operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(Dinnerstein et al.

1979, pp.

228-29).

methods completely achieved its goal
to Native American resistance);

Neither of these

(due in no small part

however,

Native American

culture was weakened as a result of this economic and
cultural onslaught.

One side effect of the White attack on

Native American culture was the beginning of Native American
ethnic m er ge r— the creation of a pan-ethnic
Indian"

"American

identity (Trottier 198 1)--although sub-ethnic

identities continued to persist.

Although White tactics

changed to a more paternalistic approach

(Native Americans

were given citizenship and some political rights

in the

1920s and 1930s), Native Americans remained an economically
marginal and politically subjugated ethnic group controlled
by Whites through the Bureau of Indian Affairs
1988, pp. 181-82).

(Schaefer

Summary:
section,

1890-1945.

As we suggested at start of this

this period was a time of transition between the

nineteenth century and the modern
The

(i.e.,

post-1945)

era.

"Great Migration" of the new immigrants from Southern

and Eastern Europe was the culmination of the immigration
which defined U.S. society as a settler society;
intergroup conflict
hegemony)

however,

(and the perceived threat to Anglo

led to stringent restrictions on immigration.

Nevertheless,

ethnic relations did not end with the ex c l u 

sionary legislation of 1924.
predecessors,

new immigrant

As was the case with their
identities both p e r s i s t e d . in

response to intergroup conflict and the demands of a new
environment

(including merger

into pan-ethnic identities),

and slowly d i m i n i s h e d . in response to increasing intragroup
dif ferentiation and the link between acculturation,
lation, and mobility.

In contrast,

as si mi 

the position of the

superexploited non-White groups remained relatively static:
Black-Americans were subject to Jim Crow and other
segregation;

Native-Americans remained marginalized on

isolated reservations;

and the position of Mexican-Americans

was undermined by deportations and contract labor.
theless,

forms of

chinks were beginning to appear

Never

in the "caste-like"

status of these groups in the form of limited mobility
(especially during the World Wars) which,

by altering the

eth-class composition of superexploited groups, would
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provide a base for subsequent mobilization.

These trends

would become dominant themes in the post-1945 era.
The Modern Era:

1945-Present

The conclusion of World War

II marked the beginning of

a new stage of global capitalist development.

This included

the establishment of the United States as the hegemonic core
power; that

is, as the political and economic center of the

world-system.

On a global level,

key processes included

nationalist movements and decolonization

in the periphery,

the emergence of U.S.-Soviet conflict as a central
international politics,
national corporations
talist accumulation
the United States,

issue

in

and the proliferation of tr a n s 

(TNCs) as a vehicle

for global c a p i 

(Borrego 1981; Hymer 1 97 8) . 38

Within

the nature of capitalist development

became increasingly p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l . marked by an expansion
of education and the service and

information sectors of the

economy and a decline of traditional
turing.

Each of these processes

reshaping patterns of American

industrial m an uf ac 

in turn contributed to

immigration and intergroup

c on tac t.
In contrast to the first half of the twentieth century,
which we have cast as a transitional period,

the post-1945

era (especially post-1960) constituted a dramatic departure
from previous patterns of ethnic relations.

Intergroup

interaction during this period can be described in the
context of several subtrends:

(1) the post-1965 removal of
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immigration quotas and the subsequent

influx of immigrants

from the periphery (the cause of which was often linked to
U.S.

imperial v e n t u r e s ) — a development with particular

for

"ethnic merger" and the emergence of Hispanic-American and
Asian-American pan-ethnic

identities;

assimilation of White Ethnics
"resurgence" of the 1970s)

(2) the

increasing

(despite the much-ballyhooed

and the corresponding challenge

to Anglo hegemony--the result of which is movement towards
the creation of a "White American"
Anglo-Americans,

old immigrants,

ethnic

and

(and,

identity;

(i.e., a partnership of

and White Ethnics)

pan

(3) the mobilization of Black-Americans

to a lesser degree,

Native Americans and Hispanics)

to

challenge their subordinate status--and the subsequent White
"countermobilization" of the late 1970s and 1980s.
same time,

the increasing

At the

interpenetration of ethnicity and

class would further compound the complexity of intergroup
interaction.

What

is clear,

however,

is that ethnic

relations have continued to play a significant role in U.S.
society.

In the

following pages, we will explore the

evolution of both group identities and intergroup inter
action during the modern era.
Intergroup Contact
In the years after 1945,

the rate of immigration and

labor migration began to increase,

reflecting both the p o s t 

war prosperity an d the new global position of the United
States.

One trend was the continuation of patterns which

were established prior to and during the Second World War:
Blacks continued to leave the South for the urban areas of
the North,

while Mexicans migrated across the border

greater numbers--as
traditional

"b r ac e ro s11 (contract laborers),

Another source of immigrants was Europeans

uprooted by World War II.

Although the quota system es t a b 

lished in 1924 remained in effect until 1965,
action

(e.g., Displaced Persons Act,

mitted

increased

and Reimers 1982,

pp.

72-7 3). 00

legislative

War Brides Act)

immigration following the war
In addition,

it opposed

beginning in
from

(e.g.,

Cuba), an extension of "Cold War" politics

context of U.S.-Soviet conflict

pe r 

(Dinnerstein

the United States also accepted refugees

"communist" nations whose policies
Hungary,

as

immigrants, and as undocumented or "illegal"

im migrants.9*

the 1950s,

in

in the

A final source of immi

grants during the 1950s and 1960s was Puerto Rico,

an

American colony whose citizens possessed United States
citizenship and were thus not subject to immigration
restriction laws.

Driven by economic underdevelopment and

rapid population growth and attracted by the need for cheap
labor,

Puerto Rican

immigration fit the periphery to core

migration pattern which had emerged in the late nineteenth
century but which had been largely curtailed by the immi
gration restriction legislation of the 1920s.

This pattern

would be re-established during the 1960s and 1970s.
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American immigration reached a watershed of sorts with
the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of
1965.

This legislation, which went into effect in 1968,

reflected several policy objectives.
the system of national quotas,
increasingly illegitimate
Amer i c a n a . decolonization,
conflict

First,

it abolished

a system which appeared

in the context of the Pax
and U.S.-Soviet political

(Archdeacon 1983, p.

207).

Secondly,

it for the

first time placed limits on migration from other Western
Hemisphere nations by establishing a hemispheric quota
(120,000) within the yearly global q u o t a . 61

This portion of

the legislation was clearly in the tradition of earlier
immigration restriction in that it addressed a perceived new
threat

(i.e., the unrestricted

placing a limit on the number
Reimers 1982, p. 75).

of newcomers

Finally,

new system of preferences,
(i.e.,

influx of Latin Americans) by
(Dinnerstein and

the 1965 act established a

this time based upon family ties

close relatives of United States citizens)

and job

skills.
The impact of this law upon immigration patterns was
dramatic and far reaching.
of immigrants

Almost immediately,

increased by one-third,

the number

while within ten years

the volume had doubled to more than 600,000 per year
1981,

p. 58).63

(Massey

Of even greater significance was the shift

in the origins of these "new"

immigrants.

immigrants between 1921 and 1960 were

While 77% of

from Europe and North
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America,
Asia

83% of immigrants between 1981 and 1985 we re

(e.g., Vietnam,

America

Philippines, Korea,

(Schaefer 1988, p. 128).

graphical proximity and changes

from

Taiwan) and Latin

At the same time,

geo

in the American e c o n o m y

(i.e., the decline of traditional manufacturing centers, the
rise of the service sector,

and the ec onomic expansion of

the "Sun Belt" during the 1970s) effected a shift in the
destination of immigrants from the Northeast to the Sout h
west and Florida,

with Los Angeles now supplanting N e w York

as the most popular point of entry.

Thus,

the ethnic compo

sition of the United States appears to be undergoing yet
another transformation.
Yet the explanation for this shift transcends the
change

in immigration laws.

During the half-century the

United States had closed its doors the world-system had
undergone a profound transformation.
global capitalist development

The

ongoing process of

(i.e., the expansion of the

area under the sway of capitalist relations and the ev o l u 
tion of an increasingly integrated world-economy bound
together by financial,
corporate networks)

transportation,

communication,

and

had altered the nature of the periphery,

which now included Latin America, Africa and much of Asia
(cf. Chirot 1977, pp.

179-81).

Continued capitalist pe ne 

tration of the periphery had resulted in partial p r ol et ar i
anization

(including a decline

in the viabil ity of small

agriculture) and rapid population growth,

while the changing
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nature of core-periphery relations

(i.e., post-1945 de co lo

nization and the emergence of neocolonialism--Hunt and
Sherman 1986,

p. 609)

fostered continued underdevelopment

and political

instability.

The result was an ev er-widening

gap between core and periphery
division)

(i.e., the

and an intensification of the

"North-South”

"push" factors

encouraging emigration from the periphery.
time, there was less economic
emigrate after 1965,
from the poorer,
Portugal,

for Europeans to

with the exception of some movement

semiperipheral nations

Greece).

migration,

incentive

At the same

(e.g.,

Ireland,

Within these shifting patterns of global

the identity of specific countries send ing immi

grants to the United States seemingly reflects pas t and
current patterns of military involvement
Asia),

colonization

economic domination

(Korea,

Southeast

(Philippines), and political and
(Latin America).

On the other side of the equation,

however,

the "pull"

factors encouraging immigration to the core had a l s o under
gone changes.

First,

transnational corporations

found it

increasingly feasible to relocate production to the peri
phery in order to take advantage of lower
(Frobel,

Heinrichs and Kreye 1977, pp.

Muller 1974).
United States

Secondly,

83-85; Barne t and

as a "post-industrial" society,

(and other core nations)

for unskilled labor.

labor costs

the

have different needs

What is available are often low paying

jobs in the service sector

(with little prospect

for upward
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mobility)

or temporary work cor responding to agricultural

needs or economic fluctuations

(hence,

the proliferation of

guestworkers or migrant agricultural workers).

One ad di 

tional consequence of the changes

in the United States

labor market has been an increase

in the occupational

heterogeneity of immigrants,

reflected

professional and technical workers
neers, scientists)

in the influx of

(e.g., doctors,

en gi 

from the periphery who are attracted to

the core by the higher wages available to skilled labor
(Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp.
p.

212; Fortn ey 1972).

skilled workers

Archdeacon 1983,

Encouraged by the preferences for

in the 1965 Immigration Act,

d r a i n " — the transfer
core,

82-84;

this

"brain

of skilled labor from periphery to

to the detriment of the former— has been augmented by

the disproportionate representation of highly educated
workers am on g refugees from Cuba and Southeast Asia
1981, pp.

(Massey

59-60).

One outcome of this imbalance between push and pull
factors, as well as the limitation on immigration from
Western Hemisphere nations, was an increase
or "illegal"

immigration,

in undocumented

a phenomenon which became the most

controversial immigration issue of the 1970s and 1980s.
While the exact number of undocumented
this period could not be determined,

immigrants during

the estimated annual

influx was between 200,000 and 1,000,000,

and the estimated

resident "undocumented" population was between three and six

million

(see Schaefex 1988, pp.

Morgenthau,
1984,

Borger,

p. 1 9 ).*3

Greenberg,

130-31; M as se y 1981,

however,

61;

Shannon, Michael and Pedersen

The primary source of undocumented

grants is Mexico;

p.

im m i

significant numbers have come

from other Latin American nations and citizens of ne arl y one
hundred countries have been apprehended by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service
the

1988, p.

131).

While

"push” factors encouraging migration are the same as for

legal immigrants,
able

(Schaefer

undocumented labor serves as an e x p l o i t 

"reserve army" working for the lowest wages in the

least desirable
labor. *■*

jobs

(i.e., as a form of "superexploited"

During the 1980s,

creasingly controversial

for a va ri et y of reasons,

fear of labor competition,
impact of undocumented

in

including

concern regarding the economic

immigrants,

of the "Hispanicization"
ing several

undocumented labor became

and an ethnocentric

of the Southwestern U . S . os

failed attempts,

fear

Follow

the United States Congress

responded to pressures for exclusion

(pressures remarkably

similar to those of the 1920s) by enacting the Immigration
Re fo rm and Control Act of 1986, a measure which sought to
limit undocumented immigration through sanctions against
employers, while at the same time extending amnesty and
eventual citizenship to undocumented
the United States before 1982
attempt to limit

immigrants who entered

(Pear 1986).*®

Despite this

immigration, the persistence of the "push"

factors encouraging undocumented immigration— high Mexican
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unemployment and economic stagnation,

rapid population

growth, and the strength of the dollar relative to the peso-suggests that recent patterns will continue

into the

foreseeable fut ure."7
Eth-Class Interaction and Group Identity
The rapid changes

in post-war American society had a

profound impact on the nature of the
that

is, the context

occurred.

" intergroup arena";

in which intergroup interaction

Ethnic relations

were shaped by several

in the post-1945 United States

forces:

the post-war expansion of the

United States and world economies

(what some would describe

as the "A-phase" of Kondratieff cycle);
"post-industrial society",

the emergence of

with its emphasis upon education

and the service and information sector;
national role of the United States

the increased int er

in the context of the Pax

A m e r i c a n a ; and by the expanding role of the state
and economic

life.

in social

These forces were bound together by

increasingly interconnected national and global mass co m m u 
nication networks

(cf. R i c h m o n d 1S - - 1 9 6 9 , pp.

278-80--notion

of V e r b in du no sn et zs ch af t ) which both expanded the scope of
intergroup interaction and the potential for ethnic m o b i l i 
zation

(e.g.,

the nationwide impact--via television--of the

Civil Rights Movement)

and increased acculturation by b o m 

barding ethnic enclaves with the dominant culture."®
our purposes,

For

what is important is to recognize that these

changes altered both the eth-class structure

(by changing
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both the class structure and the means by which this struc
ture was r ep ro du ced — e.g.,
tion,

credentials,

ac ti on

(e.g.,

therefore,

increased emphasis upon edu ca 

etc.) and the nature of intergroup inter

the emergence of mass movements).

Our task,

is to trace the influence of these processes upon

the evolution of specific group identities.
Ethnic mobilization;

B la c k - A m e r i c a n s .

most significant development

Perhaps the

in ethnic relations

in the

post-1945 era was the ethnic mobilization of Black Am e ri 
cans.

This social movement--the "Civil Rights Movement"--

involved several

important dynamics.

First,

Blacks chal

lenged and overthrew the existing racial order
norms,
tions),

(i.e.,

the

laws, and assumptions governing intergroup re l a 
particularly in the South, and as a group sought to

improve their position in the American eth-class structure.
Secondly, as a corollary to this movement,

Black-Americans

redefined their ethnic identity (Bloom 1987, pp.
including the perceptions of other groups.
process of psychological decolonization
discussion of similar processes
the periphery);

6-7)--

This entailed a

(cf. F a n o n ' s — 1963--

in nationalist movements

in

that is, the shedding of White-imposed d e f i 

nitions and the promotion of a Black-American consciousness
(Carmichael and Hamilton 1967, pp.

34-39 ).■•

Finally,

Black-American ethnic mobilization altered the social role
of ethnicity in the United States by establishing the
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legitimacy of g r o u p -based political mobilization

(Omi and

Winant 1986).
The roots of this Black-American ethnic mobilization
are best analyzed in terms of both ethnicity and class
(i.e.,

eth-class).

At the most fundamental level, ethnic

mobilization was a response to the historical ethnic e n c a p 
sulation of Blacks

(maintained via racial

ideology), whi ch

for the roost part restricted them to a superexploited f r a c 
tion of the working or lower classes,
separate segment of the middle class.
status

What must also be taken

series of structural changes:

pp.

into consideration are a

the slight but significant

in the position of Blacks

227-28--on opportunities

War II,

Yet this subordinate

is not sufficient as an explanation for ethnic m o b i 

lization.

changes

or to an ethn ica ll y

(e.g., cf. Qu a r l e s — 1969,

for mo bility provided by World

the 1949 desegregation of the U.S. military,

emergence of a small Black middle class);
basis of the Southern racial order
agriculture,

the

and the

the declining

(e.g., decreased role of

industrial development of the South and a

lessening of its "peripheral" status with regard to the rest
of the nation);

and the declining stake of Northern capital

in the Southern racial order

(due to such developments as

the encapsulation of class struggle through the

legitimation

of unions, and the international stigma of segregation
the context of decolonization,
Pax A m e r i c a n a ).

in

U.S.-Soviet conflict, and the

These subtle but significant changes

in the
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intergroup arena created an opening for Black-American
ethnic mobilization.
The Civil Rights Movement originated as a limited Black
challenge to the Southern system of segregation which was
nevertheless a challenge to the basis of the class hegemony
of the White rural elite

(Bloom 1987).

Resistance by the

elite took the form of an ethnic countermobilization,
which invoked the
to "states'

one

ideology of White supremacy--via appeals

rights" and "preserving our Southern heritage"--

in an attempt to gain the alliance of other White ethclasses.

The ferocity of White resistance

(as well as such

early successes as the Brown decision and the Montgomery bus
boycott)

in turn facilitated the formation of an eth-class

alliance between the Black middle and

lower classes and

resulted in the emergence of a mass social movement
1980, pp.

44 1-46).70

(Zinn

As part of the movement strategy,

Blacks sought to enlist

(or

force) the

involvement of the

federal government as an a l l y in overthrowing the Southern
racial order,

an objective which was feasible

the increased political influence of Blacks

in light of

(especially on

the Democratic Pa r ty in the North) and the declining stake
of Northern capital

in supporting a Southern rural elite

which had become an economic and political anachronism.
Also targeted by the movement was the emerging Southern
business class, which did not benefit
did the rural elite

from segregation as

(although they al s o had no stake in
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challenging the racial order),

but which was vulnerable to

Black economic pressure

boycotts, disruption of the

"business climate")
(Bloom 1987,
struggle,

pp.

(e.g.,

and could thus be induced to negotiate

115-17).

Ultimately,

after a prolonged

the Civil Rights Movement was successful

in over 

throwing legal segregation and transforming the Southern
racial or de r.-71
As Black-American ethnic mobilization evolved,
underwent a change

in its class basis.

Initially,

it
the Civil

Rights Movement was led by the "new" Black middle class
(primarily lawyers,

writers,

form of legal challenges,
"rights."
action,

and ministers)

limited protest,

and took the
and a focus on

As the base of the movement expanded amidst mass

the

increased

involvement of the lower classes gave

rise to class based demands.

While the Black middle class

stood to benefit the most from the removal of barriers to
equal access

(a demand which could be couched and realized

in ethnic terms),
involve more

fulfillment of lower class demands would

fundamental social and economic c h a ng es .^ 2

This was particularly evident when the focus of Black
mobilization shifted to the North and
segregation

(cf. Quarles 1969, pp.

text, the economic

255-59).

In this c on

(c l a s s - b a s e d ) demands of Blacks consti

tuted a direct challenge to the basic
American capitalist system
campaign,

its de facto system of

interests of the

(as opposed to the Southern

which merely challenged the peripheral rural
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elite).

These demands shattered the civil rights

"coali

tion" by triggering the defection of middle class Whites and
Blacks

(neither of whom had any class

restructuring)

in economic

and, when pressed in the form of increased

militan cy and ghetto revolts,
optation and repression
Winant 1986,

interest

p.

brought on government co

(Zinn 1980,

pp.

449-50;

Omi and

89).

For Black Americans,
1950s and 1960s did bring

the ethnic mobilization of the
important social,

economic,

and

political gains--the shedding of their superexploited
position;

however,

Blacks remain far behind Whites

late 1980s on virtually eve ry measure
well-being.

of social

in the

or economic

Given the continuing relationship between

ethnicity and class

(i.e.,

Blacks are

overrepresented at the

lower levels of the working class and among the underclass
while they remain conspicuously absent from the upper
classes),

there remains a strong material basis

persistence of group identity.
exclusion

(e.g.,

Furthermore,

for the

continued

residential segregation) and ethnic a n t a g 

onism by Whites provides additional

impetus for group s o l i 

d a ri ty even in the face of intragroup class divisions.
sequently,

we anticipate that Black-White interaction and

conflict will remain a focal
the foreseeable

issue in American society for

future.

With respect to ethnic relations
the social

Con

in the United States,

impact of the Civil Rights Movement far tra ns ce n
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ded

its significance for B l a ck -A me ri ca ns .

The success of

Black ethnic mobilization altered the social meaning of
American ethnicity by conferring increased legitimacy upon
group demands

(i.e., the "right" of non-dominant groups to

make demands as a group)

and by installing the federal

government as "arbiter" of such demands.

In addition,

the

movement changed the nature of intergroup relations by
establishing a socio-cultural
tion,

prejudice,

and Winant 1986,

framework

in whic h s eg re g a

and discrimination are unacceptable
p. 1 4 1 ).173

Finally,

now that the le giti

macy of group demands had been established,
mobilization was

Hispanic-Americans

Raza U n i d a ). Native Americans
land cl aim s— cf.

lesser degree,

Black-American

followed by similar movements on the part

of other ethnic minorities:

Movement,

(Omi

the "new"

(e.g.,

(e.g., La

the American Indian

Zinn 1980, pp. 513-26),

immigrants

American Civil Rights League).

(e.g.,

to a

the Italian-

These movements can be

viewed as actual or attempted eth-class alliances
cross-class ethnic mobilization)

and,

(e.g.,

pursued as a means of

attaining material or political objectives.

For the groups

involved, the process of mobilization with its emphasis upon
ethnic ties, group pride, and past or present grievances had
the effect of increasing the salience of ethnic
Assimilation vs. persistence:

identity.

White E t h n i c s .

non-Protestant and non-Western European "new"

For the

immigrants,

now referred to as "White Ethnics," the post-1945 era was
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one of both significant assimilation and surprising p er si s
tence.

Indeed,

this contradiction

"White Ethnic"--which on one hand

is captured by the label
implies the persistence of

group identity by distinguishing White Ethnics from "nonethnics"

(i.e., Anglo-Americans and assimilated old immi

grants), while on the other hand suggests
omission of specific group labels)

at

(through the

least partial a ss i m i 

lation along the lines of the "triple melting pot"
tant, Catholic,

(Protes

Jew) model popularized during the 1950s."74

M a n y forces encouraged acculturation and assimilation.

The

restriction of immigration in the 1920s reduced the p e r 
ceived "threat" which the new immigrants posed to the d o m i 
nant Anglo-Americans and led to a decline in ethnic a n t a g 
onism (e.g.,

no longer were new immigrants referred to as

"racially different").

New immigrants were also subject to

the assimilative forces which had affected the
immigrants:

Anglo dominance of institutions;

number of ethnic groups
conflict);

"old"
the

(which tended to diffuse

and the process of ethnic succession

increasing
intergroup

(Blacks

replaced the new immigrants in much the same manner that the
new immigrants replaced the old immigrants).
factors were more historically unique:

A third set of

the national

mobilization which occurred during World War II and the
increasing influence of mass society,

both of which promoted

absorption into the larger Anglo-dominated society.
most

important factor,

however, was mobility,

The

the oppor
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tunity for which was increased by the union movement

(which

improved the economic position of the working class) and by
structural changes and expansion in the United States
economy

(which facilitated the economic advancement of the

new immigrants without displacing other gro ups--Hechter,
1979,

p. 124).7 *

One significant milestone in this process

was the 1960 election of the first Catholic president,

John

F. Kennedy--an event which legitimized the inclusion of
White Ethnics

into the federal government and academic

"means of administration."

Mobility

increased intra-group class divisions

in turn led to
(subjecting the

upwardly mobile to the homogenizing tendencies of the middle
class)

which functioned to reduce e th ni c solidarity.

Opportunities for mobility made it mor e likely that
individual group members would choose an "assimilative"
strategy (i.e.,

increase opportunities by blending into the

dominant group)

as opposed to an "ethnic" strategy (i.e.,

advance

interests within the context of the enclave).

At the same time, the new immigrant groups exhibited
considerable persistence with respect to ethnic

identity.7®

The assimilative strategy,

for the

which w or ke d so well

middle class, was often eschewed by the working class,
whom ethnic ties and networks remained more salient
and Moynihan 1963;

Gans 1962).

Thus,

for

(Glazer

ethnic identity was

increasingly linked to class position--"White Ethnic" was
often equated with upper working class and with ties to the
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Democratic Party.
was the

A significant event

"ethnic revival" of

the assertion of

identities

the late 1960s and the 1970s-thought to have been assimilated

into the Anglo-American group,
melting pot
1975).

for White Ethnics

or at least into the triple

(Novak 1973; G r ee le y 1974;

Occurring

Glazer and Moynihan

in the context of the post-Civil Rights

Movement "legitimation" of ethnic politics,
was rooted in ethnic competition.

(i.e., Blacks); that

is,

"revival"

The working class White

Ethnics felt threatened by the demands
them

this

of the groups below

they believed that their

neighborhoods an d schools wou ld be integrated,

that their

jobs and opportunities for advancement would be taken awa y
(Vecoli

1978, p.

142; Novak

resistance was often racial

1973, p. 15).
(anti-Black)

both the virulence and the resilience

While

in form--reflecting

of racist

the United States--the White Ethnic "backlash"
best understood

in the c l a s s structure

2 18 -1 9J.77

"revival" was further

towards

ideology

in

is probably

in class t e r m s as a defense of their inter

mediate position
This

their

(Steinberg 1981,

fueled by resentment

(i.e., competition with) Anglo-Americans

stemmed from both memories

pp.

which

of past injuries and a sense of

exclusion from the upper e c he lo n of American s o c i e t y (cf.
Lieberson and Carter 1979;

Vecoli 1978;

Schrag 1970).

The

White Ethnic a tt emp t at e t h n i c mobilization did exhibit some
cross-class tendencies— e.g.,
ethnic

attracting segments

of the

intelligentsia and upper middle class (i.e., cultural
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entrepreneurs)
group status

who stood to benefit

(cf. Doane unpublished,

from the upgrading of
p. 73); however,

its

main effect seemed to be to slow temporarily the process of
a s s i m i l a t i o n .‘7S
By the 1980s the ne w immigrants/White Ethnics seem
largely to have

"made it" in American society in terms of

achieving overall parity with the dominant Anglo group wi th
respect to ke y economic

indicators.

On the other hand,

they

remain underrepresented among the economic and political
elite--although significant
as the U.S.

"power elite"

inroads appear to be being made

is moving towards becoming an

Ang?.o-White Ethnic partnership
Lieberson and Carter 1979).

(Alba and Moore 1982;

Continued blurring of the

relationship between ethnic it y and class among AngloAmericans and White Ethnics would be a strong force towards
the assimilation of the

latter.

Given the likely absence of

significant reinforcement or intergroup conflict,
that White Ethnic identities will become
symbolic--that
behavior

we expect

increasingly

is, an affiliation with little salience for

(Gans 1979; Alba 1985). '7*

tion of an increasing

Moreover,

influx of non-White

the combina

immigrants and

continuing challenges from more disadvantaged groups will
facilitate ethnic merger and the emergence of a "White
American" supra-ethnic identity.

Nevertheless,

the

"vestiges" of new immigrant identity remain sufficiently
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strong that the completion of any such merger will perhaps
require at least another gen er at io n. ®0
Immigration and ethnic merger:
Americans.

Hispanic and Asian-

For Hispanic and Asian-American groups,

post-1945 era brought a dramatic change

in group c o m p o s i 

tion and the meaning of ethnic identity.
here

is immigration,

the

The key dynamic

as the dominant pattern of the modern

era

(especially following the 1965 Immigration Act) has been

the

influx of immigrants

1981;

Sassen-Koob 1983).

from Latin America and Asia
Consequently,

(Massey

both groups contain

a higher proportion of first generation residents who would
tend to have a lower "entry level" status and stronger c u l 
tural ties to their country of origin

(both of which would

be more likely to trigger dominant group e t h n o c e n t r i s m ) .
second theme

A

is the expanding locus of immigration and the

resulting ethnic diversity.
Spanish-speaking group,
Puerto Ricans,

Mexican-Americans,

the original

have been joined since 1945 by

Cubans, and smaller numbers of immigrants

from virtually every Caribbean and Central and South A m e r i 
can nation.

Likewise,

Japanese,

Chinese,

and Filipino-

Americans have been joined since 1965 by Koreans, V i e t 
namese,

Cambodians,

and smaller numbers of migrants

other Asian countries.
bited a range of class
e.g.,

In addition,

from

newcomers have e x h i 

(or potential class) positions--

the high relative class positions of middle-class

"refugees" from Cuba and Vietnam

(Massey 1981; Portes and
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Stepick 1985, p.

49 4) — which

in turn has resulted

creased intragroup economic heterogeneity.
(and the small relative size of

in in

This diver sit y

individual groups)

has

seemingly served to hinder ethni c mobilization.
As opposed to ethnic mobilization,

what can be ob

served are the ea r ly phases of ethnic merger--the combining
of two or more groups into a "pan-ethnic" group.
manifest

This is

in the increasing use of "H ispanic-American” or

"Asian-American"

in place of

individual national

identities

such as Mexican or Cambodian--although these lower-level
ethnic

identities still p e r s i s t . ox

While these mergers for

the most part reflect an awareness of common interests, they
are also a product
grant "national"

(much in the same manner that new immi

identities were created by the American

ex pe ri en ce -- c f. Glazer 1954,

p.

167) of being classified and

treated similarly by dominant groups and by the state
1981,

pp. 133-34).

Interestingly,

identities are not "national"
(Asian-American)

(Enloe

these new pan-ethnic

in foundation but regional

or regional/linguistic

(H i s p a ni c- Am e ri ca n),

a factor which would seemingly offer less

in the wa y of an

historical or cultural basis for ethnic merger.

Ne v e r t h e 

less, given the broad base necessary for effective ethnic
mobilization in the contemporary United States
Native American mobilization
numbers)
continue.

(for example,

is inhibited by smallness of

there is a strong incentive for these mergers to
This is particularly true in the case of His-
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panics, who by the twenty-first century could surpass Blacks
as the largest American ethnic minority (Bouvier and Davis
1982) .
Given the newness of most Hispanic and Asian groups,

it

is difficult to analyze intergroup contact and the evolution
of identity.

To some extent,

the pattern of the past

appears to be being repeated--entry at the bottom of the
eth-class structure,

competition and antagonism on the part

of resident ethnic groups
and White fisherfolk
Americans),

(e.g., conflict between Vietnamese

in Texas;

violent attacks on Asian-

and attempts at exclusion

Haitian refugees,

(e.g.,

interdiction of

imprisonment of Marielitos,

the anti-

Hispanic tenor of the 1986 Immigration Act).
ingly,

these newest

along ethnic lines;

immigrants have responded by mobilizing
that is, by using group identity for

self-defense and survival
resistance

Not s u r p r i s 

(Portes 1984).

in the face of dominant group
What

is different

for the most

recent immigrants, as opposed to earlier groups,

is the

abovementioned change in the nature of the intergroup arena
as a result of the Civil Rights Movement.
tive of new arrivals,

the most

From the p e r s p e c 

important of these d i f f e r 

ences would appear to be the existence of some protection
from extreme racism

(e.g., the response of authorities to

violent attacks on minorities).
change

While this represents a

in the context of intergroup relations,

effects remain unknown.

the long term
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For Asian and Hispanic groups with a longer tenure in
the United States,

it is possible to trace a more developed

pattern of intergroup relations and evolution of ethnic
identity.

Mexican-Americans experienced a slow diminution

of their superexploited status;
inhibited by new and commuter
Mexico)

immigration.

exhibited

increased

however,

group mobili ty was

(given the proximity of

At the same time,

Mexican-Americans

internal di fferentiation reflected in

the emergence of an enclave-based middle class
1979, pg.

92).

Nevertheless,

sector remained,

(Barrera

a substantial superexploited

first through the temporary labor of the

"bracero" program whi ch was terminated

in 1964

(Craig 1971),

and later through the exploitation of undocumented workers
(Barrera 1979).

Conflicts regarding the status of braceros

and undocumented

immigrants followed the traditional eth-

class pattern:

agricultural capital,

who benefitted from

the exploitation of "superexploited" Mexican labor,
institutionalized and tried to protect the process;
labor,

fearing wage competition,

sought to exclude Mexicans

and displayed increased ethnic a nt ag oni sm

(especially in the

context of the Reagan-Meese attack on minorities);
Mexican-Americans
"illegal

White

and

in general suffered from the equating of

immigrant" with "Mexican"

(Craig 1971).02

Conse

quently, Mexican-American ethnic mobilization occurred in
response to economic and political i ssu es — e.g.,
rights for undocumented workers,

civil

opposition to the tactics
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of the Immigration a n d Naturalization Service
opposition to the inclusion of employer
hiring "illegal aliens")

in the

(INS), and

sanctions

(for

1986 Immigration Act for

fear of increased d i s c r i m in at io n against Hispanics.

Given

the likely persistence of Mexican immigration (and of White
resistance),
however,

the basis

for g ro u p identity will continue;

strategic co nsi de rat io ns should encourage the

continuation of the process of ethnic m erg er into a
Hispanic-American pan-ethnic gr o u p

(in wh i ch Mexican-

Americans will play a significant role).
The experience

of the oldest Asian-American groups,

Japanese-Americans a n d Chinese Americans,
a complex array of f a c t o r s .03

Both groups had al r e a d y faced

virulent racism (although less than that
cf. Lieberson 1980,

p.

the 1920s,

faced by Blacks--

366; Frederickson 1981, pp.

White hierarchies of racial preference)
sion after

has been shaped by

116-17 on

an d complete exclu

and the Japanese further endured

internment during W o r l d War II.

Ironically,

the cut-off of

immigration in 1924 m a y have had a "positive" effect over
time on the status of

Japanese and C h i n e s e - A m e r i c a n s .

Termination of immigration had several effects:
undoubtedly reduced

intergroup co mpetition and the p e r 

ceived threat felt b y the dominant group
subsequent

it

intergroup conflict,

crimination persisted);
nating reinforcement);

(and pr obably eased

although prejudice and dis 

it enhanced acculturation

(by elim i

and it transformed Japanese and
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Chinese-Americans

into less visible micro-groups

group numbers small).

Since the 1920s,

Japanese and

Chinese-Americans have followed separate paths
1988,

pp. 399-400).

resulted

assimilation.

reinforced by post-1965

in a slower rate of acculturation and

In contrast,

been more dispersed

(Schaefer

Chinese-Americans have tended to follow

an enclave-based strategy which,
immigration,

(by keeping

the Japanese-American group has

(due in part to the destruction of

communities du ring the World War II internment),
turn,

which,

in

has led to higher rates of both assimilation and

economic mo bility
1981)."'*

(Petersen 1971; Montero 1981;

Woodrum

What this comparison suggests to us is that for

micro-groups,

ethnicity and economic position are shaped by

the effects of both demography and eth-class.
Heaemonv and competition:

Anglo-Americans.

assessment of the evolution of ethnic
United States

in the

is not complete without some consideration of

Anglo-Americans and those

(e.g.,

assimilated into this group.
overlooked

identities

Our

"old"

immigrants)

who have

This is a topic which is often

in the literature on American ethnic relations

(e.g., the assumption that Anglos are not et h ni c— cf.
B a n t o n 1S--1983,
city),

pp.

64-66--critique of "minus-one" et h ni 

perhaps reflecting a less specific sense of identity

which gives the appearance of n o n - e x i s t e n c e .83
that to mistake

low visibility for non-existence

analytical error,

that Anglo-American

We contend
is a grave

(WASP) ethnicity has
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played a key role
states.

in intergroup relations

There exist several explanations for the "invisi

bility" of WASP ethnicity:
Bant on -- 19 83 , pp.
city);

in the United

dominant group status

165-66--on majority vs. minority e t h n i 

intragroup class divisions

the beginning);

(cf.

(which have existed

from

and the institutionalization of group c u l 

ture on a societal level leading to a "taken for grantedness"

in which the ethnicity of the majority is the societal

sta n da rd .as

The bottom line is access to power and the

resultant blurring of the lines between ethnic and national
identity--the appropr iat io n of "American" as the functional
equivalent of "Anglo"
Accordingly,

(Enloe,

1981,

p.

prejudice and discrimination towards

and ethnic minorities

immigrants

is most fruitfully interpreted as

ethnic-based action bv Anglo-Americans
maintenance)

130; T. Smith 1980).

(i.e., boundary

as a means of establishing and maintaining the

dominant position of the gr ou p.0-7

Indeed, the basis of

Anglo-American hegemony has been the ability to impose
definitions and set parameters for intergroup action,
masking

(i.e.

institutionalizing)

dynamics of cultural reproduction

while

this process amidst larger
(e.g., via an educational

system which transmits an "Anglicized" version of U.S.
ethnic history and guidelines for acceptable group action).
For Anglo-Americans,

ethnic competition and antagonism

towards minorities has been an ongoing process as the group
has sought to fortify its position

(even though it has never
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been seriously challenged).

This conflict has been e x a c e r 

bated by the persistence of racial
butes to increased

ideology,

which c o n t r i 

intergroup t e n s i o n . I n

the 1970s and

1980s, a variety of factors have contributed to increased
intergroup competition:
Kondratieff

the economic do wnturn

" B - p h a s e " ); the

(cf. O'Connor 1973);

(the so-called

"fiscal crisis of the state"

resistance to the demands of minorities

(i.e., a "backlash" towards the Civil Rights Movement);
cracks

in WASP hegemony (Schrag 1970; Novak

1973). 0!*

and

This

sense of disquiet has been exacerbated by the decline of
U.S. global hegemony and increased challenges to American
interests,

which in turn have spawned

chauvinism

(e.g.,

national or racial conflicts,

government-sanctioned, vs. Arabs,
self awareness

increased national

(remembering that

Iranians,

at times

Japanese) and

"American" has to a large

degree been appropriated by Anglos and, more recently,
White Ethnics).

by

While Anglo-American and White Ethnic

defense of position has often taken the form of overt
racism

(e.g., extremist groups, violent attacks on m in or i

ties, racial conflict in colleges and universities),

the

declining legitimacy of racism in the post-Civil Rights era
has encouraged the emergence of new forms of racial r e s i s 
tance couched in non-ethnic terms or (ironically)
language of equality.
include:

in the

Recent examples of these new forms

attacks on bilingualism and promotion of English as

an "official"

language;

the assertion of the existence of
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equal opportunity and denial of the obstacles facing Blacks
and other minorities
Reagan-Meese doctrine

(cf. Kluegel and Smith 1982); the
(supported by such academics as Nathan

G l az e r - - 1 9 7 5 ) with its attack on affirmative action "quotas"
and emphasis upon fighting individual
nation;

and attacks on the

(vs. group) d i s c r i m i 

"welfare state"

(i.e., an attack

on the state as an advocate for minorities--Omi and Winant
1986).

If current trends

Ethnics;

ethnic merger and polarization;

middle class";
state)

(e.g., assimilation of White
the "shrinking

the fiscal and legitimation crises of the

continue,

we can expect continued intergroup co m p e 

tition and conflict in the 1990s and beyond.
American eth-class structure

in the 1 9 8 0 s .

As the eth-

class structure of the United States has evolved over time,
one noticeable change

is its increasing complexity with

respect to number of ethnic groups,

classes,

and fractions.

This can be attributed to both continuing immigration
the continually shifting sources of

immigration)

ongoing process of capitalist development.
tant for our purposes is that there
dence between ethnicity and class
States,
versa

What

(and

and the
is impor

is no simple co r r e s p o n 

in the con temporary United

that ethnic groups contain class divisions and vice-

(at times

in the past,

various ethnic groups exhibited

a high degree of class homogeneity due to entry status or
superexploitation).

As a consequence,

to compare the eth-class

it becomes necessary

"pyramids" of different groups;
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that is,

the proportional distribution of group members

across the various classes.

Different shaped "p yr a m i d s " --

e.g., concentration of group members
provide an underlying basis

in the working class--

for ethnic mobilization as

groups seek to improve or to maintain their position.
over, ethnic segmentation within classes
tion in entry level positions,

(e.g., c o nc en tr a 

"ghettoization"

or public relations--Schaefer 1988, pp.

More

in personnel

265-66)

m a y also

contribute to the persistence of intergroup differences.
The current eth-class structure of the United States
contains a diverse array of group pyramids.
ties— e.g.,

Hispanics,

Blacks,

Et hnic minori

Native Americans— are d i s p r o 

portionately concentrated in the working class and
underclass
elite.

(Wilson 1987) and conspic uou sl y absent

In contrast,

in all classes,
bership.

WASPs

in the
from the

(and assimilates) while existent

have a disproportionate grip on elite mem

Yet other gr o u p s - - e .g ., White Ethnics,

Ame r ic an s— occupy a mostly intermediate position,

Japanesewithout

publicly noticeable overrepresentation at either end of the
class structure.

While this does not ensure that mob i li za 

tion will occur along ethnic lines
ger), the

fact that current

intergroup disparities are a

result of past ethnic-based action
mination)

(including e thn ic m er 

(e.g.,

exclusion,

d isc ri 

suggests that attempts to r e m e d y the situation

will most probably also be ethnically based.
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One key factor which will affect the potential

for

future ethnic mobilization is the nature of reproduction of
the eth-class system.
each with different

Here, we c an envision two scenarios,

implications

for ethnic mobilization and

the persistence of group identities.
economic system becomes open, w i t h
tunities for mobility,

To the extent that the

increasingly equal oppor

we would expect an expansion of

intragroup class divisions and a corresponding decline
the role of ethnicity as a major
case, ethnic
individuals

social force.

identity would become

in

In such a

increasingly symbolic for

{Gans 1979) and social movements would be more

likely to be class-based.

Even so, without virtually c o m 

plete intergroup eq uality (which is probably an "ideal
typical" eth-class system), et hn i ci ty would remain on some
level as a potential basis for mobilization.

Thus,

the more

likely outcome here would entail the diminution but not
elimination of group identities.
Our second scenario is based upon a relative lack of
mobility and a high level of social reproduction.
to Moore

(1981), recent changes

According

in the structure of the

American economy (e.g., declining need for skilled labor and
an increase

in unskilled service

tance of education)

will provide

jobs; the

increasing

fewer opportunities

impor
for

mobility for those groups currently at the bottom of the
eth-class structure than were available for European

immi

grants in the nineteenth and ea r l y twentieth centuries.

If
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this is so, then social

(class) reproduction will

in large

part be ethnic reproduction as intergroup disparities are
transmitted from generation to generation.
economic stagnation results

Moreover,

if

in a hardening of class lines,

ethnic boundaries will harden as well,

particularly as

mo bi lit y becomes a "zero-sum" proposition which can only be
achieved at the expense of others.

As a consequence,

conflict and mobilization would most

ethnic

likely increase,

par

ticularly if the current trend towards ethnic merger results
in the creation of a few,

easily polarized,

groups--and ethnicity would remain an

pan-ethnic

influential

force

in

American society for years to come.

Eth-Class Struggles and the State
In the above discussion,
themes:

we have emphasized two central

the relationship between capitalist development and

intergroup contact,

and the role of eth-class struggles

shaping the evolution of group identities.
ture,

in

At this junc

one element remains to be added to our discussion,

that being a brief consideration of the role of the U.S.
state with respect to eth-class struggles and ethnic iden
tity.

This is an important

Chapter IV,

issue,

for as we stated in

intergroup relations occur within a national

context; eth-class struggles are political struggles.
purpose here is not to present a th eo ry of the state

Our
(see

our brief discussion in Chapter IV),

but rather to draw upon

our analysis of intergroup relations

in the United States to
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develop some general propositions regarding the role of the
state in e thn ic relations.
essential,

In our view,

such a task

for while mu c h has been written with respect to

the role of the state in class struggle,
the way of

an

group relations?

there

is little

role of the state in inter

Our first observation is that the state is

playing an ever-expanding role in ethnic affairs
state is a major actor

U.S.

{i.e.,

in intergroup interaction).

the

This

is concomitant with the general expansion of the

state

amidst the process of capitalist development

(i.e., the

emergence of monopoly ca pitalism and state

monopoly c a p i t a l i s m ) .

The growth of state functions has

included an expansion of both di rect
relations

in

''ethnic" theory of the state.

What can we infer about the

phenomenon

is

involvement in ethnic

(e.g., the Immigration and Naturalization Service,

the Bureau of

Indian Affairs,

immigration legislation,

rights legislation, affirmative action)

and

in actions

civil
of

the state wh i c h have a measurable effect on the intergroup
arena

(e.g.,

growth of the welfare state;

expanded educational opportunities;

the GI Bill and

the interstate high wa y

system and "White flight" to the suburbs).

In general,

the

growth of the capitalist state was closely linked to n a t i o n 
alis m and the rise of national identities
1983).

(cf. Ehrenreich

This was especially true in the case of the United

States, as the emergence of an "American" national
and national culture was

identity

tied to the growth of the state and
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the expansionist
Commager 1966,

ideology of

pp.

Archdeacon 1983, p.
Second,
Dover

168-81;

Boorstein 1965, pp.

(Nevins and
325-90;

64; Dangerfield 1965).

s t a t e actio ns

b e t w e e n e t h n i c groups

The state

"manifest destiny"

tend

to r e f l e c t

(i.e.,

relations

of

e t h - c l a s s all iances).

is neither the "executive committee" of the

dominant group,
Nevertheless,

nor a neutral arbiter of intergroup affairs.

its policies generally serve to advance the

interests of the dominant Anglo and White Ethnic partner
ship,

thereby reflecting its disproportionate control of

resources and of the staffing of state offices.

The state

was historically the vehicle through which Anglo-Americans
(i.e.,

the political alliance

of the various Anglo-American

eth-classes) were able to conquer and dispossess Native and
Mexican Americans;
of Blacks.
to define

it played a key role

In the same vein,

in the subjugation

the ability of Anglo-Americans

"American" nationality in their own image and to

use state power,

especially in the post-1865 era,

to insti

tutionalize a particular set of cultural understandings
established a basis
Third,

for continued group hegemony.

state actions reflect the interests of elite

classes within the dominant ethnic g r o u p .
course of ethnic relations

As we review the

in the United States,

we find

that the general course of state policy has served to b e n e 
fit the dominant eth-class,
(WASP)

basically the Anglo-American

elite/capitalist class.

Indeed,

one of the earliest

tasks

of the American state was to establish rules for

inclusion on the basis of ethnicity
tion L av of 1790)
the Anglo elite

(e.g., the Na t ur al iz a

as a means of preserving the position of

(Omi and Winant 1986,

p.

75).

Likewise,

major events where state policies were focused upon inter
group relations--the conquest of Native and Mexi ca n-A mer icans,

the termination of slavery,

unrestricted

immigration,

the long duration of

and even the end of Reconstruction

(which we described earlier as a mutually beneficial treaty
with the Southern rural elite)--can be interpreted

in the

context of facilitating capitalist accumulation and s ol id i
fying the eth-class hegemony of the Anglo-American elite.
Parenthetically,

we can observe that this proposition is

also true at the regional level, as Southern state actions
served to maintain the power of the White rural elite
1987)

(Bloom

and federal and state policy in the Southwest ef f ec 

tively maintained a supply of superexploited Mexican labor
for White agricultural,
(Barrera 1979, pp.

mining,

and railroad interests

168-72).»°

Fourth, the power of the dominant eth-class

is not

absolute but can be constrained by mobilization of ethnic
minorities or the dominant group working c l a s s .ax

These

countervailing forces reflect the ability of subordinate
groups or classes to mobilize and to force the hegemonic
eth-class to make concessions

in order to maintain the

legitimacy of their position within the state system.

Such
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legitimizing actions seem particularly necessary in the
context of bourgeois democratic
rights.

At the same time,

ideologies of citizenship

concessions are particularly

likely to occur when they inflict no significant damage to
the interests of the hegemonic eth-class.

For example.

Oriental exclusion and immigration restriction were c o n c e s 
sions to the White working class
ethnic alliance)
capital.

{thus maintaining the White

which did not threaten the dominance of

Likewise,

state acquiescence to the demands of the

Civil Ri ghts Movement

increased

minimal cost to capital

its political

(on the other hand,

legitimacy at

when Northern

Blacks

instituted a challenge to the basis of the economic

order,

it was quickly rejected).

Finally, the modern state
class s t r u g g l e .

is a major target of eth-

This particularly true

expanding role of the state

in light of the

(e.g., the welfare state)

the post-Civil Rights casting of the state as arbiter
group demands.

Consequently,

demands on the state,
ing {i.e.,

co-opting),

which in turn may respond by a b s o r b 
insulating

{i.e.,

confining to a
depending

upon the strategic contingencies of the situation
Ultimately,

however,

(Omi and

the relationship

between the state and the ethnic system is dialectical
nature;

of

groups mobilize to make

limited area), or even rejecting group demands,

Winant 1976, p. 81).

and

in

that is, while state action shapes ethnic relations

(see our first point in this discussion),

the state itself--
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and the ethnic understandings which it embodies— may also be
transformed by intergroup conflict

(e.g., as in the case of

the Civil Rights Movement or some aspects of foreign
policy).

Thus, the

class struggle

(cf.

state is both subject and object in ethEsping-Andersen et al. 1976,

p.

191).

Chapter Summary
In this chapter,
theoretical

we have attempted to employ our

framework to interpret the general course of

ethnic relations
stressed two main

in the United States.
issues:

ethnic contact, and
of group identities.

Our analysis

(1) capitalist development and

(2) eth-class struggle and the evolution
For each historical era,

we

first

examined the role of capitalist development in shaping
initial contact between groups;

that is, how the evolution

of the capitalist world-economy,

uneven development,

and the

ceaseless search for cheap labor and ne w markets acted to
create specific constellations

of ethnic groups which in

turn set the stage for subsequent intergroup interaction.
In the case of the United States, we have argued that the
initial economic d ua li sm (i.e.,
United States led to separate

North vs. South)

of the

patterns of economic d ev el op 

ment and ethnic c on tac t (which was later augmented by a
third "We stern” pattern).

As the United States experienced

continued capitalist development, dynamics such as expan
sion,

industrialization, and proletarianization created the

context for massive

immigration and an increasingly complex
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ethnic structure.

Later, the changing political economy of

the United States
ism)

(i.e., the dynamics of monopoly capital

led it to embark upon an era of immigration restriction

which in turn encouraged internal migration and immigration
from neighboring countries.
resulted in further changes
emergence of new issues

Continued development has
in immigration patterns and the

(e.g., undocumented immigration).

At the same time, we noted that the role of American
capitalist development in shaping interethnic contact was
but one theme

in a larger symphony.

The United States is

(and has been) part of a w o r l d - s v s t e m ; its development has
been shaped by global trends

(e.g., world markets,

economic

cycles, and the uneven development of the w o r l d - e c o n o m y ).
In its creation,

the United States was a product of European

capitalist expansion and English colonialism--its

initial

colonizers were for the most part drawn from those displaced
by the capitalist development of Western Europe.

Processes

of global capitalist development also determined the sources
of immigration to the United States,

as changes

in the

identity of sending nations corresponded to the progression
of capitalist penetration

(i.e.,

pheral regions within the core,
the w o r l d - s y s t e m ).

first the core,

then peri

and then the periphery of

As the position of the United States

within the world-economy underwent a metamorphosis

(i.e.,

from periphery to core), so too did the nature of immigra
tion.

More recent immigration patterns

(e.g., Latin Ameri
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cans, Asians)
economic

reflect bonds forged through U.S.

imperialism,

colonialism,

or militar y intervention.

Clearly,

the ethnic history of the United States cannot be understood
apart from the evolution of the vorld-system itself.
The second

issue which we explored was concerned wi th

what hap pened following initial
how ethnic

identities evolved

resource competition.

intergroup contact;

is,

in the course of intergroup

In this context, we examined p r o c e s 

ses of e th ni c change--acculturation,
and mobilization--in each case
identity to material

that

assimilation, merger,

linking the evolution of

interests and to relations of d o m i n a 

tion and subordination.

We concluded that American ethnic

history is best understood and explained not on the basis
ideology

(e.g., melting pot, racism, ethnic

peoplehood),

identity or

or as a series of contacts between culturally

different groups leading to eventual assimilation
Park's "race relations cycle"),
intergroup
dation)

of

interaction

(e.g.,

(e.g.,

but as an ongoing process

of

conflict, domination, a c c o m m o 

betwe en e t h - c l a s s e s ■* a

As we stated

in Chapter

IV,

eth-classes--groups sharing ethnic and class affiliations-form ad hoc alliances along either ethnic/national or class
lines in order to advance material
course of this struggle, ethnic
tegic role;

interests.*3

In the

identities take on a s t r a 

that is, they are asserted, masked,

or altered

in accordance with the perceived exigencies of the situa
tion.

We believe that the notion of eth-class enables us to

269
capture the com plexity of ethnic change--and to account for
economic differences and divergent

interests within groups.

What we have attempted to postulate is a dynamic process of intergroup interaction and the evolution of group
identities,

one which involves complex matrices of eth-class

interests.

For example,

the post-Reconstruction Southern

racial order can be interpreted as an alliance between the
White rural elite and working classes

(with the tacit c o n 

sent of the Nor the rn capitalist class) which employed the
ideology of White supremacy in order to maintain dominance
over Blacks.
machines,

Ethnic mobilization

(e.g.,

the Civil Rights Movement)

alliances within groups

alliances)

involved cross-class

in which ethnic identity was a s s e r 

ted in order to advance material
national mobilization

immigrant political

interests.

(e.g., cross-class,

or class-based strategies

In contrast,

cross-ethnic

(e.g.,

capitalist

search for cheap labor, working class attempts at exclusion)
involved transcending some ethnic ties while accentuating
others.

Although we have ba rely scratched the surface

in

exploring the implications of various strategies for the
evolution of ethnic identities,

we find eth-class to be a

useful analytical tool for explaining the persistence,
change,

or disappearance of ethnic identities.

In addition to these two core

issues,

we also e m p h a 

sized the effect of the interaroup arena on the evolution of
identities.

As we asserted

in Chapter IV, the intergroup

acena constitutes the context

in which interaction occurs,

the background against which strategies are formed and
identities evolve.

In the case of the United States,

one

key factor was the demography of the intergroup arena

(e.g.,

the number,

which

relative size, and dispersion of groups),

had a significant
between groups.
the U.S. arena

impact on strategic options and relations
For example,

in

(as opposed to polar situations such as

Flemish vs. Walloons
Sri Lanka)

the mul ti plicity of groups

in Belgium or Tamils vs.

Sinhalese

has tended to diffuse ethnic conflict.

in

A second

factor was the changing nature of the intergroup arena as a
consequence of capitalist development and ongoing eth-class
struggle--a factor we sought to highlight

in our c hr on o

logical discussion of American ethnic history.
ethnic relations

Clearly,

in the preindustrial colonial era were

qualitatively different from those of the industrial era
which in turn differ from those of state mo nopoly capitalism
and v e r b i n d u n g n e t z s c h a f t .
tures

(i.e.,

Changing ethnic and class s t r u c 

the relation of groups to the economy),

new

conditions of capitalist accumulation, and the expanding
role of the state all altered the context
group interaction occurred.

Thus,

in which inter

individual and group

strategies are bounded by material and historical forces
an intergroup arena which is constantly recreated and
modified.

in
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With respect to specific groups,
address the question:
emerge,

persist,

we can begin to

What causes ethnic identities to

change,

or d i s ap pe ar ?

ence of each group is unique,

Although the e x p e r i 

it is possible to identify

some general patterns--the underlying structure of ethnic
relations.

In the American case, we can describe two basic

paths--immigration and superexploitation--each of which in
turn contains innumerable variations on a general theme.
we briefly summarize these two trends,

As

we will highlight

those factors which we deem essential to understanding the
evolution of ethnic identities.
The first pattern,

the

immigrant pattern,

the experience of European immigrants
tlers and later migrants)

characterizes

(both original s e t 

and is seemingly also applicable

to the experience of post-1945 immigrants
tion of undocumented immigrants).

(with the e x c e p 

Initially,

the experience

of these groups could be described by the first half of
Park's

(1950, p. 150)

"race relations cycle"--contact and

conflict-- a phenomenon which reflects both a seemingly
universal

initial ethnocentrism and the effects of s u b s e 

quent intergroup resource competition
1972).

(cf. Barth and Noel

An important early factor appears to be entry status

(i.e., existing or potential occupational and class p o s i 
tion) and compatibility with the then-current American class
structure.

For example,

the higher relative position of the

old immigrants and their general compatibility with the

272
then-preindustrial class structure of the United States
facilitated their absorption into the dominant AngloAmerican group.

On the other hand,

relative entry position

(e.g.,

among the old immigrants)

groups with a lower

Irish and French-Canadians

tended to retain ethnic a f f i l i a 

tions for a longer period of time.
For most

immigrant groups, there was little initial

intragroup class differentiation.
city and class

This

"fusion" of e t h n i 

(i.e., no eth-class variation as most n e w 

comers ranked near the bottom of the working class) meant
that group identity was generally expressed
(especially given the presence of other

in ethnic terms

immigrant groups),

thereby increasing the salience of group identity.
context,

In this

ethnicity became a str at egy --groups clustered

together in enclaves for mutual assistance,
"niches" within the economy,

developed ethnic

or sought to exclude c o m p e t i 

tors— for improving group position within the eth-class
system.

At the same time,

the "stuff" of ethnic identity

underwent a transformation at the hands of the acculturative
forces

in American society (Anglo institutional dominance,

the number and dispersion of groups,

the relative pe rm e

ability of boundaries).

Thus, while

identities persisted,

they also evolved

loss of language,

(e.g.,

adoption of

Anglo-American customs).
From our vantage point,

the most important factor

shaping the evolution of ethnic identities was the existence
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of intragroup class dif f er en ti at io n: that is, the emergence
of eth-classes within group boundaries.
both old and

This occurred for

(albeit with more difficulty)

an outcome of economic expansion,

new immigrants as

ethnic succession,

subsequent opportunities for mobility.
intragroup differentiation was twofold.

and

The significance of
First,

class d i v i 

sions led to a divergence of interests within groups and
increased the dif ficulty of ethnic mobilization

(unless the

entire group came under attack from another g r o u p ) .
Secondly,

middle class

(or higher) status appears to facili

tate acceptance by and assimilation into the dominant group
(seemingly the most rational strategy for members of a
minority middle class) when intergroup boundaries are not
rigid.

Consequently,

divisions

the emergence of intragroup class

is necessary if assimilation is to occur.

Nevertheless,

assimilation

is a more complex process

than was envisioned by Park and other early American s o c i 
ologists.

In the American case, assimilation was not u n i 

form (traditional ethnic identities persisted longer
working class and in enclaves),

for the

it was not unidirectional

(e.g., the ethnic "resurgence" of the 1960s and 1970s),
it was not complete

(e.g., the persistence of "symbolic

ethnicity" among post-1880 "new" immigrants).
broader perspective,

and

Taking a

we would assert that assimilation is

not necessarily the rule when peoples m e e t — as was assumed
by a generation of American sociologists--but that European
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immigration to the United States was a special case c o n d i 
tioned by a unique set of historical circumstances pa rt ic u
lar to core settler societies.

These cir cum st anc es— i.e.,

economic expans ion and waves of immigration,

which permitted

upward mobility;

which averted

the multip li cit y of groups,

more focused bipolar conflict--facilitated the assimilation
of many groups

on a scale unl ikely to be repeated.

One va ria ti on of the

immigrant path was the experience

of the dominant Anglo-American group.
the low visib il ity of the

"ethnic"

As we noted earlier,

identity of this group

can be attributed to dominant group status,
alization of Anglo-American culture,
"American" national

identity,

the

institution

Anglo appropriation of

and access to state power.

Cloaked under the guise of state action, Anglo-American
ethnic action had a significant

impact on other groups.

Anglo-Americans were to a large degree able to shape the
definition of group identities and to set the parameters of
the American

intergroup arena:

the y could foster ethnic

persistence by their ability to set and enforce boundaries;
they could encourage ac culturation and assimilation by
controlling the processes of cultural reproduction and
national mobilization;

and they could even reshape the

intergroup a r e n a by excluding other groups.

At the same

time, Anglo power was by no means a b so lu te — it was frag
mented by class divisions within the group

(e.g.,

the often-

differing interests of the Anglo elite and working classes)
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and limited by the countervailing power of ethnic minorities
{which often forced accommodation of non-Anglo interests).
Indeed, much of Am erican ethnic history can be described as
a dialectical struggle between majority domination and
minority resistance,

a struggle

increasingly characterized

(given the expanding role of the state) by political
challenges to Anglo hegemony.
The second pattern,

the superexploited pattern,

describes the experiences of non-Whites--Native,
Mexican, and
these groups,

(to a lesser extent)

Black,

Ch i ne se -A me ri c an s.

For

the common denominator of their experience was

s e g m e n t a t i o n : that is, restriction to a separate class frac
tion on the basis of e t h n i c i t y - - e .g ., a lower segment of the
working class, a separate and lower segment of the middle
classes.

As we observed earlier,

a key element in m ai nt ai n

ing this segmentation was the existence of a "racial order"-a set of beliefs of minority inferiority supporting ca st e
like rigid boundaries between groups.

Accordingly,

the

ethnic identities of "superexploited" groups persisted,

even

in the face of considerable acculturation.
An important consideration with respect to the su p er 
exploited pattern is its v a r i a b i 1 i t v ; that

is, the existence

of differences in degree of segmentation and domination.
Clearly,

the experience of Black-Americans differed from

that of Mexican-Americans,
groups varied over time

while the situations of both

(cf. Barrera--1979--on the slow
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diminution of the superexploited status of Mexican-Americ a n s ).

At the same time,

the presence of this variation

suggests that not only is superexploitation a matter of
degree,

but so also is the distinction between the immigrant

and the superexploited patterns.

For example,

Italian and

Greek-Americans experienced a form of superexploited labor
coercion at the hands of p a d r o n e s . while the experiences of
Chinese,

Japanese,

and Filipino-Americans contained elements

of both the superexploited and the

immigrant patterns

(Archdeacon 1983, p. 158).
Much less apparent are the long term effects of su p e r 
exploited status upon ethnic identity.

The initial rigidity

of intergroup boundaries

(which serves as a vehicle for

dominant group hegemony)

functions to maintain the salience

of group identity.

Moreover,

superexploited status,

the segmentation inherent in

permits only a limited degree of

class differentiation within the grou p and precludes any
assimilation by the mi nor ity middle class, thus maintaining
the fusion of class and ethnicity.

Over time,

however,

continued capitalist development of the United States
industrialization,

the

(e.g.,

post-industrialization) and the ethnic

mobilization of the most oppressed groups
Rights Movement resulted

(e.g.,

the Civil

in the gradual disappearance of

superexploited or coerced labor.

Consequently,

the c on ti n 

ued persistence of ethnicity among previously superexploited
groups can be attributed to two factors:

the use of group
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identity as a basis

for mobilization to challenge s u b o r 

dinate status; and the perseverance of racial

ideologies

even after superexploitation has given way to ethnic c o m p e 
tition.

Future evolution of ethnicity among formerly s u p e r 

exploited groups will be contingent upon the relationship
between ethnicity and class

(increased differentiation vs.

the emergence of a permanent Black,
American underclass),

Hispanic,

or Native

the degree of ethnic mobilization,

an d — especially through institutional racism--the continued
survival of racist

ideologies.

On a more general level,

we can also reach some t e n t a 

tive conclusions regarding the nature of ethnic

identities.

While ethnic identities have their origin in historical
separation and uneven development,
through interaroup contact,

competition,

is, through eth-class struggle.
group material struggles,

they are maintained
and c o n f l i c t ; that

During the course of inter

ethnic relations may take on an

ideological life of their own and thereby set the stage for
subsequent

intergroup interaction.®3

evolution of ethnic

identities

of intergroup conflict:

is more

In addition,

than a simple outcome

ethnicity is intersected by class

and the emergence of eth-class

interests may result

confounding of “ethnic" or "class" interests
explain,

in the case of the United States,

interests are

in the

(which may

the relative

absence of both class and ethnic consciousness).
class

the

These eth-

in turn are manifest in temporary
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alliances along either ethnic or class lines.

Thus group

identities assume a dynamic form--they neither disappear
la Park)

nor persist

(a

(a la the pluralist school)--but they

are constantly renegotiated as groups struggle to gain (or
protect) advantages or to establish niches within an everchanging political economy.

As we have seen in the American

case, this can lead to a va ri et y of outcomes.
At this juncture,

our conclusions have been drawn from

one case--that of the United States--which reflects but one
of our postulated trajectories of intergroup relations
(i.e.,
case,

the "core" pattern).

Moreover,

like that of any nation,

cratic characteristics

(e.g.,

the United States

undoubtedly contains
the lack of native,

list feudal elites as in Europe).

idiosyn

precapita

In the next chapter,

will attempt to analyze a second case,

South Africa,

we

in

order to test further the utility of our theoretical
framework and to provide a broader base
evolution of ethnic identities.

Then,

for analyzing the
in the final chapter,

we will draw more general conclusions regarding our model.

CHAPTER NOTES

CHAPTER V

See Zinn (1980, pp. 47-49) on the emergence of a
settler merchant elite during the colonial era.
This contrast between North and South, while of immense
historical significance, should not be overstated.
As
Archdeacon (1983, pp. 9-10) observes, the South did
resemble the British Caribbean colonies (and the
Spanish and Portuguese colonies) in the establishment
of plantation slavery; h o w e v e r . the South dif fer ed from
the Caribbean in that it contained both a larger
European population and more small farmers and artisans
(although less in comparison to the North).
What is
significant, however, is (1) that Southern s oc iet y was
not conducive to European immigration, and (2) that
slavery served as the origin (or "roots") of BlackWhite relations in the United States.
Archdeacon (1983, pp. 23-24) estimates that in 1790
Anglo-Americans constituted only 49.2% of the total
population (excluding Native Americans) and 60.9% of
the White population of the original thirteen states,
Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee.
Our use of national may be somewhat problematic here
inasmuch as we are applying it to a period which is at
best the infancy of modern nationalism.
It is employed
here as the most descriptive term for a conflict
between peoples, each of whom viewed themselves as
autonomous and self-governing.
For a discussion of conflicting White class interests
(e.g., merchants vs. settlers vs. English Crown) with
respect to native Americans, see Fredrickson (1981, p.
6 ).
Interestingly, English colonial experience in Ireland
served as a laboratory for the development of ideolo
gies and policies later employed against Native
Americans (Archdeacon 1983, p. 3; Fredrickson 1981, pp.
14-16).
This open immigration policy can be attributed to the
English desire for population growth in the colonies to
provide labor power and for purposes of defense.
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8.

As Fr edrickson (1981, p. 87) observes, slavery tended
to obscure class differences within groups, as the
racial privileges of poor Whites served as c o u n t e r 
weight to the disadvantages of class.

9.

This is c le ar ly an oversimplification.
As Archdeacon
(1983, pp. 22-23) asserts, the Revolutio nar y War
involved a complex mixt ur e of ethnic and class
interests, with many g r ou ps opposing independence.
What is significant for our purposes was the success of
this nationalist movement and its subsequent implica
tions for intergroup relations.

10.

According to Archdeacon (1983, p. 57), the continental
congress initially considered including symbols of all
major ethnic groups in the Great Seal of the United
States; however, eventual American symbols instead
reflected the new Anglo-dominated "American" identity.

11.

Dinnerstein and Reimers (1982, p. 3) conceptualize
American ethnic relations as containing a fundamental
contradi ct ion between the acceptance of newcomers
(rooted in the need for labor) and the fear of
"foreign" domination.
To this, we would add a classbased contradiction b et we en a national ideology rooted
in equality and individual sovereignty and the elite
fear of lower class rebell io n (after the experiences of
Bacon's Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, Shay's
Rebellion, etc.).
Thus, the objective of the early
American political leaders was creation of a social
order which would preserve both ethnic and class
hegemony,

12.

The American case can be contrasted with the Canadian
case, where the institutionalization of French customs
facilitated the survival of French-Canadian ethnicity.

13.

These issues are explored in detail
essays by Genovese (1966).

14.

According to Bonacich (1984, p. 86), only 2.7% of the
Southern population in 1850 consisted of foreign born
Whites, as opposed to 12%-15% in the Northeast, North
Central, and Western regio ns of the United States.

15.

In this analysis, the position of Ireland is somewhat
ambiguous.
Although it is probably best viewed as a
co lo ny rather than a cor e nation, the length of its
colonization, its pr ox im it y to Engl and and relative
political absorption, a n d the economic distortion
effected by British colonization gave Ireland c h a r a c 
teristics similar to those which facilitated emigration

in a series of
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from peripheral areas within core societies.
16.

17.

Given the dominance of the North in trade, this is
another factor working against immigration to the
South--with the exception of New Orleans.
At the same time, the virtual removal of the indigenous
peoples and the political absorption of the West into
the United States made the outcome of conquest and
settlement dramatically different from that of European
overseas colonies.

18.

It has been estimated that 12-15 million Native
Americans lived North of the Rio Grande in 1500 and
that their numbers fell to 600,000 by 1800 and 200,000
by 1900 (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 205; Schaefer
1988, p. 177).

19.

Bonacich (1984, p. 97) characterizes the Civil War as a
conflict between Southern dependent (plantation) ca pi 
talism and the temporary alliance of Northern indus
trial capital with independent small farmers.
The
foundation of this ultimately victorious coalition was
a common interest in blocking any westward expansion of
the plantation economy of the South.
From the perspec
tive of independent small farmers this was, as Aglietta
(1978, p. 21, cited in Bonacich 1984, p. 97) observes,
"an alliance with the devil himself"--for the expansion
of industrial capitalism would ultimately envelop small
agricultural production.

20.

See Steinberg (1974) on initial vs. potential class
position of Jewish immigrants.

21.

English colonial domination of Ireland reduced most
Irish to tenant farmers or laborers (as opposed to
independent farmers or artisans); hence, their
potential class position was different from that of
other groups (cf. Archdeacon 1983, p. 40).

22.

Another factor which may have contributed to intergroup
divisions and, hence, assimilation was religious
diversity--the existence of significant numbers of both
Protestants and Catholics among German-Americans (cf.
Archdeacon 1983, pp. 105-06).

23.

Our notion of superexploited eth-classes is similar to
what Blauner (1972) and Barrera (1979)--among others-would refer to as "colonized" minorities.
In order to
avoid the conceptual confusion which we believe is
inherent in the colonial an a l o g y (see our critique of
"internal colonialism" in Chapter III), we prefer to
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em p lo y the term superexploited with its connotation of
the extraction of additional surplus value by coercive,
non-market measures.
We would also maintain (as
Blauner--1972--does for colonization) that super
exploitation is a matter of degree; that is, that some
groups (e.g., Blacks) experienced considerably harsher
treatment than others (e.g., Me xi ca n- Am e ri ca ns ).
24.

There
order
1969,
like

were, however, some gaps in the Northern racial
which permitted a few Blacks to prosper (Quarles
p. 94), although they still experienced a c a s t e 
lower social position.

25.

To the extent that Northern opposition to slavery was
based on a belief in equality, it was more a matter of
legal equality— the basis of the emerging bourgeois
social order— than inherent equality (Fredrickson 1981,
p. 153).
As noted above, the popular Northern belief
was that Blacks would be unable to compete under such
circumstances (Archdeacon 1983, p. 66).

26.

The re-establishment of the Southern rural elite was by
no means inevitable, see Bloom 1987, p. 19) for a
discussion of potential eth-class alliances.

27.

As Bloom (1987, p. 51) points out, wages for Southern
Whites remained low (as opposed to the effects of a
labor aristocracy) and that the exclusion of Blacks was
accomplished through local legislation.

28.

For example, Northern business interests strongly
opposed the Lodge voting rights bills of 1890 and 1891,
claiming that the resulting social turmoil would be bad
for business (Bloom 1987, pp. 43-44).

29.

The Hobson-Lenin theory of imperialism views such
expansion as an attempt by capital to maintain or m a x i 
mize profits in the face of the inherent contradictions
of capitalism (e.g., underconsumption--the inability of
the working class to consume the output of ever e x p a n 
ding production--leading to stagnation; class struggle
and the increasing demands of the working class) and
the need for growth.
Although, as Chirot (1977, pp.
51-54) points out, this explanation is seemingly not
supported by fact (e.g., colonies were not the primary
source of trade and investment; core nations still
possessed the potential for internal growth), what is
important is that during the post-1870 era of i mpe ri
alism the core powers acted as though the Hobson-Lenin
theory of imperialism was true.
As Senator William
Frye (quoted in Ehrenreich 1983, p. 21), Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in 1895:
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"We must have
r e v o l u t i o n ."

the m a r k e t

(of China),

or we sh al l

have a

30.

For a brief but cogent analysis of U.S.
see Zinn (1980, pp. 290-313).

imperialism,

31.

For detailed listings of "new immigrant" groups, see
Archdeacon (1983, pp. 112--42) and Dinnerstein and
Reimers (1982, pp. 32-48, 158).
As Dinnerstein et al.
observe, however, inaccurate record keeping by United
States immigration officials makes an exact count
im p os si ble .

32.

In contrast, previous immigrants left core nations
(Germany, England) for the peripheral (or s e mi pe ri 
pheral) United States.

33.

United States immigration in the post-1890 era was
qualitatively different from that of the past.
New
immigrant groups contained a higher proportion of
single men (sojourners, commuters) and, in m a n y cases,
a high rate of remigration (Archdeacon 1983, p. 139;
Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 134-35).
Such a pattern
was facilitated by the urban-industrial locus of immi
grants and the prevalence of wage labor, as liquid
assets (e.g., savings vs. farms) and fluctuations in
labor demand made "commuter" migration feasible.
This
remigration rate also varied con siderably from group to
group, ranging from 4.3% for Jews to 87.4% for
Bulgarians/Montenegrins/Serbs (cf. Archdeacon 1983, p.
139 ) .

34.

One historically interesting question is why the
periphery-core pattern of labor migration did not
include significant Black emigration from the South
until the 1920s.
According to Bonacich (1984, pp. 11213), key factors were the indifference of Northern
capital to the source of its labor and the insistence
of the Southern elite upon retaining the post-bellum
system of superexploited labor (e.g., sharecropping).

35.

This illustrates the limitations of the core-periphery
(colonial) metaphor within nation states.
Despite its
"peripheral" status in the American economy, the
Western United States was, from a global standpoint,
part of a core s oc i e t y — its "colonial" experience is
hardly comparable to that of Latin America, Asia, or
Africa.
Likewise, its "core" status made the United
States West at least somewhat attractive to immigrants
from peripheral societies, hence, it did serve as a
locus for immigration, although at a much lower level
than that of the Northeast.
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36.

For expositions of the nativist position, see Fairchild
(1926) or Grant (1916).
For analyses of American
nativism, see Higham (1955) or Billington (1938).

37.

The Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924 specified that
annual quotas for each nation would initially be two
percent of the foreign born persons from that nation
according to the 1890 Census.
This was changed in 1927
to a ratio (of 150,000) proportionate to the national
origin of all (White) residents of the United States in
1920.
In effect, this shift (actually implemented in
1929) was merely the recloaking of the original formula
in more politically palatable garb.
This quota system
was not applied to nations of the Western Hemisphere,
thus Mexicans, Canadians, etc. were not affected.

38.

This s ee mi ngl y reflects a new phase of core-periphery
relations. Core investment (vs. the previous pattern of
colonization) brings about structural distortion and
social change in the periphery, whose displaced
population migrates to the core as a source of cheap
la bor .

39.

As Barrera (1979, pp. 106-09) describes, Mexican immi
gration functions as a reserve army of labor for So uth 
western agricultural interests.
Periods of increased
enforcement of immigration regulations coincided with
downturns in the American economy, while the Border
Patrol of ten avoided ranch checks and concentrated
enforcement efforts upon non-agricultural workers.

40.

For discussions of ethnic enterprise, see Light (1972)
or Light and Bonacich (1988).
For lists of ethnic
occupational specialization, see Dinnerstein and
Reimers (1982, pp. 109-25) or Hechter (1979).

41.

Obviously the situation was more complex that a direct
correspondence between class and attitude towards
immigration.
One confounding factor was ideology.
Members of the elite, who presumably should favor
immigration, were affected by the nativist/racist
climate of the times (e.g., the "bluebloods" who formed
the Immigration Restriction League in the 1890s-Archdeacon 1983, pp. 162-63).
Similarly, the American
democratic ideology of inclusion and appeals to working
class solidarity at times mitigated antagonism towards
newcomers (e.g., attempts of the Knights of Labor to
organize immigrants and Bl a ck s— Bonacich 1984, p. 111).
A second contradictory influence affecting attitudes
towards new immigrants was the existence of diverse
interests within dominant group eth-classes.
Certainly
owners and workers in different industrial sectors
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varied in terms of the benefit or threat posed by
newcomers.
Likewise, members of the independent class
who prospered through commerce with immigrants were
likely to be more tolerant than those in competition.
The point is that while eth-class interests shaped the
overall pattern of intergroup relations, other factors
could and did influence interaction in specific cases.
42.

For discussions of the role of schools in the
"Americanization" of immigrants, see Carlson (1975),
Weiss (1982), Higham (1955), and Hartmann (1948).

43.

Interestingly, pressures during World War I are
credited with effecting the final assimilation of
G e r ma n- Am e ri ca ns , as attempts to preserve German
culture withered in the face of United States conflict
with Germany (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 167-68; Hawgood
1940) .

44.

Use of the term ''lessened opposition" is important.
The bulk of the capitalist class did not support
immigration restriction, but merely failed to oppose
with the same vigor as before.

it

45.

Given the high remigration rate, many new immigrant
group members were less likely to learn English or
become American citizens.
Following the cutoff of
immigration and the decline of sojourners, this trend
was reversed (Covello 1967).

46.

This is not to suggest the disappearance of all d o m i 
nant group nativism.
Continued competition was e x 
pressed in "WPX jobs" du ring the Depression, limiting
quotas for Jews at Ivy League schools, and the p er p e t u 
ation of unfavorable stereotypes.

47.

Integration into the class structure is not incom
patible with status as a superexploited minority (cf.
Barrera 1979).
Southern Blacks constituted a (racial
ly) separate and lower segment of the working class,
subject to occupational stratification and a dual wage
system in which they were paid less than White workers
(Dinnerstein et a l . 1979, p. 152).

48.

While the nature of the Southern racial order could
seemingly lend itself to the split labor market inter
pretation that it was imposed by the White working
class (cf. Bonacich 1972; Wilson 1980), such a view is
not compatible with the political economy of the early
twentieth century South (Bloom 1987, p. 51).
The White
working class did not have the power to create such a
system, nor were they the prime beneficiaries (e.g.
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while a dual wage system did exist, Southern wages
remained below those of the rest of the nation).
Although the specter of economic competition and the
existence of racist ideology created a context in which
the White working class was amenable to segregation,
they are better viewed as a "junior partner" to White
ethnic mobilization triggered by the rural elite.
49.

Some observers (e.g., Dollard 1937; Myrdal 1944;
Berreman 1960) have act ually described the position of
Black-Americans in caste terms.

50.

According to Lieberson (1980, pp. 371-74), incoming
Blacks from the South occupied a lower class position
than Southern and Eastern Europeans.
Moreover, given
the lower standard of living of Southern Blacks
(reflecting the caste-like racial order of the postRec ons truction era), lower-paying jobs represented an
improvement over their pre-migration status.

51.

A more recent modification of the neoclassical position
(Becker 1971) suggests that discrimination will persist
if those discriminating are willing to accept the cost
(i.e., inefficiency and competitive disadvantage) of
their "taste for discrimination."

52.

As is noted by several sources (e.g., Archdeacon 1983,
p. 129; Barrera 1979, p. 67), there are no accurate
data on the exact number of Mexican immigrants.

53.

On the other hand, nativist pressure was sufficiently
strong so as to effect some restriction of Mexican
immigration (e.g., contract laborers, illiterates,
potential public charges) in the 1930s (Archdeacon
1983, p. 176).
This was undoubtedly possible in the
context of the Depression.

54.

According to Schwartz (1945, p. 117, cited in Barrera
1979, p. 106), persons with Spanish/Mexican surnames
were laid off from WPA jobs in the Southwest in order
to maintain a reserve labor force for agriculture
(under the assumption that Mexican=agricultural labor).

55.

Under the then-current interpretation of the N at u r a l i 
zation Act of 1790, Japanese and Chinese were "nonWhites" and thus ineligible to become naturalized
citizens (Archdeacon 1983, p. 164).

56.

For a discussion of the role of racist ideology in the
conflict between the United States and Japan during
World War II, see Dower (1986).
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57.

While this legislation di d not succeed in proletarianizing Native Americans, it did have the effect (often
due to White fraud) of reducing Native American land
holdings from 138 million acres to 90 million acres in
1934 (Schaefer 1988, p. 181).

58.

For our purposes, the most significant effects of TNCs
are dependent development/underdevelopment in the
periphery and (consequently) continued pressure for
labor migration from perip he ry to core (e.g..gastarbeiter in Weste rn Europe, Mexicans in the United
S t a t e s ).

59.

For a description and analysis of the bracero program,
see Craig (1971).

60.

These acts do not reflect an y significant softening of
the dis cr im i na to ry national origins system.
The first
displaced Persons Act was blatantly anti-Jewish, while
the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952 continued
the system of national qu ot as and on ly relaxed the
Oriental Exclusion Act to allow each Asian nation a
token annual qu ot a of one hundred persons (Dinnerstein
and Reimers 1982, pp. 72-73).

61.

The limits established by the 1965 act were mod ifi ed by
subsequent legislation in 1976, 1978, and 1980 (cf.
Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 168); however, the
basic thrust of the act remained unchanged.

62.

While the overall yearly quota during this period was
290,000, the to tal number of immigrants was much larger
due to the admission of substantial numbers of refugees.

63.

In addition to residents, the number of undocumented
immigrants present in the United States at any one time
would be supplemented by temporary or commuter migrants
(cf. Bennett 1986, p. 3).

64.

For a cogent analysis of the "reserve army" role of
undocumented labor, see Barrera (1979, pp. 113-26).

65.

For a brief s u r v e y of the debate concerning the e c o 
nomic impact of undocumented immigrants, see Beck, Ma,
Weathers, Cooper and Pedersen (1984).

66.

By t he time of its expiration on May 4, 1988, the
am n e s t y program attracted 1.5 million applicants.
An
em erging issue pertains to the treatment of family
members of individuals who receive amnesty, which could
potentially involve hundreds of thousands more in d i 
viduals (Arocha 1988).
At the same time, the United
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States has yet to resolve the status of those who did
not q ualify for am ne sty (cf. Bartlett 1988).
67.

Many "pull" f a c t o r s - - i .e ., the need for cheap labor,
especially in the agricultural and service s e c to rs—
also remain a reality, a fact which is explicitly
recognized by a provision of the 1986 act which permits
entry of foreign agricultural workers.

68.

This is not to suggest that the mass media cannot also
be used as a vehicle for ethnic mobilization and c u l 
tural maintenance (e.g., Spanish-language programming);
however, this has been a re latively recent (and thus
far limited) phenomenon.

69.

This was reflected symbolically and culturally through
slogans ("Black Power" and "Black is beautiful"), by
alteration of group labels (from "Negro" to "Black"),
by a rejection of White standards (the disappearance of
the higher in-group status accorded lighter-skinned
Blacks) and a promotion of Black culture (emphasis on
"soul", demands for inclusion of Black Studies in
college curricula).

70.

Formation of this alliance was not necessarily a given.
Much of the traditional (accommodationist) Black
leadership either benefitted from White largess or was
more vulnerable to White reaction and was often
initially reluctant to challenge the established racial
order (cf. Bloom 1987, pp. 127-37).

71.

As Bloom (1987, p. 2) observes, one outcome of the
social revolution wrought by the Civil Rights Movement
was the completion of the modernization of the South
and the integration of the South into the national
political economy (or, as we might phrase it, t e r min a
tion of the "peripheral" status of the South).

72.

In the words of one Southern Black
cited in Bloom 1987, p. 184):

(Chafe 1980,

p. 213,

We could go anywhere in Greensboro that we wanted
to go, but we were already raising the question,
"what the hell, if people can't afford food on
their table at home, it matters not that they can
eat at the fancy little restaurants in
G r e e n s b o r o ."
This point was also recognized by Martin Luther King,
Jr. who in 1967 (quoted in Williams 1988, p. Dl) stated
that "We must recognize that we can't solve our problem
until there is a radical redistribution of economic and
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political power."

73.

For example, recent public statements by sports figures
(A1 Campanis, "Jimmy the Greek" Snyder) wh i c h were
viewed as racist led to their dismissal from their
respective organizations.

74.

For a discussion of "White Ethnics" vs. "non-ethnics"
see Banton's (1983, pp. 64-66) notion of "minus one"
ethnicity.
The idea that Anglo-Americans were non
ethnics can be found in the work of Warner (Warner a nd
Srole 1945, p. 295) and Hughes (Hughes and Hughes 1952,
p. 137).
For discussion of the notion of the "triple
melting pot" see Kennedy (1952) and Herberg (1960).
Interestingly, as Archdeacon (1983, p. 214) observes,
the "triple melting pot" made no provision for "racial"
minorities.

75.

It is important to recognize that this m o b i l i t y often
occurred at different rates for different groups, due
to the effects of actual or potential class position,
as well as a myriad of historical and cultural factors.
For example, the different rates of m o b i l i t y experi
enced by Jewish-Americans and Italian-Americans can be
attributed to differences in potential class position
(Steinberg 1974) and to differences in economic
conditions (Covello 1967).

76.

Alba and Chamlin (1983) found that despite increasing
intermarriage (and, hence, multiple ethnicity) roost
White Americans asserted an attachment to one ethnic
group.
The strength and salience of this attachment is
entirely another matter.

77.

In essence, one could say that White Ethnics felt
"squeezed" between Anglo-Americans and Blacks--that
Anglos expected them to make restitution for injustices
for which they were not historically responsible, while
Blacks were demanding that which White Ethnics felt
that they had worked (and overcome Anglo prejudice a nd
discrimination) to attain (cf. Vecoli 1978, pp. 14243).
Symbolically, this position is reflected in the
belief that while anti-Black humor was defi ned as
racist, anti-White Ethnic humor was respectable--and a
means of asserting Anglo hegemony (Schaefer 1988, p.
155) .

78.

By 1960, three interconnected labeling processes took
place: (1) the acronym "WASP" was coined b y competitive
upwardly mobile Catholics and Jews to put "Old-Stock"
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Americans in their place, so to speak; (2) the word
"m inorities” was deflected from White Ethnics onto nonWhites and became a federal category for grants and
entitlements; and (3) and "ghettoes" was ethnically
clapped onto Black-American residential areas as an
Americanization of an Eastern-European residential
practice (Khleif 1978a).
79.

This process is seemingly reflected in the 1988 Dukakis
presidential candidacy.
Dukakis, a Greek-American,
drew upon ethnic ties for fund-raising and for a
symbolic base for his candidacy; however, he also
underwent criticism from some Greek-Americans for
alleged movement away from traditional group heritage.

80.

For an opposing viewpoint,

81.

This process is also happening, albeit on a smaller
scale, for Arab-Americans (Abraham and Abraham, 1983).

82.

For a discussion of the negative impact of stereotypes
upon ethnic groups, see Lieberson (1982).

83.

see Vecoli

(1978).

We recognize that our choice here is somewhat a r b i 
trary, that other groups (e.g., Filipinos, Koreans)
were resident in the United States prior to 1965;
however, the small numbers of these groups make a n y
meaningful analysis difficult.

84.

With respect to m an y social and economic indicators,
the position of Japanese-Americans equals or surpasses
that of White Americans (one notable exception is
representation in the economic and political elite).
At the same time, this "success" may at least in part
be attributable to small group size and concentration
in high wage regions of the United States (Shaefer
1988, p. 395).

85.

Two exceptions to this would be the work of Baltzell
(1964) and Anderson (1970).

86.

This is not to assert that Anglo culture i_s American
culture, but that it dominates American culture.
Thus,
we do not subscribe to either the American=Anglo model
or to the "melting pot" a n a lo gy in which American
culture is a composite of m a n y ethnic cultures.
Our
preferred metaphor would be that of Khleif (1978a, p.
57), who describes the United States as "a salad bowl
with Anglo dressing" (see a lso Yinger 1981, p. 251 for
a theoretical discussion of this issue).
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87.

To the extent that ethnic merger has created a "White
American" pan-ethnic identity, this term could be
substituted for Anglo-American.

88.

Interestingly, racial ideology has also been employed
by Anglo-Americans to "explain" (i.e., denigrate as
unfair competition rooted in undesirable group traits)
the success of some groups (e.g., Jewish-Americans,
J a p a n e s e - A m e r i c a n s ) in intergroup competition.

89.

For example, the WASP dominance described by Baltzell
(1964) is not as apparent in more recent works (e.g..
Alba and Moore 1982).

90.

In an excellent account, Barrera (1979, pp. 168-72)
catalogues a number of state and federal government
actions which served to perpetuate the superexploited
status of Mexican labor for the benefit of large
agricultural interests (e.g., forcing persons with
Mexican surnames off the relief rolls prior to harvest
time, consulting with agricultural interests before
institutionalizing the bracero program, non-enforcement
of school attendance lavs for Mexican-American children).

91.

This is compatible with the class-dialectical model
state power discussed in Chapter IV.

of

92.

To be sure, our framework can accommodate the role of
ideology, cultural differences, or ethnocentrism in
intergroup interaction; however, we contend that ideas,
culture, or even eth nocentrism are not in themselves
sufficient to explain the totality of intergroup
relat ion s— these processes derive their force from the
exigencies of intergroup resource competition and ethclass struggle.

93.

Our conception of material includes the political as
well as the economic.
As Bloom (1987, p. 3) observes:
the concerns of classes, while shaped by their
material existence, are political as well as
economic, because the political system is so
important in setting the framework within which
economic struggles are carried out.

94.

C f . Marx's

(1978, p.

595)

famous quote:

Men make their own history, but they do not make
it just as they please; they do not make it under
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under
circumstances directly found, given, and t r a n s 
mitted from the past.
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95.

Thus, one component of intergroup struggle is id eo l o g i 
cal or c u l t u r a l — ethnic beliefs and "markers" are
important for mobilization and for setting boundaries,
while restricting the options of others can be an
effective strategy.
This reminds us that while ideas
such as ethnicity (or race) may have a material base,
they ma y also assume a life of their own (and in turn
shape material processes).
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CHAPTER VI

ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY IN THE PERIPHERY:

SOUTH AFRICA

In this chapter, we will continue the substantive
application of our framework,

this time directing analytical

attention towards intergroup relations

in South Africa.

goals are the same as in the previous chapter:
of our theoretical

Our

application

framework so as to enable us to u n d e r 

stand a specific historical case, and use of a case study as
a vehicle for elaborating our framework.
methodology will also be similar:

Likewise,

our

interpretation as opposed

to description, and the secondary analysis of existing
studies as "data" for analysis.

Thus, what we will be

presenting is not a detailed sociohistorical study of ethnic
relations in South Africa, but rather an overview in which
we employ our framework to highlight what in our view are
major themes and

issues in the evolution of ethnic i de n 

tities .
Our analysis will emphasize the following assumptions,
each of which was initially presented

in Chapter IV.

we will argue that the evolution of ethnic relations

First.
in

South Africa was ultimately shaped by the process of South
African capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t , which in turn is linked to
global capitalist dev el o p m e n t — the ceaseless quest for
markets, materials, cheap labor, and new outlets for invest
ment.

S e c o n d l y , we will assert that the major factor
295

shaping the evolution of ethnic identities is resource
competition between groups;
actions

that is, that specific i n t e r 

( c o n fl ic ts domination,

alliance)

between eth-classes

(e.g., Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. White working class.
African w orking class)

with concrete material

interests

create a social order which embodies both a system of s t r a t 
ification and a set of

ideological understandings which

circumscribe relations between groups.
process

is a dynamic one:

Moreover,

this

tension between the forces of

social reproduction and social change creates a continually
evolving context for the

(strategic) assertion,

or attenuation of ethnic ties.
the South African case,

evolution,

Throughout our analysis of

eth-class will serve as our main

conceptual tool for the analysis of ethnic relations and
group identities.

F i n a l l y , we will again explore the role

of aspects of the nation-state or "Intergroup arena"
relative size of groups,

role of the state,

physical and social environment)

(e.g.,

impact of the

in shaping the evolution of

ethnic identities.
In addition to these general analytical themes,
specific point of emphasis in this chapter will

a

involve the

impact of the uneven nature of global capitalist development
and the peripheral status of South Africa upon the course of
intergroup re lat io ns. 3-

Globally,

early twentieth centuries,

in the nineteenth and

peripheral status entailed c o l o 

n i z a t i o n , which was manifest as direct political and eco-

297
nomic d omi nation of the periphery by the core and which
resulted in social and cultural transformation

(i.e.,

the

destruction of traditional ways) and partial p r o l e t a r i a n i 
zation (i.e., a blending of wage labor and subsistence
economy).

For South Africa, a major historical force was

Dutch/British colonization.

Indeed, we will argue that the

nature of the colonial relationship

(e.g., economic d e v e l o p 

ment shaped b y the needs of the core,
policies,

specific core colonial

and the structuring of post-colonial society)

shaped the evolution of intergroup relations.

At the same

time, ve must also acknowledge unique aspects of the South
African colonial experience.

As a colony,

South Africa was

neither an ideal-typical colony (small-scale m igration from
the core for purposes of political administration and e c o 
nomic exploitation)

nor a classic settler s ociety (one in

which the indigenous population was virtually "replaced" by
massive Eu ro p e a n settlement).

Moreover, as we shall see

below, the unique history of the Afrikaner descendants of
the Dutch colonists

(European settlers colonized by another

European core power) was a key element in the e volution of
South African ethnic relations.

Thus,

our analysis will

consider both general aspects of colonialism and the h i sto r
ically specific nature of the South African case.
The organization of this chapter will be similar to
that of Chapter V.
evolution of

Our sociohistorical analysis of the

intergroup identities in South Africa will be
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presented in four chronological segments which c orr espond to
the major divisions of the South A f r i c a n experience:
(1)

Du t c h settlement and initial

intergroup contact

(1652-1800)
(2)

B r i t i s h colonization and territorial expansion
(1800-1910)

(3)

Union,

economic development,

struggle
(4)

and eth-class

(1910-1948)

Afrikaner hegem ony and Afr ic an resistance
(1948 -p res en t).

For each historical era, ve will divide our analysis into
two sub-sections.

F i r s t . we will seek to link specific

intergroup interactions to the dynamics of capitalist
development

(e.g., accumulation), w i t h the objective of

understanding the context
occurred.

Secondly,

in which intergroup relations

once ve have established this basic

context, ve will direct our focus towards specific eth-class
struggles, as ve seek to trace the evolution of group ide n 
tities in the context of intergroup resource c ompetition and
ethnic stratification.

Following our historical narrative,

at the conclusion of the chapter, ve will review our f i n d 
ings and present our conclusions.
Dutch Conquest and Settlement:

1652-1800

Capitalist Development and Dutch Colonization
The h i s to ry of intergroup zelationB in South Africa,
a n y society for that matter,

or

is intertwined with the e x p a n 

sion of the European-based capitalist v o r l d - e c o n o m y .
the purposes of this analysis,

For

what is important is the

impact of such changes as the migration of European peoples
to other parts of the globe as conquerors,
settlers

(i.e.,

formation

(or,

colonizers,

and

increased int erg roup contact) and the trans
if one prefers, destruction)

of societies as

a result of this globalization of European capitalism upon
the evolution of intergroup relations.
Africa,

In the case of South

this process dates from 1652, wh e n the Dutch East

India Company established a small settlement on the Cape of
Good Hope as a refreshment and refueling station for
profitable East Indies spice t r a d e . 3 .

its

This development

occurred at the height of Dutch core hegemony, an a sce ndancy
grounded in financial strength and superior maritime tech 
nology (Wallerstein 1980, pp.

37-71).

As ve will see

in the

course of this chapter, Dutch colonization would forever
alter the course of South A f r i can history.
What was particularly most significant for the evolu
tion of South African society was the fact that the

initial

colonizer was not a European state, but the Dutch E a s t India
Company (VOC).3

While statelike in the powers which had

been granted to it (Katzen 1969, p. 185; Fredrickson 1981,
p. 18), the VOC was a capitalist enterprise whose ultimate
goal was profit maximization

(as opposed to territorial

expansion or empire bu il din g) .4
the Company,

From the perspective of

South Africa offered little

in terms of eco-
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noraic value; that is, there was no one staple commodity
wh ic h could be profitably exploited a n d agriculture was not
productive

(de Kieviet 1957,

p. 9 ) .9

Consequently,

had little interest in expanding beyond
(Fredrickson 1981, p. 28).*
enterprise

In short,

the VOC

its Cape beachhead
the exigencies of

(i.e., p r o f i t ) led to a different,

"conservative"

colonial polic y (e.g., attempts to limit settlement and
native contact;

imposition of tight economic controls and

comp an y monopolies),

one which reflected both the u n w ill in g

ness of the V O C to bear the costs of empire and the desire
of the Company to maximize profits

(de Kiewiet,

1957, p.

8).

What VOC presence meant for the Cape Colony was that
the pace of European settlement and capitalist development
was slow.

Given that territorial expansion was not a p r i 

o r i t y of the V O C

(especially in the context of declining

Dutch hegemony after 1671),

a ny additional settlement which

did occur was undertaken b y former C o m p a n y employees who
were permitted to establish themselves as independent
farmers and p a s t o r a l i s t s .

Accordingly,

settlement was not

followed by extensive economic development
limited interest of the VOC),

(reflecting the

thus leaving the interior of

South Africa as a frontier existing in relative isolation
from the w o r l d - e c o n o m y .

Indeed, C o m p a n y actions

fixed prices and monopolies,
tal,

official corruption)

(e.g.,

unwillingness to invest c a p i 

have gener all y been viewed as an

obstacle to the economic development of South Africa

(cf.
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Katzen 1969,

202-03; de Kleviet 1957,

pp. 5-7}.

Over time,

this "underdevelopment" fed upon itself, as low levels of
development inhibited investment,

immigration,

and the

emergence of a domestic market, all of which in turn limited
further development.

This slow pace of development would

have a significant impact upon the evolution of intergroup
relations in South African society.
Intergroup Struggles and Ethnic Ide nt ity
From our perspective,

it appears that the South African

case exhibits an historical pattern of development of inter
group contact and relations which is s ignificantly different
from that of either other European settler societies
the United States)

or other colonies.

(e.g.,

What appears crucial

is the combined effect of slow capitalist development,
limited immigration, and relative

isolation from the world-

economy, which created a South A f r ic an society in which a
relatively small proportion of Europeans existed
midst of a larger native African p o p u l a t i o n . 7

in the

This d e m o 

graphic imbalance between the dominant European colonizers
and the native African population p r o d u c e d — in the context
of South African capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t — a unique set of
political and economic exigencies

(i.e., the logistics of

dominating and exploiting a numer ica lly superior population)
which in turn led to the emergence of a particular eth-class
structure and specific cultural practices and ideologies.
These processes played themselves out: over centuries.

Our
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Immediate task

in this section is to examine those aspects

of intergroup relations during the pre-1800 era wh ich ve
believe had a significant effect upon the eth-class s t r u c 
ture and the subsequent evolution of group identities.
will focus upon three phenomena:

He

(1) resource competition

and conflict between natives and European settlers;
emergence of the Boer independent class;

a nd

(2) the

(3) s l a v e r y and

intergroup boundaries.
i*

Resource competition:__ Europeans va,

was the case with the American colonies,
intergroup conflict

Africans,

as

a significant early

in South Africa was the

"national"

(in

the context of groups viewing themselves as autonomous
socio-political entities) struggle

(or European war of con

quest) between Dutch colonists and native African peoples
for control of the land and its resources.*

The initial

pace of E u r o p e a n settlement was slov--having barely moved
beyond Cape T own by 1 7 0 0 — a reflection of both VOC p o l i c y
and the limited number of immigrants.

Nevertheless,

despite

continued attempts by the C o m p a n y to limit settlement,

by

1803 Dutch colonists occupied much of the present-day Cape
province

(Fredrickson 1981, p.

32; Katzen 1969, p. 212).

This territorial expansion was brought ab o u t by several
social and economic factors--population pressures,

t h e need

for large tracts of land for herding and farming to be
economically viable

(due to the limited fertility of the

soil), and the desire of the settlers to move beyond the
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p olitical and economic control o£ the V O C— a nd facilitated
by the ease of access

(temperate climate, no natural o b s t a 

cles)

(de Kieviet 1957, pp.

to the interior

2-15).

Indeed,

onl y the isolation of the interior and the strength of
n a tive resistance

(particularly w h e n eastward Dutch movement

brought them into contact with the n umerically larger Ngunisp eaking peoples
tury)

in the latter part of the eighteenth c e n 

inhibited further settlement

(Katzen 1969,

p. 212).*

One consequence of the ex pansion of Dutch settlement in
the eighteenth century was increased contact and conflict,
first with the Khoikhoin

(who inhabited the Cape area) and

later with the San (who lived inland and to the nort h). 3-0
W h ile first contact between the Du t c h and the Khoikhoin was
r e latively benign, due to the perceived u t i l i t y of the K h o i 
k h o i n as suppliers of cattle to the Cape settlement,
unwillingness of the Khoikhoin

the

(like many p a s t o r a l i s t s ) to

part with a significant proportion of their herds and the
ex pa nsionary desires of the independent Dutch settlers
q u i c k l y led to cattle raids and warfare

(i.e.,

the Khoi-

khoin-Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century) .iaconflicts

(or wars of conquest),

In these

the key d y n a m i c was the

ever-expanding European desire for land, a goal whose f u l 
fillment required the widespread exprop ri ati on of native
land and herds.

What is perhaps m o s t significant about this

proc es s was the use of negative stereotypes

(e.g.,

"hea

thens" or "savages") and ideologies of superiority in order
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to legitimize the conquest and dispossession of the native
peoples

(cf. de Kieviet 1957, p. 20; M. Wilson 1969c, p.

242; Fredrickson 1981, p. 34).

These

ideologies vere then

readily applied to subsequent relations between European
colonists and other native Africans.
For the Khoikhoin,
vere disastrous.
vith,

the consequences of this conflict

Khoikhoin society,

literally disintegrated

nization

never a dvanced to beg in

in the face of European c o l o 

(much in the same manner as east coast Native A m e r 

icans) as loss of land and herds brought about the rapid
erosion of the economic and social base of the Khoikhoin.
When these changes vere accompanied by the ravages of
disease,

the Khoikhoin soon ceased to exist as a n indepen

dent people

(M. Wilson 1969a,

pp.

6 7 - 8 ) . 13

vivors moved northvestvard into vhat
others

While some s u r 

is nov N a m i bia and

(including Bastaards or Griquas) reestablished

themselves on the northern frontier of the Cape Colony,
those vho remained in the Cape area vere absorbed
European colonial society as casual labor

(Katzen 1969, p.

184; M. Wilson 1969a, pp. 68-70; Macmillan 1963,
7

2

)

into

pp. 53-

For this latter group, absorption over time led to

acculturation

(i.e., the adoption of European language,

religion, and other cultural practices) and— v i t h inter
marriage vith persons of slave and/or Dutch a n c e s t r y —
eventual amalgamation

(i.e., ethnic merger)

"Coloured" ethnic group.1 *

into a nev

2.

The rise of_the Boer

independent c l a s s .

The second

significant development during the pre-1800 period was the
emergence of the Boer independent class, an eth-class,
which,

as the predecessors of the pr esent-day Afrikaners,

would play a key role in the evolution of intergroup rel a 
tions in South Africa.

Our use of the term "independent

class" reflects the contradictory position of the Dutch
settlers between modes of production;

that is, on the one

hand t h e y existed primarily at a precapitalist subsistence
level,

but on the other hand t h e y were at least somewhat

(and in varying degrees depending upon time and place)
subject locally to the sway of market relations and able to
operate as independent or petty-bourgeois producers

(market

production was primarily linked to the role of the Cape as a
supply station on the route to the East Indies— cf. Fr e d 
rickson 1981, p. 5 2 ) . This class had its origins in those
ex-Company employees who became independent herders and
farmers and who spread away from Cape Town into the interior
of South Africa.1 "

The ranks of the settlers were expanded

by an influx of Huguenot immigrants in the late seventeenth
century (who were quickly and d e li ber at ely assimilated into
the Du tch population— Magubane 1979, p.

31; Katzen 1969, pp.

196-99) and by the limited immigration permitted by the V O C
during the period between 1700 and 1717
196-202; Fredrickson 1981, p.

66).

(Katzen 1969, pp.

Given the overall low

level of immigration— particularly after 1717— the major
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means of Dutch settler population growth was by natural
increase,

thus leaving the size of the group relatively

small.
In essence,

what ve are de scribing is a process in

which economic and social forces combined to create a new
eth-class.

The lack of immigration prevented South African

settler society from d eve loping the ethnic divers ity which
was so significant in the case of the United States.

More

over, the slow economic d evelopment of the Cape C olo ny
inhibited the evolution of a differentiated class structure.
Thus, the European settlers as a group had a structure
marked by both ethnic and class ho m o g e n e i t y — indeed "Boer"
is Dutch for "farmer";
name which described

thereby providing the group with a

it in terms of both e thnicity and class

(cf. Katzen 1969, p. 231).

In addition,

of interests vis-a-vis other eth-classes

a clear demarcation
(i.e., natives,

the

VOC) and subsequent conflict encouraged the formation of a
strong sense of group i d e n t i t y .xy
Prom the outset,

the Boer independent class found its

fortunes and interests both intertwined vi t h and in o pp osi 
tion to the colonial power
To the settlers,

(in the pre-1800 era, the VOC).

the profit-oriented economic policies of

the Company (e.g., monopolies,
contact vith the natives)

trade restrictions,

limits on

constituted an economic burden.

This conflict of interests, coupled vith the nature of the
social and physical environment, encouraged settler m i g r a 
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tion into the interior both to escape the control of the VOC
and to exploit new economic opport un iti es. 3-*

For

its part,

vhile the VOC initially sought to forestall settler contact
vith the natives,

it eventually "tolerated" expanded s e t t l e 

ment and limited its role to providing support

(e.g., arms)

for the settlers when conflicts vith the natives became
particularly intense

(Katzen 1969, p. 2 2 4 ).x*

perspective of the Company,

this represented a "trade-off"—

the increased cost of control
administrative costs) vs.

From the

(e.g., military intervention,

increased reliability of supply

from European farmers and herders

(Fredrickson 1981, pp.

BO

SS).30

Given the disinterest and institutional veakness of

the VOC

(e.g.,

its unwillingness to invest financial r e 

sources to extend its influence into the "unprofitable"
interior,

its inability to collect taxes and rents and to

enforce rules), the settlers or "t r e k b o e r s " essentially
existed beyond the control of the Company,

thus giving rise

to a Boer self-image as a free frontier society living on
open land

(de Kieviet 1957, pp. 10-15; Katzen 1969, p. 211).

At the same time, the economic interests of the Boer
independent class brought them Into sharp conflict vith the
native peoples.

In the "national" conflict between E u r o 

peans and Africans,
European antagonist,

the Boer independent class was the chief
for it was the settler desire for

expansion vhlch conflicted vith native land tenure.

This

vas a quintessential example of resource c o m p e t i t i o n , lnas-
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much as the basis of the settler herder eco nom y (a s u f f i 
cie ntl y large tract of land so as to s u p p o r t — despite

its

low carry ing c a p a c i t y — an e co nomically viable herd) v a s also
the economic base of native society.

Despite their r e l a 

tively small numbers,

the settlers vere able to v a n q u i s h

the natives by virtue

of their access to superior E u r o p e a n

mi li tar y technology.

Even in its early stages, this

in t e r 

group conflict c on tai ne d a class as veil as an ethnic or
national dimension,

for the basis of the economic veil

of the Boer independent class vas grounded

being

in the d i s p o s s e s 

sion of native land and the exploitation of native labor
(Magubane 1979, p. 10).

This intertvining of class a n d

ethnic interests vill remain a dominant theme in our

inter

pretation of South Af ric an history.
Another salient aspect of the settler
experience vas that

it undervent a process of ethnic c h a n q e -

-a transformation of
African).

independent class

identity from Dutch to Boer (White

To quote de Kieviet

(1957, p. 17):

In the long q uietude of the eighteenth century th e
Boer race vas formed.
In the vast, unmysterious,
t h i r s t y landscape of the interior lay the true
center of South African settlement.
When the
Trekboers enter ed it vith their flocks and tented
vagons, they left the current of Eu ro p e a n life a n d
lost the economic habits of the nations from v h i c h
t h e y had sprung.
What made this rapid transformation possible vas the social
and economic isolation of the trekboers.
nomadic lifestyle,

Scattered farms, a

economic self-sufficiency, and a la c k of

transportation netvork s all served to limit settler t i e s to
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Cape Tovn and European civilization

(Magubane 1979, p.

Fredrickson 1981, p . 34; de Kieviet 1957, pp.

11-15).

31;
More

over, the limited nature of immigration meant that the
settler population vas predominantly African-born and lacked
the dynamic element

introduced b y constant immigration.

The emergence of Boer society vas manifest in changes
in culture and language

(e.g., the evolution from Dutch to

t a a l . a local dialect vhich vas the forerunner of modern
Afrikaans).

Historically, the emerging Boer culture vas

c h a r a c t e r i z e d — often as a result of isolation— as c o n s e r v a 
tive, anti-intellectual,

highly religious

(the Dutch

Reformed Ch urch vas at the core of Boer culture), and
stamped vith the individualism of the frontier
1957, pp. 15-18; Katzen 1969, pp.

228-31).

(de K i e vi et

More ominous,

hovever, vas the fact that Boer society vas seemingly
grounded in tvo fundamental tenets

(vhich vere clearly

linked to economic interests)— the principle of unlimited
White access to land and the p r e s u m e d — thought to be d i 
v in ely sanctioned — right of settlers to deal as they
Pleased vith natives

(Katzen 1969,

ples vould provide the

p. 232).

These p r i n c i 

ideological basis for future

intergroup conflict betveen Europeans and Africans.
3.

Slav ery and group boundaries.

of intergroup relations

The other k ey aspect

in pre-1800 South Africa vas the

emergence of slavery and the importation of slaves from
East Africa and from Dutch holdings

in the East Indies.

From an economic standpoint, the establishment of slavery
vas a consequence of the need for c h e a p agricultural labor
juxtaposed wit h the s carcity of local supply.22
quently, slavery became widespread

C ons e

in the Cape settlement,

particularly after the V O C made a conscious d ec ision in 1717
to favor slavery over European immigration (Fredrickson
1981, pp.

66-67; de Kieviet 1957, p.

21).22

Cape slavery vas less salient in t ha t

Economically,

it vas n o t the c o r n e r 

stone of a single-crop cash export economy (as in the A m e r 
icas) and, consequently,
ruling class

not essential to the power of a

(Fredrickson 1981, pp.

89-92).

Instead,

although the VOC did utilize slave labor, the bulk of slaveholding occurred on a widespread basis, vith a ma jority of
settlers possessing slaves, yet most ovning a rel ati vel y
small number
69).22

(Katzen 1969,

p. 205; Fredrickson 1981, p.

What slavery did do, however,

tinued underdevelopment

was facilitate c o n 

(by inhibiting productivity and

market expa ns ion — much as

it did in the U.S. South) and

encourage territorial expansion

(by eliminating op po r t u n i 

ties for White labor, thus forcing the "excess population"
to migrate in search of farmland and,

hence,

contact vith Bantu-speaking native peoples),

to come into
both of vh i c h

vere k e y processes in the evolution of South Af ri can s o c ie ty
(de Kieviet 1957, p. 22).
sons,

For these,

if for no other r e a 

the institution of slavery in South A fri ca should be

viewed as historically important.

For purposes of this analysis,

South Afri ca n slavery

vas significant inasmuch as it established an institutional
and cultural basis for White d o m i n a t i o n .
spread extent of slaveholding,
relations

Given the wi d e 

slavery shaped production

in that the domination and exploitation of non-

White labor vas the ma in sta y of the economic well-being of
the majority of the Boer independent class

(unlike the U.S.

South where slaveholding vas prim ari ly concentrated within a
small elite class).
ests vere

Not surprisingly,

these economic

inter

ingrained in an ideological system vhich empha

sized the religious and racial differences between natives
and Europeans and the importance of "proper relations"
between masters and s e r v a n t s — thereby maintai ni ng White
dominance

(Macmillan 1963, p.

20).

Furthermore,

given the

economic h om og ene ity of the Boer settlers and the general
underdevelopment of the Cape Colony, the belief that manual
labor vas the province of non-Whites

(vhich created c a s t e 

like distinctions) vas the basis of the suprem acy of White
settlers over native labor
Fredrickson 1981, pp.

(de Kieviet 1957, pp.

92-92).

21-22;

This superimposition of

ethnicity and class provided an ongoing basis for the
supremacist ideologies vhich maintained the group position
of the Boer

independent class.

The other major Impact of Cape slave ry vas

its c o n t r i 

bution to the changing ethnic structure of the emerging
South Afri can society.

Although some slaves were captured
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during commando raids beyond the borders of European s e t t l e 
ment, most slaves were not indigenous to South Africa,
came instead from East Africa or Dutch holdings
(Katzen 1969, p. 204).

but

in Asia

The existence of widespread m i s c e 

genation among Dutch settlers,

imported slaves, and native

Khoikhoin and S an— a phenomenon whic h reflected, among other
factors,

the re la tively relaxed Dutch attitude

Indonesia) towards the mixing of groups,

(displayed in

the demographic

imbalance in the male-female ratio among Dutch settlers,
the status of Cape Town as a "rest station"

for passing

ships

p. 184; F r e d 

(H. Wilson 1969a, p. 66; Katzen 1969,

rickson 1981, pp.

and

94-135; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 17-19)--

produced a population of mixed ethnic background, which in
turn continued miscegenation with the d ifferent ethnic
g r o u ps .3 *

For South African society,

the ultimate outcome

of this process was the e thnic merger of slaves. Khoikhoin.
San, and mi xed -r ace persons into a new.
group.

"Coloured" ethnic

This process was seemingly facilitated by external

forces— the "deculturation" of slaves, Khoikhoin, and San
and their rapid acculturation into Dutch culture

(van den

Berghe 1965, p. 19), as well as White insistence

(despite

attempts to retain subgroup identity)

upon treating persons

of mixed anc estry as a homogeneous entity.

What emerged

from this process was a unique social e n t i t y — the "Coloured"
population;

however,

the small size of this group relative
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to the Europeans and Africans would relegate them to a
marginal role in South African history.
While the distinctions between Whites and natives,
persons and slaves,

free

were rela ti vel y clear, the social posi

tion of this mixed group was more ambiguous.

Initially,

intergroup boundaries were somewhat fluid, particularly in
light of the rapid a cculturation of Coloureds,

to the extent

that third and sometimes even second generation offspring of
mixed unions were generally able to "pass" into the Dutch
group

(van den Berghe 1965, p.

118).30

19; Fredrickson 1981,

p.

In this process, a k e y variable was often social

and economic p o s i t i o n — i.e., wealth facilitating absorption
into the Dutch g r o u p — reflecting the relationship between
ethnicity and class and the need of the European settler
community to expand its numbers.
however,

With the passage of time,

boundaries began to harden, due to greater economic

differentiation

(which encouraged those of putatively "pure"

European stock to use ethnic markers to enhance their
status--cf. Fredrickson 1981,

p. 122) and expanded conflict

with the Bantu-speaking population (which led to increased
prejudice against non-Whites).

Nevertheless,

throughout

South African history, the bounda ry between Whites and mixed
(Coloured) persons has continued to be ambiguous and based
on common knowledge as much as any other factor

(van den

Berghe 1965, p. 53; Fredrickson 1981, pp. 133-34).
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British Co lo nization and Territorial Expansion.

1800-1910

Ca pi tal ist Development and British Colonial Rule
At the begin nin g of the nineteenth century,

the Cape

Colony was little more than a Eur opean beachhead on the tip
of southern Africa.
of occupation,

Despite n e a r l y a century and one-half

the VOC had left "light footprints"

in that

the Cape exhibited a very low level of economic development,
a p a u c it y of political and cultural

institutions,

relatively small colonial population
30).*•

and a

(de Kleviet 1957,

p.

Indeed, with the exception of Cape Town and its

immediate environs,

the remainder of vhat would become South

Africa could be characterized as an "external area" beyond
the ec onomic and political sway of the European-based ca p i 
talist world economy.

Nevertheless,

the pre-1800 era left

an enduring legacy in the form of an ethnically diverse
society whose political econ omy was based upon domination
and exploitation of the non-White ma jor i t y by the White
settler minority.

Moreover, Cape s o c ie ty at the end of the

eighteenth century was marked by an increasing divergence of
Interests between the European settlers
dent class) and the colonial power

(the Boer

(the V O C ) . 37

indepen
These

dynamics constituted the foundation upon which South African
society would be built.
The period encompassing the nineteenth century and the
first decade of the twentieth cent ur y was a time of rapid
change for South Africa.

During this period, the forces of

global capitalist development facilitated the incorporation
of South Africa into the capitalist vorld economy as a p er i 
pheral area

(cf. Marti n 1987; Magubane 1979, p. 32).

elements of this process of incorporation were:

Key

(1) the

absorption of South Afric a into the British empire/sphere of
influence;

(2) settler/colonial territorial expansion and

the conquest and ab so rption into settler/colonial soci et y of
the Bantu-speaking native peoples; and

(3) the emergence of

mining and the ex pansion of capitalist production and market
relations.

From our perspective,

an inarguable

each of these events had

Impact upon the South African ethnic structure

and upon the subsequent course of intergroup relations.
this

initial discussion,

macro-level processes,

our purpose

In

is to examine these

with our ultimate objective being the

de velopment of an analytical context for the evolution of
intergroup relations.
1.

British c o l o n i z a t i o n .

One major transition o c c u r 

red at the beginning of the nineteenth century (1795-1806),
v hen the Dutch/VOC were supplanted by the British as the
E u ropean colonial pover

in South A f r i c a . 3*

On a global

scale, the acquisition of South Africa can be viewed in the
context of British consolidation of hegemonic core status
(replacing the Dutch) as the dominant political and economic
power within the capitalist wor ld -ec ono my (Wallerstein 1989,
p.

122).

For the e mer g i n g South African society,

transformation was to have two m a i n effects.

this

First,

it
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changed the political econ om y of the Cape Colony by substi
tuting British colonial p oli cy for that of the V O C and by
linking the fortunes of South Africa t o global Brit ish
political and economic interests

(South Africa vas, after,

all, but one "jewel" in the imperial crown).

Secondly,

it

added an ethnonational component to divergent cl a s s inter
ests within the European colonial community;

that

is, eco 

nomic and political conflicts were no longer b e t w e e n Dutch
settlers and the Dutch-based VOC, but
Boer

instead betwe en the

independent class and the British colonial ad m i n i s t r a 

tion .
The results wrought by the transfer of the Cape Colony
to British control were neither immediate nor dramatic;
however,

they d i d produce several tangible alterations in

the social fabric of South African society.

Perh ap s the

most significant of these changes was an upsurge

in economic

activity--the removal of VOC monopolies and the opening up
of trade, the introduction of Merino sheep and the develop
ment of a wool export economy, and the general expansion and
rationalization of market relations
de Kiewiet 1957,

pp.

(Houghton 1969,

30-31; Martin 1987, p. 860).

pp. 4-5;
Other

major effects of British rule included the establishment of
an expanded
structure;

(and indelibly British) social and political
the elimination of the slave trade

(1807) and of

slavery (1834/38); and a change in the ethnic structure of
the settler commu ni ty through the introduction of British
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immigrants
pp.

(cf. de K i e w iet 1957,

272-73; Thompson 1969a, pp.

pp.

30-31;

378-79).

Davenport 1969,

F or each of these

processes, however, the overall impact was somewhat muted.
The economy expanded,

y e t underdevelopment remained a s i g n i 

ficant feature of South African society.

Political and

administrative structures emerged,

but were slow to e xpand

into the hinterlands.

freed, yet non-White

labor experienced other

Slaves were

formB of coercion

enforcing labor "contracts").

(e.g., laws

And while Brit is h immigration

led to a div ersification of the e t h n i c structure,

it d i d not

occur in sufficient q ua ntity to overcome the numerical
su periority (within the European settler community)

of the

B o e r s .a#
2.

Settler e x p a n s i o n .

The s eco nd major development

du ri ng the nineteenth century vas t h e expansion of Europ ean
settlement, a process w h i c h — after decades of conflict-resulted in the subjugation of n a t i v e African peoples and
their eventual

incorporation into South A f r i can society as

the largest ethnic g r o u p . 30

Intergroup c ontact between

Europeans and Africans began on the Eastern Cape frontier
the eighteenth century,

In

where the expansion of Dutch s e t t l e 

ment vas checked for some seventy years by e nc ountering
substantial settlements of Xhosa

(Macmillan 1963, p. 40).

What followed were dec ade s of increased economic contact
and slow Europe an expansion along the eastern frontier,
process punctuated by mutual raids and outbreaks of open

a
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warfare

(H. Wilson 1969c, pp.

237-53).

This vas to be but

the first act in an unfolding drama.
A second front of European territorial expansion began
in 1830 with the movement of the Boer independent class
across the Orange River into the interior highlands.

This

m i g r a t i o n — often referred to as the "Great Trek"— was unique
in that it did not consist of individuals moving in search
of grazing land

(t r e k b o e r s ) but instead vas comprised of

loosely organized groups

(v o o r t r e k k e r s ) who consciously

sought to move beyond the borders of the Cape Colony
son 1969c, pp.

4 0 5 - 0 6 ) . The roots of the Great Trek are

c o m p l e x — demographic,
1987, p. 895).

(Thomp

economic,

From the outset,

and political

(cf. Marti n

European settler s o c i e t y

possessed a strong expansionary d y n am ic — extensive a g r i c u l 
ture

(and the impact of herding upon the fragile grasslands)

and population g r o w t h — a force which for a century an d a
half had induced trekboers to ignore the frontier in search
of better grazing areas.

Given the Xhosa "barrier" al ong

the eastern frontier, a barrier which vas also maintained by
British policy (e.g., the British foreign Office order to
the Cape Governor to restore African land seized after the
1835 w a r — de Kiewiet 1957, p. 51), and the rapid population
growth of the Cape C olony in the early nineteenth century,
the Great Trek can in some respects be viewed as a natural
outcome of bottled up expansionary pressures
1963, p. 199; Davenport 1969, p. 274).**

(cf. Macmi ll an

Moreover,

there

also existed s tr ong economic incentives for migration, as
the expansion of market relations and British attempts to
rationalize agricultural production drove up land prices and
encouraged Boers to move in search of cheap land
1957, p.

55; Martin 1987, p.

895) .

(de Kieviet

What set the voortrek-

kers apart from the t r e k b o e r s . for w h o m the above dynamics
also existed, vas the political and ideological— or, ve
might add, eth non at lon al — component of their migration;

that

is, Boer resentment of British rule, par ti cul ar ly the impo
sition of a new racial order

(e.g., the elimination of

slavery and increased legal rights for n a t i v e s — which also
threatened the material interests of independent farmers)
and the failure to maintain "proper relations" between
masters

(Europeans) and non-White servants

(Davenport 1969,

pp. 297-311; Macmi lla n 1963, pp. 7-20; Moodie 1975, p. 4).
Whatever its root causes,

the Great Trek had three

significant effects on the evol ut ion of South African
society:
society;

(1) the absorption of African peoples into settler
(2) the persistence of Boer

widening of British

identity; and

involvement in South Africa.

(3) the
First,

settler expansion brought the African peoples--first the
Ndebele

in the high veld and the Zulu in Natal,

then others

in the ensuing y e a r s — within the pale of European settle
ment, t hereby s e t ti ng in m o tio n a chain of events which
would result in Europeans a nd Africans being inextricably
bound together in a single s o c i e t y (cf. de Kieviet 1957, p.

56).

Secondly,

territorial expansion provided the Boers

vlth the opportunity to preserve their gro up identity.
de Kieviet

(1957, pp.

52-53)

observed,

As

the Great Trek came

to occupy a symbolically important role in Boer/Afrikaner
history,

vith the voortrekkers portrayed as heroic peoples

fleeing British colonial o p p r e ss io n.33
establishment of the Boer Republics

Zn addition,

the

(the South A f r i can

Republic and the Orange Free State) provided a p olitical and
territorial basis for group identity.
math of the Great Trek forced
sphere of influence

F i n a l l y , the after-

Great Britain to e x p a n d its

in South Africa.

While Britain vas

generally reluctant to extend colonial control unless
could realize clear economic or strategic benefits,
creased frontier unrest

it

in

(in part due to the di sr uption

caused b y Boer migration into Natal) and a perceived threat
to the security of the Cape C olo ny (a Boer outlet to the sea
could serve as a foothold for an un fr iendly pover)
British to annex Natal in 1843

moved the

(de Kieviet 1957, p.

6 2 ) . 34

Although Great Br ita in proceeded no further at this juncture
(indeed,

it recognized the aut onomy of the Boer Republics),

the imperial genie vas nevertheless out of the b o t t l e . 39
Continued unrest and var on the Cape frontiers led to the
annexation of British Kaffraria, Victoria East, and B a s u t o 
land— actions vhi ch vere but the first steps tovards
British imperial domination of all of South Africa.

By the 1860s South Africa had evolved as follows.

The

Cape Colony and Natal, while still underdeveloped, had under
British control steadily expanded both productive activities
and external economic ties

(Houghton 1969, pp.

1-6).

At

this stage, both could be viewed as peripheral areas of the
world economy

(Martin 1987, p.

860).

In contrast,

the

Orange Free State and the South African Republic vere weak,
frontier societies whose primarily subsistence economies
vere only minima ll y integrated

(via limited trade)

capitalist world-economy (Thompson 1969c, pp.
1987 pp.

860-61;

Houghton 1969, pp.

Africa in the 1860s contained

6-7).

into the

425-27; M ar ti n

Finally,

South

innumerable Afri can kingdoms

and chiefdoms ringing the borders of the Orange Free State,
Natal, and the South African Republic.
ties had felt

(in varying degrees) the impact of European

territorial expansion;
part,

Most of these s o c i e 

however, they remained,

for the m os t

on the fringes of or external to colonial society

(cf. A r r i g h i — 1979, pp. 161-62— on "nominal

incorporation";

i.e., external political domination and weak economic ties,
but no wholesale

Introduction of market relations or p r o l e 

tarianization of independent producers).

What none of these

actors knew, however, vas that South Africa stood upon the
threshold of an era of revolutionary social change.
3.

Mining and capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t .

The t ra n s f o r m a 

tion of the social and economic landscape of South Africa
began in 1867 wi t h the discovery of diamonds near K i m b e r l e y

in Griqualand
C o lo n y ) . 3"

(an area on the northern frontier of the Cape

By 1871, the K i m b e r l e y mines made South Africa

the largest d iamond producer

in the world; total exports for

1872 were valued at more than 1.6 million pounds
1984, p. 21; Houghton 1969, p. 11).

(Innes

Scarcely fifteen years

later, gold vas discovered on the Witvatersrand

(in the

South African Republic/Transvaal), g i vi ng birth to an indus
try whose value and significance would eclipse even that of
the diamond i n du str y.37

By 1898,

was the largest producer of gold

the South African Republic
in the world,

producing

27.55% of total global o u t p u t — a proportion vhich rose to
40% by 1913

(van Onselen 1979, p. 2 8 9 ).3 "

The emergence of

these two industries irrevocably altered the course of South
African capitalist development;

they provided the basis for

economic development and incorporation into the capitalist
world-economy (Martin 1987).

It is not an overstatement to

say that the emergence of mining, more than a n v other single
development,

transformed interaroup r e l a t i ons and shaped the

economic, social, and political nature of modern South
African s o c i e t y .3*
The impact of the mining revolution vas felt in all
sectors of South African s o c i e t y . " 0

Moreover,

the gradual industrial development of the core,

as opposed to
the pace of

growth vas ra p i d — as was the social di slocation vhich r e 
sulted from development.

The influx of core capital and

technology (facilitated by the colonial

link between South
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Africa and Great Britain) a n d the revenues generated from
mining fueled ra p i d economic g ro wth — the expansion of c o m 
merce

(vhich benefitted the ports of the Cape and Natal),

Infrastructural d evelopment

(the extension of roads and rail

links from the ports to the interior mining areas), and the
growth of a dom es tic market.

This in turn provided a basis

for secondary industry (e.g., coal, brickmaking,
and an expanded m ar ke t for agriculture,

explosives)

both of vhich fu r

ther contributed to economic exp ans i o n . * 3-

Another effect

of the mining e c o n o m y vas the creation of a basis for a
significant vage-labor workforce, a recasting of the class
structure vhich vas manifest

in both the immigration of

skilled mining labor and the proletarianization of indi
genous

(African a n d Boer)

labor.

Finally, South African

economic expansion initiated those p roc e s s e s — urbanization,
industrialization,

and the expanded role of the s t a t e — vhich

are the seemingly inevitable concomitants of capitalist
development.

Clearly,

South Africa vould never be the same.

The nature of this economic e x p a n s i o n — and of the
course of South Afric an capitalist d e v e l o pme nt — vas heavily
influenced by the specific conditions of capitalist a c c u m u 
lation in the m i n i n g industry.

The marketing of diamonds

(the quintessential luxury commodity)

necessitated the

forging of links between the South African mines,
market,
p. 22).

and core-based economic interests

(cf.

the world

Innes 19B4,

Even m o r e significant vas the nature of mining

itself:

South African diamonds are located in diamond-

iferous "pipes'* running d e e p into the earth, vh i c h meant
that once surface deposits had been exhausted,

continued

mining vould require modern te c h n o l o g y — and a massive
infusion of capital

(de Kieviet 1957,

pp. 92-93).

At the

same time, the scope of the diamond deposits vere suf fi 
ciently extensive so as to serve as a basis for ongoing
industry (rather than the brief "booms" vhich occurred in
the vestern United States).

Thus, v h l l e the South African

diamond industry vas initially marked b y small holdings
vorked by independent diggers,

the forces of centralization

resulted— after economic and political struggle

(e.g., the

"Black Flag R eb el lio n" )— in the di spossession of small
diggers and the consolidation of h oldings
in 1871 to 71 in 1881— Innes 1984, pp.

(e.g.,

29-31).

from 3588
This in turn

enabled the mineovners to ensure m a r k e t stability

(by li mit 

ing production) and to enhance pr ofitability (by increasing
their ability to control labor).

The ultimate denouement of

this process of centralization occurred

in the mid-1880s

vhen Cecil R h o d e s — vith the backing of core finance capital
in the form of the Rothschild group— bought out all
competitors and consolidated the d i a m o n d fields under the
aegis of De Beers Consolidated Mines
94-95;

Innes 1984, p. 36).

In short,

(de Kieviet 1957, pp.
in less than tvo

decades the South African diamond industr y evolved from
domination by independent small d iggers to control by
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monopoly capital
Furthermore,

intimately linked to core

interests.

South Afr ica n mo nopoly capital vas to become a

major force in other economic ac t i v i t i e s — agriculture,
secondary Industry,

and finance

(Innes 1984, pp.

41-42).*■

A similar process occurred within the gold industry,
accelerated by the capital and expertise accumulated in
diamond mining.

Indeed,

prior to the announcement of the

Witvatersrand gold fields,

leading South A frican capitalists

(e.g., Rhodes) actively bought up land in the area

(Innes

1984, p.

46).

Given the initial pa rticipation of mon op o l y

capital,

centralization of the gold industry proceeded at a

much faster pace and by the 1890s the industry vas dominated
by a few large groups

(de Kieviet 1957, p. 118;

p. 55; Ho ughton 1969, p.

13 ) . 49

Innes 1984,

As vas the case with d i a 

monds, the process of centralization vas facilitated by the
nature of South African gold m i n i n g — extensive veins of low
grade ore vhich ran dee p into the earth--vhich required
extensive capital
Moreover,

investment

(de Kieviet 1957, pp. 116-19).

the unique role of gold as a global medium of

exchange created an unlimited demand for gold, but at a
fixed price set by Great Britain.

This meant that the core

concern of the mining industry vas not overproduction and
market saturation,

but the need to control costs in order to

maintain profitability

(Innes 1984, pp.

48-49).

Given the

relatively invariant nature of capital expenditures,
control

cost

in the gold mi ning industry could best be obtained
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through rea dy access to cheap labor
116).44

(Magubane 1979,

pp.

115-

Thus, cheap labor served as the basis tor the e c o

nomic d evelopment of South Africa

(de Kiewiet 1957,

p. 96).

This vould have a significant effect upon the evolut io n of
the South African eth-class system.
Interoroup Relations and the Eth-Class Structure
Until the beginning of the twentieth century South
Africa vas not a u n i t ary society in that it contained
neither structured relations between groups nor a single
political s t r u c t u r e .

With respect to intergroup r e l a 

tions, we maintain that the k e y process

(and outcome) during

the period between 1800-1910 vas the m olding together of
diverse groups into a single soci et y (Union of South Africa)
with a unique eth-class structure.

At the same time, the

evolution of intergroup relations in South Africa vas shaped
by the changes wrought by the mining revolution and by the
incorporation of South Africa into the capitalist vorldeconomy as a peripheral society.
relations

In general,

intergroup

in South Africa during the nineteenth c e n t u r y vere

characterized by continual tripartite conflict between
Africans,

British,

and Boers.

For our purposes,

conflict— and its reso lut io n— is crucial,
the nature of the eth-class structure
African society.

this

for it determined

in the emerging South

Our discussion of intergroup relations

during this era will focus upon four significant d e v e l o p 
ments:

(1) the complete conquest of the African population
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and their absorption into European settler/colonial society;
(2) the extension of British coloni ali sm and subsequent
bitter co nflict with the Boer republics,

the resolution of

vhich established the political framework for modern South
African society;

(3) the processes of peasantization and

proletarianization;

and

(4) the transformation of the South

African eth-class structure.

In each case, ve will explore

the implications of developments for the evolution of ethnic
i d e n tit ies .
1-

Europeans vs. Africans:__ conflict and c o n q u e s t .

The hi st ory of nineteenth century South Africa is the h i s 
tory of struggle over

land — a "na t i o n a l ” conflict

(in the

context of a struggle between au to nomous peoples)

between

Europeans and A f r i c a n s .*m
this c on fli ct vas dramatic:

By any yardstick,

the outcome of

in 1800 European colonial rule

vas limited to Cape Town and the surrounding area;

by 1900

the entire area vhich constitutes modern South Africa had
been conquered and absorbed into a society vhich vas d o m i 
nated by Europeans.

From our perspective, European-Afrlean

conflict c a n be viewed as a case of resource competition
over land and cattle, a conflict grounded in co nfrontation
between two societies vith similar expa nsi ona ry d y n a m i c s —
population growth and extensive a g r i c u l t u r e . 47

This r e s u l 

ted in a cycle of conquest and disposs ess io n of Africans
from the best land, vhich increased the pressure on the
remaining land, vhich in turn led to further conflict

(raids
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and counter rai ds ).4 *

Despite fierce African resistance,

the technological superiority of European weaponry proved
decisive and the process of conquest and dispossession c on
tinued such that by the end of the century, European c o l o 
nial rule had been extended over all of South A f r i c a . 4*
One k e y outcome of the c onq ue st of African societies
vas that the African population vas not annihilated

(as vere

natives in ideal-typical settler societies such as the U.S.)
but instead vas absorbed into colonial socie ty (cf. de
Kieviet 1957,

p. 79).

As a result,

a central problem for

the European settlers became how, even given their t ech no 
logical superiority,

could they maintain control over a

s i gnificantly larger

indigenous p o p u l a t i o n . 80

In general,

European colonial policies involved measures for ensuring
both security and a s up ply of cheap labor,

such as r e s t r i c 

ting African settlement to allott ed "reserves", while at the
same time limiting the number of Africans permitted to live
as tenants on "European* land.*1
tions, and nominal chiefdoms,
vere allowed to persist;

Within the reserves,

loca

African political structures

however,

they vere ultimately s ub

ordinate to European authority (Thompson 1969a, p.

3 7 6 ) . 02

According to colonial lav, Africans vere viewed as encroachers or foreigners— the Cape C o l o n y Kaffir Employment Act
used the convenient oxymoron "native foreigner"

(Davenport

1969, p. 3 1 0 ) — who vere required to have a pass to be in a
White area

(de Kieviet 1957, p.

74; Thompson 1969c, p.

436).
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In reality,

these policies

(like their more recent "Bantus-

tan" successors) vere not workable
the economic realities

inasmuch as they ignored

(e.g., the colonial need for labor;

the fact that the land allotted

for reserves vas insuffi

cient to support the African population) vh ic h bound
Africans and Europeans together.

Consequently, many

Africans vere forced to live in violation of colonial lavs—
as tenants or squatters on "European" land.

On the other

hand, vhat these policies did do vas establish a framevork
for European domination of the African m a j o r i t y within the
confines of a single society.
In addition to military conquest, A f r ic an societies
vere transformed by economic and social forces stemming from
European domination

(Thompson 1969b, p. 251).

Initially,

when conquest entailed the e x t ens io n of the colonial fr o n 
tier and the expulsion of native

inhabitants,

it resulted

in little structural change in Afr ica n s o c i e t y (i.e.,

if

Europeans vere to leave, African society could continue
relatively unchanged— cf. Arrighi
increased contact and conquest,

1979, p. 166).

hovever,

fusion and expanded economic ties

With

came cultural d i f 

(e.g., trade,

employment),

both of vhich began to erode the economic and political base
of pre-colonial African society (Macmillan 1963, p.
Thompson 1969a, p. 3 3 5 ) . 03

In this context,

ix;

ve might assert

that the subjugation of the A f r i ca n peoples vas effected not
only by milita ry force, but also by missionaries who intro
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duced new values,

traders vho induced new wants,

who appropriated the best lands
Kieviet 1957, pp.

86-87).

Africans found themselves

(Thompson 1969b,

and farmers
p. 251; de

Dispossessed of the best land,
in an increasingly untenable

economic position with respect to traditional activities and
vere often reduced to serving Europeans as tenants or
laborers.

This process vas facilitated by nev colonial

lavs— e.g., hut taxes, clothing regulat io ns— vhich vere
designed to force Africans into the colonial e c o n o m y . 84

In

short, precapitalist African soc ie ty withered av a y and
African peoples vere absorbed

into colonial society.

The conflict between Europeans and Africans was also
waged on an ideological and cultural level.
possession,

Conquest, d i s 

and domination required rational iza ti on— the

debasement of subordinate peoples vhich vas endemic to
Western colonialism.

This vas manifest in racist ideologies

which cast Africans as barbarians or even as members of a
different s p e c i e s, thereby provid in g a moral basis for
d o m i n a t i o n .**

In the context of the transformation of

traditional A frican culture,

settler racism resulted in a

process of psychological colonization or "d e c u l t u r a t i o n "
(cf. Magubane 1979, p. 65); that is, the forced shedding of
traditional culture and adoption of an externally imposed
"colonial" culture.*"
turation

This

(usually partial)

involved some measure of a c c u l 
to European culture,

vhich in

creased both the exploitability of African labor and their
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acquiescence to colonial rule

(e.g., by socializing colo

nized peoples to accept European domination).

To the extent

that elements of traditional culture persisted,
adapted to this new framework.

t h e y vere

Prom an ethnic standpoint,

the outcome of this process vas to create a nev, subordinate
"African” ethnic i d e n t i t y , largely imposed by Europeans,
the context of E uropean-dominated colonial society. B'
r

in

Thus,

European domination shaped the formation of A f ri can ethnic
I d e n t i t i e s .am
2.

British v s. Boe rs:

The second major

imperialism and n a t i o n a l i s m .

intergroup conflict in nineteenth century

South Africa occurred within the European colonial commu
nity— between British imperialism and Boer settlers.
conflict,

This

vhich dominated the last two decades of the nine

teenth century, vas significant for tvo reasons.

First,

the intensity of this conflict kindled the flames of A fri
kaner nationalism,

a dynamic vhich vould become a driving

force in twentieth century South Africa.
resolution of this conflict

Secondly,

the

(given the European dominance of

South African society) d irectly shaped the political economy
of modern South Africa.

At the same time, however,

the

British-Boer conflict must be viewed as secondary to the
conflict between Europeans and Africans

(e.g.,

intra-Euro

pean conflict abated during periods of frontier unrest,
neither side vould arm Africans or e m p l o y them as soldiers
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against the other— F redrickson 1981, p.
p.

194; T hom p s o n 1969c,

250).
From our vantage point,

the British-Boer c on fli ct is

best understood as an eth-class conflict, albeit vi t h
national overtones.

In essence, this vas a conflict between

British imperial interests

(and their local representatives)

and the Boer independent c l a s s — the concerns of em pire and
core capital

(e.g., security, profitability,

colonial expenditures)
settlers

vs.

limitation of

the interests of the independent

(land, cheap native

labor,

conflict vith a cultural veneer.®*

low taxes)— an economic
This conflict was

grounded in a unique set of historical circumstances.

The

replacement of the VOC b y the British meant that Boer se t t 
lers vere ruled by a cul turally different colonial power,
the effects of vhich vere

felt as the British moved to

superimpose their language,
South African society.*0
British settlers
Boers)

institutions,

Furthermore,

and values on

British rule brought

(although never in the same numbers as the

into South African society, a g r o u p vhich vas not

only able to resist assimilation (by d int of the inst itu 
tionalization of their culture) but a l s o able to e m p l o y
core-based educational and occupational skills to a t t a i n a
superior economic position

(Davenport 1969, p. 2 7 9 ).*1

At

the same time, British settlers tended to side with the
British colonial government

(as its presence served as a

guarantor of their status),

often clam or ing for increased
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imperial involvement to protect their
1969b/ p. 251; 1969d/

interests

(Thompson

p. 318).

Prom the outset/ a key issue dividing the British and
the Boers vas treatment of the natives.
the conflict vas not ideological
bourgeois liberalism)

(e.g.,

but e c o n o m i c .

material interests of the Boer

the core of

settler racism vs.

On one hand, the

independent class vere

closely tied to direct exploitation
cion)

Again,

(e.g.,

slavery,

coer

of native labor on individual farms and to the el imi 

nation of the African m ilitary threat
their ability to appropriate land).

(thereby enhancing
As a consequence,

the

Boer republics employed more direct means of labor control
and instituted political structures vhich expressly excluded
non-Whites from citizenship
Thompson 1969c,

p. 436).

of British colonialism
direct,

(Fredrickson 1981, pp. 175-78;

On the other hand, the interests

(i.e.,

core capital)

required less

less c ostly means of c o n t r o l — the more generalized

exploitation obtainable through the labor market.

Thus,

slavery vas outlaved in the British colonies and natives
vere accorded de lure e q u a l i t y . * a

Our point here is not to

deny the existence of British humanism

(see M ac m i l l a n — 1963-

-on the role of John Philip and the London Missionary
Society in influencing British native policy),

but instead

to assert that such "liberalism” vas c l e a rly tied to e c o 
nomic interests

(e.g.,

labor supply, market expansion,

the costs of a d min ist ra tio n— cf. Magubane 1979, pp.

62-

and
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64).■■

divert the divergence of economic interests between

British an d Boers— settler expa ns ion ism and pett y bourgeois
farming vs. British exigencies of e m p i r e — native policy
served as an important political battleground.
Like m a n y other aspects of South African society,

the

British-Boer conflict vas transformed by the post-1867
mining revolution.

The d i sco ver y of diamonds and gold

heightened British interest

in the interior of South Africa

(vhich had previously been viewed as unprofitable),

exempli

fied by the British move in 1871 to annex the diamond fields
(Thompson 1969b, pp.
clear:

255-56).

Imperial goals vere seemingly

protect British strategic interests vhile maximizing

economic benefit and minimizing costs of control
1957, pp.

100-03).

Over the long range,

establishment of a self-sufficient,

(de Kieviet

this me a n t the

White settler dominated

society operating wi thin the British sphere of influence and
under the tutelage of British c apital— p res umably for the
benefit of British interests
Magubane 1979, pp.

48-52).

(cf. Thompson 1969d, p. 291;
What remained problematic,

however, vas the means by v h i c h this goal could be attained.
The Afrikaner republics vere unlikely to join volun ta ril y
into any union vith the British colonies

(particularly after

the ill-fated British annexation of the Transvaal
and subsequent relinquishment,

after embarrassing military

reverses at the hands of the Boers,
Colony was too weak

in 1877

in 1881), vhile the Cape

(and dr iven by its own interests) to
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serve as a proxy
1957,

pp.

(Thompson 1969d, pp.

291-92; de Kieviet

1 2 2 - 2 5 ) . Thus, Great Britain sought to attain

its goals via diplo mac y and pr es s u r e — the politics of
imperialism.
Occurring s imu ltaneously vith increased intergroup c o n 
flict vas the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism;

that is,

the assertion of a White South African identity linked to
the Boer experience, the Afrikaans
Calvinism,

language, conservative

and a claimed role as a "chosen people" vith a

divine covenant to rule South Africa
Fredrickson 1981,

pp. 193-94;

(Moodie 1975, pp.

Thompson 1969d, pp.

2-26;

301-02).

While a basis for Afrikaner group assertion had been p r o 
vided by prior events

(e.g.,

the Great Trek), a full-fledged

nationalism vas slov to coalesce before the 1870s due to the
isolation of Boer communities, divisions vithin Afrikanerdom
(e.g., cultural and linguistic differences betveen Boers in
the Cape Colony and the republics),
trek communities
96).**

(Thompson 1969d,

p.

and conflicts betveen
301; Giliomee 1979a, p.

What gave rise to Afrikaner nationalism in the late

nineteenth century vas c o n f l i c t ;
geois agricultural

interests

the defense of petty b o u r 

in the face of modernization,

(British) mo nopoly capitalism, and economic exploitation by
the British colonies

(de Kieviet 1957, pp. 67-68); the

defense of territory (i.e., the Boer Republics)

from the

mounting threat of British imperialism; and the defense of
identity in response to the influx of uitlanders

(non-
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Afrikaner Europeans attracted by the mines) and feared
assimilation into the British colonial community
Villiers 1969, pp.

(de

365-67; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 119-21;

Giliomee 1979a, pp. 99-103).

At the same time, Afrikaner

resistance vas limited by their economic and military
weakness vis-a-vis Great Britain, by the South A frican
Republic-Orange Free State division,
outlet to the sea.

and by the lack of an

Nevertheless, emboldened by revenues

from the gold Industry and the nationalist leadership of
Paul Kruger, the South African Republic
adopted policies designed to remove
sphere of influence.*17

increasingly

it from the British

While none of these measures vas

completely successful, the Afrikaners vere playing a
dangerous game by threatening the interests of both the
British empire and the m onopoly capital dominated gold
industry.■■
By the mid-1890s, the situation evolved into a series
of moves and countermoves,

Machiav ell ian maneuverings vhich

constitute a fascinating case study in imperial power poli
tics. ••

On a global

level,

the British-Boer conflict vas

played out against the larger backdrop of the Eu ropean race
for Africa--the competition for colonies as other core
powers

(e.g., Germany, France)

(cf. Stavrianos 1987,

challenged British hegemony

pp. 567-71; Magdoff 1978, pp.

54-62).

This effectively raised the stakes for Great Britain in the
interior of South A f r i c a — pa rt icularly after the German

annexation of South Wes t Africa

(Namibia)

in 1684— as it now

faced the possibility of the loss of the Boer republics and
adjoining areas to the

"empires'1 of other core powers

Kiewiet 1957, pp. 109-13).

As a result,

(de

Great Britain

rapidly escalated its involvement in southern Africa,
annexing Basutoland

(Lesotho),

Bechuanaland

of the r emaining A f r i c a n kingdoms

(Botswana),

most

(e.g., Zululand), a n d —

through Cecil Rhodes'

British South Africa Compa ny — much of

Rhodesia

Tensions were heightened by the

(Zimbabwe).

Jameson Ra i d of December 1895— a failed attempt by Rhodes
and the British For eig n Office to stage a rebellion in the
Transvaal which would serve as a pretext for military
intervention.
resolve,

as

This episode only strengthened Afrikaner

it united the Orange Free State and the South

African Republic in the face of British "treachery"

(de

Kiewiet 1957, p. 135).
In the aftermath of the Jameson Raid,

Great Britain

increased its pressure on the South African Republic,
ultimately triggering the outbreak of war

in October 1899.

Despite the overwhelming military s uperiority of Great
Britain,

the South Afric an War

Second War

(Boer War to the British;

of Freedom to the A f r i k a n e r s — Thompson 1969e,

p.

325) lasted for two and one-half y e a r s — a crushing rebuff to
British imperialism.70

Although the particulars of the war

are beyond the scope of this inquiry,

its co ncl us ion — the

Treaty of V e r e e nig in g— saw the complete defeat of the Afr i-
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kaners and the absorption of the So u t h African Republic and
the Orange F r e e State into the B r i t i s h empire.'73'
perspective,

From our

the South A f r i c a n War is best v i e v e d through

the prism of both class a n d ethnicity:

independent or p e t t y

bourgeois settlers vs. m o n o p o l y capital;
ism vs. the British e m p i r e . 173

Afrikaner n ational

Significantly,

t h i s dual

nature of the conflict w o u l d shape the peace w h i c h was to
follow.
While G r e a t Britain v o n the war,
involved the structuring of post-war
On the surface.
objective

the more crucial

issue

South A f r i c a n soc iety.

Great B r i ta in had seemin gl y ob tained its

(i.e., the political consolidation of the British

colonies and the Afrikaner republics);
policymakers quickly re ali ze d

however,

British

(given the m i n o r i t y status of

British settlers) that t h e y needed Afrikaner cooperation in
order to a chieve their goa l of settler
vein,

self-rule.

In this

both the peace t r e a t y and su bs equent B r i t i s h colonial

a d min istration were narked by a tone of reconciliation, a
reflection of the British

Interest in restoring unity w i t h i n

the European settler c o m m u n i t y (and creating a stable
climate for c o r e investment).73

Moreover, B r i t i s h policy

was shaped b y the as su mption that co ntinued m odernization
and British immigration w o u l d in time result in the disap
pearance of Afrikaner nationalism a n d their eve n t u a l a b s o r p 
tion into a British-dominated settler society (Thompson
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1969c, p. 330).

Time heals all wounds and erodes all

unwanted identities— or so the Bri ti sh thought.
Achieving the political unification of the European
settler community turned out to be a formidable task.
Conflict between the different colonies threatened to create
social and economic chaos
Kiewiet 1957, p p . 148-49).

instead of unity and stability (de
Afrikaner nationalism did not

fade away, but instead was strengthened by the memories of
the South African War
policy,

(e.g.. Kitchener's "scorched earth"

the death of an estimated 25,000 Afrikaners in

British concentration camps) and the emergence of new heroes
(Villiers 1969,

p. 369; cf. Mood ie — 1975, pp.

"sacred history" of Afrikanerdora) .'
7*

At the same time,

Britain no longer had the political will
support)

for continued

Consequently,

imperial

2 - 1 3 — on the

(or the domestic

involvement in South Africa.

the British quickly restored self-rule to the

colonies and consented in 1910 to the

independence of the

Union of South Africa as a member of the British Co mmon
wealth.
Historically,

the formation of the Union of South

Africa constituted a compromise between British capital and
Afrikaner se tt ler s— a resolution of an intra-White conflict
which served to benefit both sides.
having achieved

Great Brit ain came a w a y

its goals of settler self-rule,

political

unity, and stable conditions for capital accumulation, while
the Afrikaners gained political a uto n o m y and e t hn ic survival

(via the institutionalization of "Dutch" on an equal footing
with E n g l i s h ) .

Perhaps what is clearest about the resol u

tion of the British-Boer conflict and the creation of the
Union of South Africa is that the Africans were the losers.
Nov a conquered p e o p l e , the Africans had been bystanders
during both the war and the negotiations leading to u n i o n . 7 "
Great Britain,

despite

its professed concern for native

welfare, made no serious attempt to improve the status of
the Af ri c a n s . 7,7

Indeed, the Treaty of Vereeniging postponed

resolution of the issue of political rights of Africans
until after

independence,

thus ensuring White settler h e g e 

mon y within the new South African s oci ety .7 *

In essence,

the British sold out the African peoples in exchange for
White political unity and a stable climate for capitalist
accumulation

(much in the same manner that northern capital

in the United States had little interest after the Re con 
struction period in pressing for improved conditions for
Bl a c k s — cf. Fredrickson 1981, p. 197).
pp.

As Magubane

(1979,

52-53) has observed, Britain exchanged "the right to

rule for the right to make money."
the present,

From the standpoint of

it is no exaggeration to state that the "peace"

process created the context for South African intergroup
relations in the twentieth ce nt u r y . 7*
3.

Peasantization and proleta r i a n i z a t i o n .

Thus far,

we have discussed the military conquest and deculturation of
the African peoples;

that is, the destruction of traditional
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culture and the absorption of Africans Into European c ol o 
nial society.

Equally far-reaching in its effects,

was the economic incorporation of Africans
soc iet y and, by extension,
economy.

however,

into colonial

into the capitalist vorld-

As a result of this process, Africans became not

only a subordinate ethnic group in a White-dominated South
Africa, but also a lover class in a capitalist e c o n o m y . 00
Thus, any consideration of South African intergroup r e l a 
tions from this point onward is inextricably interwoven
with issues of class and ethnicity.

In this context,

we

must first consider the nature of the incorporation of
Africans into the colonial e c o n o m y — the specific processes
which shaped the eth-class structure of the new South
African society.
Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century,
traditional African relations of production were destroyed
by European conquest,

the dispossession of Africans from the

best land, a n d — once absorbed into colonial society— by the
effects of colonial domination
consumption).

(e.g., hut tax,

This became particularly evident with the

complete subjection of the African peoples
after 1870.01

induced

in the years

Incorporation into the colonial eco nom y

Involved two complex and interrelated processes:
zation and proletarianization.

peasanti-

Peasantization can be

described as the dissolution of kin-based subsistence
economies and the emergence of relations grounded in land

rights,

family labor, and a link

(via external domination)

to a broader market economy (cf. Saul 1979,
Freund 1988, pp.

64-65).•*

pp. 303-05;

In the South African case,

peasant production took such forms as tenant farming
(including "farming on the h a l f " — cf. F. Wilson 1969, p.
128), squatting

(under "semi-feudal" co n d i t i o n s — cf. de

Kiewiet 1957, p.
1969a,

84), and

p. 385).**

independent landholding

(Thompson

P r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n , perhaps the more

familiar term, will be used here to describe the alienation
of primary producers
tion")

from land

(Marx's

and their necessary entrance

wage labor

(cf. Arrighi 1979,

"primitive a c c u m u l a 

into the labor market as

p. 185).

In South Africa,

this meant both casual labor on White farms and, after 1870,
entrance

into the mining work force.

To assert that the processes of peasantization and
proletarianization are interwoven is to acknowledge that,
the South African case,
period

they both occurred during the same

(as opposed to Europe,

where proletarianization

involved a w ell-established p e a s a n t r y ) .
what transpired

In this context,

tional class.

one which involved

(depending upon time and place) of t r a d i 

tional subsistence farming,
labor.

In other words,

in South Africa during the late nineteenth

century was a sl o w and uneven process,
varying levels

in

peasant production,

and wage

the African p easantry is a t ransi

On the one hand,

they represented a dramatic

break from traditional soclety--"radicals"

in the process of
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social change

(M. Wilson 1969e, pp.

53-54).

hand, virtu all y as soon as it was created,

On the other
the African

peasantry came under siege from the forces of capitalist
development,

forces vhich transformed the most successful

peasants into capitalist farmers and the bulk of the
remainder
p.

into a proletarianized worki ng class

(Saul 1979,

305).
Given the peripheral status

ment)

of South Africa,

the transformation of the African

peasantry was a slow process.
(e.g., soil quality,
market.

(and ensuing u n d e r d e v e l o p 

Due to environmental

factors

lack of rainfall) and the absence of a

South Africa for most of the nineteenth century

experienced no "agricultural revolu ti on" — vhich elsewhere
had the effect of displacing peasants who could not compete
with capitalist agriculture

(cf. Wallerstein 1974, pp. 110-

20; M. Wilson 1969e, p. 69).■*

What ultimately did t r a n s 

form South African agriculture was the mining revolution,
vhich,

by expanding both the demand for agricultural p r o d u c 

tion and

(by encouraging infrastructural development)

the

ease of access to markets,

in turn greatly accelerated the

peasantization of Africans

(Southall,

Wilson 1969, p. 114).

In addition,

least over the short run,

1983, pp.

70-71;

P.

this "boom" had, at

the effect of retarding pr o l e 

tarianization by reducing incentives to leave the land
(Fredrickson 1981, p. 205).
status could,

Furthermore,

for the African peoples,

retaining peasant

be viewed as a form
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of resistance to modernization and E u r o p e a n domination--a
means of retaining at least some ties to traditional culture
(Znnes 1984, pp.

27-28).

At the same time, peasant production was bein g under
mined by both capitalist development a n d the colonial poli
tical economy.

The railways vhich exp anded the ma rket also

brought foreign

(e.g., American)

local goods

(F. Wilson 1969,

deterioration,

produce to compete with

p. 114).

Overcrowding,

and state policies vhich benefitted their

White competitors

(e.g., the

location of railroads)

increased pressures on A f r i c a n peasants
74-75; H. Wilson 1969e, pp.

61-64).••

pestilence comp let ed the pro ces s
126).

soil

What emerged

further

(Southall 1983, pp.
War, drought,

and

(cf. F. Wilson 1969, p.

in many cases was partial prol et ari ani 

zation linked to temporary migrant labor.
Africans with a foot In both worlds:

This left many

labor migration

increased deculturation and the influence of White-dominated
colonial culture;

rural subsistence farming preserved many

elements of traditional s o c i e t y . " 7
From the perspective of the colonial economy,
processes, while

the above

increasing the impoverishment of Africans,

moved too slowly to meet the
the mining ind u s t r y . ••

labor needs of agriculture and

The point is that African proletari

anization began in the late nineteenth century--and worked
itself out through much of t he twentieth."*

Consequently,

Europeans often resorted to the importation and coercion of

labor— indentured Indian labor on the sugar cane plantations
of Natal;

forced a pprenticeship of African children in the

Afrikaner republics;

labor agreements vit h Portuguese co l o 

nies; and imported Chinese miners after the South African
War

(cf. Freund 1988, p. 113;

Thompson 1969a,

pp.

387-90).

Magubane 1979, pp.
In addition,

77-78;

colonial policy

included the use of political and economic "levers" to
hasten the decline of traditional/peasant societies and to
accelerate the proletarianization of A fr icans.*0
example,

the Glen Grey Act

For

(put into place by Rhodes

in the

Transkei during the 1890s) established a system of indi
vidual

land tenure on small,

eco no mic all y untenable plots;

thereby effectively and d el iberately forcing Africans off
the land and into the labor market
Wilson 1969e,

p. 65; Southall

(Magubane 1979,

1983, p. 90) .*x

p. 78; M.

One outcome

of this con fl i c t — the struggle between Europeans and
Africans over the control of African labor pover--vas the
emergence of racially based ideologies asserting the right
of European settlers to have access to African l a b o r . * 2
Once again,

the nature of intergroup relations was shaped by

resource competition.
One key to understanding the nature of the South
African proletarianization process is an appreciation of the
role played by the mining industry, particularly gold.
Given that mining was the driving force behind South African
economic development,

it is not surprising that the process
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of proletarianization was st ron gl y conditioned b y the exi
gencies of mining.

This was p a r t i c u l a r l y true if we con

sider the r e lat io nsh ip between cheap labor and the
b i lit y of gold m i n i n g . * 3

profita

Not surprisingly, Afri ca n labor

constituted the core of the emerging South African wo r k 
force:

by 1912,

Mozambique,

325,000 African

Rhodesia,

t o t a l — were employed
1984, p. 51).

(including migran ts from

and Basutoland)
in mining

workers— 88% of the

(Houghton 1969, p.

19; Innes

Partially proletarlanized migrant laborers

(i.e., Africans) were particularly desirable from the
standpoint of

industry,

because their rural base me ant that

their wages could be below the cost of reproduction of their
labor power;

that is,

less tha n what was necessary to

provide for the families of these w o r k e r s . * 4
context,

In th i s

one early class struggle was between capital,

was dependent upon c h e a p African labor,

and African

which

labor,

w h i c h reacted to low wages by w ithholding their labor--as
long as peasa nt farming provided a viable alternative
Innes 1984,

pp. 58-59).

Thus,

(cf.

the partial p ro letarianiza

t i o n of the African workers constituted a contradiction of
late nineteenth c e n tu ry South African capitalism in that it
was both neces sa ry for profitability and at the s a m e time a
ca u s e of continual labor shortages.
mo nopoly capit al

As a consequence,

(in the form of the Chamber of M i n e s and

the Witwatersrand Native Labour Associ ati on — cf. Johnstone
1987, p. 16)

adopted a series of strategies (e.g.,

the
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compound system, pass lavs, contract labor lavs) to obtain a
sufficient s up pl y of cheap labor.

None of these measures

vas completely successful in the period prior to 1910

(due

to a lack of effective state support and the existence of
alternative means of subsistence

for African labor) and the

mining industry continued to be troubled by shortages of
cheap labor

(cf. Innes 1984, pp.

57-68).

Concurrent vith the above processes vas the emergence
of a White vorking class, a p h e n om en on — hitherto absent from
South African society (Fredrickson 1981, p.

205)— vhich

increased the co mplexity of the eth-class structure.

One

component of this process vas the proletarianization of the
predominantly Afrikaner

independent/petty bourgeois farmers,

vho fell vi c t i m to the same forces — population pressures,
capitalist agriculture, disease,

and va r — vhi ch vere d i s 

placing the African peasantry (de Kieviet 1957, p. 187; F.
Wilson,

1969,

p. 126).**

The pace of proletarianization

vas more rapid for Afrikaners than for Africans,

to the

extent that by 1911, sixty percent of the White population
of the Transvaal lived in urban are as
53) .

(Johnstone 1987,

In additio n to displaced settlers,

p.

the ranks of the

White vorking class vere svelled b y immigration, most
notably an influx of skilled En qlish-speakinq mining labor
from Great Britain and other British colonies.

This had the

effect of cre ating eth-class fractions vithin the White
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working class,

thereby providing a basis for the persistence

of Afrikaner ethnonatlonalism.
4.

Evolution of the eth-class s t r u c t u r e .

By the time

the Union of South Africa emerged as an independent nation
in 1910, the above pr oc es se s— conquest,
tion,

the mining r e v o l u 

peasantization and proletarianization, and the re s o l u 

tion of the British-Boer conflict-~had combined to create an
entirely new eth-class structure.
imperial wars:

There were no frontier or

those Issues had been settled.

South Africa

had embarked upon a new stage of capitalist development,

one

in which intergroup conflict would be Played out against a
backdrop of mo de rni za tio n (i.e.. urbanization,

proletariani

zation) and within the c o nfines of a single society.

Like

wise, the class system was no longer comprised of African
pa sto ra li st s, Afrikaner settlers,
tionaries,

and British colonial

func

but instead exhibited an ethnically segmented

and increasingly differentiated character.

Briefly,

the top

of the eth-class structure was occupied by British and
Afrikaners,

both of w h o m had their own internal class

"pyramids"— the British providing the preponderance of
capitalists and administrators,

while the Afrikaners were

predominantly petty bourgeois farmers and newly established
laborers.

In an intermediate and much lower position were

the Cape Coloureds and Indians in Natal, both of whom played
an increasingly marginal role due to their small numbers.
Finally,

at the bottom of the eth-class structure was the
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A f ri ca n majority,

now £ully incorporated into settler

so c i e t y as peasant farmers or as fully or partia lly
proletarianized

labor.

A key d y na mi c in cr eating this system was the d i f f e r e n 
tial proletarianization o f Africans and Europeans; that is,
their disparate

incorporation into the South A fr ic an

economy. At this point in time, the bulk of the African
population rem ained at best partially proletarianized
peasants, while Whites tended towards total p r o le ta ri a ni za 
tion and complete alienation from the land.

In addition to

this different general position in the class structure,
Europeans and Africans were

further dif fe rentiated occupa

t i on al ly in that the former were predominantly skilled or
semi-skilled labor while the latter were limited to
unskilled positions.

These different structural positions

gave rise to different material interests, which would then
be articulated

in ethnic/racial terms.

The focus of intergroup competition was no longer land
and cattle, but

labor market

issues.

An overriding fear for

the White working class was that th ey would be displaced by
Africans, whose

"partial proletarian" status and

lower

levels of consumption enabled them to work for lower wages.
This reflects what Johnstone
the

"structural

hand,

insecurity"

(1987, pp.

57-58)

of White workers.

has termed
On the one

their com plete proletarianization left t h e m completely

depend ent upon wage labor as a means of s ur v i v a l .

On the

other hand, t h e y knev all too well th a t the interests of
capital would be advanced by increasing the exp loitation of
cheap African labor in the place of more highly paid White
labor

(particularly in the context of gold mining and the

need to limit production costs).
(1981, p. 211)

observes,

Moreover, as F re dr ic kso n

Afrikaners were experlentially no

more suited to industrial work than ve r e Africans.
consequence,

As a

their interests would be served by erecting

barriers to reduce labor market competition.

What was

crystallizing was a new tripartite eth-class con f li ct
between White capital, a White vorking class

(vhich also

contained a British-Afrikaner division), and pa rt i al ly
proletarianized African labor.

This conflict wou ld dominate

twentieth c en tur y South African society.

Union.

Economic Development* and E t h- c l a s s Struggle:

1910-48

Capitalist Development a nd Economic Growth
As

it emerged from British colonization,

So ut h Africa

in 1910 had seen a century of dr amatic social change.

The

nineteenth c en tu ry had witnessed the expansion of European
settlement and the conquest and transformation of African
societies.

It had also contained the mining revolution

vhich had altered the pace and direc tio n of eco nomic
development and facilitated the incorporation of South
Africa

into the capitalist v o r l d - e c o n o m y .

In its turn, the

first decade of the twentieth century had brought the South
A f ri ca n War and the resolution of the British-Boer conflict
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In the form of the Union of South Africa,

thus binding all

South Africans together in a single political and economic
system.

Nevertheless,

South Africa in 1910 vas not a nation

but a state, as it remained divided al o n g lines of race and
ethnicity and shoved little sign of developing a "South
African" national

identity.

For our purposes, the k e y development of the

first half

of the tventieth century vas the continued economic trans
formation of South African society.
Africa

On one hand,

South

in 1910 vas an underdeveloped peripheral society,

vith a modern,

foreign-dominated mining sector counterpoised

against an inefficient farming economy
by coerced labor and mining revenues)
peasant sector.

a nd a backvards native

On the other hand, the seeds of economic

development had been planted.
ization,

(vhich vas subsidized

proletarianization,

The processes of industrial
and urbanization v h i c h had

taken root in the late nineteenth c en tu ry operated more
intensively in the decades after union.

Indeed, during the

period under consideration these dynamics functioned to such
an extent that b y the middle of the tventieth c en t u r y South
Africa possessed a relatively diversified industrial economy
and stood poised to move into the semiperiphery of the
vorld-economy.
What contributed to these changes vere tvo k e y factors.
F i r s t , the mining sector serve d as an "engine" of d ev elo p
ment.

The consistency of the mineral resources of South
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Africa

(i.e., the consistent quality of the ore— as opposed

to surface deposits vhich in other m i l i e u s resulted in
cycles of boom and bust) provided a s t e a d y source

of

national income— made possible, of c o u r s e , bv the

super-

exploitation of chea p African labor.**

This increased

national wealth facilitated economic development
vari et y of ways:

it stimulated consumption, t h er e by

expanding markets for other sectors;
{i.e., mining profits) vhich could be
production of manufactured goods
and it provided,

in a

it created capital
invested in expanding

(Innes 1984, pp.

119-20);

through dispropo rt ion ate taxes a n d tariffs,

state revenues vh ic h vere used for infrastructural and
industrial development

(de Kiewiet 1957,

p. 16 2 ). * T

In

short, the economic development of S o u t h Africa v a s rooted
in geological happenstance and made possible by a political
economy vhich enabled settler society t o maximize the
exploitation of these fortunate circumstances.
In addition to mining-led economic grovth,

th e second

key factor in the transformation of S o u t h Africa va s the
restructuring of the vorld-economy v h i c h occurred during
this period.

The First World War accelerated the decline of

British core heg e mo ny and ushered in a n era of heightened
core conflict in concert wit h the contraction of th e vorldeconomy.

As an independent,

albeit peripheral,

removed from the economic mainstream,

socie ty ve il

South Africa vas veil-

positioned to benef it from the maneuvering room created by

the demise of the Pax Britannica and took advantage of this
space to increase its resistance to core domination
1986, pp. 108-09).

World War I and the attendant disruption

of commerce forced South Africa to substitute
for core imports.

Following the war,

local products

labor unrest reduced

the competitive advantage of core manufactures
African market,

(Martin

while a general global

in the South

increase in p ro te c

tionism (a reflection of the decli nin g British ability to
maintain free trade) enabled South Africa to institute
protective tariffs
ture) without
intervention

(to shelter local

industry and a g ri cu l

incurring retaliation or provoking British
(Innes 1984,

p. 120; Houghton 1969,

de Kiewiet 1957, p. 2 6 1 ) . Finally,

pp. 28-30;

the period up to and

including World War II s a w increased foreign investment by
core-based multinational corporations

(a precursor to the

wholesale global expansion of m o no po ly capital which
occurred in the post-1945 era), a process vhich included an
upsurge in foreign Investment in South African industrial
production
Thus,

(Magubane 1979,

p. 203;

Innes 1984,

p. 131).**

South A fr ica n economic expansion occurred at a p r o p i 

tious moment wi t h respect to processes of the capitalist
world-system.
At the same time, the expansion of the South African
econo my vas not a smooth process.

The period between 1919

and 1932 contained considerable ec onomic stagnation,

a

reflection of a general decline in world commodity prices

relative to manufactures vhich resulted in declining terms
of trade
1969,

(and higher prices)

p. 22).

for South Africa

(Houghton

Given the poor qu al it y of South African gold-

bearing ore and the narrow profit margins of the mining
industry, rising costs triggered a "profitability crisis"
the years after World War

in

I, esp ecially when Great Britain

lowered the wo r l d gold price by rem oving the price p re mi um
(Johnstone 1987,
1984,

pp. 93-104; Houghton 1969, p.

pp. 7 5 - 8 2 ) . xo°

26; Innes

Indeed, on mo re than one occasion,

South Africa vas seemingly faced wit h the end of gold-based
prosperity (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 172).

These economic p r o b 

lems vere exacerbated by the decline of agriculture, as the
Depression combined with problems stemming from inefficient
production, ecological limitations,

and capitalist d e v e l o p 

ment to create widespread dislocation of farmers
Wilson 1969, pp.

(cf. F.

1 3 1 - 3 6 ) . These economic reversals we r e

an integral component of the context for intergroup in te r
action during the 1920s and 1930s.
What completed the economic transformation of South
Africa was a ri se

in gold prices triggered by the worldwide

cu rrency devaluations of the 1930s
Kiewiet 1957,

pp.

174-76;

(Houghton 1969, p. 32; de

Innes 1984,

pp. 129-30).

This

in

turn ushered in a new era of mining-led economic e x p an si on —
a long wave of prosperity in a world racked b y Depression.
By this juncture, a sufficient industrial and infrastruc
tural base had been established so as to provide the c o n d i 
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tions

for "take-off"— to borrow Rostov's

in industrial development.

(I960,

p. 7) te r m—

This expansion occurred with

such rapidity that by the 1940s,

industry surpassed mining

in its proportional contribution to the South African Gross
Domestic Product

(Innes 1984,

p. 167).

Given the further

impetus for economic development provided by World War II,
the South African economy of the late 1940s exhibited a
well-developed

industrial base, a condition vhich bore scant

resemblance to its position at the beginning of the century.
In sum, d uri ng the years between 1910 and 1948 South
Afric an society vas transformed from an underdeveloped
colony/peripheral area to an industrialized semiperipheral
state.

Prom our perspective,

this period constitutes a key

era in the development of South African intergroup re la 
ti o n s — a time of transition between the colonial and modern
eras.

The changing nature of the forces of production

altered the dimensions of the "arena"
relations occurred;

that is,

from the "n a t io na l" conflicts

in vhich intergroup

intergroup relations evolved
(between separate peoples)

of

the colonial era to ethnic conflicts between groups bound
into a common e c on omy and polity.

Moreover,

this process

vas shaped by the specific forms of South African capitalist
development

(e.g., the mining-based economy) and by the eth-

class structure vhich emerged from the colonial era.
task

Our

in the remainder of this section is to explore the

cha nging nature of intergroup relations during this era,
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with particular attention devoted to struggles between ethclasses and their impact upon group

identities.

Eth-Class Struggles and Group I de n t i t i e s .
From the standpoint of intergroup relations, the period
from 1910 to 1948 covered the transition from the colonial
social structure to the system of apartheid characteristic
of modern South Africa.

On the one hand,

the struggles of

the early twentieth century were shaped by the eth-class
structure vhich emerged from the colonial era and by racial
ideologies and cultural practices which evolved from p r e 
vious eth-class struggles

(e.g.,

the use of notions of

racial superiority to legitimate the dispossession and
domination of Africans).
shaped by the material

Thus,

intergroup relations were

interests of various eth-classes and

by socio-cultural understandings stemming from earlier
con flicts.102

On the other hand,

the eth-class struggles of

early twentieth century South Africa took place in an inter
group arena defined by the processes of South African c a p i 
talist development, whic h in the period between 1910 and
1948 were the mining-led economic transformation and the
emergence of a substantial

industrial sector,

vere punctuated by periodic crises
ture.

In addition,

both of which

in mining and agri cul 

South African society experienced a

continuation and intensification of the process of pr ole ta r
ianization vhich had begun in the nineteenth century, as
economic changes uprooted small farmers and peasants and
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forced increasing numbers of both Africans a n d Afrikaners
into the vo r k i n g class.

This ch an gin g economic context

altered the material interests of the various eth-classes,
who in turn responded b y changing
group identities

(i.e.,

cultural understandings

intergroup relations and

altering past social structures and
in an attem pt to pursue strategic

interests in a new set of circumstances.
Having outlined the setting for

intergroup interaction,

we will now examine the specific nature of eth-class
struggles d u r i n g the pe riod between 1910 and

1948.

discussion wi l l be ce ntered on the

issues:

following

Our
(1)

the initial eth-class struggles after the formation of the
Union of South Africa;

(2) the eth-class alliance between

the White vo r k i n g class and the Afrikaner petty-bourgeoisie
and the subsequent expanded use of the state as a vehicle
for advancing group interests;

(3)

the rise

in Afrikaner

nationalism as a result of eth-class struggles;

(4) the

upsurge in A fr ic a n nationalism spawned by their subordinate
status in the South A f r i c a n eth-class structure; and
"crisis,f of the 1940s.

(5) the

Throughout our analysis, we will

place particular emphasis upon the

implications of these

developments

for the ev olution of group identities.

1.

19 1 0 - 1 9 2 4 .

E a r l y struggles:

The South Afric an

eth-class structure at th e time of Union contained four
major eth-class groupings:

a la rg ely agrarian Afrikaner

petit bourgeoisie; a British-dominated, mining-based c a p i 

talist class;

a White w or k in g class;

tarianized Afri can vork ing class.103

and a partially proleEach of these eth-

class groupings had c l e a r l y defined material
however/ there vas no one hegemonic class.

interests;
Indeed,

the

rough "balance" existing among the White eth-classes,

as

well as the perceived co m m o n interest in maintaining d o m i 
nance over

Africans, wo u l d be important factors in shaping

group strategies.

Given this state

of affairs,

our in t e r 

pretation of ear ly twentieth centu ry South African int er
group relations will emphasize the role of strategic s t r u g 
gles and alliances between these eth-classes
course,

in the context of

ment) .

As we will seek t o demonstrate,

(set, of

South A fr ic a n capitalist d e v e l o p 
it vas this process

of pursuing gr o u p interests which led to the shaping a nd r e 
shaping of the

South A fr ic an eth-class structure.

One issue vhich remained to be determined

in the years

following union vas the matter of wh o would wield power
this new Mstate-nation"--to use Rejai and Enloe's
term.

South Africa was not a n a t i o n — few,

in

(1969)

if any, of its

inhabitants vi ewed themselves as "South A f r i c a n " — but rather
a conglomerate
Afrikaner,

of sharply defined eth-classes grounded

British, and African ethnicity.

Indeed,

in

the

relationship between the British a n d the Afrikaner petit
bourgeoisie co ul d best be characterized as one of " an ta g
onistic cooperation"

(Simons and Simons 1969,

only clear outcome at the

p. 108).

The

time of Un io n was that Africans
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would be excluded from the political arena,

that South

Africa would continue to be controlled by European settler
eth-classes.
Given the numerical domination of Afrikaners within the
settler community,

the agreement of Union ensured a s i g n i f i 

cant role in South African politics for the Afrikaner petit
b o u r g e o i s i e .3-°*

As an eth-class,

the Afrikaner petit b o u r 

geoisie had evolved from the Boer

independent class which

had conquered much of South Africa;

however,

it vas now

increasingly internally differentiated as a result of c a p i 
talist development and the mining revolution
1979, p. 121;

Thompson 1969e,

p. 339).

Thus,

(Magubane
the ranks of

the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie ranged from a landed upper
class to independent farmers

(many of whom would be prole-

tarianized in the coming decades).

This in turn produced

divisions within the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie with regard
to relations with the British capitalist class, where the
largest landowners
tied to mining)

(and the Transvaal

interests most closely

favored accommodation with Great Britain and

mining capital, while smaller agricultural
hard-line Afrikaner nationalists
domination

interests and

feared continued British

(de V i l l i e r s ‘1969, p. 368; Buravoy 1974, p.

539).

Indeed, this strategic division--accommodation vs. re s i s 
ta n c e — would shape Afrikaner

(and South African)

throughout the early twentieth century.
lines drawn,

politics

With these battle

the first South African governments vere
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dominated b y the accommodationist Botha-Smuts faction, a
group committed to alliance with Great Britain and mining
capital

(Davies 1973,

p.

43; Thompson 1969e, p.

341).109

A major early instance of eth-class struggle and al l i
ance involved the effort by mining capital and the Afrikaner
petit bourgeoisie to secure a supply of cheap,
ploited African labor.1 0 *

super ex 

This vas essential to the

material interests of both eth-classes:

the nature of gold

mining (unlimited demand at a fixed price,

cost constraints,

and low grade ore) meant that industry profitability was
based on the exploitation of African labor; while the
"backwards"

(i.e.,

inefficient,

labor intensive)

South African agriculture created a similar

status of

link between

cheap labor and the well-being of the agricultural petit
bourgeoisie.

The guest for cheap African labor in the early

twentieth c en tu ry can be viewed as two problems:

(1) the

ability to insure that a sufficient number of Africans
needed to work

(i.e., were forced to enter the workforce in

order to survive); and

(2) the abil ity to control the

African workforce in order to maintain their status as
superexploited labor.

Paced with this situation,

mining

capital and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie joined forces
and used the power of the state to establish what Magubane
(1979, p. 71) has termed the "migrant labour system"--a
series of measures designed to insure a steady flow of cheap
African labor.
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The cornerstone of this effort was the Natives Land Act
of 1913, a piece of legislation vhich vas originally p r o 
posed by the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and subsequently
supported by mining capital

(Southall 1983, p. 24).107

the purposes of this analysis,
tained two key elements
Kiewiet 1957,

pp.

For

the Natives Land Act c o n 

(cf. F. Wilson 1969,

205-06; Magubane 1979,

pp. 127-31; de

p. 81).

First,

it

delineated as "African land" approxi ma tel y 7.3% of the total
territory of South Africa
serves"),

(mostly the existing "native r e 

while holding out the promise of an additional

5.7% to be released at a later d a t e . xo*

Africans were only

permitted to purchase land within these areas, while Whites
vere proscribed from buying land within these areas.
Secondly,

the act outlawed "farming on the half" and other

sharecropping or tenancy arrangements vhich enabled Africans
to pursue peasant farming on White-owned land, permitting
Africans to reside on White-owned land only as wage laborers
de Kiewiet 1957, p.

205; F. Wi ls on 1969,

pp.

127-29).xa»

The effects of the Natives Land Act vere stark and
immediate, dislocating thousands of Africans who were either
forced to return to the alrea dy overcrowded Native Reserves
or to migrate to urban areas

in search of employment

and Simons 1969, p. 132; F. W ils on 1969,
societal level, this

pp. 129-30).

(Simons
On a

increased the proletarianization of

Africans by restricting land occupancy and peasant a gr ic ul 
ture^— acja3^20matfLliL-asy£iitz_£££££nt_£lJtl]£_J2i2fiiilatLfiiL_aL£

South Africa vas now legally restricted to roughly seven
percent of the l a n d .

The Natives Land Act served the class

interests of both mining capital and the Afrikaner petit
bourgeoisie by increasing the numbers of Africans who were
forced to seek wage employment in the settler econ omy
(Southall 1983/ p.

24).

In addition,

the Act further bene-

fitted the agricultural petit bourgeoisie by precluding any
serious competition from African peasant
1969, pp.

127-31; Fredrickson 1981, p.

farming

244).

(F. Wilson

Thus,

while

many of its supporters couched their arguments in the
rhetoric of segregation

(separate development) and even

protection of African land tenancy (cf. de Kieviet 1957, p.
205; F. Wilson 1969,

pp. 131-32), the ultimate purposes of

the Natives Land Act were not ideological but material:

the

provision of a steady supply of cheap African l a b o r . 110
In essence,

the effect of the Natives Land Act was to

codify and intensify the reserve-based migrant labor system
which had begun to emerge at the end of the nineteenth
centur y— an attempt to eliminate the then existing co ntra
dictions
economy.

(i.e.,

labor shortages)

of the South African

There were specific advantages for capital

in the

migrant labor system in that it maintained the partially
proletarianized status of African labor

(i.e., wage labor

retaining an agricultural toehold in the reserve economy),
which in turn enabled wages to remain below subsistence
level.111

At the same time,

successful maintenance of this
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system required that m in in g capital and the agricultural
petit bourgeoisie perform a "balancing act" with respect to
the peasant e co nom y of the reserves.

On the one hand,

if

the agricultural economy of the reserves was to prosper,
then there would be a shortfall

in the number of Africans

forced to enter the wage-labor workforce.
hand,

On the other

if reserve agriculture were to become too weak,

then

the African w or kin g class would become fullv proletarianized, which in turn would

increase both its wage require

ments and its re volutionary potential
38;

Southall 1983, p. 2 6 ) . ia-a

(Wolpe 1972, pp.

437-

This balancing act was s u f f i 

c i en tl y successful so as to enable the reserve-based migrant
labor system to serve as the foundation of the South African
e c on om y throughout the first part of the twentieth century.
In addition to insuring an adequate su pp ly of cheap
Afric an labor,

a second exigency for capital was to exert

effective control over labor; that
conditions of superexploitation.

is, to mai nta in the
This was accomplished both

through the use of state power and through the practices of
the mining companies.

Shortly after the formation of the

Union of South Africa,

existing labor control

(e.g., Masters & Servants

legislation

laws, w h i c h made br each of a work

contract a criminal offense; pass laws, which required
Africans to obtai n an official pass

in order to seek or

change employment) was consolidated and extended to mining
by the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911

(Johnstone 1987,

pp.

35-37; Southall 1983,

pp. 2 4- 25) .111

E qu all y important,

the government acted to administer existing labor control
laws more effectively (Innes 1984, p.

64).

This legislation

was supplemented by a range of practices of the mining
industry:

monopsonistic recruiting via the Native R e c r u i t 

ing corporation;

the maintenance of prison-like compounds

for mine laborers;
wages— e.g., wage

and a series of methods for minimizing
fixation,

the loafer ticket system
Southall 1983, pp.
legislation and

the m i ni mu m average system,

(Johnstone

78-80).

1987, pp.

and

34-45;

Considered in t o t o . state

industry practices constituted a rat i on al 

ized and institutionalized means of exploiting African
labor,

for the benefit of both mining capital and

mining led growth)

(via

capitalist interests in general.

Indeed,

given the economic centrality of m i n i n g and the dependence
of mining profitability upon cheap labor,

it is no ov er 

statement to say that the exploitation of African labor was
the basis of settler prosperity.
A second ma j or area of eth--class struggle was the
conflict between mining capital and the White working class,
a conflict which encompassed two areas:
al"

(1) the "tradition

(i.e., structurally inherent in capitalism)

over wages, benefits, and working conditions;
conflict over the role of African l a b o r .X3-*
peripheral status,

struggle

and

(2) the

Despite its

South Africa by the end of the nineteenth

century had begun to experience increased conflict between
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labor and capital, a phenomenon attributable to the nature
of mining

(i.e.,

its domination by monopoly capital) and to

the influx of skilled British

(core) mining laborers who

brought wit h them a strong union tradition.

Indeed,

the

first mi ni ng union was established in 1892, and by the end
of the first decade of the twentieth century.

South Africa

has an increasingly militant labor movement, a labor-based
political party, and even an active socialist movement
(Simons and Simons 1969).

In 1913, three years after the

formation of the Union of South Africa,

the mining industry

was racked by major strikes which were settled only with
direct government intervention
Simons and Simons 1969, pp.

(de Kiewiet 1957,

156-58).

pp.

167-68;

At the same time, the

White working class was itself an amalgamation of two ethclass fractions:

skilled labor, which was comprised largely

of British immigrants, and unskilled labor, which

increas

ingly consisted of proletarianized Afrikaner bvwoners .1X9
This division at times constituted a major obstacle to
working class solidarity; however,

it was of considerably

lesser significance than the schism between White and
African labor.
The "traditional" conflict between capital and the
White working class was complicated by the existence of a
third party,

superexploited African labor, and the fact that

the interests of capital
mines) were

(and the profitability of the gold

linked to maximizing the use of superexploited
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African labor.

In d ire ct opposition to these interests vere

those of the White vorking class,
monopoly over skilled

which had used its initial

labor to secure high relative wages

(averaging three to ten times that of Africans), and which
feared replacement by cheaper Afri can labor
1957,

pp.

210-13; Johnstone 1987,

consequence,

(de Kiewiet

pp. 71-72).ia-«

As a

the White vorking class pushed for adoption of

"colour bar" legislation which prohibited the employment of
non-Whites

in particular occupations

engineers,

engine drivers, e t c . ) where they would be in

competition with W h i t e s . 117
legislation had emerged

(e.g.,

blasters,

While the first colour bar

in the late nineteenth cen tu ry (a

colour bar had first been instituted in the Transvaal
1893 and was reinstated by the Briti sh in 1906),
Mines and Works Act of 1911

"White labour policy")

dominated state
Simons 1969,
material

(Johnstone 1987,

pp. 78-91;

it was the

(and attendant regulations)

which extended and consolidated the colour bar
red to as the

in

pp.

de Kiewiet

(also re f er 

in the new settler66-70;

Simons and

1957, p. 166).

Thus,

the

interests of the White vorking class vere grounded

in both the low wages of Africans
"afford" expensive White labor)

(which enabled capital to

and the ability of the White

vorking class to exclude cheap A fr ica n labor from competing
for the same jobs.
How can we explain the colour bar with respect to ethclass interests?

From the perspective of the White vorking
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class, colour bar legislation,

as ve have noted,

served as a

means of protecting themselves from being replaced by supe r
exploited African labor.

Agitation for the colour bar

reflected the structural insecurity of White workers:
fully proletarianized,

"free"

as

labor they could not compete

with partially proletarianized and coerced African labor;
moreover, they recognized that capital had a clear
in replacing them with cheap labor.

interest

At the same time, their

political rights— which Africans did not have and which were
particularly important given the split between mining capi
tal and the Afrikaner petit b our ge ois ie— and their monopoly
on skills

Increased the power of the White working class and

enabled them to protect their

"privileged" p o si ti on .11 *

Given that Africans could not be excluded from the mining
labor for ce— indeed,

both mining profitability and the

status of the White vorking class rested on the exploitation
of African labor

(Johnstone 1987,

pp.

86-87)— job discrim i

nation served as an effective means for maximizing the
material

interests of the White working class.

The only

other strategic alternative for the White vorking class, a
cross-ethnic class alliance with African labor, held only a
promise of long-term gains

(i.e., the fruits of class

struggle waged by a united vorking class).
point of the White worker,
to the short term gains

From the vantage

this outcome paled by comparison

(e.g., higher wages,

realized through job segregation.

job security)

A point needs to be made here regarding the relation
ship between material

interests and racist ideologies.

maintain that eth-class

interest,

not racism,

We

was the force

underlying Wh it e working class support for the colour bar.
In other words,

job discrimination was not merel y a product

of the racism of the White working class, but instead was a
reflection of their ethnic and class
of the dominant ethnic group,

interests.

As members

the White working class had an

interest in maintaining the privileged position created by
colonialism;

as an upper

had an interest

"fraction" of the working class,

it

in defending its position from both capital

and African labor.

Indeed, White miners had previously

attempted to exclude competition from both unskilled Eu r o
pea n immigrants and Chinese contract
Simons 1969, pp.

53, 80-82).

labor

(Simons and

Thus, while the racial ideolo

gies which pervaded both the British Empire and South
Afri ca n socie ty undoubtedly channeled and inflamed White
vorking class antagonism towards African labor, we do not
believe that t h e y were the determining factor in group
a c t i o n . 11*

R a c i s m was used as an instrument for protecting

material interests.
At this juncture, the South Afri ca n situation seemingly
fits the split
upon capital

labor market thesis of restrictions

imposed

(which would prefer a free labor market and

wage competition) by a dominan t group vorking class bent
upon eliminating competition from ch e a p labor— with ethnic
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antagonism resulting from the "coincid ent al ” relationship
between ethnicity and
1972).
the

labor market status

While this gives us some useful

(cf. Bonacich

insights regarding

interests of the South African White working class,

split labor market model does not,

in our opinion,

provide a

satisfactory explanation of the South African case.
hand,

the

On one

the colour bar undoubtedly hurt capital by limiting

its ability to exploit cheap African labor
African labor

(e.g.,

the use of

in semi-skilled and skilled occupations).

On

the other hand, capital was a clear beneficiary of the
"split labor ma rk et” inasmuch as the migrant labor system
and the colour bar maintained the "superexploitability" of
African labor and, hence, the profitability of the mining
industry (which in turn enabled
sive White labor).

Furthermore,

it to tolerate more exp en 
the existence of the colour

bar effectively divided the vorking class along ethnic
lines, where a unified vorking class would in all

likelihood

have been able to wage an effective struggle for higher
wages

(thereby reducing profitability).

therefore,

Our conclusion,

is that the existence of the colour bar benefit-

ted both capital and the White working class; the

issue

w h i c h divided them was the location of the colour bar--labor
favoring an extensive colour bar, capital a more limited
s ys tem of segregation

(Johnstone 1987,

p.

81).X2°

Thus,

the

location of the colour bar was the field upon which the
battle between the mine owners and the White vorking class
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would be fought.

The outcome of these struggles would be

determined by the strength of the respective eth-class
alliances.
In the first years after the formation of the Union of
South Africa,

the balance of power between eth-classes would

fluctuate rapidly.

Although raining capital and their allies

were successful in crushing the 1913 strikes,
working class almost

the White

immediately gained an advantage

struggles with the mine owners.

in its

Shortages of workers during

both World War I and the brief postwar boom enabled the
White vorking class to use its economic and political power
to extract significant concessions from capital with respect
to wages,

benefits,

pp. 98 -9 9). 1=1

and working conditions

In addition,

(Johnstone 1987,

the White working class was

able in 1918 to coerce mining companies

into signing the

"Status Quo Agreement", a pact which extended the colour bar
and proscribed any replacement of White workers by Africans
(Simons and Simons 1969, p. 278; Johnstone 1987, pp.

109-

1 1 ) .122
The context for eth-class struggle was changed dr am a
tically by the onset

in 1921 of the post war profitability

crisis in gold mining.

The mining industry sought to

address this crisis by attacking the colour bar through the
increased use of African labor.

While mine owner rhetoric

stressed the rights of African workers,
motivating

interest was economic.

the overriding

Only by substituting
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cheap African labor
tion)

(often in conjunction with m e c h a n i z a 

for more hi g hl y paid White

industry achieve the

labor could the m i n i n g

lower costs and higher pro du ctivity

(i.e., output per shift) necessary to restore p ro fit a
bility.

When the Chamber of Mines unilaterally abrogated

the Status Quo Agreement, White workers struck in J a n u a r y of
1922— triggering the bloody confrontation known as the Rand
Revolt

(Johnstone 1987, pp. 125-45;

pp. 279-97).

Simons and Simons

1969,

Stripped to its barest essentials, the Rand

Revolt was an all-out struggle between capital and labor
over the location of the colour bar:
class was

fighting to preserve

the White w or kin g

its position;

mining capital

was attempting to crush the unions and restore profitability
by limiting the colour bar.

The ethnic and class n a tu re of

this confrontation was reflected in the slogan "Workers of
the world unite and fight for a White South Africa"
1974, p.

540; Davies 1973, p.

class consciousness."

(Burawoy

4 3)— a rare example of "eth-

Ultimately,

the intransigence of the

mining industry and the military forces of the government
(Smuts'

South African Party ha vin g combined with the mining-

backed Unionist P a r t y in 1920— Simons and Simons 1969,

p.

249) combined to c ru sh the rebellion and enable mining
capital to restore profitability by reorganizing labor and
restricting the colour bar (Johnstone 1987,

pp. 136-37;

Simons and Simons 1969, p. 3 0 0 ) . This apparently c o n s t i 
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tuted a complete victory for mining capital;
shall see below,
2.

as we

it was to prove a short-lived triumph.

Eth-class alliance:

ing point

however,

the Pact G o v e r n m e n t .

A tu r n 

in South African politics was the emergence of an

eth-class alliance between the White working class and the
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie,

and the subsequent success of

this alliance in capturing state power.

Shortly after

mining capital and the Smuts government had combined to
crush the Rand Revolt,

the Labour Party

British-dominated craft unions)

(representing

and the Nationalist Party

(established in 1914 by a faction of the Afrikaner petit
bourgeoisie which rejected the accommodationist policies of
Prime Ministers Botha and S m u t s — cf. de Villiers 1969, pp.
369-70; Moodie 1975, pp. 73-82) agreed to electoral cooper
ation in opposition to the Smuts government.
elections,

this alliance was successful

In the 1924

in defeating Smuts

and creating a Nationalist-Labour coalition government

(the

"Pact G o v e rn me n t” ), dominated by the Nationalist Party under
Prime Minister Her tz og .laB

Pr o m our perspective,

the su r 

passing significance of this development was that the White
working class/Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie eth-class alliance
embarked upon the use of state power to a dvance group
interests on a scale which wou ld transform the s t ructure of
South African intergroup relations
164; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 224).

(cf. Magubane

Indeed,

as Davies

1979, p.
(1973, p.
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44) asserts,

"it is this class alliance which remains the

key to understanding the South Af r ica n system."
The eth-class alliance between the Afrikaner petit
bourgeoisie and the White working class was grounded in
common economic and political
class groupings.

First,

industrial segregation

interests vis-a-vis other eth-

both groups shared an interest in

(i.e., the colour bar):

the White

vorking class for reasons of pr otection and privilege; the
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie for the purpose of maintaining
its supply of cheap agricultural

labor

(inasmuch as the

colour bar would restrict the flow of African labor towards
mining and i nd u s t r y ) .

Secondly,

both groups had an interest

in constraining the power of mining
local allies.

(core) capital and its

The Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie

feared that

the growing economic power of British-dominated mining
capital

(which they often referred to collectively and

pej or atively as "Ho ggenheimer"— an epithet derived from the
surname of the Oppenheimer family w hi ch controlled the
Anglo-American Mining C o r p o r a t io n- -c f. Moodie 1975,
would channel South African economic development
direction inimical to agricultural

interests,

p. 90)

in a

while the

White vorking class had just experienced the effects of
unbridled capitalist power in the crushing of the Rand
Revolt

(cf. Johnstone 1987, pp.

152-54).

Indeed,

these two

eth-classes had been taking tentative steps towards each
other

(e.g., petit bourgeoisie support for the Min es and
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Works Act of 1911); however, a n y dynamics

facilitating

coalition had hitherto been offset by mutual mistrust

(e.g.,

Afrikaner resentment of British support for the British
empire; British fear of Afrikaner nationalism;
fear of union socialism)
emerge

the Afrikaner

before any eth-class alliance could

(Simons and Simons 1969,

p. 303).

In addition to common interests,

there vere compelling

strategic and ideological reasons for the post-1924 ethclass alliance,

reasons rooted in the unique eth-class

configuration of the South African political arena.

Given

the exclusion of Africans and the sixtv-fortv AfrikanerBritish split within the White population,

the Afrikaner

agricultural petit bourgeoisie needed White vorking class
support in order to overcome the political dominance of
mining capital, British South Africans, and their allies
(e.g., Coloureds,

accommodationist Afrikaners).

If the eth-

class alliance which led to the Pact Government was grounded
in common interests and considerations of political s t r a t 
egy, the final bonds vere ideological.

Afrikaner n a t i o n a l 

ism helped fuse together the petit bourgeoisie and the
expanding Afrikaner segment of the White vorking class;
Afrikaners feared British domination,

many

harbored smoldering

resentments from the South African War, and viewed Smuts as
a collaborator
p.

88).

("the Handyman of the E mp i r e " — Moodie 1975,

In the same vein, racist doctrines provided a

common ideological base for the policies of segregation,
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domination/

and exploitation which benefitted both the petit

bourgeoisie and the White working c l a s s . T h u s ,

the ideo

logical/ while emerging from material circumstances,

was in

turn able to shape the direction of eth-class relations.
Once in power, the Pact Government and its Nationalistdominated successors made effective use of the state to
advance the interests of their eth-class coalition.
surprisingly,

the government expanded state

Not

involvement in

the agricultural sector--the agrarian petit bourgeoisie
being the power base of the Nationalist Party.
years after 1924,

During the

the government increased the number of

programs designed to stimulate production or otherwise
improve the economic position of farmers
pp.

257-61; F. Wilson 1969, pp. 137-40).

(de Kiewiet 1957,
Even more critical

vere measures designed to improve the status of the White
vorking class,

for the persistence of the ruling eth-class

alliance was contingent upon the ability of Afrikaner petty
bourgeois politicians to deliver benefits to the White
vorking class.

Almost immediately,

the Pact government was

able to reinstate and extend the mining colour bar

(which

had been limited by mining capital and invalidated by a 1923
judicial decision)
1926

in the Mine and Works Amendment Act of

(Johnstone 1987, p. 162; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 228;

Davies 1973, p.
This action was,

45; Simons and Simons 1969, pp.
however,

340-41).

but the first in a series of
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policies designed to protect the White vorking class and
solidify the eth-class alliance.
A major concern for Whi te South Africa d u rin g the 1920s
and 19 30s vas vhat was described as the

"poor White" prob

lem— as though "poor White" vas a social o x y m o r o n .137

This

referred to the increasing proportion of the population
(one-tenth to one-sixth of t he population— de Kiew iet 1957,
p. 181; Magubane 1979, p. 183),
displaced Afrikaners,
could not compete

largely proletarianized and

who had no industrial skills and who

in the unskilled labor market against

superexploited A fr ica n labor

(whom, of course,

vere on l y too will ing to ex pl oi t) .128

employers

From the perspective

of the government and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, the
poor Wh it e phenomenon vas threatening for two reasons:

(1)

the potential for cro ss -ethnic class alliances between poor
Whites a nd Africans;

and (2)

the potential for intermarriage

and the weakening of ethnic boundaries,

which in turn would

threaten White political and economic hegemony

(Simons and

Simons 1969, pp. 516-17; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 221-22).
Furthermore,

it q u ic k ly became evident that the poor White

problem could not be solved b y increasing the utilization of
Whites as unskilled mining labor
colour bar even further).

(i.e.,

by extending the

Gi ve n the nature of South African

gold mining, the p ro fi ta bil ity of the mines--and,
extension,

by

the h ea lt h of the South A f ri ca n econ om y and the

revenue base of the gove rn men t— was dependent upo n the
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exploitation of African labor

(via the coercive migrant

labor system) at wage levels at which Whites were unwilling
to work.
In response to this dilemma,
a "civilized labour" policy;

the government established

that is, a series of measures

to protect the White working class and discriminate against
the use of cheap labor
p.

224).

(Davies 1973, p.

45; de Kiewiet 1957,

Foremost among these was the Wage Act

(1925),

which maintained the White-African wage gap by asserting
different subsistence needs for the two groups and then
setting "civilized"

(i.e., European) wage levels for certain

occupat ion s— assuming that given equal wages, employers
would prefer White labor
1957, pp.

273-75).

(Johnstone 1987,

p. 156; de Kiewiet

This wage policy was buttressed by

making the awarding of government contracts and the ex ten 
sion of tariff protection contingent upon industries follow
ing the government wage guidelines
Burawoy 1974,

p. 541).

(Davies 1973, p. 45;

In addition,

the government

itself

served as an employer of poor Whites at "civilized" wages
through expanded public works programs and the development
of state owned industries
spite these measures,

(de Kiewiet 1957, p. 229).

De

resolution of the poor White problem

was a slow process, as the government was unwilling to risk
economic disruption for the benefit of the White working
class

(e.g.,

limiting application of the Wage Act when

business profitability was thr eat ene d— Simons and Simons
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1969, p. 338).

Eventually,

however,

these policies,

along

with the economic and industrial boom of the mid-1930s,
produced the remarkably low White unemployment rate wh i ch
became a characteristic of the South African economy
(Davies 1973,

pp.

On a general

46-48).
level, ve would maintain that the c i v i 

lized labour policy did not turn the White working cla ss
into an elite

(as Simons and Simons--1969,

p. 3 2 5 - - s ug ge st ),

but instead gave the White working class a vested interest
in the status quo and in a continued alliance with the
Afrikaner petit bourg eoi si e.12 *
nation

(e.g., colour bars,

The system of job d i s c r i m i 

the civilized labour policy)

enabled the White working class to enjoy artificially high
wages, employment levels, and mobility

(a position w h i c h was

only possible due to the small relative size of the White
vorking class).

This in turn had two important consequences

for South African society.

First,

it solidified the eth-

class alliance between the White working class and the
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie,

as the White working cla ss gave

its allegiance to the state and
protection of its material

in return enjoyed continued

interests.

Secondly,

the c i v i 

lized labour policy solidified the connection between the
interests of the White vorking class and the petit b o u r 
geoisie and the subjection of the African population, a
linkage whi ch would lead to further measures to maintain
White supremacy.

As ve consider the actions of the eth-class alliance
between the White vorking class and the Afrikaner petit
bourgeoisie, a question arises regarding the role of m ini ng
capital and British interests,
opposition.

now cast in the role of

Alt hough the petit bourgeoisie/White working

class coalition pursued different policies,

and the A f r i 

kaners sought to increase their political and economic
power,

the interests of mining capital were not clearly

contravened by a n y actions of the new government.
the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie had a clear
maintaining the health of the mining

Indeed,

interest

industry,

in

for mining

remained the basis of economic prosperity and government
rev en ues — which the petit bourgeoisie needed
advance
1974,

its own interests

p.

537).

in order to

(Magubane 1979, p. 174;

Burawoy

Thus, government policies tended to preserve

the migrant labor system and the flow of cheap labor into
the mines.

At the same time, mining capital

found the

colour bar and the civilized labour policy to be an a c c e p t 
able price to pa y for peace with the White working classpetit bourgeoisie alliance
short,

(Fredrickson 1981,

p.

234).

In

there was no overriding conflict of interest between

mining capital and the Afrikaner petit bo urg eo is ie .3-30
Indeed,

all White eth-classes had an interest

in maintaining

a political e c on om y which assured White sup re ma cy and c o n 
tinued capitalist accumulation;

the differences which did
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exist were more a matter of disputing the appropriate means
for achieving this go a l. 1 *1
3.

Eth-class alliance;

Afrikaner n a t i o n a l i s m .

A

third major intergroup phenomenon in South African so ci ety
du ri ng the first half of the twentieth century was the e m e r 
gence of Afrikaner nationalism as a significant political
fo rc e.132

Indeed,

it is probably no exaggeration to assert

that Afrikaner nationalism vas a dominating factor in South
African during this era.

The unique Boer/Afrikaner

identity

was molded by the events of the nineteenth century-~isolation,

the wars of conquest versus the Africans,

conflict with British imperialism.1 **

and the

From an "ethnic

studies" standpoint,

Afrikaner ethnicity had a firm basis:

cultural differences

(e.g.,

language and religion)

from

other groups; a strong feeling of peoplehood and a claimed
"territory";

and a sense of common experience and historical

injury (what H o o d i e — 197 5— has termed the "sacred history"
of A f r i k a n e r d o m ).
1910.

Yet all of these factors existed prior to

What is analytically interesting is the upsurge

in

Afrikaner nationalism during the first half of the twentieth
century, a phenomenon which requires new explanations.
At the time of Union,

the position of Afrikanerdom had

both strengths and weaknesses with respect to the potential
for group mobilization.

Although the Union of South Africa

was formed under the auspices of British imperialism,

the

creation of a un it ar y South African society brought all
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Afrikaners

into one intergroup a r e n a — as opposed to pre-

Un i on days, when group activity had been linked to the
British colonies and the Boer Republics.

Other strengths

included the numerical domination of Afrikaners w it hi n the
White community (which provided a potential electoral base
for political power and a strong incentive

for group m ob i li 

zation) and the British acceptance of linguistic eq uality
(which provided an institutional
c u l t u r e ).13*

At the same time,

contained major

footing for Afrikaner
the Afrikaner community

internal divisions--most notably the co n 

flict between the accommodationists
governments)

(i.e.,

the Botha-Smuts

and the resolute n a ti on al is ts — which were

reflected in Hertzog's withdrawal

from the South Afric an

P a r t y and the formation of the Nationalist Party in 1914.
Thus,

Afrikaner nationalism was still in its formative

stages in the early twentieth century;

however,

it no w had a

vehicle for political mobilization--the Nationalist Party.
While some aspects of nationalist assertion took place
on an ideological level

(e.g., Afrikaner resistance and

revolt against South African participation

in World War

I—

de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 168-69; continued agitation for status
as a republic outside of the British Commonwealth— de
Villiers 1969,

pp. 391-93), twentieth centu ry Afrikaner

nationalism vas not the persistence of primordial tribalism.
Afrikaner nationalism flourished because

it served the class

interests of the Afrikaner petit .bourgeoisie and intelli-

qentsia.

Appreciation of this point must be linked to an

understanding of the eth-class interests of these two
groups.

The Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and intellectual

eth-classes occupied an intermediate position in the overall
South African eth-class structure,
inferior
tal.

one which was clearly

in comparison to British minin g and finance c a p i 

Moreover,

the agricultural power base of the petit

bourgeoisie left them vulnerable to the effects of ca p i t a l 
ist development and British economic power
539).

(Burawoy 1974, p.

Given these circumstances, acquisition of state power

became the best and perhaps only means of advancing the
material interests of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie.
problem,

however,

The

was that the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie

was neither large enough nor su ffi ciently united to pursue
this strategy.

Ethnic mobilization

(i.e., obtaining the

support of the Afrikaner working class bv couching eth-class
interests in ethnic terms and by stressing symbolic issues—
e.g..

lanquaqe--to promote u n i t v ) would provide the

solution.
During the same period

(1910-1924),

a second dynamic

was occurring wh ic h would further strengthen the basis of
Afrikaner nationalism.

Forces of social ch ange— pr ole ta ri

anization and urbanization--transformed Afrikaner society by
turning farmers a n d bywoners

into an urban vorking c la ss .13S

The n e w l y urbanized and proletarianized Afrikaners found
themselves in unfamiliar surroundings

(the cities were
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centers of British culture) and often at a disadvantage
labor market competition with the British
the ranks of skilled labor) and Africans

in

(who dominated
(preferred by

employers due to their "sup ere xpl oi ted ” status).

These

circumstances left the Afrikaner vorking class receptive to
nationalist appeals which both appealed to their ps yc ho lo gi 
cal needs and provided a basis for advancing their material
interests

(Giliomee 1979a,

p. 107).

Thus,

in addition to a

common interest in the colour bar, Afrikaner n at io nal is m—
initially promoted by the petit bourgeoisie as a means of
advancing their

interests vis-a-vis British capit al— became

the cement for a cross-class ethnic alliance between the
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and vorking classes.
The accession to power of the Pact Government did not
represent a complete triumph for Afrikaner nationalism,

for

the eth-class alliance which led to the Pact Government also
included the British-dominated Labour party (British influ
ence within the labor movement reflected the nevly-proletarianized status of the Afrikaner vorking class).

As a co n se 

quence, the Nationalist Part y was forced to soft-pedal Af ri 
kaner nationalism in order to avoid alienating its coalition
partners

(Moodie 1975, p. 91).

Furthermore,

the narrowness

of the electoral mandate of the Pact Government and the
continuing political strength of Smuts and the South African
Pa rt y constituted additional constraints upon the N a t i o n a l 
ist agenda

(de Villiers 1969, p. 379; van den Berghe 1965,
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p. 294).

In this context,

the Nationalists found appeals to

White unity to be strategi cal ly more effective in es ta bl i sh 
ing a political common gr o u n d . X3a

This in turn further

imbued Afrikaner nationalism with an anti-African tone which
vas at least as powerful as pro-Afrikaner sentiment, a
development which would only further heighten conflict
between Africans and Whites.
Once in possession of state power,
bourgeoisie used the state as a vehicle
eth-class

interests.

the Afrikaner petit
for furthering its

The political interests of this class

were advanced by protecting White labor via the colour bar
and the civilized labour policy,

thereby maintaining the

eth-class alliance with the White working class

(which,

while by no means an equal partner, provided crucial ele c
toral s u p p o r t ).13,7

In addition,

geoisie vas able to advance

the Afrikaner petit bour

its own material

through both agricultural programs and, more

interests
importantly,

through the use of the power of the state to facilitate
Afrikaner entrance into the mo dern sector of the economy.
This latter goal vas acc omplished through development of the
state capitalist sector and Afrikaner monopolization of
government employment,

both of which provided an urban power

base for the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie
pp.

48-49; van den Berghe 1965,

pp. 60-61).

ficant about this development is that the
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie vere

(cf. Davies 1973,
What is signi

interests of the

increasingly wedded to the
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exercise of state power as a means of maintaining and e n 
hancing economic power

(Magubane 1979, p. 188;

p. 56).

the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie made

Consequently,

Davies 1973,

increasing use of the "nationalist card"--the twin specters
of British imperialism and the African threat--as an
ideological prop for their political position.
Another manifestation of increasing Afrikaner n a t i o n a l 
ism vas the proliferation of ethnic activity outside of the
realm of politics.

In addition to Afrikaner schools, social

organizations and newspapers,

this

included the Broederbond

(a secret society which played a key role

in organizing the

Afrikaner elite and coordinating nationalist activity),
FAK

(Federasie van Afrikaanse Kul tu urv er e ni ai na s — a cultural

organization), and trade unions
Villiers 1969, pp.
25).

the

395-401;

(Moodie 1975,

Simons and Simons

pp. 96-115;
1969, pp.

de

517-

Also significant was Afrikaner economic nationalism--

exhortations to patronize ons eie mense

("our own people"),

the amassing of funds for Afrikaner entrepreneurs, and the
organization of Afrikaner investment companies
1979, pp.

175-76; Moodie 1975, pp.

1969, p. 612).a-**

202-07;

(Magubane

Simons and Simons

From our perspective, these developments

can be interpreted in the context of urbanization and in
creasing intergroup competition;

that

is, as a response to

the perceived threats posed by Africans and the British.
a practical level, the effect of the emergence of these

On

386
organizations vas to expand the ideological and material
bases of Afrikaner nationalism.
Despite the increase
activity,

in nationalist sentiment and

the realization of Afrikaner heg emony vas a long,

dravn-out process.

A major obstacle to unity vas the e x i s 

tence of divisions vithin Afrikanerdom,

particularly vith

regard to such issues as the definition of "Afrikaner"
(i.e., vhether the ethnic boundary extended to all White
South Africans or vould be restricted to Afrikaans speakers)
and relations vith the British
Giliomee 1969a,

p. 101).

(de Villiers 1969, p. 380;

Matters came to a head in 1933,

vhen Hertzog joined vith Smuts to form a government

(the

"Fusion" government) and subsequently merged the Nationalist
and South African Parties into the United South African
Nationalist Party--later the United Party (Simons and Simons
1969, p. 4 6 9 ) . This vas anathema to hardline na ti o na l
ists, vho in turn formed a nev opposition party,
fied Nationalist Party,
(Moodie 1975,

under the leadership of D.F. Mala n

pp. 1 2 6 - 4 5 ) .1 *°

British capital

Moreover, by returning

(affiliated vith Smuts and the South A fr ica n

Party) to a position of pover,
the material

the P u r i 

"fusion" posed a threat to

interests of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie,

all of vhom depended upon access to state pover to compete
vith British-South Africans

(Giliomee 1979b, pp.

152-53).

The effect of these developments--internecine struggle,
return to opposition,

the

the return of Smuts as Prime Minister
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(Hertzog resigned in 1939 when the Cabinet vote d to enter
World War II)— was to increase Afrikaner m i l i ta nc y. 1*1
Indeed,

it was during the late 1 9 3 0 s — particularly the Great

Trek centennial celebration of 1938--that Afrikaner n a t i o n 
alism became a mass movement

(Moodie 1975, pp.

177-93).

This ethnic resurgence would play a significant role in the
postwar restoration of Afrikaner political power.
4.
tion .

African nationalism;
Thus far,

objects

our discussion has treated Africans more as

(or victims)

participants.

of eth-class struggle than as active

While they were c le ar ly involved

abovementioned struggles
party"

conflict and ethnic a s s e r 

in the

(e.g., Africans were the "third

in the struggle between mi n i n g capital and the White

working class over the colour bar),

the fragmentation and

political powerlessness of Africans served to limit their
a bi lit y to act.

At the same time,

there were also strong

forces which favored the development of an Afr ica n national
consciousness.

Incorporation into a settler-dominated

society increased intergroup contact and awareness of the
differences betw een Africans and Europeans.
the mining workforce

Entrance into

(which began in the late nineteenth

century) brought Africans

from different ethnic groups

together under common conditions of exploitation
1979,

p. 272).

however, was the

(Magubane

Perhaps the most important dy n a m i c of all.
fact that natives were subject to White

domination as Africans

(i.e.. lumped together as

"Kaffirs"
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or "Bantu ” ) rather than a s members of a particular ethnic
group

(e.g.. as Zulus.

(racial)

Xhosa^etc.).

Thus, the national

nature of exploitation and oppression gave rise to

a national conscio us nes s. 142
Despite the strength of these unifying forces,

the

development of a broad-based African nationalism was a slow
process.

In our view, this

tence of two factors.
of African labor

can be attributed to the e x i s 

First,

the partial proletarianization

(a result of the migrant labor system which

maintained ties to the rural reserves)

slowed the

formation

of a permanent urban working class and encouraged the p e r 
sistence of traditional group identities,
turn inhibited national mobilization.

both of which in

Secondly,

harsh state

repression and rigid social and political controls
the compound system)

(e.g.,

further dampened African attempts to

resist tfhite domination.

As a consequence,

the period from

1910 to 1948 saw the painfully slow emergence of African
nationalism,

as the propelling dynamics were often out

weighed by countervailing forces.

Nevertheless,

the events

of this period were crucial to the development of African
nationalism, as they created the basis for a common national
consciousness which would dominate

intergroup relations

in

the years following World War II.
The emergence of African nationalism involved a process
of ethnic m e r g e r : that is, the fusion of regional ethnic
Identities

(e.g.,

Zulu, Xhosa,

Tswana,

Sotho)— which were

in

themselves still emerging from precapitalist Mtr i b a l n ti es —
into an "Af ri ca n” group identity.143

First steps towards

this group mobilization were taken in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth ce ntu ri es— as
autonomous

"Ethiopian" churches,

intellectuals established
and as Africans responded

to their political exclusion by founding the African
National Congress
and Simons 1969,

(ANC)
pp.

in 1912

132-34).

(Kuper 1969b, p. 435;

Simons

One characteristic of the

earl y stages of this ethnic merger was its petty bourgeois
base, as the ANC was dominated by professionals and intel
lectuals

{Simons and Simons 1969,

"African" national consciousness

p. 116).

The fact that an

first emerged among the

petit bourgeoisie reflected their awareness of the d i s j u n 
ction between their class and ethnic statu s.144
significant about this development was that

What was

initial na ti on 

alist strategies reflected the experiences and interests of
the African petit bourgeoisie

(e.g.,

the use of "constitu

tional methods" such as resolutions or petitions to Great
Britain),

not the economic interests of the working class.

During the period prior to World War II, this "petty b o u r 
geois nationalism", as well as the slower evolution of
nationalism among the working class
proletarianized status),

{due to their partially

served to hinder the alliance of

African eth-class s egm ent s. 143
For this analysis, a significant question pertains to
whether African resistance would be expressed in class or

national terms.

Given the overt ly racial nature of South

African s oc iet y and the relative absence of class d i f f e r e n 
tiation wi thi n the African group,

one might expect that

Africans would mobilize along national lines.

At the same

time, the "racial" oppression of Africans also reflected the
class interests
privilege)

(e.g.,

profit,

ch ea p labor,

of various White eth-classes.

occupational

Moreover,

the lack

of significant economic differentiation within African
groups

(i.e., most Africans were wage laborers or peasant

farmers) and the fact that African national
opposed to ethnic or "tribal" ties)

identity

was still

(as

in the early

stages of emergence made class-based group action a s e e m 
ingly viable alternative.

This potential became reality in

labor actions by African workers
with major strikes

(strikes as early as 1875,

in 1918 and 1 9 2 0 — Magubane 1979, pp.

85; Simons and Simons 1969, pp.

211-12,

280-

230-32) and in the

formation and growth of the African-based

Industrial and

Commercial Workers Union (ICU).
Despite this initial surge of eth-class action a r t i c u 
lated in class terms,

the African working class was unable

to maintain effective mobilization during the first half of
the twentieth century

(indeed,

the early 1920s were the high

water mark for such activities).
be attributed to three factors.

We believe that this can
F i r s t , the partially prole-

tarianized status of African labor
of class consciousness

inhibited the emergence

inasmuch as the migrant labor sy stem

maintained the temporary status of wage workers.

Moreover,

continued ties to the reserves maintained ethnic divisions,
which

in turn undermined class sol idarity

movements were, after all,
e.g.,

Zulu workers,

(African labor

alliances of eth-class s e g m e n t s —

Xhosa workers,

etc.).

A second key

factor limiting class-based action was the lack of c o o p e r a 
tion and even outright hostility from the White working
class

(the optimal class action,

of course,

being an eth-

class alliance of African and White workers),

who sought

instead to maintain their relative privileges at the expense
of African labor. 1'#s

This precluded a ny broad based eth-

class alliance and weakened the position of the African
working class.
workers'

The third obstacle confronting African

organizations was state repression:

brought immediate and har sh response,

strikes

while the ability of

Africans to form labor unions was restricted by the In d u s 
trial Conciliation Act of 1924.3-'*’7
other

factors,

As a result of these and

the ICU withered away in the late 1920s,

taking with it any prospects for class-based mobilization
during this e r a . 5-'**
Thus far, we have asserted that the major

force in the

weakening of both national and class based African r e s i s 
tance was repression.

The political control of Afr ic a ns —

that is, the ability of Whites to use state power to r e 
strict African group a c t i o n — was a core aspect of South
African eth-class struggle.

Indeed,

political domination of

the African population was essential to the
White eth-classes:

interests of all

both the migrant labor system

(and

profits of the mine owners and the agrarian petit b o u r 
geoisie) and the colour bar

(and the privileged position of

the White working class) were maintained by state action.
But political control went far beyond economically-oriented
measures.

Particularly critical were measures which re p r o 

duced the political powerlessness of the African population,
for this was the cornerstone of White d o m i n a t i o n .

Given the

overwhelming numerical superiority of the African p o p u l a 
tion,

anything remotely resembling political equality would

bring an end to White political and economic hegemony

(thus

the immediacy of White opposition to any measures which
would

increase African political power).

As a consequence,

political control of Africans was undertaken by all White
govern men ts— differences,

such as those between Smuts and

the Nationalist Party— were merely a matter of degree.
While the African majority had been ef fectively d i s e n 
franchised from the beginning,

political control meant more

than maintaining the status quo.

The system of White d o m i 

nation was subject to destabilizing forces in the form of
the

increasing proletarianization and urbanization of the

African population.

A fully proletarianized African urban

working class would be a potentially formidable political
force in eth-class struggle, as opposed to a fragmented and
partially proletarianized work force.

Accordingly,

the

39 3
South African state sought to forestall this threat and
maintain political control by increasing the segregation of
Africans

(thus, segregation vas a product of increased

intergroup contact).

A major step in this direction was the

Urban Areas Act of 1923, which restricted the right of
Africans to remain

in urban locations and extended the

provisions of the colonial pass laws
98; de Kiewiet 1957,
state action,

(Welsh 1969, pp.

pp. 229-31).1-**

197-

As much as any single

the Urban Areas Act maintained the partial

proletarianization of the African population and,

hence,

extended White political control.
A second area of political control vas the political
sphere itself.

While Africans were effectively d i s e n f r a n 

chised, Whites feared that urbani zat io n would in time lead
to acculturation and demands
(and, ultimately,

for political representation

the loss of White h e g e m o n y ) .

Accordingly,

South African governments enacted a series of measures
(e.g., the Native Affairs Act of 1920,
tration Act of 1927,

and the Representation of Natives Act

of 1936) designed to remove Africans
establishing separate political,

even their limited

p. 235).

franchise

from political life by

legal,

tions in the context of the reserves
88; de Kiewiet 1957,

the Native A d m i n i s 

and social

in st it u

(Magubane 1979, pp.

84-

By 1936, Africans had lost
in the Cape, and political

representation was restricted to three White representatives
to Parliament

(out of 150) an d an "advisory" Natives Re pr e-
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sentative Council

(Simons and Simons 1969,

1969b, p. 4 5 2 ) . 180

p.

495; Kuper

Eq ua ll y significant was the ideological

rationale for this legislation--the assertion that s e g r e g a 
tion reflected the natural order of things and that Whites
and Africans should each develop in their own manner
Kiewiet 1957,

p. 235; Magubane 1979, pp.

(de

84-85)--a precursor

of the system of apartheid which was to come.
In addition to political exclusion,

the 1927 Native

Administration Act furthered the goal of segregation by
attempting to revive traditional culture and by restoring
the power of chiefs

(Simons and Simons 1969,

bane 1979, p.

The purpose of this legislation was to

84).

use traditional African

"tribal"

p. 345;

Magu

identities as a means of

separation and control--by fostering traditional practices
to inhibit acculturation and by installing traditional
authority figures
Kiewiet 1957,
essence,

(chiefs) as a petty bureaucrats

pp. 236-37; Magubane 1979, p.

84).

(de
In

the White South African state was employing e t h 

nicity as a weapon;

that

is,

it was attempting to revive

aspects of traditional culture to create new subordinate
African ethnic

identities.

There

irony attached to this strategy,

is considerable historical
for it was nineteenth ce n 

tu r y European conquest and deliberate policies of deculturation which had resulted
African societies.

in the disint egr at ion of traditional

While

it was probably impossible to

reverse the ethnic fusion which was creating an "African"
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Identity,

the White South African "ethnic weapon" was

nonetheless effective

in retarding African mobilization by

maintaining reserve-based ethnic identities

(e.g.,

Pedi, etc.) and by creating a comprador class
headmen) whose

Zulu,

(chiefs and

interests were tied to political separation.

The eth-class struggles described above had specific
outcomes— segregation,

political control,

migrant labor, and

partial pro let ar ian iz ati on— which produced a social system
with a high level of reproduction;

that

is, one which main

tained the correlation between ethnic affiliation
and class position
Indeed,

(African)

(partially proletarianized labor).

the material circumstances of Africans seemingly

worsened over the period, given the continued decline of
real wages under conditions of superexploitation
1983, p. 80;

Simons and Simons 1969, pp.

569-71).

(Southall
Such

practices as the colour bar and the migrant labor system
retarded b o t h economic mobility and the emergence of a
stable, self-conscious urban proletariat.

Nevertheless,

White South Africa vas only postponing the inevitable.1 ®1
5.

The

"crisis" of the 1 9 4 0 s .

The first half of the

twentieth centu ry was a time of rapid economic and social
change for South African society.
group relations,

With respect to inter

this period was dominated by eth-class

struggles between British mining capital,
petit bourgeoisie,

the Afrikaner

the White working class, and the African

working class, as well as the emergence of an eth-class

alliance between the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and the
White working class).
outcomes:

Our analysis emphasized three major

(1) the evolution of the system of se g re ga ti on —

the migrant labor system,

the colour bar,

and the native

re ser ves — as a reflection of the political power and e c o 
nomic interests of the White eth-classes vis-a-vis the
African majority;

(2) the Afrikaner-British conflict and

the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism as a potent political
force; and

(3) the slow development of African resistance to

White domination,

a process inhibited by partial p r o l e t a r i 

anization and by White political control.
three decades

following independence.

in the

South Africa gave rise

to a unique system of social relations,
the exigencies of capitalist development
and by the material

Thus,

a system shaped by
(e.g., gold mining)

interests of specific eth-classes.

If there is any constant in intergroup relations,
ever,

how

it is that they are in a continuous state of change.

South Africa
no exception,

in the first half of the twentieth c en tur y was
for during this period dynamics were in force

which would alter the nature of relations between groups.
By the 1940s,

the contradictions of the reserve-based

migrant labor sy st em — the bulwark of the Sou th African
political e co no my — had reached the crisis stage
Gelb 1986, p. 67).
system depended

(Saul and

The "balancing act" upon which the

(i.e., the ability of the reserve e c o n o m y to

subsidize superexploited African migrant labor) vas eroded

by the decline of African agriculture

(manifest in increas

ing po v e r t y and landlessness and declining productivity) as
a consequence of underde velopment and population pressures
(Wolpe 1 9 7 2 / pp.
same time,

440-42; Southall 1983, pp.

73-88).

At the

the post-1933 economic expansion generated an

increased demand for cheap African labor,
unskilled and semi-skilled

particularly as

factory workers

(where the

"civi

lized labour policy" made them less expensive than White
workers)
1988,

in the r ap i dl y growing industrial sector

pp.

121-23;

Southall 1983, p. 30).

(Freund

This combination

of push and pull factors resulted in a dramatic influx of
Africans

into urban areas and

into the

industrial workforce-

-the percentage of Africans residing in urban areas rose
from 18 .4 % in 1936 to 23.7% in 1946, the number employed in
industry increased during the same period

from 270,000 to

457,000

a significant

(Kuper 1969b,

p. 451).

Moreover,

proportion of this population was becoming permanently
urbanized

(Welsh 1969, pp.

Fagan Commission

209-10).

In the words of the

(cited by Magubane 1979,

p. 130):

"The

natives have come to town and they have come to stay."
For the African population,

one major outcome of urban

ization was a more complete proletarianization of the work
ing class.

This was manifest

in the emergence of a "cu l

turally new working class" with new "urban" concerns
transportation,

(e.g.,

housing) and supported by an array of new

institutions and associations

(Freund 1988,

p. 124; Welsh

1969, pp. 214-19).

The material

interests of this urban

proletariat were asserted in a varie ty of ways:
cotts

in response to fare increases;

bus b oy

squatter cam ps

in the

face of overcrowding in slums; and strikes in re act io n to
low wages
1969,

(Magubane 1979, pp. 127-28;

pp. 554-55).

existing order,

Simons and Simons

In terms of destabilization of the

the upsurge

in strike activity— strikes

absorbed 1,684,915 African man hours
opposed to 171,088 in the 1930s
particularly sig nificant.1 *2

in the 1940s,

(Wolpe 1972, p.

as

44 5 ) — was

This resistance reached

zenith with the 1946 Mine Workers'

its

Strike, when 75,000 to

100,000 African miners paralyzed the mining ind ustry with a
week

long strike which was brutally crushed by the police

(O'Meara 1975;
1979,

pp.

Simons and Simons 1969,

293-94).

Clearly,

pp. 571-77;

Magubane

the_ further proletarianization

of the African working class was creating the ba s is

for a

challenge to the underpinnings of the entire s oci al s y s t e m .
The crisis of the 1940s and the African "challenge from
below" had varying implications for the material
of the different White eth-classes.
(still primarily British)

interests

Industrial capital

stood to benefit the mos t from a

stable African work force— which would enable capital to
take advantage of labor which was both cheaper and more
permanent

(i.e., better trained and more productive).

consequence,

As a

industrial capital was more willing to consider

the relaxation of restrictions on the urban m ig rat io n of
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Africans,

so long as the hegemony of capital remained u n 

challenged

(cf. W e l s h — 1969, pp.

20 0-0 1— on the rec om m en da 

tions b y the Smits Committee that the pass lavs be a b o l 
ished).103
mining,

In contrast,

other fractions of c ap it al — e.g.,

vith its need for fixed costs; agriculture,

nantly Afrikaner,

predomi

vhose survival depended upon cheap African

labor— believed that profitability would be jeopardized

(due

to either higher wages or loss of workers to other sectors)
by the decline of the migrant labor system (Freund 1988,
120; Magubane 1979,

p. 132).

Most threatened of all,

ever, was the White working class,

how

which once again faced

replacement by cheaper African labor.
Afrikaner workers,

p.

Within this group,

who constituted the least-skilled segment

of the White working class, were particularly vulnerable to
any change

in the existing s yst em— thereby creating a c o i n 

cidence of ethnic and class
crucial

interests which would prove

in group mobilization

(cf. Southall 1983, p. S I ) . 1*'*

As South Africa approached the second half of the twentieth
century,
result

resolution of these conflicting interests would

in the emergence of a new set of social relations.

Apartheid and African Resistance:

1948-Present

Capitalist Development:__ The Post-1948 Era
As we noted

in Chapter V, the period following World

War II constituted a new stage in global capitalist d e v e l o p 
ment.

Fr om the standpoint of the world-economy, this vas

the era of the P ax Ameri can a— U.S. core h e ge mo ny — which was
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marked by decolonization,
transnational corporations

the Cold War, and the emergence of
(TNCs) as the major vehicle for

global capitalist accumulation.

For South Africa,

this vas

a new era as well, as the years after 1945 brought continued
economic and industrial expansion and the consolidation of
its semiperipheral status in the global economy.
perspective,

these events, while

From our

interesting in themselves,

are significant inasmuch as they established the larger
context for South African intergroup relati on s— the conflict
between White hegemony and African resistance which has come
to dominate modern South African society.
will briefly discuss these macro-trends

Consequently,

we

in order to set the

stage for our discussion of intergroup relations.
Geopolitically,

the world in which South Africa found

itself after World War II was shaped by decolonization in
the periphery and the superpower rivalry between the United
States and the U.S.S.R.

(cf. Beaud 1983,

186-88).

The wave

of decolonization and Third World nationalism which began
immediately after 1945 reached Africa with the independence
of Ghana in 1957 and would sweep across the continent in the
following two decades

(Stavrianos 1987, pp.

Decolonization came to Southern Africa
Malawi,

Zambia)

694-706).

(e.g., Botswana,

in the mid-1960s and continued with the c o l 

lapse of Portuguese colonial rule
Angola and Mozambique)

(and the independence of

in the mid-1970s and the liberation

of Zimbabwe from settler rule in 1979.

For South Africa,

decolonization would have several major effects.
continued White domination and racial capitalism
South African colonial rule in Namibia)
anomalous

(as well as

increasingly

in the emerging new international order.

consequence,

nations) and,

As a

South Africa was subject to strong inter na 

tional criticism

isolation

became

First.

(which was led by the newly independent

especially after 1960,

(Spence 1969, pp.

increasing political

507-24).199

S e c o n d l y , de c o l o n i 

zation changed the nature of African n a t i onalism within
South Africa by expanding the ideological basis for group
assertion and by increasing external support for African
1 ib er at io n.

This served to provide further

group mobilization.

impetus for

F i n a l l y , decolonization restructured

the political environment of Southern Africa:

where

previously South Africa had been bordered by British and
Portuguese colonies,

it was now surrounded by potentially or

actively hostile African stat es. 3-9®

At the same time,

however, the economic and military weakness of these new
states would provide South Africa with new opportunities to
act as a regional power.
Although at first glance decolonization appeared to
increase pressure on the White-dominated state,
effect was reduced by countervailing forces.
while decolonization transformed the

For example,

interstate system and

produced an arr ay of newly independent states,
altered the regional balance of power

its overall

it also

in Southern Africa by
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eliminating direct core rule.

Consequently,

ness o£ the ne w ly independent states,

given the we a k 

South Africa was able

to em ploy its mil itary and economic power to mute opposition
towards apartheid on the part of its neighbors.
more, decolo niz at ion did not occur in a vacuum,

Fu r t h e r 
but

in c o n 

cert with the global political struggle between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
was the freedom of maneuver

One product of this "Cold War"
it provided

periphery and s e m i p e r i p h e r y .XBT

for nations

in the

For the South African s e t 

tler state, this meant that Western criticism of apartheid
would be restrained by "strategic" interests;

that

is, the

perceived utility of a st ridently anti-communist state
located adjacent to sea lanes and atop vital minerals.
From an economic standpoint,

the ke y feature of the

post-1945 capitalist world-economy was the globalization of
production relations;

that is, the worldwide activities of

core-based transnational corporations
Magdoff 1978, pp.
South Africa,

171-76;

(Martin 1986,

Beaud 1983, pp.

this meant an upsurge

216-24).

in core

p. Ill;
For

investment,

as

transnational corporations were attracted by cheap labor,
the availability of local capital, a relatively developed
infrastructure,
regime.

and the seeming stability of the settler

What vas particularly significant for South Africa

was the changing nature of foreign inv estment— from holding
shares

in mining companies to direct investment and active

involvement in productive facilities

(Saul and Gelb 1986, p.

74).

This trend became increasingly evident in the 1960s,

as direct

foreign investment more that doubled,

in the manufacturing sector

(Magubane 1979,

particularly

pp.

205-211).

The impact of this foreign investment vas mixed.
hand, the expansion of foreign

investment

On one

increased the

economic d e pendence of South African upon imported capital
and technology--South Africa

imported m os tl y capital goods

and relied upon mineral exports to balance payments
and Gelb 1986, p. 75; Magubane 1984, pp.

204-06).

(Saul
Thus,

South Africa vas even more c lo se ly linked to and affected by
processes of the capitalist v o r l d - e c o n o m y .

On the other

hand, the grovth of foreign investment increased the e c o 
nomic stake of the core in South Africa above and beyond
any "strategic11 interests.

This had the effect of u n d e r m i n 

ing Western opposition to apartheid and support for African
liberation

(Magubane 1979, pp.

213-15).

In terms of the capitalist vorld-economy,

vhat ve have

been describing is the seminer ioheral status of South Africa
(i.e.,

its mixture of core and peripheral processes),

a

position vhich crystallized d uri ng the decades folloving
World War

II

throughout
pheral role
same time,

(Martin 1986, p.

its history,

111) .3-®*

As had been the case

South Africa clear ly assumed a pe r i 

in its relationships vith the core.

At the

South Africa emerged as a regional pover vith

respect to its nevly independent neighbors;

that is,

assumed a "core" position vithin Southern Africa.

it

This vas
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manifest

in the flow of labor and other commodities

South Africa,
infrastructure

into

in South African dominance of the regional
(the British-built transportation network

extended north from South Africa),
African investment

and in increased South

in neighboring states

205; Innes 1984, pp.

(Magubane 1984,

248-49; M a r t i n 1986, pp.

Thus, South Africa was

p.

110-11).

increasingly able to shape political

and economic processes beyond its borders,
would become a significant force

a capacity vhich

in Southern Africa during

the 1970s and 1980s.
While our discussion thus far has concentrated up on the
implications of world-system processes for South African
capitalist development,

it is als o essential

for us to c o n 

sider the evolution of the domestic economy,

for it is at

this level that productive processes most directly interact
with intergroup relations.

In the years following the

Second Wor ld War, South Africa found itself

in the midst of

a long (1933-1973) period of economic expansion, which
turn resulted in continued industrialization,
and proletarianization

(Houghton 1969, pp.

1988, p. 121;

1983, pp.

173).

Southall

Initially,

in

urbanization,

32-36; Freund

208-13; Wels h 1969, p.

South African economic development adhered

to the prewar pattern of reliance on mining

(which was b u t 

tressed in the post-war period by the discovery of new gold
fields in the Orange Free State)
development

(Innes 1984,

175-84).

and mining-led industrial
As a consequence,

despite
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economic growth,

the

industrial sector

economy remained small,
Freund 1988, p. Ill;

of the South African

labor intensive, and backwards

Innes 1984, pp.

169-71).

(cf.

This pattern

would change during the economic boom of the 1960s, when an
influx of foreign capital,

the expansion of state-owned

industry, and the accelerated movement of mining capital
into industry (cf. Innes— 1984, pp.

191-222--on the ex pa n

sion of the Anglo-American Corporation into industrial p r o 
duction)

resulted in rapid

industrial development and the

increased concentration of South Af ri ca n capital

in fewer

hands

pp. 205-06;

(Saul and Gelb 1986, p.

Innes 1984, pp.

188-89).

73; Magubane 1984,

In the post-1948 era,

this t r a n s 

formation would provide the backdrop for the further a l t e r a 
tion of both the context for intergroup Interaction and the
South African eth-class structure itself.
Eth-Clas3 Struggles and Interaroup Relations
In our analysis thus far, we have described the e v o l u 
tion of South African intergroup relations as shaped by the
dynamics of capitalist development and the outcomes of
intergroup conflict.

Moreover,

we have demonstrated how

eth-class interaction during each era reflects the legacy of
previous periods;
classes,

that is, the existence of specific eth-

ideologies, and relations of productions.

Africa after 1948

is no exception to this pattern.

South
The main

elements of its eth-class structure had emerged during the
first half of the twentieth century.

Likewise,

k e y pro
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cesses which affected the eth-class structure— industrial
ization,

urbanization,

and pro letarianization— were evident

during the years between 1910 and 1948.
At the same time,

intergroup relations in the post-1948

era were more than an intensification of previous patterns.
By 1948,

the evolution of South African capitalist d e v e l o p 

ment, the changing dynamics of the world-system, and the
outcomes of previous eth-class struggles combined to create
an Intergroup arena which was a u a l 1tativelv different
conditions at the beginning of the twentieth century.
thermore,

the course of intergroup relations

from
Fur

is continually

shaped and re-shaped by the actors the mselves— their inter
ests

(and perceptions thereof),

and their success

their ability to mobilize,

(in relation to other groups)

group objectives.

Social groups

in attaining

in South Africa in 1948

faced a new array of opportunities and constraints

in the

form of the crisis of the 1940s--the challenge to existing
relations posed by the internal contradictions of the social
sy s t e m .
From our perspective,

intergroup relations

South Africa can be most fruitfully analyzed
three core

issues.

in post-1948

in terms of

The first of these is the 1948 e s t a b 

lishment of Afrikaner political hegemony and the creation of
the apartheid s y s t e m , a development which defined the co n 
text for subsequent

interaction.

the second dynamic,

the upsurge

This in turn engendered
in African resistance

in
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response to the apartheid s t a t e .

Finally, the dialectical

relationship between these two forces, as well as the
changing nature of South African capitalist development,
gave rise to the third event:

the "crisis" of the mid-1970s

and 1980s and the restructuring of interoroup r e l a t i o n s .
Throughout our analysis, we will attempt to highlight ethclass interests and the implications of developments

for

both gr oup identities and relations between groups.
1.

Afrikaner hegemony and a p a r t h e i d .

1948 marked a watershed
tions,

as it resulted

The election of

in South African intergroup r e l a 

in the return to power of the N a t i o n 

alist Pa r t y {albeit a "recreated” party)

and the e s t a b l i s h 

ment of an Afrikaner political hegemony which has persisted
to the present.

Historically,

interaction of two dynamics:

these events reflected the
the rising tide of Afrikaner

nationalism and the South African "crisis" of the 1940s.
While Nationalist Pa rty campaign slogans stressed White
supremacy and Afrikaner unity,

the issue was not White

d o mi na nc e— neither party considered changing that aspect of
South African so c i e t y — but rather one of tactics and the
interests of specific eth-classes;

that is, how best to

maintain White supremacy in the face of increasing African
urbanization and resistance.

Here the parties differed:

the Unite d Party was prepared to tolerate some African urban
presence

(the interests of its capitalist constituency would

be served by a more stable work

force— cf.

Saul and Gelb

1986,

pp.

68-70),

while the Nationalist Party advocated a

hard line policy of total se gr eg at i on .1 * 0

The outcome of

the election was a narrow vi ct or y for the Nationalist Party
and the

installation of D.F. Malan as Prime Mi n i s t e r . 1 *1

As was the case with the 1924 Pact Government,

the N a ti on a l

ist P a r t y was in essence an eth-class alliance betwe en the
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie
White working clas s

(still largely rural)

and the

(without the Labour Party), wi th Af r i

kaner nationalism and White supremacy serving to cement the
alliance.

What was different,

however, was that the Na ti on

alist Party was controlled b y a more con se r va ti ve - - ! .e ..
militant Afrikaner nationalist,

hard line attitude towards

n o n- Wh ite s— political leadership as a result of the schisms
of the

1930s and 1940s.

Consequently,

this new government

would be even more adamant in pursuing eth-class
Once in power,

interests.

the Nationalist Pa rt y embarked upon its

program of apartheid,

the state-based system of racial

oppression which has become the defining feature of South
African society in the post World War II era.1 *2
trast to the "race relations" approach,

which views a p a r 

theid as an expression of Afrikaner racism
Berghe

1965, p.

In c on

(e.g., va n den

267), we will assert that apartheid

understood as a reflection of the material
eth-class coalition which came to power
apartheid is not an irrational

is best

interests of the

in 1948.

Thus,

ideology divorced from eco 

nomic life, but an eth-class st ra tegy w h i c h can be analyzed

in terms of intergroup relations a n d South A f ri ca n capital
ist de v el op me nt - - ! . e .. interaction between the Afrikaner
petit bourgeoisie,

British capital,

the White working class,

and the African working class in the
of the 1940s

(cf. Stone 1985, pp.

context of the crisis

62-82).

At the same time,

we recognize that apartheid was not a narrow economic p r o 
ject, but that it was shaped by the
eth-class struggles,

including the

outcomes of previous
institutions and ideolo

gies which emerged from them (cf. B u r a w o y - - 1 9 7 4 , p. 528--on
the interaction between economic b a s e and superstructure).
Indeed,

ideologies played a significant role, bo t h as a

means for group mobilization and in attempts to legitimize
the existing system of domination.

Nevertheless,

in keeping

with our theoretical framework, we will give analytical
primacy to eth-class int er es ts , for

therein lies the key to

the specific nature of apartheid.
Having staked out this theoretical ground,
focus upon the specific eth-class
petit bourgeoisie

interests of the Afrikaner

(and the small Afrikaner capitalist class)

which dominated the 1948 Nationalist government.
surface,

we will now

On the

these interests were similar to those of the eth-

class alliance which formed the Pa ct

Government

of 1924:

(1)

promote the economic interests of the Afrikaner petit b o u r 
geoisie;

(2) maintain political p o w e r within the White c o m 

munity (i.e.,

control of state p o w e r ) : and (3) maintain

White he ge mon y over the African p o p u la t io n. 1* 3

What was
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different,

however,

was the context.

was more urban and industrial;
increasingly proletarianized

the African population was

(given the decline of reserve

agriculture) and more likely to engage
tance.

South Africa in 1948

in militant re s i s 

Thus, the policies of the South African state after

1948 reflect the interests of the dominant eth-class as
shaped by the changing nature of the intergroup arena.
What gave South African state policies their seemingly
unique cast was the quantity and quality of actions which
di rectly advanced one or more of the interests of the
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie .18 *

Briefly,

South African

state "ethnic" policies after 1948 can be divided
main categories:

economic, segregative,

into three

and d o m i n a t i v e .189

Economic policies either di rectly advanced the economic
interests and power of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and
capitalist class or aided in the consolidation of political
power by benefitting the White population in general.
ples of the former

include the growing Afrikaner domination

of the state bureaucracy,
corporations, and
private sector

the further expansion of state

increased state support for the Afrikaner

(Giliomee 1979b,

pp. 162-69;

1986, p. 65; van den Berghe 1965,
178-79).
lation

Exam

Saul and Gelb

p. 105; Magubane 1979, pp.

On a more general level, new "colour bar" le gi s

(e.g., the Native Building Workers Act; Section 77 of

the Industrial Conciliation A c t — cf. Davies 1973, pp.
maintained the protected position of the White working

45-46)
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class.

Furthermore,

it

is probably no exaggeration to

assert that the overall effect of government spending—
whether on agriculture,

education,

infrastructure,

housing,

or jobs— has been to increase further the economic d i f f e r 
ences between Whites and

non-Whites

1989,

the Nationalist P a r t y

p. 19 6 ) . 1-8

Thus,

(Wilson and Ramphele
(and the

Afrikaner elite) has b e e n able to solidify its hold on power
by maintaining the allegiance (and dependence)

of broad

segments of the White p o p u l a t i o n .*-m 17
Segregative policies,
of the apartheid system,

perhaps the most notorious aspect

are those state actions designed to

separate Whites and non-Whites.

These included the Gro up

Areas Act (which expanded and rigidified ur b an segregation),
the Bantu Authorities Act
tion via separate "tribal"
tion Act
tion),

(which extended political s e g r e g a 
institutions),

the Bantu E d u c a 

(which formalized a system of educational s e g r e g a 

the Population Reg istration Act

(which effectively

codified ethnic divisions), and the system of
theid"

"petty a p a r 

(including the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act,

the Immorality Act, and the Separate Amenities Act).1 **
This body of legislation promoted dominant eth-class
ests

in that it sought to halt the urbanization,

anization, and acculturation of Africans,
their ability to make dema nds
African s o c i e t y . F r o m

i nt er 

pro l et ar i

thereby reducing

in t he context of South

the standpoint of the White p o p u 

lation, segregation provided reinforcement for

ideologies of
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group separation and White supremacy,
rigid

thus maintaining the

intergroup boundaries necessary for do mi na ti on .170
Finally, dominative policies refer to the use of the

South African state to maintain White political and economic
hegemony.

These policies served two crucial

the dominant eth-classes.

First,

interests of

they enabled the continued

superexploitation of migratory African labor, a dynamic
which served as the cornerstone of White economic p r o s 
perity.
laws"

Particularly effective

in this regard were the "pass

(officially c all ed — in an excellent example of Orwel-

lian "doublespeak"— the Abolition of Passes and Coordination
of Documents Act of 1952), which operated in conjunction
with the Group Areas Act and other legislation to restrict
African urban migration to those persons employed under
labor contracts and the few who had "legal" urban r ig ht s. 171
In addition to "influx control",

the migrant labor system

was supported by state labor bureaus and by the continued
proscription of African labor unions.

The second

function

of these dominative policies was to crush African resistance
and mobilization through both direct and indirect means.
Direct measures of domination

included both an ar r a y of

repressive legislation and the increased use of police and
mi litary power,

the combination of which effectively

created a police state with regard to the African po p ul a
tion.1 7 *

Indirect measures,

on the other hand, were

designed to control Africans via ideology

(e.g., Bantu

413
education)

and through African intermediaries

reserves and townships

(e.g.,

in the

the Bantu Authorities Act,

creation of Urban Bantu cou nci ls) .17S

the

From the perspective

of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and capitalist classes,
the maintenance of political dom ination over the Africans
constituted the crux of intergroup relations.
(1979, p. 188)
state power,

has observed,

As Magubane

"if the Nationalist Part y loses

it loses all else as well."

Without the domi-

native powers of the state, White advantages would quickly
wither away.
Viewed

in a broader historical perspective,

theid system can be seen to have clear roots
African past

the a p a r 

in the South

(e.g., earlier pass laws, the Natives Land Act

of 1913, the Urban Areas Act of 1923).

Indeed,

given that

they were both means of political and economic domination,
it is tempting to view apartheid me re ly as a rationalized,
rigidified outgrowth of earlier South African segregation.
Yet while

it evolved from the past

(i.e., earlier capitalist

development and eth-class struggle),

apartheid was also

qualitatively different in that it reflected changing c o n d i 
tions of accumulation
the unique eth-class
geoisie.

(i.e., the crisis of the 1940s)

and

interests of the Afrikaner petit b o u r 

Given the declining yield of peasant agriculture,

the problem for White South Africa was no longer

inducing

peasants to seek wage employment but was now to maintain
superexploitation and political control

in the face of
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increasing African urbanization
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie
allies) were,

(Wolpe 1972).

Moreover,

the

(and its White working class

unlike British capital,

more vulnerable to any

social restructuring and were therefore more likely to favor
a Mhard li n e ” reactionary solution as opposed to the reforms
considered by the United Party (Saul and Gelb 1986,

p. 69).

In the wake of our several references to B ri tis h capi
tal and the suggestion that its eth-class
from the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie,

interests differed

it is useful

for us to

examine bri efl y the role and interests of British South
African capital

in the years after 1948.

dent during the crisis of the 1940s,
and manufacturing)

As had become e vi

British capital

was seemingly willing to accept

(mining

(and,

indeed, would seemingly benefit from) a limited p r og ra m of
reform and a permanent African urban presence.

In addition,

it was not unlikely that apartheid would contain “costs'* for
capital as a result of its limitations on pro du ctivity and
markets.

Nevertheless,

British capital did not strenuously

object to the apartheid program because it had no intention
of dismantling White domination

(which had, after all,

served as the basis for profitability) and found

its eth-

class interests threatened by African resistance.

In this

context, Afrikaner hardliners were viewed as playing a
useful role in maintaining White supremacy
p.

190; Adam,

1979b, pp. 177-86).

(Magubane 1979,

Furthermore,

the

British capitalist class stood to profit from the super-
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exploitation of cheap labor which was perpetuated by the
apartheid system.

At the same time, the Nationalist Party

was unlikely to adopt extreme policies which would endanger
capitalist accumulation,
state power

for, as was true in the 1920s,

(and the Afrikaner political program) depended

upon continued economic prosperity.

Thus, while the British

South African capitalist class was not part of the dominant
eth-class alliance,

it was able to exist in a symbiotic

relationship with the Afrikaner-dominated apartheid state.
In our analysis of post-1948 South Africa,
emphasized the material base of apartheid;

that

we have
is,

its

relationship to the interests of the dominant eth-classes.
O ur point is that apartheid is not only a rigid system of
social relations

(as might be suggested by an ideological

interpretation),

but also a means for maintaining White

(especially Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie/capitalist)
a n d political domination
ical systems).

(supported,

of course,

economic

by ideolog

One benefit of this approach is its abil ity

t o address changes in intergroup relations by linking them
to the evolution of the intergroup arena
n e e d to alter group strategies).
point,

This

(and,

hence,

the

is a significant

for So ut h African society did change,

a process

spurred by both eth-class struggle and the dynamics of
capitalist development.
An excellent illustration of this point is provided by
t he emergence of the "Bantustan" or homelands p o l i c y — the
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at t emp t by the South African state to transform the African
reserves into se lf- governing territories and,
"independent11 nations.
alone

At the outset,

even autonomous

(let

independent) African homelands were not the objective

of post-1948 Nationalist governments
pp.

ultimately,

117-18; Wolpe

46) . 178

1972, pp.

In this context,

pro ba bl y best

interpreted

448-49;

(van den Berghe 1965,
Southall 1983,

pp.

45-

the 1951 Ba ntu Authorities Act

is

as a vehicle for achieving po li 

tical segregation and the indirect control of the African
population (via so-called
to the first st ep

"tribal" authorities),

in a greater plan.3--78

as opposed

At the same time,

however, the emerging apartheid system was beset during the
1950s by contradictory pressures:

the intensification of

A fr ic an resistance; the dec ol onization

of Africa and the

increase in international

South Africa; and

criticism of

the

growi ng realization that total segregation was economically
unfeasible--that Whites and Africans were economically
intertwined

(Magubane 1979,

pp.

237-41).

In response,

the

apartheid state evolved its "Bantustan" policy, a process
which began w i t h the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self Government
A c t — legislation which "e st ab li s he d" eight

(later ten)

"nationalities" among the African population and proclaimed
an explicit goal of gradual African "self-rule" compatible
with their own traditions--but which in reality meant
pseudo-self ru le under White domination
46; van den B er gh e 1965, p.

145).177

(Southall 1983,

This process was

p.
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accelerated by the government

(partially in response to

international pressures for change) during the 1960s and
1970s and culminated with the nominal
Bantustans

"independence" of four

(beginning with the Transkei

In terms of the eth-class

in 1976). 3-"rm

interests outlined above,

the

Bantustan policy was an attempt by the dominant eth-classes
to respond to changing circumstances.
barest essentials,

Stripped to its

the Bantustan system was a str ategy for

maintaining the migrant labor system and the economic bene
fits of superexploited laborr while sustaining White poli
tical h e g e m o n y .17 *

While the economic benefits are rel a

tively self-evident,

the political objectives of the Bant u

stan policy were equally significant.

First,

creation of

African homelands was an attempt to provide legitimation
for the existing system of social relations.

The South

African government could now cla im to the African population
and to the outside world
tional criticism)

(in an attempt to deflect

interna

that the political and civil rights of

Africans would be attained with the "decolonization"

(an

interesting mutation of the an ticolonialist rhetoric of the
era) of the homelands— thereby excusing the denial of these
rights in "White" South Africa
Indeed, carried to its extreme,

(Spence 1969,

pp.

510-11).100

the Bantustan policy envi

sioned that every African would become a citizen of a home
land— thereby eliminating the Black-White problem within
South Africa

(Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 1 0 1 ) . Secondly, the

Bantustan policy w a s — to borrow Southall's

(1983, p.

ex pression— a strategy of "divide and rule".

34)

The South

African state was again employing ethnicity as a weapon;
essentially created officially recognized

identities

it

(which

were loosely bas ed upon traditional African society)

in

order to divide the African population and forestall the
emergence of a more Inclusive Af ri ca n Identity (cf. v a n den
Berghe 1965,

p. 76).1S2

In addition,

the South African

government was also playing the "class card";

that is,

it

further attempted to divide the African population by
creating a comprador class of bureaucrats and small e n t r e 
preneurs whose

interests would be tied to "separate d e v e l o p 

m e n t 11— and who would serve as agents of control for White
South Africa

(Saul and Gelb 1986,

pp.

101-02).

While the South African government sought to portray
its Bantustan policy as a concession which would lead to
independence and African political empowerment,

the reality

was that very little power was changing hands.

First,

homelands were

(to quote Pienar and Simpson— 1960, p.

cited by Magubane 1979, p. 237)

the
25,

"economic nonsense" in that

they cannot begin to support their p op ula ti ons .1®3

Thus,

the homelands remain underdeveloped and economically d e p e n 
dent upon South Africa, serving as reservoirs of cheap labor
for South African industry.1 ®®

Moreover,

the Bantustans

remained politically subservient to South Africa:

the

"autonomous" homelands found that certain key functions had
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been reserved for South Africa, while the power of the
"independent” Bantustans was se verely limited by their
economic and milita ry weakness
145-48;

Southall 1983,

pp.

(van den Berghe 1965,

247-80).

Ultimately,

pp.

South

Africa hoped to create a network of small, dependent African
states,

thereby enabling it to retain political control and

access to cheap labor while transferring the costs of gov 
ernment services to the inhabitants of the B a n t u s t a n s .
This, then, was the grand strategy.

We will follow its

progress when we consider more recent developments

in the

1970s and 1980s.
A final Issue for consideration

in this section

is the

impact of Afrikaner political hegemony on Afrikaner na ti o n
alism;

that is, how access to state power shaped gr o up iden

tity.

During the first half of the twentieth century, A f r i 

kaner ethnic mobilization had increased dramatically,
gered by intergroup competition
African capitalist development.

trig

in the context of South
With a growing a r r a y of

ethnic institutions and the Nationalist Party as a political
vanguard, Afrikaner nationalism emerged as a potent po l i 
tical f o r c e . I t

was this flood of national i s m - - inter

twined with eth-class
ist Pa rt y to power

Interests— which brought the N at i o n a l 

in 1948. *-my

Thus,

Afrikaner nationalism

was important to the dominant e t h- cl as s— the Afrikaner petit
bourgeoisie and the emerging capitalist class— for it was
the cement which bound together the eth-class alliance with
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the work ing class and enabled them to maintain their grasp
on political power

(van Zyl Slabbert 1975).

Given this central role of group identity,
alist Part y quickly moved to consolidate
base.

the N a t i o n 

its ideological

One step towards this end was advancement of the

Afrikaner cultural/symbolic a g e n d a — elimination of English
influences from currency,
(van den Berghe 1965,

the flag, and the national anthem

p. 105; de Villiers 1969, pp.

393-94).

This process culminated with the achievement in 1960-61 of
two long sought goals of Afrikaner nationalism:
lishment of South Africa as a republic and

the es t ab 

its subsequent

withdrawal from the British Commonwealth--the shedding of
the two most prominent remnants of British colonial do mi na 
tion
94).

(Spence 1969, pp.

486-88; de Villiers 1969, pp.

390-

Of more substantive significance were government steps

to expand the role of the Afrikaans

language

(including

separate education for Afrikaner and English South Africans)
and to establish a syste m of "Christian-National" education
steeped

in Afrikaner nationalist ideology and propaganda

(Moodie 1975, pp.

239-45; van den Berghe 1965, p. 105; de

Villiers 1969, p. 3 9 9 ) . It was through this and other
measures that the Nationalist Party further entrenched Afr i
kaner identity in South African society,

thereby securing

its political position.
Once the Nationalist Party was firmly installed
power

in

(it increased its parliamentary ma jo r it y in each
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election),

it appears to us that Afrikaner ethnic assertion

underwent a transformation of sorts.

Where pr eviously the

major focus of group mobilization had been to resist British
political and economic power,

it was

increasingly clear by

the end of the 1950s that the fight against the forces of
assimilation and domination had been won--at least as far as
the British were concerned.

Consequently,

Afrikaner na tio n

alist leaders began to reach out towards British South
Africans by emphasizing the co mmonality of interests within
the White co mmu nit y (Giliomee 1979a,
131; Moodie 1975, pp.

277-86;

p. 116; Adam 1979a,

Spence 1969,

p. 495).

not to imply that any ethnic merger was occurring;
the Afrikaner/British bo und ar y remained distinct,

p.

This is
indeed,

as it was

reinforced b y British economic superiority (although the gap
was narrowing)
Berghe 1965,

and an Afrikaner sense of injury

pp. 107-08).

(van den

What we are suggesting instead is

that the improvement of Afrikaner status within South Africa
has allowed Afrikaners to cooperate with the British--this
time as the dominant et hnic group within the White community
(de Villiers 1969, pp.
At the same time,

375-76).
however, Afrikaners became

increas

ingly insecure with regard to African nationalism and its
claim to political rights.

Accordingly, Afrikaner nat i on al 

ism is more frequently expressed as a negation of African
status within South A fr ica n society.
took a v a ri et y of forms:

Ideologically,

this

the claim to be a unique p e o p l e —

White Af ric an s— with a right to self-determination apart
from others

(thereby legitimizing the "separate development"

of the Bantustan policy);

the

Europeans and Africans arrived
time

in South Africa at the same

(thus negating any prior African claim to South

Africa);

and self-characterization as the defenders of

Western civilization

in the face of African "barbarism"

den Berghe 1965, p. 116;
p.

incredible assertion that

149; Magubane 1979,

a broader

Spence 1969, p.

(van

491; Saunders 1988,

p. 254; Moodie 1975,

p. 264).3-’ 0

On

level, Afrikaners sought to mobilize themselves

(and any British South Africans willing to adopt a "proper"
position)

to defend the "fatherland" from the threat of

communism (which included, by legal definition,
to abolish apartheid),

"British-American"

general global condemnation
Spence 1969,

pp. 489-92,

a ny attempt

liberalism,

(de Villiers 1969, p.

517-24).

and

374;

This linkage between

Afrikaner mobilization and continued White domination was a
key force in intergroup relations,
political and
2.

for it solidified the

ideological base of the apartheid system.
Apartheid and African r e s i s t a n c e .

The leitmotif

of South African hist ory in the post-1948 era is the d i a l e c 
tical confrontation between White domination
apartheid)
status.

(as manifest in

and African resistance to their subordinate

Our use of the word dialectical

is important,

for

it captures both the oppositional nature of the forces
(e.g., White material well-being is grounded in the s u b j u 
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gation of the African population) and their
ship.

This

interrelationship

lying contradiction,

interrelation

is as important as the unde r

for just as the nature of apartheid was

shaped by African resistance,

the direction of African

resistance was shaped by the actions of the apartheid state.
Inasmuch as we have just examined the dynamics of White
domination,

our purpose here is to assess briefly the nature

of African resistance to apartheid.
From our perspective,

African nationalism in the 1950s

represented a significant departure

from the previous era.

This transformation was due to a variety of factors:
crisis of the 1940s

the

(the contradictions of the existing

system of social relations fell most heavily upon the
African population);

Afrikaner nationalism and the emergence

of the apartheid state; and the changing nature of the
intergroup arena,
zation.

especially the impact of global d e c o l o n i 

At the same time, African group mobilization could

also be viewed as having evolved from the struggles of the
early twentieth century.

The African National Congress

(ANC) continued to be dominated by the petit bourgeoisie and
the intelligentsia;

however,

upsurge in its membership.

it also experienced a dramatic
While this is at least partially

attributable to continued proletarianization and ur ba n iz a
tion,

it also reflected the realization by the African petit

bourgeoisie that it could not advance as a class,

but

instead must pursue an "ethnic" strategy in alliance with
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the African working cl ass es .1* 1
and African resistance
more radical

In addition,

both the ANC

in general were energized by a never,

leadership

(e.g., Mandela,

Tambo, Mbeki,

Sisulu

and the ANC Youth League--the generation which came of age
in the 1930s and 1940s— cf. Simons and Simons 1969, p.
Accordingly,

546).

the ANC was now better situated to form the

alliance with the African working classes which would become
the basis of the mass movements of the 1950s.
Two major strategic

issues for the expanding African

resistance were the form which mobilization would take and
the particular tactics to be used to advance group claims.
The question of form pertains to whether claims would be
asserted in class or national terms
the ANC-ICU division

(a debate reminiscent of

in the early 1920s), a question which

was especially pertinent following the central role played
by the working class in the resistance of the 1940s.

Given

the then existent stage of development of the working class
(partially proletarianized,

limited availability of unions),

the domination of the nationalist movement by the petit
bourgeoisie and

intelligentsia,

and the fact that eth-class

subordination was overtly expressed in ethnic/racial terms,
group action took the form of an eth-class " na ti ona lis t”
alliance rather than a working class mov em e nt .1* 2
quently,

the explicit focus of group protest and demands was

upon conditions which oppressed all Africans
laws,

Conse

political exclusion)

(e.g., pass

rather than the material

in t e r 
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ests of a particular eth-class,

an inclusiveness which

reinforced the emerging cross-class nationalist allia nce .193
Closely related to the form of the struggle was the
question of t a c t i c s ? that is, the specific strategies selec
ted to pursue group goals.

This was not an easy matter.

The strategic options of the African population were con
strained by their total exclusion from the political arena
and by their economic and mil itary powerlessness relative to
the apartheid state.
movements,

Moreover, unlike other nationalist

African South Africans were not confronting a

colonial power

(which could be induced to leave by increas

ing the cost of domination through either non-violent pro
test or guerilla warfare),

but

instead were challenging an

entrenched settler community which was determined to hold
on to power.

What emerged in this context was a process of

national mo bi li za ti on — national by virtue of its grounding
in an pan-ethnic African identity— which was marked by
extraparliamentary mass action
Wolpe 1984, p. 236).

(Magubane 1979, pp.

298-99;

The widespread nature of this movement

constituted a break with the past on the part of the pettybourgeois/intellectual leadership, a reflection of both the
evolution of eth-class struggle and the realization that
small-scale protests and petitions to the government were
futile
state).

(especially given the actions of the apartheid
As a result,

types of mass action:

movement tactics

included vary ing

mass demonstrations;

strikes

(e.g.,
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the June 26, 1950

"Freedom Day"

strike);

the 1952 Defiance

Campaign

(mass disobedience of the pass lavs); and economic

boycotts

(Kuper 1969b, pp. 461-63; Magubane 1979,

pp.

299-

307) .
The transformation of Af ri ca n resistance can a l s o be
seen in the evolu tio n of group
protests of the A N C

(1909-25)

reforms from Whites,

ideology.

Where the

first

had essentially "requested"

the 1949 A N C Programme of Action

explicitly rejected White dom ina ti on and asserted the right
of national self-determination for Africans
1979,

p.

Charter,

298).

(cf. Magubane

E v e n more influential was the 1955 Freedom

which c al le d for liberation from apartheid and an

inclusive democratic state (Kuper 1969b,
Berghe 1965, p. 180).

463-64; v a n den

These developments can be interpreted

in the context of decolonization and, more
response to increased White domination.

importantly, as a

While expanded

African nationalism was alrea dy emerging in post-World War
II South Africa,

its growth was

undoubtedly enhanced by the

total oppression embodied in the apartheid state.
again,

ve see that ethnonational

response to the exigencies of
One related

Once

ideologies arise

in

intergroup conflict.

issue of interest involves the role

of the

other non-White groups in resistance to ap ar th eid .1 **
post-1948 era brou ght rapid de te ri or ati on
political circumstances of Coloureds and
of franchise of representation;

The

in the social and
Indians

(e.g.,

increased segregation).

loss

there by increasing their commonality of interest with the
African population
Berghe 1965,

(Fredrickson 1981,

pp.

272-76; van den

pp. 1 5 1 - 5 2 ) . On the one hand, this led to

increased intergroup cooperation in opposition to government
policies.

Both the 1952 Defiance Campaign and the 1955

Congress of the People
contained Coloured,
1969b,

(which produced the Freedom Charter)

Indian, and African components

p. 463; Magubane 1979, p. 301).

(Kuper

On the other hand,

there remained elements which separated the three groups.
Segregation

(e.g., the Group Areas Act,

facilities)

limited intergroup contact and inhibited the

potential
remained:

for joint action.

Furthermore,

the Indian fear of Africans

the 1949 attack

separate educational

on Indians by Africans

ethnic barriers

(particularly after
in Durban);

the

African resentment of Indians as a "middleman minority";
Coloured insulation and sense of superiority;

and the s o m e 

times exclusionary nature of African nationalism
Berghe 1965,

168-69; Kuper 1969b,

Simons 1969,

p. 599).

Finally,

pp.

462-69;

(van den

Simons and

the sheer numerical weight

of the African population seemingly preordained that the y
would assume a dominant role in a ny resistance movement.
Accordingly,

while the 1950s brought

increased intergroup

cooperation,

a full-fledged ethnic alliance failed to

materialize.
Despite the significant upsurge in African nationalism
and the emergence of mass resistance to apartheid,

African

opposition was not successful

in bringing about a n y changes

in the South African social structure.

One explanation for

this lies in the persistence of divisions within the African
population, which in turn inhibited the

formation of an eth-

class alliance and limited African a bi lit y for group action.
The continued slow development of an urban worki ng class
(the result of the persistence of the migrant labor system
and the Bantustan policy)

reduced contact between different

ethnic and class fractions of the African population.

Like

wise, government policies such as the system of Bantu e d u c a 
tion

(which was designed to maintain linguistic divisions

among the African population)

and the Bantu Authorities Act

(which strengthened the reserve-based comprador class) also
contributed to the fragmentation of the African peoples.
Even within the resistance movement itself,

ideological

schis ms — between the multiracialism of the ANC and the
exclusionary nationalism of the break aw ay Pan-African Con 
gress

(PAC); between socialists and nationalists;

between

radicals and mo der at es— stood as an obstacle to national
mobilization

(Magubane 1979,

468; van den Berghe 1965, pp.

pp. 307-10; Kuper 1969b, p.
177-78).

The paramount reason for the lack of success on the
part of the national liberation movement was the repressive
reaction by the apartheid state.

Kuper

(1969b,

p.

459)

aptly describes the Nationalist Party apartheid program as a
counter-revolution aimed at crushing African resistance.
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Each and every mass action against White domination vas met
by increasingly harsh police responses and a growing body of
restrictive legislation.

Even the drafting of the Freedom

Charter resulted in the arrest of 156 leaders of the C o n 
gress Alliance on treason charges

(Magubane 1979, p. 305).

The early 1960s saw a further escalation of dominative
action by the state:
outlawing

(banning)

a police state

of the ANC and the PAC;

(mass arrests,

security apparatus);
the Rivonia

the 1960 Sharpeville massacre;

the emergence of

state of emergency,

expanded

and the "decapitation" of the ANC via

"treason" trials

den Berghe 1965, pp.

the

136-40;

and Gelb 1986, pp. 190-91).

(Wolpe 1984,

pp.

Magubane 1979,

237-38;

pp.

van

312-19;

Saul

This repressive counte r- rev olu 

tion achieved its go a l s — at least for the short t e r m — as
overt African resistance declined dr ama tically during the
middle and late 1960s.
In the context of the escalation of repression and the
absence of change,

it is reasonable to enquire exactly what

was achieved by the African nationalist movement during the
1950s and 1960s.

Perhaps the major accomplishment of this

political struggle was to heighten group consciousness among
Africans,

thereby providing an organizational and ideologi

cal base for subsequent action.

In addition,

the general

rejection by Africans of the basic mechanisms of dominance-e.g.,

the Bantustan policy,

Bantu educa tio n— increased the

contradictions of the apartheid system and intensified the
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pressure on the South African state by foiling attempts to
achieve legitimacy for its policies.

Furthermore,

just as

African mobilization resulted in increased reaction,

so did

state repression further radicalize the nature of r e s i s 
ta n ce — as evidenced by the Pondo revolt,
and the formation of a mil itary wing
"Spear of the Nation")
19; Kuper 1969b,

pp.

violent protest,

(Unkhonto We S i z w e —

of the ANC (Magubane 1979, pp.

464-65).

Thus, while resistance may

have been temporarily silenced,
zation which were planted

306-

the seeds of group m o b i l i 

in the 1950s and 1960s would bear

fruit in the decades to follow.
The other major achievement of the post-1948 African
nationalist movement was the internationalization of the
South African struggle.
decolonization,

In the post-1945 era of global

apartheid became

increasingly anomalous with

respect to the international order.

Within this context,

the cycle of mass action and state repression evoked w i d e 
spread condemnation of apartheid and increased the political
isolation of the settler regime.

Moreover,

external support

for African liberation enabled the resistance movement to
persist during periods of inactivity (e.g.,
the ANC to survive

the abil ity of

in exile during the 1960s).

The link

between the conflict in South Africa and the capitalist
world-economy was particularly evident immediately after the
Sharpeville massacre,

when international concern with the

"instability" of the situation led to a flight of foreign
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capital,
crisis

which in turn triggered a (temporary)

(Southall 1983,

p. 48).

financial

This vulnerability of the

South African ec o n o m y to international reaction to ethnic
conflict would become a significant aspect of the intergroup
arena

in the 1970s and 1980s.
3.

Crisis of the 1970s and 1 9 8 0 s .

The late 1960s and

the e a r l y 1970s could app ropriately be described as the
"golden age" of apartheid.

At this juncture,

the general

course of events appeared to favor the dominant Afrikaner
petit bourgeois and capitalist eth-classes:

South Africa

was in the midst of an economic boom spurred by the rapid
growth of industry;

the Nationalist Party had established

unchallenged political hegemony;

and the African resistance

of the 1950s and early 1960s seemed to have been crushed.
In this environment,

the South African state continued with

its task of limiting African urbanization.

The border

industries policy sought to move industry near the h o m e 
lands;

forced removals increased segregation and reduced the

number of Africans

in urban areas;

the cessation of African

housing construction seemingly insured that the number of
urban Africans wou ld not grow; and the Bantu Homelands
Citizenship Act removed even the limited South African
citizenship of the African population
1989, pp.
50).

216-25;

Freund 1988,

(Wilson and Ramphele

p. 125; Southall 1983,

If Third Wo rld condemnation persisted,

p.

or in d us tr i al 

ists objected to plans to reduce the African urban presence
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(cf. Magubane 1979, p. 136), or the ANC engaged in isolated
acts of sab o ta ge — these were minor problems which could be
solved.

The South African state had apparently succeeded in

creating a stable society held together by coercion and
exploitation

(cf. van de n Berghe 1965, p. 218).

Within a few short years,
changed dramatically.

however,

The four decade

the situation had
(1933-1973) cycle of

economic prosperity which had supported the evolution of
South African social relations came to an abrupt halt
early 1970s,.

in the

Decolonization in Angola and Mozambique and

the liberation of Zimbabwe

left South Africa surrounded by

African-dominated states hostile to apartheid.

Moreover,

the virtually complete dec olonization of Africa added to
global sentiment against apartheid and led to the further
political

isolation of South Africa.

Most significa nt ly of

all, African resistance, which had been thought to have been
broken, emerged with renewed strength in a series of strikes
(e.g.,

the 1973 Durban strike),

increased ANC activity,

the 1976 student-led Soweto uprising
321-26;

Saul and Gelb 1986, pp.

From this point onwards,

and

(Magubane 1979, pp.

159-67; Wolpe 1984, p. 239).

it was clear that African re si s

tance, although it might vary in intensity,

would be a p e r 

manent feature of South African society.
These developments had their genesis

in both processes

of the world-system and the dynamics of South African c a p i 
talist development.

The post-1971 downturn of the c a p i t a l 
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ist world-economy was felt in South Africa as slow growth,
rapid inflation,
groups,

increasing unemployment

(experienced by all

but particularly the African working class), and

rising balance of payments problems
Saul and Gelb 1986,

p. 77).1**

(Innes 1984,

pp. 190-91;

At the same time,

the

internal contradictions of "apartheid capita lis m"— hitherto
masked by the superexploitation of Afri ca n labor and heavy
foreign investment— emerged as obstacles to continued c a p i 
talist accumulation.
White

Economically,

(especially Afrikaner)

pro sperity and supplied capital

with a supply of cheap labor,
of an internal market
and

while apartheid ensured

it also restricted the growth

(by limiting Afric an purchasing power)

(by preserving the migrant labor system)

development of a skilled work
26; Saul and Gelb 1986,

pp.

force

70-73).

ceiling on industrial growth,

inhibited the

(Freund 1988,
This

pp. 125-

in turn placed a

as the stunted domestic market

and the inability to develop a meaningful export sector

(due

in part to low productivity stemming from the shortage of
skilled labor)

left limited room for exp ans io n.1 * 7

Equally if not more important were the political c o n 
tradictions of South African capitalist development.
well-being has been grounded

White

in the impoverishment of the

African popul at ion — White income per capita is roughly five
times that of urban Africans and fifteen times that of rural
Africans;

the South African Gini coefficient of income

inequality is the highest in the world among countries for
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which data are available;

and an estimated sixty percent of

the African population is living in poverty (Wilson and
Ramphele 1989, pp.

17-19).3-*a

Moreover, conditions for

Africans have seemingly worsened as a result of recent
(post-1960) capitalist development:

mechanization of a g r i 

culture and the growth of capital intensive industry has
resulted in a growing unemployment problem; Africans are
disproportionately affected by inflation
1986, pp.

71,

160; Wilson and Ramphele 1989, pp.

Magubane 1979, p.

322;

inequality exists

in every nation, wha t

explosive

(Saul and Gelb

Southall 1983,

p.

39).1**

84-93;
While

is politically

in the South African case is the direct correspon

dence between the high level of economic inequality and
ethnicity,

coupled with the fact that this relationship is

maintained by an explicitly ethnically-based s yst em of
control and exploitation.
diction of apartheid:

This is the

fundamental contra

the specific form of eth-class d o m i 

nation gives rise to an implacable oppositional

force,

for

only bv drasti cal ly restructuring social relations can the
material

interests of the African ma jor it y be a d v a n c e d .

For our purposes,

the most salient aspect of the crisis

of the 1970s and 1980s was the transformation of the inter
group arena which we have just outlined.

At the same time,

the impact of this transformation was magnified b y a more
gradual evolution of the South African eth-class structure
during the post-1948 era.

The joint effect of these two
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dynamics was to alter both eth-class interests and the
strategies available

for pursuing group goals.

tions contain new opportunities and threats;
have new interests and new capacities
interests.

New s i t u a 

evolving groups

for pursuing these

In the remainder of this subsection,

we will

explore the interests and strategies of the most significant
eth-classes in the context of this changing intergroup
arena.
One noteworthy phenomenon was the changing nature of
the South African capitalist class,

manifest

in the

increasing concentration and centralization of economic
power;

the creation of expanded links between South African

and international capital;

and the emergence of an increas

ingly powerful Afrikaner capitalist class
220,

326-33;

Adam 1979b,

pp. 177-78).

(Innes 1984, pp.

The rapid growth of

Afrikaner economic power after 1948 was fostered by A f r i 
kaner political power

(e.g., the awarding of government

contracts to Afrikaner

firms;

government and Afrikaner
72-73; Magubane 1979,
nationalism

the flow of personnel between

industry— Saul and Gelb 1986, pp.

pp. 178-79) and by Afrikaner economic

(cf. M a gu ba ne — 1979,

Afrikaner organizations

pp.

175-77~-on the role of

in mobilizing Afrikaner capital).

This development was significant for two reasons.

First,

the melding of political with economic power resulted in a
redefinition of the interests of the dominant eth-class
(i.e.,

the interests of the Afrikaner elite were now more
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closely identified with those of capital because the A f r i 
kaner elite now contained a larger c a p i t a l i s t
petit bourgeois,

co mponent).200

Secondly,

as opposed to

the growth of

Afrikaner capital led to increasing differentiation and
divergence of interests within Afr ikanerdom
187-88).

(Adam 1979b,

pp.

This reshaping of the eth-class structure would

in

turn alter both group strategies and state policies.
The effects of this evolution of the South African
capitalist class can be seen in the conflicting interests
of various White eth-classes with respect to the crisis of
the 1970s and 1980s.

On the one hand, Afrikaner/British

capital was seemingly willing to accept some change
existing social relat ion s— e.g.,

higher wages,

in

urban rights

for A f r ic an s— in order to preserve South African capitalism
(i.e., to avoid the "soci ali za tio n” of production by the
African majority).

Moreover,

avoid continued political

South African capital needs to

instability,

which would undermine

the confidence of international capital and jeopardize
access to capital, credit, and technology.
increasing centralization of capital,

Given the

these dominant classes

would be able to retain economic power even in the face of
significant concessions;

indeed,

they could potentially

benefit from expansion of the domestic market and a greater
supply of skilled labor.
petit bourgeoisie,

On the other hand, the Afrikaner

bureaucracy,

be adamantly opposed to change,

and working classes tend to
inasmuch as they have the
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most to lose— e.g.,

small businesses would be less able to

pass on higher wage costs;

without protection,

the White

working class and the Afrikaner bu reaucracy would be v u l n e r 
able to African competition
91; Adam 1979b,

pp.

Politically,

(cf. Saul and Gelb 1986,

pp.

79-

187 -90).201

these conflicting interests emerged as

divisions within the Nationalist Party,

which,

in the wake

of the disappearance of the United P a r t y and the political
irrelevance of its successors
Party),

(e.g.,

the Progressive Federal

was the center of White politics

early 1980s.202

in the 1970s and

Initially (until the mid-1980s),

this

involved the split over African policy between the verliate
("enlightened” or progressive conservatives) and verkrampte
("cramped" or reactionary)
Party,

factions of the Nationalist

the former advocating reform,

"hard line" defense of apartheid

the latter espousing a

(de Villiers 1969,

p. 390).

As was the case with previous divisions among White South
Africans, the issue was not White s up re mac y per se.
rather how best to maintain it. 203
however,

What

but

is different,

is that this conflict no longer so neatly co r re 

sponds to the Afr ik aner-British division;

instead,

distinction is articulated more along class lines

the
(e.g.,

capital vs. the petit bourgeoisie and working c l a s s e s ) . 184
For v e r l i u t e s . this means preservation of "free enterprise";
for verkramptes r maintenance of White supremacy (reflecting
both the threat of African compet iti on and the fact that
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many of their verliate opponents are also Afrikaner).

Thus,

both Afrikaner solidarity and et h n i c divisions within the
White community have been weakened by class differences,
thereby reducing the material ba si s for Afrikaner m o b i l i z a 
tion (Giliomee 1979c).
Of greater significance are the effects of the changing
eth-class structure on actual g r o u p strategies and actions;
that is, upon how the South A f ri ca n state and key White ethclasses responded to the crisis threatening apartheid.
Initially

(i.e., the mid-1970s),

the response of the Vorster

government was to expand state repression
organizations, mass arrests, state
the pace of the Bantustan policy

50-53).

would be citizens of independent homelands);
"White" South Africa as

Despite these developments
of Venda and the Ciskei

This was, after

"Black problem":

would ultimately be no Black South Africans

only enter

and to step up

to the Transkei and to

(Southall 1983, pp.

all, the "final solution" to the

terrorism)

banning of

(the cornerstone of a p a r 

theid) by granting w independence"
Bophuthatswana

(e.g.,

there

(all Africans
Africans would

" gue stw or ker s".ao*

(and the subsequent

in 1979-81),

it became

independence
increasingly

clear that the Bantustan policy w o u l d not resolve the South
African crisis.

The Bantustans were economically, g e o g r a p h 

ically, and demographically irrational; they were not r e c o g 
nized by a n y nation other than So u t h Africa;

and they were

rejected by the overwhelming m a j o r i t y of the African
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people.30*

Thus, the Bantustan policy has essentially been

in a state of limbo throughout the 1980s;

it is retained by

the South African government as a useful tool for dividing
African resistance and

for muddying the waters for future

political negotiations.
Given this state of affairs,

South African state policy

underwent a transformation of sorts with the accession to
power in 1978 of the Nationalist Party verliote faction led
b y P.W. Botha.

What followed was a new attempt to preserve

White supremacy and to protect the
African capital,

interests of South

one which adopted the rhetoric of reform

(e.g., Botha's oft-quoted "adapt or die" state men t— cf.
Marger 1985,

p. 217).

These reforms were part of what was

presented as a "total strategy"

for dealing with the South

African crisis, a plan which included the regional assertion
of South Afri can power
Mozambique,

(e.g., destabiliz at ion of Angola and

attacks on AN C bases,

economic and political

pressure directed towards neighboring states) and a propa
ganda campaign aimed at breaking the international
of South Af ri c a

(O'Meara 1986),

African resistance,
series of minor

the

With respect to quelling

"total strategy" has entailed a

(yet unprecedented

Party) concessions:

isolation

for the Nationalist

a limited right to form unions;

some

recognition of urban rights; a curtailing of petty a p a r 
theid; and a relaxation of restrictions on African managers
a nd entrepreneurs

(Saul and Gelb 1986, pp.

117-37;

Freund
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1988, pp.

127-30; Magubane 1984, p. 213; Wolpe 1984,

240-42).

From a strategic standpoint,

pp.

these "reforms" can

be interpreted as attempts to divide and co-opt segments of
the African popu la tio n— e.g.,

union vs.

non-union workers;

urban vs. rural dwellers; middle vs. working c l a s s . 207
While the South A f r i c a n state did experience some success
with the regional a spe ct of its strategy,

by the mid-1980s

it was evident that little headway had been made towards
deflecting domestic opposition to apartheid.
throughout the late

Indeed,

1970s and early 1980s the ultimate

foundation of White dominance remained the power of the
state security apparatus, a force which the government found
it necessary to em p l o y with increasing frequency.
What becomes

increasingly visible

is the dilemma which

reform presents for a South African capitalist economy which
is so Intimately linked to racial domination.
perspective of the dominant eth-class
capital),

From the

(Afrikaner-British

some measure of re for m is necessary to resolve the

crisis and to preserve the core of group hegemony.

Re pr es 

sion without reform

would

(i.e., the verkrampte position)

seemingly only lead to a hardening of African resistance and
the further
same time,

international isolation of South Africa.
however,

At the

a n y softening of apartheid undermines

the political power of capital by increasing the hostility
of the White petit bourgeoisie and working cla sse s— a group
which is essential to Nationalist Party rule, but which
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perceives any improvement in the status of Africans as
threatening to its own eth-class interests
pp.

213-16).

plex.

Furthermore,

As Saul and Gelb

(Magubane 1984,

the situation is even more c o m 

(1986, pp. 94-96)

observe,

change

is a perilous path for those who dominate South Africa.
optation requires real concessions;

however,

Co

reforms may

increase expectations and assume a dynamic of their own
(e.g.,

the emergence of "l eg al ” African unions such as the

National Union of Miners and the Congress of South African
Trade Unions as a major force in the African struggle
against apartheid).

South African capital

is as concerned

at the prospect of rapid change as are the White petit b o u r 
geois and working classes.
tradictory pressures,

Consequently,

given these c on

it is not surprising that the South

African state has repeatedly drawn back

from any meaningful

reform of the apartheid system.
Thus far, our analysis
upon changes

in this subsection has focused

in the eth-class structure of White South

Africans and the evolution of group strategies.
half the equation.

This is but

The actions of White eth-classes in

South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s can only be under
stood as a response to the assertion of African interests
(and vice-versa).

Eth-class struggle takes place

constantly changing intergroup arena.
gle,

in a

Through this strug

groups transform both themselves and their social

environment,

thereby creating a new context for subsequent
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interaction.

To complete our analysis,

therefore, we must

examine the evolution of the African eth-class structure and
assess the implications of any c hanges for the

interests and

strategies of the various eth-classes.
In general,

the shape of the current A fr ica n eth-class

structure reflects both the influence of previous patterns
and the changes
proceeded hand

in the intergroup arena.

Proletarianization

in hand with the continuing decline of r e 

serve agriculture; that

is, an ever-increasing proportion

of the African population became totally dependent upon wage
labor, while significantly fewer were able to survive as
peasant farmers without relying ex tensively on wages
Southall 1983,
71).

pp. 219-21;

(cf.

Wilson and Ramphele 1989, pp.

69-

Although this suggests a rapid expansion of the urban

working class,

the persistence of the migrant

and the increasing enforcement of restrictions
settlement meant that an

labor system
on urban

important portion of the working

class remained partially o r o l e t a r ia ni ze d.ao*

In addition,

the combination of dr amatic population increases in the
reserves and rising levels of urban and rural unemployment
(both post-1960 phenomena)

have led to the emergence of a

significant African u n d e r c l a s s .ao»

Considered

in t o t o . the

major effect of these processes has been to expand the
proletarian base of the African eth-class structure

(espe

cially if we make the assumption that the underclass has at
least some commonality of

interest with the working class).

443
An equally important ph enomenon involved alterations

in

both the size and the character of the African petit b o u r 
geois and middle c l a ss es .210

Partic ul arl y striking in this

regard was the expansion of the power and

influence on the

bantustan-based peti t bou rg eo is ie — chiefs,
bureaucrats,

politicians,

and e nt r e p r e n e u r s — a class which was,

for the

most part, a deliberate cre ation of the Bantustan po lic y of
the South African state
Southall

1983, pp.

(Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 101-02;

173-94).211

Moreover,

the interests of

this cl ass were tied directly to the apartheid-fostered
notion of separate development:
cians was

the power of the p o l i t i 

linked to territorial segregation and support

the Sou th African government;

African entrepreneurs bene-

fitted from government aid and
competition (Wolpe 1984, pp.

from protection from White

246-47).

elites are but part of the picture.
numbers are other

from

Yet the bantustan
Also expanding in

fractions of the emerging petit bourgeois

and mi dd le classes:
professionals, and

an urban commercial class, managers,
intellectuals— each with different

interests with resp ec t to ex isting social relations.

A

final addition to the African eth-class matrix was the
rapidly growing n um be r of students, whose declasse position
(given the closed opportunity structure)
them into a potent political
Gelb 1986, p. 185).

force

In sum, the

has transformed

(Bigras 1986;

Saul and

last four decades have seen
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the evolution of an

increasingly complex and differentiated

class structure within the African population.
One
class

important consequence of this proliferation of eth-

"fractions"

is a multiplicity of group interests.

we have already noted,

the Bantustan policy has resulted

As
in

the establishment of a comprador class whose economic inter
ests are seemingly tied to a p a r t h e i d — and stand
tion to other A fr ic an e t h - c l a s s e s .212

in op po si

Furthermore,

even

though the remaining African eth-classes are united by
opposition to apartheid,

they also contain a diverse array

of potentially divisive interests.
middle class

(e.g.,

professionals,

For example,

the African

intellectuals)

has served

as the vanguard of resistance to White domination.
theless,

the common

Never

interests which unite them with the

working classes ste m more from the political

(i.e.,

lack of

political and civil rights) as opposed to the economic
aspects of their oppression.

As a consequence,

the African

middle class could potentially be pried away from the re s is 
tance movement by reforms which remove the barriers to their
adv anc em en t. 213

Indeed, this separation of African eth-

classes could be viewed as the underlying goal of the
government in its recent decisions to scrap aspects of petty
apartheid and to extend limited urban rights;

however,

reforms to date have been too limited to achieve this goal
(cf. Ad a m 1979a,

p.

136).

In contrast to the middle c l a s 

ses, the African working classes would seemingly have a
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broader economic agenda
migrant labor system,

(e.g., higher wages, an end to the

land redistribution) whi ch would

require more drastic social c h a n g e s .
emphasized here

The point to be

is that there is no monolithic "African”

resistance to apartheid,

but rather an alliance between eth-

classes with interests wh ich are overlapping yet discrete
(and contain potential contradictions).
Politically,

African mobilization reflects changes

both the eth-class structure and the
Continued mass action over

in

intergroup arena.

four decades and the centrality

of the Black-White divide as maintained by the apartheid
state has resulted
African national

in an ever-broadening adherence to an

identity--an ongoing process of ethnic

merger despite government attempts to maintain ethnic d i v i 
sions.

Prom an organizational standpoint,

remains the core of African resistance,
rain has become

infinitely more varied.

while the ANC

the political t e r 
Eth-class d if f e r e n 

tiation and the exigencies of struggle have led to a p r o l i f 
eration of organizations.

Increased proletarianization and

the legalization of unions has produced an enlarged working
class presence

(e.g., NUM,

COSATU).

The expansion of e d u c a 

tion and the oppressive nature of the Bantu Educational
s ys tem gave rise to student resistance organizations
Congress of South African Students).
includes cultural nationalist groups
Organization)

(e.g.,

African mobilization
(e.g., Azanian People's

and organizations reflecting the

interests of
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the reserve leadership

(e.g.,

Inkatha).

Even the broad-

based United Democratic Front is an umbrella for an ar r ay of
organizations.

What provides the basis for cooperation

am o n g most of -these organizations
ance)

(i.e., an eth-class a l l i 

is the totality of White d o m i n at io n— which creates a

commonality of

interests— and the

"cement" of African

nationalism.
If st rategy

(e.g.,

reform vs.

repression) constitutes a

dilemma for th e White eth-classes,

it is also a problematic

issue for the African resistance movement.
tory

A milita ry v i c 

is unthinkable for the foreseeable future, yet Whites

are unlikely t o make meaningful changes voluntarily.

Given

the continuing total absence of African political rights
(the emergence

of an unrestricted

franchise would constitute

an effective transfer of power to the African majority),
change cannot be sought through existing political
tions.

What remains is mass action

(perhaps accompanied by

underground w a r f a r e ) — th e use of economic power
fact that the
African labor)

(i.e., the

South A fr ic an econo my cannot exist without
and large scale protests to make existing

social relations untenable.
difficulties:

institu

Yet even this strategy has

its

the willingness of the state to use r e p r e s 

sive measures has kept the cost of resistance high;

the

continuing b a n n i n g of org anizations and silencing of the
African leadership inhibits group mobilization.

Ne v e r t h e 
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less, the ongoing trend in the 1970s and 1980s has been the
expansion of the kind of mass action described above.
From our perspective,
significant
classes.

the above analysis contains

implications for the evolution of African eth-

Mass action requires mass

ideologies and a program

vhich is sufficiently general so as to appeal to a broad
range of interests

(e.g., one person,

of organizations).
uing upsurge

Consequently,

one vote;

legalization

ve would expect a co n ti n

in African nationalism as a unifying force for

group mobilization.

At the same time, to the extent that

proletarianization and exploitation of the working classes
continue, we would also expect the
working class consciousness.
identities emerge,

further development of

As ve have asserted before,

persist, change,

and disappear

in the

course of eth-class struggle.
Current s c e n e .

The post-1984 era has brought an inten

sification of previous trends.

A dramatic

increase

in

African resistance has intensified the level of intergroup
conflict.

In response,

the South African state has imposed

a draconian state of emergency,
detentions,

engaged in mass arrests and

banned organizations and leaders, and imposed

severe restrictions upon media coverage of African protests.
Given the willingness of the government to use violence
an attempt to control African protests,

in

South African so ci 

e ty has been enmeshed in a low level civil war, with an
annual death toll of several hundred.

Nevertheless,

while
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the imposition of the state of emergency over several years
has resulted in a temporary lull in the level of intergroup
conflict,

African resistance has not disappeared

estimated two million Africans participated
strike

in June of 1988,

(e.g.,

an

in a three-day

the 1989 election campaign has

sparked organized a cti on by the Mass Democratic Movement).
Clearly,

the next cycle of resistance and reaction could be

even more cataclysmic.
Cl o sel y linked to these events has been a deepening of
the economic and political crisis.

During the past few

years South Africa has been rocked by one blow after
another:

the flight of foreign capital in response to

unrest; a decline

in the value of the rand and increasing

balance of payments problems;

fiscal and political pressures

upon the government as a result of the increasing cost of
security an d of the unsuccessful military involvements
Namibia and Angola;
additional
fication of

in

and the refusal of foreign banks to make

loans to South Africa.

In addition,

the intensi

intergroup conflict has led to expanded in te r

national pressure upon the apartheid state,

including the

imposition of sanctions by the United States,

vhich had

hitherto at least tacitly supported the current government.
Once again,

the South African government was forced to talk

of reform and negotiations with the African majority.
With respect to the White eth-classes,

the second half

of the 1980s has been marked by the persistence of the
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intragroup conflicts vhich had emerged during the previous
decade.

The Botha government maintained the pattern of

rhetoric suggesting significant change followed by minor
reforms

(a reduction of "petty1* apartheid;

scrapping of the "pass laws",
White,
tal

a pro forma

the creation of a tr icameral—

Coloured, and Ind ia n -- pa rl ia me n t).

Similarly,

ca pi 

(ever aware of the changing business climate and the

reaction of
change,

international capital)

has continued to push for

even going so far as to make contact with the ANC in

defiance of the government.

Nevertheless,

neither capital

nor the government has demonstrated a willingness to c ont em
plate significant power sharing,

let alone meet the demands

of the African majority.

in the contradictions of

reform,

the dominant eth-classes have also come under mo un t

ing pressure
classes,

Caught

from the White petit bourgeois and working

both of which feel increasingly threatened by the

course of events.

Moreover,

following the failure of "sepa

rate development," White politics suffer from the absence of
a unifying ideology (cf. Adam--1979a--on "survival po l i 
tics").

The result has been a dramatic growth in the poli 

tical strength of the right

(e.g., the Conservative Party,

the Afrikaner Resistance Movement)

and a lesser but still

significant growth in the left opposition,

to the extent

that the Nationalist P ar ty was faced with the loss or reduc
tion of its pa rliamentary majority in the September 1989
elections.

While the new de Klerk government appears to be
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adopting a more conciliatory approach towards the African
population

(e.g.,

increased toleration of protest,

of political prisoners,

release

tacit acceptance of the ANC),

the

outcome of the still-unresolved political struggle within
the White com mu ni ty will

influence the course of the larger

Black-White conflict.
Likewise,
with the same

the African eth-classes continue to grapple
issues as before.

sisted; however,

Mass resistance has p e r 

mobilization has been limited by ongoing

repression and the banning of organizations.

Accordingly,

the search for effective strategies of resistance continues.
In addition,

ongoing conflicts between eth-class fractions

(e.g., between "comrades" and "fathers"
and increased

in the townships)

intragroup violence threatens to divide the

African liberation movement.

Finally,

any political nego

tiations with the apartheid state will pose a new set of
strategic and organizational dilemmas,

as well as the poten

tial for new intragroup eth-class conflict.

Thus,

a major

challenge for the anti-apartheid forces will be to maintain
their eth-class alliance

in the face of mounting fissiparous

t e n de nc ie s.

Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have applied our theoretical

frame

work for the s tu d y of ethnic relations to the South African
case.

As we stated at the outset,

were twofold.

our purposes in doing so

F i r s t f by employing our model for the analy-
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sis of a particular historical case, we intended to d e m o n 
strate its utility.

Secondly, through this application,

hoped to be able to refine our framework.
we will focus upon the first issue;
which our framework

we

In this summary,

that is, the degree to

is useful for un derstanding the e v o l u 

tion of intergroup relations in South Africa.

The second

issue, modification of the

framework

studies,

in the final chapter.

will be addressed

Throughout our analysis,

in light of our case

we stressed two basic themes.

On a general level, ve emphasized the role of capitalist
development in shaping initial intergroup contact and in
setting the context for intergroup
changing nature of economic life
of production)

interaction.

Thus,

the

(i.e., forces and relations

gives a dynamic as pe ct to ethnic relations.

On a more specific level

(i.e., wi t h i n the environment

created by capitalist development),
group resource competition

(i.e.,

we focused upon inter-

eth-class struggle)

primary factor in the evolution of group identities.

as the
Social

groups constantly redefine themselves and their relations
with other groups as they pursue material

interests.

As we

conducted our exploration of the South African case, we did
so over a long period of time

(1652-present)

capture the historical evolution of

in order to

intergroup relations.

The following is a reprise of the major themes raised by the
application of our theoretical framework.
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In examining the
intergroup relations,

impact of capitalist development upon
ve asserted that events in a pa rt ic

ular s o c ie ty cannot be understood apart from global ca p i
talist development.

South Africa,

like most of the non-

European world, was shaped by the wave of European expansion
vhich resulted in unprecedented levels of intergroup contact
and social change.

The fact that South Africa vas initially

colonized by the Dutch East India Company vas reflected in
both the emergence of a Dutch settler population and
limited degree of settlement prior to 1800.
significant for the course of
"second colonization"

in the

Even more

intergroup relations vas the

of South Africa by Great Britain in

the early nineteenth century.
tvo settler populations

This left South Africa vith

(the British vere not immigrants but

rather a dominant colonial group) and mea nt that its eco 
nomic and political development vould be shaped by British
imperial

interests

(e.g., protection of British interests

vis-a-vis other core povers in the "race for Africa").
ve saw in our historical narrative,

this

As

led to the British-

Boer conflict vhich dominated nineteenth-century South
Africa a nd culminated

in the South African War.

The impact of these "external" forces did not end vith
the independence of South Africa in 1910.

For example,

the

nature of post-colonial soci ety vas shaped by British poli
cies

(e.g., deferment of the question of African franchise

rights until after

independence;

the British decision not to
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integrate Botswana,
South Africa).

Lesotho,

and Swaziland into the Union of

Structural changes

decline of British hegemony,
corporations as a vehicle

in the world-econoray— the

the emergence of transnational

for core investment— had important

implications for South African society.

Throughout the

twentieth century wars and global economic cycles affected
intergroup relations in South Africa

(e.g., the post-World

War I pr ofitability crisis which subsequently led to the
Rand Rebellion and the Pact G o v e r n m e n t ) .
actors even exerted a direct
intergroup relations

is:

external

influence upon South African

(e.g., support for the ANC;

tional condemnation of apartheid;
point

At times,

interna

economic sanctions).

The

not only did the dynamics of global capitalist

development bring specific groups into contact with one
another

in South Africa,

but they also continuously

after the colonial era) shaped the environment
these groups interacted.

Consequently,

(even

in which

we believe that any

analysis of interoroup relations should take the dvnamics_of
the capitalist wo rld-economv as a point of d e p a r t u r e .
At the macro level of analysis

(societal as opposed to

global) we asserted that South African capitalist d e ve lo p
ment

itself played a major role in shaping the course of

ethnic relations.

In other words,

economic relations within

a society determine the context in which groups
During the colonial period,

interact.

a key factor affecting inter

group relations was the underdevelopment of South Africa;
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that is, the limited development of the forces of pr od uc 
tion, the economic
ket.21*

infrastructure,

From the standpoint of

and the domestic m a r 

intergroup interaction,

slow economic development vas linked to limited
the isolation of the

interior,

immigration,

and the emergence of a

specific set of production relations

(e.g., the "feudal-

like" relations of extensive agriculture).

These processes

in turn gave rise to a particular eth-class structure
a homogeneous Boer independent class,

an African peasantry,

the absence of other European immigrant groups)
each group had specif ic material

that is,

impact of capitalist

the effect of changes

forces and relations of production.
revolution

in which

interests.

Even more significant vas the
development over time;

(e.g.,

For example,

in the

the mining

(i.e., the development of large-scale diamond and

gold mining)

effected the transformation of production rela

tions

the emergence of a wage-dependent working

(e.g.,

class, the evolution of monopoly capital) which in turn
altered ethnic relations
British-Boer conflict,
Afrikaners).

Moreover,

(e.g.,

intensification of the

proletarianization of Africans and
the sp ecific nature of mi ning

(i.e.,

the profit/cost structure and the need for cheap labor) had
a major influence upon subsequent eth-class relations
twentieth century (e.g., the mi gr an t labor system,
colour bar,

etc.).

in the

the

Over the long run, mining triggered a

change in the forces of production

(i.e.,

industrialization)
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which resulted

in a further restructuring of intergroup

interaction— a pattern which continued with subsequent
events

(e.g.,

of the 1960s,

the crisis of the 1940s,
the

the industrial

crisis of the 1970s and

issue here is change:

1980s).

boom

The key

the progressive development of the

forces of production and the contradictions

inherent

in any

social formation mean that ethnic relations take place
continuously evolving intergroup arena.
structure and

the

interests of individual

by the nature

of capitalist development.

At our third level of analysis,

Both the eth-class
groups are altered

that of intergroup

interaction, we examined the role of eth-class struggle
shaping group identities.
particular eth-classes

in a

in

This required an emphasis upon

(e.g., the Afrikaner petit b o u r 

geoisie) and the strategies which they employ in order to
pursue their material

interests.

Initially,

the focus of

eth-class struggle in South Africa was resource competition
for land, a process whose denouement included the conquest
of South Africa by European settlers,
traditional African societies,

the transformation of

and the establishment of

relations of domination and subordination between Europeans
and Africans.

This gave rise to a new set of social r e l a 

tionships vhich,

like any social system,

of both reproduction

(e.g., control mechanisms,

and economic practices) and change
ordinate groups).

contained elements

(e.g.,

Our central point here

ideologies,

struggle by s u b 
is that interaroup
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relations are never static:

t h e y change not only (as d i s 

cussed above) as a re su lt of externa l forces and the e v o l v 
ing na tu re of production, but al s o as a consequence of the
actions of social gr o up s pursuing material

interests.

While

later eth-class st rug gl es in S ou th African m a y have had
different

foci (e.g,

twentieth century,

labor market competition

in the ea r l y

the political struggles of the post-1948

era) and different strategies,
pursuit of material

the underlying dynamic— the

Interests— remains the same.

Wi t h respect to our core i s s u e — the evolution of ethnic
identities--this ch ap ter traced the

impact of

intergroup

interaction upon the various So ut h African groups.
outset,

Fr o m the

one major proce ss entailed the deculturation of

natives a nd the transformation of
vhich was

identities— a dynamic

manifest m o s t spectacularly in the disappearance

of the Khoikhoin and the emergence of the "Coloured" group.
For the African majority,
resulted

a slower process of deculturation

in the c re a ti on of a "colonized"

European settler s o c i e t y (indeed,
affect A f ri ca n i d e n ti ti es — e.g.,
the "ethnic weapon",

the ability of settlers to
via the missi on schools,

an d the s y s t e m of "Bantu Education"--

has been a n important
domination).

identity shaped by

factor in the persistence of European

During the same epoch,

ment was the emergence

a second key d e v e l o p 

of Boer/Afrikaner

identity, a p h e n o m 

enon l in ke d both to resistance to British hegemony and their
own a s s e r t i o n of do mi nat ion over the African peoples.

In
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each of the above cases,

oro up identities evolved through

interaction vi th other g r o u p s .
This process was no less evident

in the twentieth

century, as n ew conditions generated new struggles and the
further change of group identities.

Indeed, eth-class

struggle and ethnic change seemingly gained mo mentum as a
result of the increased

intergroup interaction which accom

panied

industrialization,

proletarianization,

tion.

In the Afrikaner case,

and urb an iza 

we saw ethnic assertion

an alliance between eth-classes)

(i.e.,

in response to the economic

superiority of British South Africans and the desire to
maintain advantages with respect to the African population.
This led to ethnic mobilization and the capture of state
power

(due to their weak economic position, Afrikaners

needed state power
which

in order to attain group interests),

in turn produced further changes

in identity

(e.g., an

increasing emphasis on the need to ma int ai n White d o m i 
nance) .

Also occurring at the same time was the emergence

of African nationalism, a process which involved the merger
of subgroups

into a pan-ethnic African

which to a lesser degree
alliances).

identity (a process

involved the forging of cross-class

As ve asserted

in the chapter,

tion was a reaction to the overtly racial

this m o b il iz a

(i.e.. ethnic)

nature of Afrikaner petty bourgeois domination and the use
of state power to maintain this state of a f f a i r s .
the African and the Afrikaner cases,

In both

group identities have
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evolved as a result of the exigencies of intergroup conflict
and competition.
Throughout this analysis,

eth-class has served as an

essential organizing concept inasmuch as it has enabled us
to account for

intragroup (and intraclass)

give rise to different

i nt er est s.

divisions vhich

At first,

the South

A f ri ca n eth-class structure vas marked by limited
differentiation;

intragroup

that is, the correspondence between ethn i

c i t y and class vas virtually total

(e.g.,

the Afrikaner

From our vantage point,

independent class).

the homogeneity of

this had the effect of solidifying group identities and
boundaries so that ethnic assertion vas in effect also class
assertion

(e.g.,

Boer

farmers vs.

colonial administration).

These

African labor or British
interrelationships were

transformed b y the mining revolution and its aftermath,

as

increased differenti at ion produced a more complex eth-class
structure.

As a consequence,

ve found it necessary to

examine the interests and actions of a constantly evolving
a r r a y of eth-cla sse s— the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie,
B r it is h capital,

the White working class,

tarianized African labor,

partially prole-

the African petit bourgeoisie,

the reserve-based comprador class.

The central finding of

this analysis vas that there were no Afrikaner or African
(or Black or White)

interests as s u c h , only those of eth-

classes or eth-class alliances.
racial

and

Ethnic identities

(and

ideologies) served to cement eth-class alliances
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(e.g., the role of Afrikaner nationalism in uniting the
petit bourgeoisie and working classes);

they remained an

effective basis for group mobilization due to the compa ti
bility of interests between the different eth-class "frac
tions" of each group

(e.g., the African petit bourgeoisie

and working classes have a common interest in overturning a
set of social relations which restricts Africans as
Afr ic a n s ).
The final analytical concept which we employed was the
notion of intergroup a r e n a ; that is, the general environment
in which groups come

Into c o n t a c t . In our examination of the

South African case, we noted the impact of a myriad of variables--e.g.,

geographical location,

ecology, mineral wealth,

economic c yc le s— upon eth-class struggle.
"background variables" shaped
changing interests,

intergroup relations by

guiding strategies,

power of groups to achieve their goals.
found that demography

Each of these

and affecting the
For example,

we

(i.e., the relative size of groups)

played a particularly salient role in determining group
strategies.
majority,

Factors such as the overwhelming African

the sixty-forty split of the settler community

between Afrikaners and British, and the small size of the
Coloured and Indian groups all contributed to the historical
evolution of South African ethnic relations
strategies

(e.g., the

involved in establishing settler control over the

African m a j o r i t y ) .

Accordingly,

one might wonder how the

course of events could have been alter ed

if British settlers

had achieved a majority within the White community as had
been envisioned by Lord Milner at the turn of the century.
Would a politically dominant British capitalist class have
erected a less rigid system of dom ina tio n than apartheid?
Would an Afrikaner mi no ri ty have adopted a secessionist
strategy

(perhaps in the Transvaal and the Orange Free

State)?

Would a less rigid but still

onerous system of

exploitation have led to the more rap id assertion of Afric an
mobilization?

How would the various eth-classes have

responded to these changed circumstances?
questions are hypothetical,
point:
class

While these

they underscore our larger

different intergroup arenas produce different ethinterests and, hence, a different evolutionary course

for group i d e n t it ie s.
As is evident even in this brief summary,

our analysis

of the evolution of intergroup relations in South Africa
dr e w upon many different threads
unfolding of events.
which emerges
relations,

If there is one overarching conclusion

from our consideration of South African e th ni c

it is that they are not the product of primordial

ties or racist

ideologies,

interests of groups
occasions,

in order to explain the

but instead reflect the material

(which can, as we have noted on several

be affected by ideologies stemming from previous

in ter ac ti on ).

Thus, apartheid is best studied not as an

ideological system or a feudal relic,

but as a changing

system of social relations which
past events)

(although conditioned by

reflects both the interests and the constraints

of particular eth-classes
class struggle continues

in a specific context.
in South Africa,

As eth-

we ma y anticipate

yet the further transformation of intergroup relations and
ethnic

identities.

CHAPTER NOTES
CHAPTER VI

1.

As we indicated in Chapter I, South Africa is cu rrently
viewed as s e m i p e r i p h e r a l : that is, as containing a
mixture of core and peripheral activities (Arrighi and
Drangel 1986). Nevertheless, given what we believe to
be the relativity of the semiperiphery-periphery d i s 
tinction as well as the clearly peripheral nature of
South Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century,
it is our opinion that the South African case is best
analyzed in the context of the periphery.
At this point, we might ask:
Why choose South Africa
as a peripheral case study.
We believe that there are
distinct advantages to the selection of South Africa.
The stark nature of its ethnic structure has attracted
considerable scholarly attention, thereby providing a
rich store of material for secondary analysis.
More
over, the length of the South African experience (both
colonial and post-colonial) incorporates a broader
range of intergroup interaction, thus providing more
"data” for analysis.
Finally, South Africa constitutes
an excellent laboratory for application of those precepts--the influence of capitalist development, inter
group material conflict, and eth-class st ruggle— which
comprise the core of our theoretical framework.

2.

As a refueling station for ships, Cape Town offered the
advantages (vs. other African ports) of a temperate
climate, local water, and a small native population (de
Kiewiet 1957, p. 2).

3.

VOC is a popular historical acronym for the Dutch East
India Company (Vereeniode Nederlandsche Ge-Octroveerde
Oost-Indische Compagnie = United Netherlands Chartered
East India Company--cf. Katzen 1969, p. 183).
Henceforth, we will refer to the Dutch East India
Company as either the VOC or the Company.

4.

For a discussion of the issues involved in the choice
of the Dutch East India Company between trade and
colonization, see Wallerstein (1980, pp. 47-51).

5.

Indeed, for much of its tenure the VOC viewed the Cape
Colony as a net economic loss (Katzen 1969, pp. 20203) .
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6.

Indeed, VOC instructions for Jan van Riebeeck, the
first governor of the settlement, emphasized that
settlement should be limited (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 2;
Katzen 1969, p. 189).

7.

Indeed, the survival of a significant proportion of the
native population (we are referring here to the Ba n t u 
speaking groups as opposed to the Khoikhoin and the
San) is an historical fact which in itself sets the
South African experience apart from that of other
European settler societies.

8.

For an interesting comparison of European-native
relations in South Africa and the United States, see
Fredrickson (1981, pp. 3-53).

9.

Although contact and conflict between the Dutch
settlers and the Nguni-speaking peoples began in the
late eighteenth century, consideration of this subject
will be deferred to our discussion of the next
historical era (1800-1910), which is when the bulk of
the struggle occurred.

10.

The Khoikhoin (pejoratively called "Hottentots" by the
Dutch) and the San (called "Bushmen" by the Dutch) were
"click" language speaking pastoralists and hunters who
were physically and linguistically distinct from the
other native peoples of South Africa.
For a discussion
of the Khoikhoin and San peoples and their societies,
see M. Wilson (1969a).

11.

For a discussion of the uniqueness of the "colonial"
po l ic y of the V O C — that is, how the desire to maintain
trade relations provided an incentive for accommodation
with native p eo ple s— see Wallerstein (1980, p. 48) and
Fredrickson (1981, pp. 19-20).
On the other hand, if
circumstances seemed to favor the acquisition of
wealth instead of trade, the VOC could be particularly
ruthless (Fredrickson 1981, p. 19; Magubane 1979, pp.
26-30) .

12.

According to M. Wilson (1969a, pp. 67-8), the Khoikhoin
population of the Cape Colony dwindled from an e s t i 
mated 200,000 in 1652 to approximately 20,000 in 1805.

13.

The Bastaards or Griquas were a persons of mixed
anc est ry (Khoikhoin, Dutch, slave) who fled the Cape
area and settled to the north of the colony.
Described
as "Europeanized" (e.g., religion, language, use of
European clothes and arms), the Bastaards/Griquas
established themselves as a new group.
During the
nineteenth century, however, they were absorbed by the
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expansion of European colonial society and disappeared
as a separate group (Macmillan 1963, p. 57; M. Wilson
1969a, p. 70).
14.

The impact of this accultur at ion and assimilation was
not lost up on the neighboring Nguni-speaking peoples,
w h o referred to the early nineteenth century Khoikhoin
as "the people without customs" (M. Wilson 1969b, p.
105).
In comparison to the Khoikhoin, the fate of the
San was even more stark (cf. M. Wilson 1969a, pp. 701).
As the combined population of the Cape area
increased the supply of game (upon which the San
hunters were dependent) decreased, thus forcing the
San to turn to cattle rustling for survival.
As a
consequence, they were hunted and exterminated in a
genocidal manner.
Those who did survive were absorbed
into the Coloured group.

15.

For further discussion of the notion of contradictory
class location, see Wright et al. (1982, p. 710).

16.

The initial plan of the VOC called for farming to be
carried out by company soldier/farmers; however, the
low productivity of this workforce forced the Company
to encourage the establishment of free landholders in
the hope that economic self-interest would inspire
greater productivity--to the ultimate benefit of the
V O C (de Kiewiet 1957, p . 5).

17.

For a comment on how these conflicts were magnified in
later South African history (to serve as an ideological
cornerstone of modern Afrikaner identity), see de
Kiewiet (1957, p. 8).

18.

Env ir onm ental/economic factors which promoted migration
into the interior included: abundant land (and the
weakness of Khoikhoin resistance); low agricultural
pr o duc ti vit y (which required large landholdings and
expansion to accommodate population growth); and the
lack of markets, labor, and capital (which precluded
alternatives to herding).
For further discussion of
these issues, see Ka tzen (1969, pp. 208-12) and de
Kiewiet (1957, pp. 11-15).

19.

Indeed, du ri ng the e a r l y years of European settlement,
the Company went so far as to consider building a canal
and/or a hedg e to separate the settlers and the
Khoikhoin (de Kiewiet, 1957, p. 20).

20.

In essence, this created a self-fulfilling cycle.
European settlement was tolerated due to the perceived
un rel ia bi li ty of the Khoikhoin as trading partners.
As
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European expansion disrupted the native way of life,
the Company became increasingly dependent upon White
farmers and herders and, hence, more tolerant of
further settlement (Fredrickson 1981, p. 33).
21.

The small number of European immigrants, the existence
of alternatives to unskilled labor (e.g., the a v a i l a 
bility of land for agriculture or herding), and the
perceived social instability inherent in sizable White
working class, meant that other sources of labor would
have to be sought (Katzen 1969, pp. 200-02; Fredrickson
1981, p. 67).
Similarly, while cattleless Khoikhoin
could often be induced to labor for Europeans, the
proximity of their own society made it difficult for
Europeans to find a sufficient supply of stable, lon g
term labor.
These circumstances were remarkably to
those in the Southern United States as described in
Chapter V.

22.

For a more detailed discussion of the VOC debate on the
relative merits of slavery and free labor, see Katze n
(1969, pp. 200-04).

23.

For an in-depth discussion of South African slavery,
including interesting comparisons to the Southern
United States, see Fredrickson (1981, pp. 54-93).

24.

This process of miscegenation was not random with
respect to choice of partners, at least from the
perspective of the European population.
Fredrickson
(1981, pp. 110-117) describes a preference system in
which persons of mixed or Asian background were favored
over East Africans or Khoikhoin.
Indeed, DutchKhoikhoin unions faced greater social disapproval and
only tended to occur along the frontier.
It was the
socially outcast offspring of these latter unions who
formed the bulk of the Bastaard (later Grigua)
population mentioned earlier (cf. Fredrickson 1981, pp.
123-24).

25.

Indeed, several studies cited by Fredrickson (1981, pp.
114-15) suggest that a considerable portion of the
current South African Afrikaner population could be
said to have mixed ancestry.
Utilizing genealogical
data, Fredrickson (1981, p. 115) calculates that
approximately "twenty-four percent of the founding
marriages taking place between 1688 and 1807 involved
one spouse, usually female, who had some known de gree
of nonWhite ancestry."

26.

According to de Kiewiet (1957, p. 30), the total
population of the Cape in 1795 consisted of 13,500
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persons in Cape Town and the western districts and an
estimated 7000-8000 persons in the rest of the colony.
27.

For discussion of conflicts between the Boer indepen
dent class and the VOC, see Katzen {1969, pp. 227-28),
Macmillan (1963, pp. 43-47), and Davenport (1969, pp.
311-12) .

28.

This changing of the colonial guard was not marked by
armed conflict; however, control of the Cape Colony
oscillated over a period of eleven years at the
beginning of the century.
The British first occupied
the Cape in 1795, then returned control to the Dutch
(Batavian Republic) in 1803, and then assumed final
control of the area in 1806 (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. BO33; Davenport 1969, p. 273).

29.

According to de Kiewiet (1957, p. 70) net European
immigration to South Africa during the period between
1820 and 1860 averaged roughly 750 persons per year.

30.

By African we refer to the native peoples of South
Africa other than the Khoikhoin and the San, those who
are often loosely characterized as Bantu-speaking
peoples.
The major division within this group is
between the Nguni-speaking peoples of southeastern
South Africa (of whom the Xhosa and the Zulus were the
most significant, but whose ranks also included the
Ndebele and the Swazi) and the peoples of the northern
interior (of whom the Sot ho— subdivided into the
Southern Sotho, the Northern Sotho, and the Tswan a—
were the largest group, but also including the Venda
and the Tsonga.
For an extensive discussion of these
peoples, see M. Wilson (1969b; 1969d).

31.

According to Thompson (1969c, p. 400), approximately
5000 Afrikaner voortrekkers had crossed the Orange by
1837, a number which roughly tripled in the next eight
years.
Physically, the Great Trek consisted of two
separate movements:
one northward along the high veld,
where Boer migration was ultimately constrained by the
Kalahari desert to the vest and by environments co ndu 
cive to malaria to the north and east (e.g., near the
Limpopo River and towards the coastal lowlands); the
other (initially more popular) northeast, then south
through passes in the Drakensburg Mountains into
southern Natal (Macmillan 1963, pp. 200-07; Thompson
1969c, p. 409; 1969b, p. 358).

32.

According to Davenport (1969, p. 274), the White
settler population expanded from 8554 in 1773 to
in 1819 to 187,439 in 1865.
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33.

As Macmillan (1963, pp. 195-99) indicates, this image
is overstated inasmuch as the Great Trek was much less
sudden than is often portrayed in history.

34.

The initial Brit ish reaction to the Great Trek was
weak:
the colonial administration opposed Boer
emigration yet made no de cisive response (de Kiewiet
1957, p. 61; Tho mpson 1969c, p. 410).
For cogent
analyses of Briti sh imperial imperatives during this
period, see de Kiewiet (1957, p. 65); Thompson 1969a,
p. 368).
For an enlightening discussion of British
colonial "models" (e.g., settler societies such as
Canada and Australia vs. col onies such as India--with
South Africa located somewhere in between), see
Thompson (1969b, p. 248).

35.

During the following three decades (1836-67), BritishBoer relations exhibited v ar yi ng levels of conflict and
cooperation.
In general, G r e a t Britain was willing to
countenance Boer autonomy (which, after all, relieved
Britain of the co st of go verning--Macmillan 1963, pp.
324-25) as long as the Boer republics pos ed no threat
to British imperial interests (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 65;
Thompson, 1969a, p. 368).
For their part, the Boers
were too divided and too occupied with subduing the
Africans to mount a significant challenge to British
hegemony (Thompson 1969c, pp. 425-35).
This uneasy
relationship be tw een British and Boers was manifest in
the Sand River an d Bloemfontein Conventions (1852/54)
in which Britain recognized the independence of the
South African Republic and the Orange Free State--a
tacit alliance between Eur opean groups where Britain
agreed to supply arms to the Boers so as to enable the
extension of White rule (Thompson 1969c, pp. 420-24;
Fredrickson 1981, p. 187).

36.

News of the dis co ve ry of the diamond fields was
presented by the Colonial Secret ar y to the Cape Hou se
of Assembly with the now-famous (and prescient) wor ds
(quoted in Hou ghton 1969, p. 11):
"Gentlemen, this is
the rock on which the future success of South Africa
will be built."

37.

The Witwatersrand mines did not constitute the first
discovery of gold in South A fr ic a (small findings had
been reported in the South Afric an Republic as e a r l y as
1868--Innes 1984, p. 45); however, the scope of the
Witwatersrand m i n e s — described as the greatest in
history (de Ki ew iet 1957, pp. 115-17)--makes 1886 the
baseline for discussion of the influence of gold up on
South African society.
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38.

For detailed data on South African gold output,
Innes (1984, pp. 246-47).

see

39.

Indeed, without the gold and diamond industries, the
subsequent evolution of South Africa would pr oba bl y
have been more similar to that of Southern Rhodesia
Zimbabwe (cf. Arrighi 1979, pp. 184-90).

40.

For more detailed discussion of the social and economic
effects of the South African mining revolution, see de
Kiew iet (1957); van Onselen (1979); Martin (1987);
Magubane (1979); and Houghton (1969).

41.

For example, Southall (1983, pp. 70-71) describes a
measurable impact of mining upon native agriculture as
far away as Pondoland on the border between the Cape
Co l o n y and Natal.

42.

The emergence of South African mon opoly capital also
had important political ramifications.
Rhodes' British
South Africa company was a major force in extending
British control into the interior of Africa (e.g.,
Bechuanaland and the Rhodesias), while Rhodes himself
served as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony in the
1890s.

43.

The group system, as developed in the South African
gold industry, entailed combining finance houses into
groups which in turn controlled (as the dominant
mi no ri ty partner) several mining companies.
This
sy st em enabled the industry to amass large amounts of
capital while distributing (and thereby minimizing)
risk, with the added advantage of maintaining liquidity
for future investment--and even greater control of the
industry (cf. Innes 1984, pp. 54-56).

44.

Indeed, a major objective of the Chamber of Mines
(an
organization of monopoly capital in the gold industry)
was the procurement of a stable supply of cheap labor
(cf. Innes 1984, pp. 57-69).

45.

For example, in his discussion of South Africa in 1870,
Thompson (1969b, p. 245) describes five types of
societies:
independent African chiefdoms, p r o t e c 
torates (e.g., the Southern Sotho), small autonomous
communities (e.g., the Griqua), the Afrikaner r e p u b 
lics, and the British colonies.

46.

Note the resemblance of this conflict to the conflict
betw een Europeans and Native A m er ic an s — which we
described as a "national" conflict in Chapter V.
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47.

The nineteenth century African societies which faced
this European invasion ranged from small chiefdoms to
large kingdoms (cf. M. Wilson 1969b; 1969c; 1969d).
From a military standpoint, African societies had been
weakened by rivalries between groups and by internal
tendencies towards division, a situation often e x p l o i 
ted by Europeans (Thompson 1969c, p. 438).
These w e a k 
nesses were exacerbated by the Pifaaane and M f e c a n e -"forced migration" and "crushing of peoples" (Martin
1987, p. 864)--a domino-like series of wars and d i s l o 
cations triggered by the Zulu conquests of the 1820s
(Thompson 1969c).

48.

For an illustration of the relationship between
resources and intergroup conflict, see de Kiewiet
(1957, p. 75) on the link between drought and border
conflict.

49.

Examples of African resistance abound.
The Northern
Sotho drove the Boers out of the northern Transvaal in
the 1860s and 1870s; the Southern Sotho defeated an
invasion by the Orange Free State in the 1850s; and the
Zulu annihilated a force of 1600 British soldiers at
Isandlwana in 1879 (Thompson 1969b, 1969c).
On the
other hand, the superior firepower of the Europeans
often resulted in unequal outcomes (e.g., a small force
of voortrekkers defeated and killed a much larger
number of Zulus at Blood River in 1838— Thompson 1969a,
p. 362).

50.

For example, the estimated population of
included 250,000 Africans, as opposed to
Europeans (Thompson 1969a, p. 387).

51.

For a detailed description of such policies in the
South African Republic and in Natal, see Thompson
(1969c, p. 436; 1969a, p. 367).

52.

Clearly, we are simplifying the complex process of
incorporation of Africans into colonial society.
The
degree of autonomy/control varied in conjunction with
such factors as location, degree of economic inter
dependence, etc.

53.

For example, cultural diffusion (via trade) created new
wants which in turn induced Africans to enter the c o l o 
nial economy (e.g., either via cash crop production or
wage labor).
These external economic links weakened
traditional African polity by eliminating economic
basis of the power of African chiefs (cf. Thompson
1969a, p. 335).
We should note, however, that this
process occurred in varying degrees for different

Natal in 1870
only 18,000
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African peoples.
54.

Note, for example, the following recommendation of the
Natal "Kaffir Commission" of the early 1850s (cited in
Magubane, 1979, p . 61):
All Kaffirs should be ordered to go decently
clothed.
This measure would at once tend to
increase the number of laborers, because many
would be obliged to work to produce the means of
buying clothing; it would also add to the general
revenue of the colony through Customs duties.

55.

According to Thompson (1969a, p. 366), the voortrekkers
described Africans as s k e p s e l s . or creatures of a
different sub-species.
In Natal, a commission
empaneled to make policy recommendations regarding
Africans described them as follows (cited in Thompson
1969a, p. 384):
When not effectually restrained and directed by
the strong arm of power, the true and universal
character of the Kafirs, as framed by their
education, habits, and associations, is at once
superstitious and warlike.
Their estimate of the
value of human life is very low; plunder and
bloodshed are engagements with which their
circumstances have rendered them familiar since
their childhood; they are crafty and cunning; at
once indolent and excitable; averse to labour; but
bloodthirsty and cruel when their passions are
in f l a m e d .

56.

On this point,

57.

Given the role of Eu rop ea ns— who were more race
conscious (i.e., in terms of emphasizing the BlackWhite division and in terms of asserting White
superiority) and who tended to vi e w all Africans as a
unitary bloc (more so than the Africans th e ms el ve s) — in
creating this new African ethnic identity, one might
refer to this identity as a "Kaffir" identity (using
the derogatory European term for Africans to reflect
the ability of dominant groups to impose--and to
debase--ethnic identities).

58.

As a footnote to our discussion of conflict between
Europeans and Africans, we should note its impact upon
the Coloured population who figured so prominently in
the first one hundred and fifty years of colonial h i s 
tory.
With the expansion of South African society and
the wholesale incorporation of African (i.e., Ba n tu 
speaking) peoples, the influence of the Coloured group
was reduced d ra mat ic all y— except perhaps in the Cape

see also Fanon

(1968, pp.

236-48).
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Colony--due to their small numbers relative to
Africans.
While some Coloured groups persisted along
the frontiers until the 1 8 7 0 s — e.g, the Griqua states
(cf. Thompson 1969b)— a more common process was the
continued deculturation and amalgamation of Khoikhoi,
San, and others (e.g., ex-slaves, persons with a
"m i xe d”— including pa rti al ly European background) into
a mostly europeanized "Coloured" ethnic group (Fredric
kson 1981, pp. 131-35; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 38-42;
M. Wilson 1969c, p. 248).
In both cases, Coloureds
were absorbed into South African colonial society as an
intermediate and marginal group.
59.

As mentioned in our dis cu ssi on of the pre-1800 era, the
interests of settlers were different from that of the
colonial power, even when this involved Dutch settlers
and the Dutch-controlled VOC.
Thus, we would suggest
that while ethnonational divisions m a y have amplified
or even added a new dimens io n to this colonial powersettler conflict, they did not cause it.
Consequently,
we reject the idealist interpretation (such as that of
D a ve np or t- -1 9 69, p. 277) of this conflict as one
between pre-Enlightenment Calvinism and nineteenth
centu ry liberalism.

60.

There did exist early Boer ethnonational resistance to
British rule, particularly in the areas of language and
education.
On the other hand, the improvement in the
economic position of the settlers (i.e., the effects of
British liberalism vs. V O C monopoly control) had a
dampening effect upon this conflict.

61.

British settlers were more likely to be urban dwellers,
merchants, and capitalist farmers (de Kiewiet 1957, p.
39; Davenport 1969, p. 274).

62.

For natives in the British colonies, equality under
the law did not mean social equality.
Property qu a l i 
fications for the franchise limited the native vote,
while pass systems and "masters and servants" laws
maintained a supply of ch e ap native labor.
In a d d i 
tion, planned programs for native education and d e v e l 
opment were never carried out as Britain was unwilling
to absorb the costs (Thompson 1969a, p. 375; de Kiewiet
1957, pp. 35-51).
For an enlightening discussion of
the whole phenomenon of "Cape liberalism", see
Fredrickson (1981, pp. 182-86).

63.

Moreover, the ideological difference between British
and Boers was less than would appear on the surface.
When objective material circumstances were s i m i l a r — as
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was the case with British settlers in Natal (Thompson
1969a, p. 383)--there was a convergence of attitudes
towards natives.
64.

For a description of the ann ex ati on of the Transvaal
and subsequent events, see Th omp so n (1969d, pp. 295300) and de Kiewiet (1957, pp. 103-08).
The British
annexation of the Transvaal was made possible by a
state of anarchy which existed in the Transvaal in the
mid 1870s; however, Britain was unwilling to invest
sufficient resources for effective rule.
Afrikaner
rebellion in 1880 resulted in the mil itary defeat and
withdrawal of Great Britain and the restoration of
Afrikaner self government via the Pretoria Convention
of 1881.

65.

One key aspect of this identity should be noted;
namely, the fusion of Afrikaner identity with the
"rightful" domination of "inferior" A f r ic an s— the
notion of baaskap (cf. Fredrickson 1981, p. 193).

66.

From an ideological standpoint, see Thompson's (1969d,
pp. 301-05) interesting di scussion of the role of the
Cape-based Afrikaner Bond in providing a cultural base
for Afrikaner nationalism.

67.

Afrikaner strategies included:
attempts at expansion
(e.g., the annexation of Stellaland and Goshen to the
west and Swaziland to the east); the search for an
outlet to the sea beyond B r it is h control (i.e., the
rail link to Delagoa Bay in Portuguese Mozambique and
the use of tariffs to favor this route over ports in
the Cape Colony and Natal); political flirtation with
Germany; and restriction of the political rights of
non-Afrikaner Europeans in the Transvaal (de Kiewiet
1957, pp. 110-11, 122-26; Tho m ps on 1969d, pp. 311-12).

68.

From the vantage point of the gold industry, the
policies of the South African Republic (e.g., tariffs,
monopolies) and the political division of South Africa
constituted a drag on profits (de Kiewiet 1957, pp.
134-35).

69.

For a more detailed discussion, see Thompson
pp. 313-24; de Kiewiet (1957, pp. 126-40).

70.

For an outline of the military strengths and weaknesses
of each side, see Thompson (1969e, pp. 325-26).

71.

For example, see Marais (1961) and Le May (1965).
See
also the references cited by Thompson (1969e, p. 325).

(1969d,
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72.

On one hand, the Sou th African Wa r bears interesting
similarities to the U.S. Civil War, which we inter
preted in Chapter V as primarily a class conflict
between the industrial North and the Southern planta
tion class (albeit w i t h ideological rallying points-e.g., states' rights, antislavery).
On the other hand,
Afrikaner nationalism gives a unique tenor to the South
African conflict, inasmuch as "Southerner" never fully
emerged as an ethnonational ide ntity in the United
States.

73.

Symbolically, Vereeniging, the site of the AngloAfrikaner treaty e nd in g the South African War, means
"union" in Afrikaans (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 143).
From
an African standpoint, Magubane (1979, p . 48) describes
the Anglo-Boer War as "a classic case of a ‘thieves'
falling out" and the Treaty of Ve reeniging as a
"reconciliation between the intruders."
British
generosity in victory towards the Afrikaners stands in
sharp contrast to their treatment of the Zulus two
decades previously (cf. Magubane 1979, pp. 48-49).

74.

Some interesting historical similarities exist between
the Afrikaners and F re n ch -Ca na dia ns in Quebec.
Both
were conquered peoples forcibly absorbed into Britishruled settler societies.
Both gr oup s nurtured
identities in isolation during th e nineteenth century.
In both cases it was assumed that modernization would
bring assimi lation--and in both cases modernization
instead contributed to the persistence of grou p identities.

75.

For a discussion of forces promo tin g union, see
Thompson (1969e).
One issue of historical significance
for the future of Sou th Africa w a s the fact that the
South Africa Act separa ted the H i g h Commission terri
tories of Southern Rhodesia, Basutoland, Swaziland, and
Bechuanaland from the Union of S o u t h Africa (cf.
Thompson 1969e, pp. 362-63).

76.

During the war, neither the Br it ish nor the Boers
employed Africans as troops (Thompson 1969e, p . 326).
Furthermore, Africans were not al lo wed to participate
in the drafting of the South A f r i c a n Constitution and
were rendered politica lly non-existent by provisions
which retained the ex ist in g co lonial franchise laws.
This meant that Africans were proscribed from voting in
the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, while fran
chise qualifications in Natal and the Cape effectively
excluded Africans.
For example, in 1910 Whites co m
prised 85% of the electorate in th e Cape (with
Coloureds constituting much of the remainder) and 99%
of the electorate of Natal (Thompson 1969e, pp. 337-39).
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77.

Accor din g to Fredrickson (1981, pp. 195-96), British
racism played a key role in the British willingness to
sacrifice African interests.
He quotes Lord Milner,
British High Commissioner for South Africa du ri ng the
post-war period, as follows:
A political equality of White and Black is
impossible.
The White man must rule, because he
is elevated by many, man y steps above the Black
man; steps which it will take the latter centuries
to climb, and which it is possible that the vast
bulk of the White population m a y never be able to
climb at all.

78.

The importance of continued settler dominance was not
lost upon the Afrikaners who, due to their lower class
position, had the most to lose from a n y improvement in
the status of Africans.
In the words of Afrikaner
leader Jan Smuts (cited in M a g u b a ne -- 19 79 , p . 52):
two peoples [Black and White] cannot indefinitely
go on living side by side without some major
future explosion.
For this day of reckoning we
Whites must prepare.
We must see that we have in
our power all those things which can insure
tactical and military superiority. . . . M a n u f a c 
turing, industry, wealth, and education must be
kept in White hands.

79.

The decisions made in the writing of the South African
Constitution (British South Africa Act of 1909) played
a vital role in shaping the future of South African
society.
Key elements of this process included:
(1)
the adoption of existing voting systems (which assured
the disenfranchisement of the African population); (2)
the establishment of the Dutch language on equal status
with English (thereby institutionalizing Afrikaner cul
ture); (3) the establishment of a s ys t e m of political
representation which gave disproportionate influence to
rural areas (thus increasing Afrikaner political
power); and (4) the retention by Great Britain of its
other colonies in Southern Africa— B e c h u a na la nd , Swazi
land, Basutoland, and the Rhodesias--which meant that
they would not be included in the settler-dominated
South African state.
For a more extensive discussion
of these issues, see Thompson (1969e, pp. 337-39).

80.

This is not to assert that the African peoples were in
themselves a class, but instead to recognize that they
were universally incorporated into the working classes
of the colonial economy.
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81.

As Freund (1988, p. 112) observes, prior to complete
subjection Africans were often able to retreat beyond
the frontiers of European settlement and thereby
preserve the core of traditional economic structures.

82.

In his definition of peasantization, Saul (1979, p.
304) emphasizes the "structural subordination" of
peasants; that is, their incorporation into a larger
system of stratification.

83.

As part of the economic incorporation of Africans,
colonial administrators and missionaries sought to
encourage individual land ownership rather than the
traditional communal tenure.
For a discussion of this
point, see M. Wilson (1969e, p. 60).

84.

Land restriction imposed on Africans and unequal access
to markets had the effect of limiting the emergence of
capitalist agriculture, wi t h the exception of those
chiefs and their allies who were able to use extraeconomic methods to amass land and cattle (Southall
1983, pp. 85-87).
Thus, the African comprador class
was able to use its position to become a rural "elite"
(within the confines of the African community).

85.

One exception to this agricultural underdevelopment was
the introduction of Merino sheep, which, according to
Houghton (1969, pp. 4-5), "carried the impact of the
world market into the interior" of South Africa.
Otherwise, farming remained mostly at the subsistence
leve l.

86.

This resulted in dramatic declines in productivity, to
the extent that traditional grain exporters (e.g.,
Sotho in Basutoland; Mpondo in the Transkei) lost their
ability to produce a surplus (Southall 1983, p. 72; M.
Wilson 1969e, p. 69).

87.

The status of migrant workers has been the subject of a
debate as to whether they constitute a peasantry or a
rural proletariat.
On one hand, Arrighi (1979, p. 163)
described peasants as increasing consumption by
"raiding" the industrial economy.
Monica Wilson
(19 69e , p. 68) and Saul (1979, p. 305) would define
migrant workers with land rights as peasants.
On the
other hand, Innes (1984, pp. 60-61) described migrant
workers as a proletariat located in rural areas.
We
would suggest that these peasants are at least
partially proletarianized— to the extent that wage
labor is necessary for survival--while recognizing that
the migratory process limits the emergence of a
traditional proletariat.
This was especially true in
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the latter decades of the nineteenth century.
88.

Thus, South Africa experienced the contradictory
condition of having both a labor shortage and u n d e r 
employment (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 83-84).

89.

According to Welsh (1969, p. 173), urban Africans in
1911 constituted only 12.6% of the total African
population (although the m ig ra tor y labor pattern
undoubtedly meant that a greater proportion of the
African population came into contact with urban
society).

90.

Interestingly, one lever which was not employed was
raising wages.
As F. Wilson (1969) notes, one tenet of
colonial society was the belief that increased wages
would only result in fewer hours worked by Africans
(i.e., that less labor would be required in order to
be able to purchase desired consumer goods).
This was
at variance with reality:
Afr ica n labor displayed
considerable sensitivity to wage fluctuations (Innes
1984, pp. 62-67).

91.

There is an interesting si milarity between the Gl e n
Grey Act and the Dawes Act (discussed in Chapter V)
imposed by Whites upon Native Americans.

92.

According to M. Wilson (1969e, p. 65), most Europeans
viewed peasant status as a state of "idleness".
More
telling, perhaps, are the words of a Lieutenant
Governor of Natal (quoted by Welsh--1969, p. 176):
It seems impossible for a body of White men to
live in proximity to the coloured races, without a
conviction that as the dominant people, they have
a right to command the services of the less
civilized.

93.

As we noted earlier, the key to profitability in gold
mi ning— given that prices were set on the world market
(virtually unlimited demand at a fixed p r i c e ) — was cost
c o n t r o l . Since the nature of gold mining in South
Africa required a heavy investment in fixed capital
(e.g., machinery), the major area for achieving economy
(and, hence, insuring profitability) was wages (i.e.,
variable capital).

94.

In other words, the existing wage level assumed that
part of the subsistence needs of African workers and
their families were being met by a source other th an
wages paid by the mining industry.
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95.

Many displaced farmers passed through intermediate
steps before entering the wage labor workforce.
Some
became bvwoners (i.e., tenant farmers), while others
prospered as petty bourgeois entrepreneurs (e.g.,
brickmaking, t r an s p o r t a t i o n ) . Ultimately, however,
these occupations fell victim to the expansion of
market relations (e.g., large industry displaced the
independent brickmakers; completion of the rail link to
Johannesburg eliminated wagon hauling).
For further
discussion of this point, see van Onselen (1979);
Thompson (1969e, p. 329); and de Kiewiet (1957, pp.
191-96) .

96.

The importance of cheap African labor was abundantly
clear to White South Africans.
For example, the
Landsdown Commission of 1944 (cited in M ag ub an e - - 1 9 7 9 ,
p. 97) commented that:
The gold mining industry of the Witwatersrand has
indeed been fortunate in having secured, for its
unskilled labour, native peasants who have been
prepared to come to the Witwatersrand for periods
of labour at comparatively low rates of pay. . . .
. . That the results accruing from this cheap
native labour supply have had a profoundly
beneficial influence on the general economic
development of the Union is a matter that needs no
demonstration.
Not only has the earth yielded up
a great body of wealth which would have remained
unexploited, but vast amounts of money have been
paid away in wages and put into circulation for
the acquiring of equipment and stores necessary
for the working of the mines and this, in turn,
has had the beneficial effect upon the development
of secondary industries.

97.

Indeed, as we will see below, the South African state
played a unique and central role in industrial
development.
Beginning with the formation of the state
iron and steel corporation (ISCOR) in 1928, government
established korporasies came to pla y an increasingly
important role in the South African economy (cf. Davies
1973, pp. 48-49; Southall 1983, p. 27).

98.

As Innes (1984, pp. 123-24) observes, South African
protectionism and local development may not have run
counter to British interests.
Through the Ottawa
Agreement of 1932, Great Britain gained preferential
market status for its capital goods, thereby insuring
that it benefitted from industrialization within the
British Commonwealth (cf. Beaud 1983, pp. 165-66)
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99.

South Africa was an attractive locus of investment for
core capital for a vari ety of reasons:
cheap African
labor; low taxes and tariffs; an infrastructure
sufficiently developed to support industry; and the
distance of South Africa from the gathering storm
clouds of European conflict (Magubane 1979, p. 203).
For a list of core-based multinationals which es t a b 
lished an early presence in South Africa, see Innes
(1984, p. 131).

100. For a discussion of the problems of "low grade mines"
(i.e., mines with smaller amounts of profitable ore
given rising costs), see Johnstone (1987, pp. 102-04).
According to the Chamber of Mines, two-thirds of South
African gold mines in 1921 were only profitable as a
result of the gold premium (Johnstone 1987, p. 130).
101.

The dimension of the problems facing South African
agriculture is reflected in the scope of government
legislation during this period.
For an extended
discussion of this point, see de Kiewiet (1957, pp.
250-59) and F. Wilson (1969, pp. 136-42).

102. For a similar argument, see Burawoy (1974, pp. 527-28)
on the interaction between base and superstructure in
South African society.
103. Our point here is not that these were the only ethclass groupings in early twentieth century South
Africa, but merely that they were the most significant
political and economic actors.
Other eth-classes
clearly existed (e.g., Indian and Coloured working
classes); however, they played a relatively minor
historical role.
104. Our review of the literature found a rather d i s c o nc er t
ing array of terms used to describe this eth-class,
including "rural bourgeoisie" (Southall 1983, p. 32);
"landed upper classes" or "landed aristocracy" (Burawoy
1974, p. 537); "Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie" (Magubane
1979, p. 106); and "farmers" (F. Wilson 1969).
While
this undoubtedly reflects the increasing d i f f e re nt ia 
tion among rural Afrikaners, it also indicates a need
for further research into the nature of this class. At
this juncture, we believe that the term "Afrikaner
petty bourgeoisie" best captures the intermediate
position of this eth-class (i.e., their ability to
dominate African labor, their relative weakness vis-avis mining capital); however, we recognize that this
represents an attempt to capture a continuum which
ranges from a "landed aristocracy" comparable to that
of the southern United States to small-scale indepen
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dent farmers.
In a n y event, ve believe that the
exclusive use of such terms as "rural bourgeoisie" or
"landed aristocracy" describes an entire class on the
basis of a "fraction" of that class.
105. See T h om ps on (1969e, p. 341) on how British concessions
following the South African War encouraged the accommodationist policies of Botha and Smuts.
At the same
time, this stance caused Botha and Smuts to be viewed
as "traitors" by Afrikaner nationalists (Moodie 1975,
pp. 82-88).
For a discussion of the "internationalism"
of Smuts and his role in the British Commonwealth, see
Spence (1969, pp. 481-85).
106. This discussion will focus upon the actions and
interests of mining capital and the Afrikaner petit
bourgeoisie; issues of African working class resistance
will be discussed separately below.
107.

The 1913 Natives La nd Act did not emerge de n o v o , but
had its genesis in the recommendations of a 1905 Native
Affairs Commission Report (cf. Magubane 1979, pp. 8081; F. Wilson 1969, p. 129).

108.

Due to opposition from Afrikaner agricultural in t er 
ests, t h i s additional land was not released until after
1936 w h e n the limited African franchise in the Cape was
terminated (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 131; Magubane
1979, p. 81).

109. For a description of "farming on the half", "Kaffir
farming", and other South Afri can systems of a g r i c u l 
tural tenancy, see F. Wilson (1969, pp. 127-29).
This
provision was not completely successful, as many
Africans were able to enter into illegal "squatter"
tenency arrangements with Afrikaner farmers (de Kiewiet
1957, pp. 202-03; F. Wilson 1969, p. 130).
110. During the debate on the Natives Land Act, some members
of the Labour P a r t y characterized the legislation as a
device designed to create "an abundance of cheap Kafir
Labour" (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 130).
The focus of
the A ct is stated even more clearly in the words of a
prominent Afrikaner politician of the 1930s (Jan
Hofmeyr, cited in Fredrickson 1981, p. 244):
it is inconceivable that the White man should be
a b l e to co mpletely dispense with the Black man's
labor on his farms, in his mines, in his fac
tories; it is just as inconceivable that there
s ho u l d be set aside for the Black man's occupation
land sufficient to provide for all his needs
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independent of the White man's wages.
111. For elaboration of this p oi n t/ see Magubane
93-97).
112.

(1979,

pp.

Indeed, Wolpe (1972, p. 437) maintains that the other
provision of the Natives Land Act--the proscription
against Whites purchasing land within the reserves— had
the consequence of preserving the land base of the
reserve economy.
This protection of African land, in
conjunction with limits on the size of landholdings and
the seemingly deliberate underdevelopment of African
agriculture, effectively maintained the reserve base of
the migrant labor system (Southall 1983, pp. 76-79;
Wolpe 1972, p. 438).

113. One effect of the. pass system of the early twentieth
century was to make it difficult if not impossible to
bargain in the labor market.
Africans were required to
secure a pass within twenty-four hours of arrival in an
area; if they had not secured employment within six
day, they were subject to arrest and expulsion.
In
the same vein, passes were also required for Africans
to leave mining compounds or to change jobs.
For
further discussion of this point, see Johnstone (1987,
p p . 37-39 ) .
114. Our purpose here in emphasizing the eth-class struggles
between mining capital and the Afrikaner petit
bourgeoisie and between mining capital and the White
working class is not to ignore two other significant
eth-class issues, African resistance and Afrikaner
ethnic assertion.
These phenomena will be treated
separately below.
115. According to Davies (1973, p . 43) and Simons and Simons
(1969, p. 271), Afrikaners constituted 75% of the
mining labor force by the mid 1920s.
Johnstone (1987,
p. 105) asserts that this milestone was reached by the
end of World War I . In either event, the k e y issue for
our purposes is the increasing entry of Afrikaners into
the working class.
116. An important aspect of the wage structure was, as de
Kiewiet (1957, p. 210) observed, the absence of a
graded wage scale and the existence instead of an
abrupt gap between White and African wages.
This
increased the stake of the White working cl ass in
maintaining ethnically-based job distinctions.
In the
same vein, Simons and Simons (1969, p. 277) suggest
that some White miners were both petty-bourgeois
contractors and wage laborers to the extent that the
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wages of supervisors were linked to the output of
African labor under their supervision.
This would
further divide the interests of White and African
la b or .
117. As Fredrickson (1981, p. 228) observes, Africans could
not be excluded in the same manner that Chinese and
Eastern Europeans were in the United States.
Conse
quently, the role of colour bar legislation was to
enable the continued exploitation of unskilled African
labor while protecting White workers from competition.
118. This reflects the "contradictory class position" of the
White working class; that is, their membership in both
the dominant ethnic group and a subordinate class (cf.
Simons and Simons 1969, p. 89).
119. The industrial colour bar had strong ideological and
material roots which can be traced back to the
beginning of European settlement.
Underdevelopment,
limited immigration, and slavery had combined to create
an agricultural caste sy st em— one in which only nonWhites performed manual labor (F. Wilson 1969, p. 110;
Fredrickson 1981, p. 206).
Moreover, the prosperity of
European settlers derived from their ability to command
non-White labor.
When these economic interests were
compounded with racial and religious ideologies which
served to rationalize the dispossession and domination
of Africans, what emerged were cultural and institu
tional practices (e.g., increasingly rigid group
boundaries, ideologies of White superiority) which
could ea sily be transplanted to new circumstances.
More recently (i.e., 1870), this relationship between
competition and discrimination had been evident when
White pet ty bourgeois diamond diggers created a colour
bar to eliminate their native competitors (Welsh 1969,
p. 181).
Thus, the industrial colour bar reflected the
adaptation of earlier practices to new material
interests in a changing intergroup arena.

120. As evidence of the interest of capital in retaining
some form of colour bar, it is significant that after a
1923 judicial ruling (the Hildrick-Smith case) which
held that the colour bar regulations exceeded the
wording of the 1911 Mines and Works Act and therefore
had no legal basis, the mining industry made no attempt
to eliminate colour bars (cf. Johnstone 1987, pp. 14550) .
121.

During this period, the wages of White miners increased
by roughly 50%, while the wages of African workers
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increased by only 9% (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 235).
122. Acquiescence to the Status Quo Agreement reflected the
relatively weak position of mining capital in 1918--a
situation which was recognized by the Chamber of Mines.
For a discussion of this point, see Johnstone (1987,
pp. 111-14) .
123. For example, colour bar regulations requiring certain
tasks to be performed under White supervision often
reduced effective labor time for Africans to 5-6 hours
per shift.
By increasing the autonomy of African labor
and using Africans as de facto supervisors (i.e.,
raising the colour bar), mine owners were able to
increase output per shift (Johnstone 1987, pp. 128-39).
124. According to data presented by Johnstone (1987, p.
145), mine output and dividends rose following the
strike, while cost per ton, total wages, and the number
of White employees all declined.
125.

In the 1924 parliamentary elections, the Nationalist
Party won 63 seats, Smuts' South African Party won 54
seats, and the Labour Party won 17 seats (cf. van den
Berghe 1965, p. 293).
Given that 68 seats were
necessary in order to establish a clear parliamentary
majority, the coalition between Labour and the
Nationalist Party was necessary in order to form a
government.
While this stood as the high water market
for the Labour P a r t y in electoral politics (it was
never thereafter a necessary component of a government
and it eventually withered away), the eth-class
alliance with the White working class remained an
essential aspect of the Nationalist Pa rt y power base.

126.

For example, Nationalist Pa r ty propaganda accused the
mine owners and Smuts of "Blackening'1 the industrial
sector while the party pl atform called for "saving
Whites" (Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 321-22; de Kiewiet
1957, p. 224).

127.

One indicator of the depth of concern of White South
African society with this problem was the number of
commissions which emerged to deal with the "poor White"
issue (cf. Magubane 1979, p. 170),

128. With respect to the industrial labor market, Afrikaners
were disadvantaged by the underdevelopment of South
African agriculture (in essence, they were migrating
from the periphery of the South African economy to the
core) and were no more suited for industrial labor than
were the Africans (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 217; Simons and
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Simons 1969, p. 612).
As a consequence, Afrikaner
labor found it necessary to use its political power to
secure a privileged position.
129.

Application of terms such as "elite" or "labor
aristocracy" to the South African White working class
may be useful to describe the relatively privileged
position of this eth-class; however, we believe that
use of these terms has dangerous analytical impl ica 
tions.
The South African White working class was not
an elite; it was merely able to use its limited
political power to realize material gains at the
expense of other e t h - c l a s s e s .

130.

As evidenced by the ability of Hertzog and Smuts to
join together in the "Fusion" government of 1933 (cf.
Magubane 1979, p. 185; de Villiers 1969, p. 379).

131.

For example, Smuts' opposition to the Mines and Works
Amendment Act was not that it promoted White supremacy
(which he favored), but rather that its overt d i s c r i m i 
nation would increase African resistance and "make
impossible any policy of appeasement and settlement
between White and Black in this country" (Johnstone
1987, p. 165).

132.

To some degree, it might be more appropriate to
characterize Afrikaner mobilization as ethnic a s s e r 
t i o n : that is, the strategic use of group identity to
pursue material interests within a society.
On the
other hand, given that the ultimate goal of Afrikaner
mobilization was the acquisition of state power, it
took on the characteristics of a nationalist movement.
Accordingly, we will employ the term "nationalism" to
describe Afrikaner group mobilization.

133.

According to de Villiers (1969, p. 365), absorption
with the threat posed by an external ene my became an
integral component of Afrikaner group identity.

134.

The British South Africa Act actually placed Dutch on
an equal footing with English as official languages.
One of the actions of the Nationalist-dominated Pact
Government was to substitute Afrikaans for Dutch, an
act which reflected both the increasing power of
Afrikaner nationalism and the importance of language as
a symbolic issue for group mobilization (van den Berghe
1965, p. 102; Giliomee 1979a, p. 106).

135.

The urban proportion of the White population increased
from 35.8% in 1891 to 51.6% in 1911 to 65.2% in 1936
(Welsh 1969, p. 173).
Displaced Afrikaner farmers and
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bvvoners were a ma jor

factor in this increase.

136. This is not to imply either that no appeals were made
to Afrikaner unity or that the Nationalist Party met
with no success in promoting the nationalist agenda.
For example, the Nationalist P a r t y was able to
substitute Afrikaans for Dutch as an official language;
it also succeeded in securing a 1926 British Common
wealth agreement w h i c h asserted the aut onomy of members
(van d en Berghe 1965, p. 102; de Villiers 1969, p.
391) .
137. Nationalist rhetoric throughout this period attempted
to d o w n p l a y class divisions w it h i n Afrikanerdom and
emphasize owner-worker solidarity (Simons and Simons
1969, p. 563; Magubane 1979, pp. 186-87; Moodie 1975,
pp. 169-72).
138. As Gil iomee (1979b, pp. 156-57) has observed, while the
rhetoric of Afrikaner economic nationalism focused upon
the "poor White" problem, the reality is that this
movement was designed to aid the fledgling Afrikaner
capitalist class.
139. Explanations for this development vary, including a
desire by Hertzog to remain in power during an economic
downturn, an attempt to achieve British-Afrikaner un i ty
(Hertzog subscribed to the more inclusive definition of
Afrikaner), and a ne ed to achieve a two-thirds maj ority
to pass the "Hertzog Bills" w h i c h eliminated the
African franchise in the Cape (cf. Simons and Simons
1969, pp. 463-69; de Villiers 1969, pp. 379-81;
Magubane 1979, p. 185).
140. The Pu rified Nationalist Party later became the
Reunited Nationalist Party (following a 1940 reunifica
tion agreement between Hertzog and Malan) and even
tually (in 1951) returned to calling itself the
Nationalist Party.
141. There was also considerable Afrikaner sy mpa thy for Nazi
Germany.
Nazi-like (i.e., authoritarian, extremely
nationalistic) movements in So uth Africa included the
Ossewabrandwaa and the New Order.
The influence of
these movements waned with the downfall of Nazi Germany
and the rise of the Nationalist Party (Moodie 1975, pp.
208-33; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 527-28; de Villiers
1969, pp. 385-87).
142.

This was clearly articulated by P. Ka I . Seme (cited in
Simons a nd Simons 1969, p. 133) during a 1911 appeal
for A f r i c a n unity:
"We are one people.
Let us forget
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the differences between Xhosa-Fingo,
Basutos, and othe r natives."

Zulus and Tongas,

143. For a brief discussion of regional differences in the
situation of Af ri ca n s in e a r l y twentieth century Sout h
Africa, see Kuper (1969b, pp. 426-31).
144. This "petty bourgeois" base of early African n a t i o n a l 
ism ha s a parallel in the e a r l y stages of the et hn ic
mobilization of Black Americans (cf. B l o o m 1987, p.
219 ) .
145. In a pa rti cularly cogent analysis, Magubane (1979, pp.
274-78) criticizes the te n d e n c y to dismi ss the e a r l y
efforts of the A N C as "reformist" or "naive" and
interprets early nationalist ideologies and strategies
in the context of their t i m e s (i.e., as the "moral"
struggle of an educated m i n o r i t y elite which is
simultaneously aw ar e of b o t h its oppressed status an d
its powerlessness to change its situation).
The
historical contribution of this movement was its
a b il it y to increase African national consciousness.
146. For a detailed examination of relations between the
A f ri ca n and White working classes in e a r l y twentieth
c e nt ur y South Africa, the work of Simons and Simons
(1969) should be read in its entirety.
Their d i s c u s 
sion of the e v ol vi ng position of the S o u t h African
Communist Party is particularly insightful.
147. The Industrial Conciliation Act institutionalized
unions and collective bar gaining and established a
system of arbitration to re d u c e industrial conflict.
Africans, however, were exc lu ded from
the definition of
"employee"; therefore, it w a s illegal
for them
to fo rm
unions (Simons a n d Simons 1969, p. 320).
148. For discussions of the dissolution of
th e ICU,
see
Simons and Simons (1969, pp. 353-76) a n d Magubane
(1979, pp. 282-86).
149. The underlying philosophy of the Urban Areas Act w as
expressed by the Stallard Commission of 1921 (cited by
Southall--1983, p. 25), w h i c h stated t h a t Africans:
should only be allowed to enter t he urban
areas, whic h are essentially the White man's
creation, w h e n he is willing to enter and to
minister to the needs of the White man and
should de pa rt therefore when he ce ases so to
mi n i s t e r .
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After 1923, the Ur b an Areas Act was extended on several
occas ion s— e.g., 1930 restrictions on African women,
1937 expanded police powers to remove "surplus"
Africans (Welsh 1969, p. 198).
150. The elimination of the African franchise in the Cape
particularly served the interests of the Nationalist
Party as it (1) increased the Afrikaner proportion of
the electorate, and (2) improved Nationalist electoral
chances in the Cape where A f ri ca n voters (who were not
likely to vote Nationalist), despite their small
numbers, occasionally provided the winning margin in
close elections.
151. One question not addressed thus far in this section was
the status of the other South African ethnic groups-the Coloureds, Indians, and British.
Ho w did their
identities evolve amidst the events described above?
For the first two of these groups, Coloureds and
Indians, group identities persisted in response to ethclass differentiation, unequal treatment, and rigid
ethnic boundaries. Both groups occupied an intermediate
position in the eth-class structure (i.e., one which
was slightly above the position of Africans but s i g n i 
ficantly below that of Whites) and both were s y s t e m a t i 
cally excluded from economic an d political power.
In
response to this state of affairs, both the Coloureds
and the Indians engaged in et h n i c mobilization (e.g.,
the African People's Organization and the South African
Indian Congress; however, neither of thee movements
emerged as a significant political force.
One major
obstacle to effective group a ct io n was the existence of
internal divisions, both sub-ethnic (e.g., Hindu vs.
Moslem within the Indian community, "light" vs. "dark"
Coloureds) and class (e.g., the dominance of the petit
bourgeoisie within these ethnic organizations).
Equally limiting was the smallness of ea c h group
(Coloureds comprised 9% of the South Af ri c an p o p u l a 
tion, Indians approximately 3%) and the lack of a
significant economic or political niche.
Thus, while
material forces (e.g., their subordinate position) were
strong enough to trigger e thn ic mobilization and the
persistence of identities, bot h Coloured and Indian
ethnicity were for the most part salient only on the
regional or local level.
Given their small numbers and economic and political
marginality, an alternative course of ac ti on for
Coloureds and Indians could have been an eth-class
alliance or even an ethnic m er ge r with other ethnic
groups (e.g.. Coloured merger with either Africans or
Afrikaners).
In this context, one possibility would
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have been a cross-ethnic class alliance with the White
working class or, in the case of the Coloured petit
bourgeoisie (who had acculturated to Afrikaner so ci ety
and who tended to pursue an accommodationist strategy),
the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie.
This was precluded,
however, by the exclusionary strategies of the White
working class (which was interested in restricting
group boundaries, particularly in light of the "poor
White" problem) and by the emergence of a narrowly
defined and race conscious Afrikaner nationalism (cf.
Fredrickson 1981, p. 272).
The second course of
action, eth-class alliance or ethnic merger with the
African majority, was rejected by the Coloureds and
Indians themselves, as both groups were reluctant to
jeopardize the few privileges which they did possess in
order to enter into an alliance with a lower status
group (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 120).
Thus, while
increasing discrimination by Whites against both
Coloureds and Indians narrowed intergroup differences
and created a broader basis for common a ct io n with
Africans, intergroup cooperation remained at best at a
moderate level.
An entirely different case from the Coloured and Indian
experience was that of British South Africans.
The
British occupied a somewhat paradoxical position in
that they overwhelmingly dominated the economy, but
were less able (given Afrikaner numerical superiority)
to exert political power.
This meant (1) that they had
no economic grievances to generate ethnic mobil iza tio n
and (2) that their material position was best main
tained by muting their e t h n i c i t y — as assertion would
only inflame Afrikaner nationalism.
In addition,
British South Africans were probably not unhappy with
the general direction of government policy, for
(despite British "liberalism") they too had a strong
stake in continued White supremacy.
Finally, the
British ethnic assertion which did exist had an a l t e r 
native outlet in support for Great Britain and the
British Commonwealth (e.g., strong British South
African support for Great Britain in World War I and
World War II).
Thus, while British South Africans were
a self-conscious ethnic entity, their was no real
material or ideological basis for ethnically-based
group action.
Circumstances also militated against the emergence of
an inclusive South African national identity.
NonWhites were excluded from the beginning, while the
bifurcation of the White commu nit y limited any pr os 
pects of a White South African identity.
Indeed, the
existing eth-class configuration--the smaller, econom-
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ically powerful British vs. the numerically dominant
Af ri ka ne rs — was an ideal prescription for ethnic
mobilization on the part of the latter group.
While
there were South Africans who envisioned a BritishAfrikaner merger (albeit with varying e m p h a s e s ), their
numbers were never sufficiently large to enable them to
achieve this objective.
152. White South Africans were well aware of the threat
posed by a stable urban proletariat.
According to a
1945 Board of Trade and Industry Report (Cited by
Sou th al l— 1983, p . 30):
Racial and Class differences will make a hom o ge ne 
ous Native proletariat which will eventually lose
all contact with its former communal rural r e l a 
tions which had previously given their lives a
content and meaning.
The detribalisation of large
numbers of Natives congregated in amorphous masses
in large industrial centres is a matter which no
government can view with equanimity.
153. From the perspective of industrial capital, the
existing relations of production (i.e., the coerced
migrant labor system) constituted an obstacle to the
development of the forces of production (i.e.,
industrial mass production) and to continued capitalist
accumulation.
Industrial committees and reports spoke
of the waste of African labor and the retardation of
industrial development (cf. sources cited by Magubane
1979, p. 129).
Even if a fully proletarianized African
workforce required higher wages, increased productivity
and higher prices would me a n that the manufacturing
sector could accommodate such demands (Southall 1983,
p . 30 ) .
154.

This fact was not lost upon Nationalist Party po l i t i 
cians, who by the late 1930s had be gun to speak of the
need to "save White civilization" (Simons and Simons
1969, p. 525).
In a 1938 speech, future Prime Minister
D.F. Malan (cited in Magubane 1979, p. 126) observed
that:
the Afrikaner of the new Great Trek meets the nonWhite at his Blood River, half-armed or even
completely unarmed, without barricade, without a
river between, defenseless in the open plains of
economic competition.

155.

Third World condemnation of South African apartheid
reflected the anti-colonial (anti-core) component of
peripheral nationalist ideologies.
Given the central
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role of European racism in colonial domination, it is
not surprising that Third World leaders have found
apartheid to be particularly offensive (see, for
example, the quotations found in B e a u d — 1983, p. 18 8—
and Sp en c e- -1 969, p. 311).
While this assault on South
Africa was grounded in id eo lo gy , peripheral a n t i 
colonialism and nationalism can in turn be linked to
core domination and global capitalist development.
As
ve observed earlier, nationalism is one of the
contradictions of capitalism.
156. Although the British South Africa Act of 1909 had left
open the possibility of transferring the High C o m m i s 
sion Territories (e.g., Basutoland/Lesotho, Swaziland,
and B e c h ua na la nd /B ot sw an a) to South Africa), this was
clearly impossible in the context of post-1945 d e c o l o 
nization and anticolonialism.
Consequently, all three
colonies became independent nations in the late 1960s.
For an extended discussion of this issue, see Spence
(1969, pp. 496-503).
157.

Indeed, South Africa capitalized upon the U.S. fear of
"communist expansionism" to gain support for its recent
intervention in Angola.

158. For a brief discussion of characteristics of s e m i 
peripheral states, see Hopkins and Wallerstein (1987,
pp. 773-774).
For a theoretical and empirical analysis
of semiperipheral areas, see Arrighi and Drangel
(1986).
159.

In separate analyses, both Arrighi (1979, pp. 186-87)
and Martin (1986, p. Ill) discuss how the economic
development of other areas (e.g., Southern RhodesiaZimbabwe) was undercut by South African capitalist
development.

160. The different party policies were reflected in the
reports of two commissions:
the Fa ga n Commission
(United Party) and the Sauer Commission (Nationalist
P a r t y ) . For discussions of these respective reports,
see Magubane (1979, pp. 129-31) and de Villiers (1969,
p p . 406-09).
161. The Nationalist Party received 120,000 fewer votes that
the United Party; however, due to the disproportionate
electoral influence of rural areas, it won 70 pa rl ia 
ment ar y seats to 65 for the United Party.
Neverthe
less, the Nationalist Pa r t y was forced to enter into a
coalition with the tiny Afrikaner Pa rty in order to
attain the seats necessary for a working parliamentary
maj ority (van den Berghe 1965, pp. 293-95).

490
162. Apartheid was defined by future Prime Minister Verwoerd
(cited in v an den Bergh e— 1965, p. 119) as "a process
of co ntinually increasing separation in all spheres of
living, and this takes place even wh e n there is no
territorial segregation."
163. Whi le we present these interests separately, the y are
cl e arl y interrelated.
For example, maintaining White
domination over Africans had clear economic benefits
for the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie inasmuch as it was
ab l e to maintain a pool of cheap labor.
164.

It is not our intention to present an overly instrumen
tal picture of the South African state as a mere tool
of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie.
Dominant eth-class
interests were constrained by the interests and power
of other groups (the British-dominated capitalist
class, the White working class, international capital,
and even the African w or kin g class).
The seemingly
instrumental nature of the apartheid state reflects the
increasing political heg emony of the Nationalist Party
juxtaposed against relative economic weakness--in other
words, state power was the most ready (if not
the only)
me a ns for attaining group objectives.

165. Our purpose here is not to provide a detailed d i s c u s 
sion of the ar r a y of apartheid legislation, but instead
to illustrate the connection between state policies and
eth-class interests.
166. This point is captured in a quote by W. M. Macmillan
(cited in Southall--1983, p. 75):
"to locate the
native reserves it is no bad rule ... to look for the
ar e a s circumvented or en tir ely missed by even b ran ch
ra i lwa y lines."
167. Whi le all South African political parties protected the
economic interests of the White population, the success
of the Nationalist Party since 1948 has been tied to
its ability to project itself as the best defender of
Whit e interests.
This was particularly important for
the White w o rk in g class (especially the less-skilled
segments) whic h would seemingly have the most to lose
from the elimination of segregation (cf. Davies 1973,
pp. 51-55).
168. For more
Villiers
38); and

detailed discussion of these laws, see de
(1969, pp. 409-14); Magubane (1979, pp. 132Southall (1983, pp. 33-44).

169. As an example of Afrikaner concerns in this area, the
1955 Tomlinson Commission (cited by M a g ub an e— 1979, p.
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137) decried African urbanization as l ea din g to "the
westernization of the Bantu" and the eventual certai nt y
"that the control of political power w i l l pass into the
hands of the Bantu."
170. Also falling into this c a t e g o r y would be the 1956
elimination (after a five-year struggle) of the
coloured franchise (de vi lliers 1969, pp. 405-06).
While this was generally interpreted ideologically
(I.e., as the Afrikaner drive for total segregation),
it was also perceived by the Nationalist Party--which
believed that the coloured vote could be decisive in a
close election--as a key step in ma intaining control of
the government (Fredrickson 1981, p. 279).
171. The pass laws, which required all Africans to carry
"reference books", were the centerpiece of the system
of "influx control" which sought to ma in ta i n the
migrant labor sy st em by restricting Af r i c a n urban
residence.
Under Section 10 of the B a n t u (Urban Areas)
Consolidation Act of 1945, it was illegal for Africans
to be in urban areas for more than seventy-two hours
unless they (1) had resided there since birth; (2) had
worked for the same employed for ten years; (3) were
dependents of persons quali fie d under the first two
categories; or (4) had been given permission by a labor
bureau (established to funnel African labor to
industry) to work as contract labor (Saul and Gelb
1986, p. 118).
Since few Africans could prove that
they qualified under the first three categories, the
bulk of legal urban residents were em pl oy ed as contract
laborers (and were not allowed to have their dependents
reside with them in urban areas).
Residential s e g r e g a 
tion (the Group Areas Act) an d the pass lavs facili
tated enforcement of these policies.
If apprehended,
unemployed Africans could be declared "redundant Bantu"
and woul d be "endorsed out" to the re serves or s e n 
tenced to serve as convict labor on White farms
(Magubane 1979, p. 143).
Th es e lavs were vigorously
enforced:
during the period 1950-1975, hundreds of
thousands of Africans were arrested each year for pass
law violations (see the figures provided in Wilson and
Ramphele--1989, p. 209).
By retarding African u r b a n i 
zation, these lavs propped up the migrant labor s ys te m
despite ever-increasing econom ic pressures for Africans
to leave the reserves.
172. Direct control measures, w h i c h included the Suppression
of Communism Act of 1950, the Criminal L a v Amendment
Act of 1953, and the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956,
gave the South African state virtually unlimited pow er
to suppress persons and organizations (Southall 1983,
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p. 40; van de n Berghe 1965,

pp.

130-32).

173. We will consider the full implications of this indirect
control in our discussion of the "Bantustan" policy.
For a dis cussion of the control aspects of "Bantu
Education", see van den Berghe (1965, pp. 129-30).
174.

Moreover, change (i.e., greater African urbanization
and proletarianization) would also potentially involve
costs to c a p i t a l — higher wages, further political
demands, increased conflict with the White working
class, and increased conflict with agricultural capital
over access to African labor (cf. Wolpe 1972, 445-46).

175.

See the statements of various Nationalist P a r t y leaders
cited by van den Berghe (1965, p. 118) and Southall
(1983, pp. 45-46).

176. Moreover, as Southall (1983, p. 45) observes, there was
little immediate response to the Bantu Authorities Act.
Reserve Councils were sl ow to disband in favor of the
new "tribal author ities"--the first homeland to accept
this new arrangement was the Transkei in 1955.
177. Particularly interesting was the ideological shift
which accompanied the evolution of the Bantustan
policy.
The Nationalist Party began to d o wn pl ay racial
dogmas (i.e., those stressing the inferiority of
Africans) and instead be gan to emphasize "ethnic"
(i.e., cultural) differences and the need for separate
development (Wolpe 1972, pp. 450-51; Saul and Gelb
1986, p. 100; Magubane 1979, pp. 234-36).
Too much
should not be read into this transition, for the
doctrine of separate development was infused with a
sense of paternalism and an implicit assumption of
inferiority (e.g., Africans as different and less
developed).
For illustrative quotations, see van den
Berghe (1965, pp. 121-24).
For a discussion of the
link between separate development and Afrikaner
nationalism, see Moodie (1975, pp. 260-76).
178. For a dis cussion of the process leading to the
"independence" of the Transkei, see Southall (1983, pp.
103-45).
179.

Given the decline of reserve agriculture, su p e r e x p l o i 
tation was no longer grounded in the contribution of
peasant farming to the subsistence of migratory wage
labor (which had previously allowed African wages to be
below the subsistence level).
Instead, s u pe re xp lo it a
tion was no w achieved through c o e r c i o n : that is, via
direct and indirect control measures instituted by
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post-1948 governments which essent ial ly forced Africans
to accept low wages and to re main migratory labor.
For
elaboration of this point, see Wolpe (1972, pp. 44450).
For an insightful co mparison of the Bantustan
policy with Israeli policies towards Palestinians in
the occupied territories, see Locke and Stewart (1985).
180. Thus, apartheid was presented as "posit iv e” in that it
would eliminate White domination and al l ow Africans to
develop along their own lines (albeit by being confined
to 13% of the land area of South Africa).
181. A first step towards this end was taken with the Bantu
Homelands Citizen sh ip Act of 1970 (cf. S ou t h a l l - - 1 9 83,
p. 292).
182. Towards this end, government spokespersons sought to
promote the perception of Afric an ethnic attachment to
the homelands (see H. M, Verwoerd, quoted in Magubane
1979, pp. 241-42).
For example one bureaucrat (cited
by Wilson and Ra mp h el e— 1989, p. 213), in explaining
the "voluntary" movement of Africans into the
KwaNdebele homeland, observed:
What motivated the Israelis to go to Israel after
the Balfour Declaration?
Idealism gripped the m
and see what happened to Israel.
It is the same
thing in KwaNdebele.
It is all about the m a g n e 
tism, the pulling power of a spiritual fatherland.
They are streaming in and we just can't keep up
with the services there.
They prefer to live
there, in their own community.
In this context, it is not surprising that apartheid
proponents opposed "denationalized Africans" (i.e.,
urbanized and educated Africans who espoused an
"African" ethnic identity) and favored "civilized
Bantu" (i.e., those retaining traditional group ties
the context of the homelands).
For a discussion of
this point, see Magubane (1979, pp. 242-43).

in

183. This was quickly evident to the South African g o v e r n 
ment.
The Nationalist Party's Tomlinson Commission
(1955) estimated that even wi th heavy investment, the
reserves could only support one-half of the African
population (Southall 1983, pp. 3G-37; de Villiers 1969,
p. 409).
While the Commission's financial re c om me nd a
tions were insufficient and its estimates of the c a r r y 
ing capacity of the land were gross overstatements, the
point is that the Bantustans did not have a viable
economic base.
Moreover, the South African state was
unwilling to expend funds at ev en the level recommended
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by the Tomlinson Commission.
What it did do was
establish a few "development corporations" and promote
the creation of "border in dustries"— White industries
located adjacent to the reserves to take advantage of
cheap labor (Wolpe 1972, p. 452; Southall 1983, pp. 3639 ) .
184. According to Southall (1983, pp. 210-12), a high
proportion of the labor for of the Transkei must
migrate to South Africa.
The important point is that
this economic dependence will perpetuate the un der 
development of the homelands.
185. When it was clear that Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland
were to become independent nations and not part of
South Africa, Prime Minister Verwoerd observed that
South Africa would enjoy political and economic
domination over these areas without having to assume
responsibility for social welfare expenses (Wilson and
Ramphele 1989, p. 205).
This thinking carried over to
South Africa's relations with the Bantustans, for
although it continued to provide them with economic
support. South Africa forced the Bantustans to become
increasingly responsible for raising revenue through
the taxation of their inhabitants (cf. Wolpe 1972, p.
451).
The ultimate Nationalist Part y vision for
Southern Africa was a commonwealth type arrangement
with South Africa as the regional core exercising
economic and political suz erainty over "independent"
African states (cf. Southall 1983, pp. 49-50).
186. The relationship between the Nationalist Par ty and
Afrikaner nationalism is reflected in the slogan:
"die
party is die volk en die volk is die Da r tv "--"the party
is the nation and the nation is the party" (de Villiers
1969, p. 370).
187. The Nationalist Party vict ory in 1948 was attributed to
Malan's ab i lit y to unify Afrikanerdom.
An estimated
two-thirds of Afrikaners voted for the Nationalist
Pa rt y on 1948 (de Villiers 1969, p. 387).
188. For a discussion of the origins of "Christian-Nationalism,"
see Moodie (1975, p. 110).
For a graphic
illustration of the effects of this education, see
Coles (1986, pp. 184-96).
189. Thus, Afrikaner have assumed some of the charact er is
tics of a dominant ethnic identity (e.g., a decreased
need for assertion as compared to a minority id e n t i t y ) .
Some British South Africans, on the other hand, began
to fear for their position in an Afrikaner-dominated
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South Africa and moved towards assuming characteristics
of a min ori ty group (cf. Spence 1969, p. 486).
190. This ideological front was supported by such institu
tions as the Nationalist Party-backed South African
bureau of Racial Affairs (de Villiers 1969, p. 401).
For "a cad em ic” works in this tradition, see the
references cited by van den Berghe (1965, p. 116).
191.

Indeed, the position of the African petit bourgeoisie
was seemingly worsening as a consequence of the
segregative policies of the apartheid, of policies
designed to protect White economic interests (e.g.,
restrictions upon African entrepr ene urs — cf. Southall
1983, pp. 186-87), and of the decline of their already
limited political power (e.g., the effects of the
"Hertzog b i l l s ” of the 1930s).

192. This was, however, not a zero-sum proposition inasmuch
as the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU)
played an active role in the resistance mov ement and
the ANC itself contained a socialist wing.
193.

At the same time, it could be argued that the course
followed by the resistance was pre dominantly a pettybourgeois program inasmuch as the specific targets were
the most significant obstacles to the interests of this
class, as opposed to the more economic interests of the
working class.
This bears an interesting similarity to
the U.S. civil rights movement, whose program for
change (e.g., desegregation, voting rights) removed
obstacles to the mo bil it y of the Black middle class
more than they improved conditions for the Black
working class.

194. We should also make parenthetical mention of the
existence of a White opposition to ap art he id -- e. g. , the
Liberal and Progressive political parties, the Congress
of Democrats, and the Black Sash Movement (de Villiers
1969, pp. 419-21; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 171-74, 24344; Magubane 1979, pp. 314-15).
While often courageous
in face of government persecution, White liberals made
at best a limited contribution to anti-apartheid
resistance, a fact which can be attributed to both the
smallness of their numbers and the general un wil li ng
ness of liberals to consider the total restructuring
(e.g., one person, one vote) of South African society.
195. This was particularly true for Indians, who were
characterized by Nationalist P a r t y propaganda as
"unassimilable a li en s” and who
were subject to an
unsuccessful government campaign to effect their return
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to India

(van den Berghe 1965, p. 152),

196. This occurred in spite of the increase in gold prices
engendered by the decline of the Bretton Woods A g r e e 
ment.
The important point here is that while gold
prices could exacerbate or mitigate economic problems,
mineral exports were no longer sufficient to insure
economic prosperity.
Moreover, to the extent that gold
continued to play a key role, South Africa was v ul n er 
able to sudden changes in international gold prices
(Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 76-79; Innes 1984, pp. 190-91).
197.

Innes (1984, pp. 189-90) links the South African e c o 
nomic crisis to the peripheral relationship of South
Africa to the core.
Investment during the 1960s was
extremely capital I n t en si ve , which required the impor
tation of advanced technology from core nations.
Given
the limited ability of South Africa to export ma nu fa c
tures (due to low productivity and the high cost of
White labor--both consequences of the apartheid s y s 
tem), this eventually led to balance of payments
difficulties.

198.

The impact of this inequality is such that although
South Africa as a whole has a moderately high per
capita gross domestic product, the African population,
par ti cularly the two-thirds who live in the reserves,
ranks below many Third World nations on such key
variables as income and life expectancy (cf. Wilson and
Ramphele 1989, pp. 22-28).

199. While the economic position of some segments of the
African working class ma y have improved since 1970
(i.e., through wage increases for the urban working
class), there is also evidence that the number of very
poor has increased and that conditions for this group
have worsened (cf. Wilson and Ramphele 1989, p. 21).
200. Although the advancement of the Afrikaner capitalist
class placed in on an increasingly equal footing with
British capital and resulted in the further diminution
of British political power, this process was not obje c
tionable to British capital inasmuch as it gave
Afrikaners a greater stake in maintaining optimal co n 
ditions for capitalist accumulation.
Indeed, some
elements of British capital deliberately fostered the
expansion of Afrikaner capital— cf. Innes (1984, pp.
158-59) on the role of the Oppenheimer family and the
Anglo-American Corporation in facilitating Afrikaner
penetration of the mining industry.
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201.

This point has not been lost upon the petit b o u r 
geoisie, the White w or kin g class, and their political
leaders.
As Andries Treurnicht (currently leader of
the Conservative Party) noted in a 1980 speech (quoted
by Saul a n d Gelb 1986, p. 106), "free markets would
jeopardize the whole edifice of apartheid."

202.

By "political irrelevance" we are referring to the
inability of parties to the "left" of the Nationalist
Party to provide any meaningful electoral opposition or
to stymie government policies.
White "liberal" politi
cal parties probably d i d increase the overall level of
opposition to apartheid and created additional
maneuvering room for resistance movements; however,
their unwillingness to accept broad social change
precluded a n y meaningful alliance with African
resistance movements.
Some White radicals (e.g., the
South Af ri ca n Communist Party) have exhibited total
opposition to White supre mac y (an interesting example
of the a b i l i t y of id eology to transcend material
interests); however, their numbers are cur re nt ly too
small to enable them to play a significant role.
For
further discussion of these issues, see Simons and
Simons (1969); Charney (1986); and de Villiers (1969,
pp. 417-22).

203.

The central theme of this conflict was evident in the
difference between B ri ti s h and Boer colonial po licy and
in the m a n y clashes b e tw een the So u th African/United
Parties and the Nationalist Party.

204.

Our point here is that the conflict is the same
(capital vs. the petit bourgeoisie and working
classes), but that it is no longer expressed in ethnic
terms because the ca pitalist-petit bourgeoisie division
no longer corresponds to the British-Afrikaner
division.
We should a l s o note that while
the
verliqte-verkrampte di vis io n re flects class interests,
this does not imply a mechanistic division a l o n g the
lines of Ver li g te = c a p i t a l . v e r k r a m p t e =petit bourgeois
or working class.
Ideologies may emerge from material
interests; however, t h e y can take on an independent
existence.

205.

This was explicitly st ated in 1978 by Nationalist Party
official Connie Mulder (quoted in Saul and G e l b 1986,
p. 101):
If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion
as far as the Black people are concerned, there
will not be one Black man wi t h South A f ri ca n
cit i z e n s h i p .
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206. For an in-depth discussion of these
Southall (1983, pp. 202-308).
207. For a detailed discussion of these
and Gelb 1986, pp. 117-37).

issues, see
issues,

see

(Saul

208. As a result of increasing enforcement of the pass laws
(approximately one-half million arrests per year) and
forced removals (3.5 million people were resettled
between 1960 and 1985), the proportion of Africans
living in urban areas (33% according to official
statistics--which probably underestimate the actual
figure) remained the same between 1960 and 1980 (Wilson
and Ramphele 1989, pp. 26; 209-19).
For a conceptual
discussion of issues of partial proletarianization, see
Saul and Gelb (1986, pp. 147-51).
209. According to data presented by Wilson and Ramphele
(1989, pp. 38-39, 84-88), the reserve population more
than doubled between 1960 and 1980, while estimates of
the proportion of Africans who are unemployed (data are
limited; however, all sources agree that it is rising
rapidly) begin at 20%-25%.
210. A k e y element in the African eth-class structure is the
absence of a bourgeoisie (the title of Kupe r' s— 1 9 6 5 —
book notwithstanding), due to a myriad of restrictions
on African commercial ac t i v i t y (cf. Southall 1983, p.
172; van den Be rg he 1965, p. 71; Saul and Gelb 1986,
p p . 13 2-33).
211. As we have noted earlier, the creation of such a
reserve-based comprador class was part of the "divide
and rule" st rat egy for inhibiting African national
mobilization.
The South African government has also
employed this strategy in urban areas via municipal
councils and assistance to entrepreneurs (Southall
1983, pp. 192-94; Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 108-16).
212. To some degree, the emergence of the bantustan elite
has undoubtedly weakened African resistance to a p a r 
theid.
While commanding little popular support, b a n 
tustan governments have been ruthless in suppressing
opposition and pursuing class interests (Saul and Gelb
1986, pp. 178-81).
This in turn has led to violent
clashes between bantustan elites and the national
liberation movement (e.g., between Zulu-based Inkatha
and the anti-apartheid United Democratic Front).
At the same time, this point should not be overstated.
The interests of a comprador class m a y be in many ways
linked to those of dominant classes (e.g., the dominant
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White groups); however, they are not i d en ti ca l. For
example, a dispute over terri tor y and South African
resettlement policies led the Transkei to break off
diplomatic relations with South Africa from 1978 until
1980 (Southall 1983, pp. 268-75).
For a discussion of
the potential long-term role of the bantustans, see
Southall (1983, pp. 281-308).
213.

This would probably be more true of the urban petit
bourgeois entrepreneurs, who, while adamantly opposing
apartheid, are alrea dy inclined to adopt a more
"moderate" line with
respect to change (Wolpe 1984,
pp. 246-47; Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 183).

214.

See, for example, the statement by Jay Naidoo, General
Secretary of COSATU (quoted in Saul and Gelb 1986, p.
236:
I told the ANC and SACTU delegations we did not
want superficial changes, or Black bosses to
replace White bosses, whi le the repressive
ma ch in er y of state and capital remained intact.
I
expressed very clearly to them our commitment to
see a society whic h was not only free of a p a r 
theid, but also free of the exploitative,
degrading, and brutalizing system under which
Black workers suffered.
This meant a res tructur
ing of society so that the wealth of the country
would be shared among the people.
At the same time, the African working class could also
be vulnerable to the divisive tactics of the South
African state.
Legislation permitting African unions
and discussion of u r b a n rights could be viewed as an
attempt to split urba n and rural segments of the
working class by gr anting concessions to the former.

215.

We recognize, of course, that the underdevelopment of
South Af ri ca was a reflection of its peripheral status
(i.e., political and economic domination by the core)
within the capitalist w o r l d - e c o n o m y . Our interest
here, however, is the nature of South Af ri ca n c a p i t a l 
ist d ev e lo pm en t— a lower level of analysis than the
wor ld-sys tern.

CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION

At the beginning of this work, we stated that our pu r
pose was to d ev elo p a theoretical model useful
ing the evolution of ethnic and national

identities.

summarized this endeavor in the question:
ethnic and national
or di sa p pe ar ?

for expl ain 

What causes

identities to emerge,

peraist.

In our effort to address this goal,

took an intellectual "long march" which
tual discussion,

We

change,
we under

included a co ncep

a critical review of existing theories of

the evolution of ethnicity and nationality,

presentation of

our own "class-based" theoretical framework,

and two case

studies in which we employed our model to interpret the
historical development of intergroup relations
States and South Africa.
destination,

in the United

Now that we have arrived at our

we will attempt to draw together the various

segments of our e n d e a v o r .
We shall begin with a summary of the central arguments
of each chapter

in order to provide a succinct statement of

the core of our work.

In addition to this short summary, we

also intend to consider briefly two global

issues.

First.

we will assess the general

implications of this work for the

study of ethnic relations;

that is, what we envision to be

the most fruitful aspects of our model.
review our framework

Secondly,

we will

in light of our experiences with the
500
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two case studies,

our goal being the development of issues

for future research.

Summary
From design to execution, we viewed this undertaking as
an integrated series of tasks, with each part making a s i g 
nificant contribution to the larger whole.
introductory chapter,
(Chapter XI)

we began with a conceptual discussion

in which we sought to c l ar if y basic issues of

ethnicity and
class),

Following our

nationality

(and, to a lesser degree,

of

a step which we felt was mandated by the d e f i n i 

tional confusion which we believe characterizes the field of
ethnic studies.

In general,

we described ethnicity and

nationality as social attachments,
grounded

as group affiliations

in presumed common origin and shared history.

Moreover,

these

identities only become meaningful when

actively contrasted with other such groupings
group" vs.

"out-group").

(i.e., an " in

We also proposed a fundamental

distinction between ethnicity and nationality

(one which we

hope addresses the common tendency to confuse these two
terms):

that ethnic ties are asserted within a society,

while national identities are more inclusive and linked to
citizenship in a nation-state which is asserted on a global
level.

Yet our discussion did not end with these rather

static definitions,
national

identities,

social significance

for we then asserted that ethnic and
while putatively communal,

assume

in the course of interoroup resource
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competition and ethnic st rat ifi ca tio n--conflict stemming
from differences of power and in relation to the means of
production.

This then led us to the position that ethnic

and national

identities are variables

strategies),

that they emerge,

(or,

persist,

as a result of interoroup i n t e r ac ti on .

if one prefers,

change,

or disappear

In addition,

this

allowed us to posit the existence of intragroup variations
in identity, differences which can be explained
material

in terms of

interests.

Armed with this conceptual arsenal,
critical review

we then turned to a

(Chapter III) of existing theories of the

evolution of ethnic and national

identities.

We began with

two basic assertions derived from our conceptual discussion:
(1) that given their material base,

a complete theory of

ethnicity and nationality must consider them in relation to
c l a s s ; and

(2) that given their variable

(or evolutionary)

nature, anv theory of ethnicity and nationality must contain
a theory of social c h a n g e .

In our review of existing theo

ries, we noted the failure of classical

(especially pre-

1960) social theories--both mai nst re am and Marxian--to
account for the persistence of ethni cit y in modern societies
other than as a precapitalist relic or an individual at tri 
bute

(i.e., the attempt by ma instream U.S. sociologists to

theorize ethnicity and class out of existence).
tique notwithstanding,

these

Our c ri

initial theories of ethnicity

experienced a paradigmatic "crisis"

(to use Kuhn*s--1970--
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term)

in the wake of worldwide ethnic persistence and mo bi l 

ization in the post-1945 era.
of affairs,

As a response to this state

the past three decades have seen the emergence

of "new” theories of ethnicity and nationality which purport
to explain the persistence of these bonds in modern s o c i e 
ties, theories which we organized and criticized on the
basis of the following typology:
plural society theories;
reactive ethnicity;

and

(1) primordialism;

(3) competition theories;
(5) class theories.

(2)

(4)

In general,

while we felt that all of these approaches contained some
useful elements,

each theory failed to address one or more

of our core problems
over time,

(e.g.,

intragroup variation,

change

and the relationship between ethnicity and

cl a ss ).
Following these necessary preliminaries, we then p r e 
sented

(in Chapter IV)

our theoretical framework for un de r

standing ethnicity and nationality in the post-1800 era.
While our model is best taken
can be summarized as follows.
that,

in t o t o . its central elements
We started with the assertion

in the most general sense,

national

the evolution of ethnic and

identities can only be understood

global capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t .
social change at the societal
eration of external
Wallerstein 1972, p.

in the context of

In other words,

the stud y of

level must embody some co ns id 

(i.e., world-system)
222; Shannon 1989,

dynamics
p.

171).

(cf.
We further

suggested that a central global dynamic is the uneven de v e l 

opment of the world-system/

and that the evolution of group

identities can be understood

(as we attempted to do in a set

of working h y p ot he se s— see

. 136-44)

p p

core-peripherv d i s t i n c t i o n .
analysis

in the context of the

Moving to a "l ower” level of

{that of an individual so c iet y or nation-state) we

then outlined several key factors--the course of economic
development,

the ethnic and class composition of a society,

political structure,

and a series of contextual variables

which we subsumed under the aegis of "intergroup a r e n a " —
which we believe pl ay a key role
of group identities.

Finally,

interaction and ethnic change,
analytical concept
eth-class

(i.e.,

and class).

we introduced our basic

social location in terms of both ethnicity

From our perspective,

this concept could then

national,

in terms of eth-class "alliances"

offered a typology--see pp.
ethnicity,
groups

with respect to intergroup

for the explanation of group action;

be employed to explain ethnic,
action

in determining the course

nationality,

120-22)

and class-based
(of which we

where the bonds of

or class were used to mobilize

in order to pursue material

In the last two chapters,

interests.

we presented case studies

(the United States and South Africa)

in which we applied our

model to the st ud y of intergroup relations
specific circumstances.

in historically

The underlying rationale

in se l ec 

ting these two cases was to allow us to explore the d i f f e r 
ential

impact of core vs. peripheral capitalist development
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upon the evolution of ethnic relations.
United States,

In the case of the

we saw h ow economic expansion and movement

into the core produced a complex ethnic pattern c h a r a c t e r 
ized by immigration and both persistence and change of group
identities.

For South Africa,

on the other hand, prolonged

colonization and peripheral status resulted
external

(i.e.,

British)

in expanded

influence and a slower development

of "modern" ethnic identities.
such as industrialization,

In both cases,

proletarianization,

processes
and u r b a n i z a 

t i o n — and the specific forms which they assumed in the
course of national capitalist development--left an indelible
imprint upon the nature of intergroup relations.
While we gleaned much from our case studies, what
stands out is the utility of eth-class in explaining gro up
mobilization and the evolution of

i d e n t it ie s.

We found

intergroup interaction to be an infinitely complicated
process:

identities and

(and non-material)

ideologies emerged from material

practice, and in turn altered the course

of subsequent resource competition.

Nevertheless,

by v i e w 

ing group identities as linked to eth-class strategies,

we

were able to interpret su c h diverse phenomena as BlackAmerican mobilization,
assimilation,
cans

European immigrant ethnic merger and

and the exclusionary actions of A ngl o- Ame ri 

in United States;

and African resistance

or Afrikaner mobilization, apartheid,
in South Africa.

In addition,

our

eth-class/resource competition model enabled us to explain
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differences between groups

(e.g., why British South Africans

downplayed group identity while Afrikaners engaged
assertion)

and even differences within groups

in ethnic

(e.g., w h y

upper and middle class White Ethnics happened to assimilate
more quickly than the enclave-based working class).
as the culmination of our endeavor,

Thus,

the two case studies

provided us with a diverse array of data with which to test
our model.

We will provide our evaluation of the results

in

the following sections.

The Study of Interoroup Relations
What conclusions can we reach about the study of e t h n i 
city and nationality?

At the outset, we posited that these

group identities are not immutable,
a result of intergroup interaction.
of the two case studies,

but that they evolve as
Throughout our analysis

we attempted to demonstrate that

the explanation of this process of change must be grounded
in global, historical,
nic identities,

and material processes.

Modern e t h 

whether Asian-American or Afrikaner,

are

forged during intergroup resource competition and shaped by
the dynamics of global and national capitalist development
and by the evolution of the arena

in which groups interact.

Having thus far completed our research,

we would like to add

that we are convinced of the essential validi ty of this
statement.
By placing analytical emphasis upon global dynamics,
we are asserting that the analysis of intergroup relations
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within a particular society must take
the

into consideration

impact of forces external to that society.

ethnic relations have their genesis

in contact between

peoples who were previously separate,
processes of conquest,

colonization,

Indeed,

most notably the
and immigration whi ch

characterized the centuries of European expansion.

More

over, we saw that the impact of global forces does not end
once groups have been brought
cesses of the worId-system,
tions,
act

into contact.

Specific p r o 

such as core-periphery r e l a 

continue to shape the context in which groups

{e.g.,

the

in te r 

impact of the rise and fall of British imp e

rialism upon relations between settlers and natives in South
A f r i c a ).
Of equal

importance to our approach to the study of

intergroup relations

is the emphasis which we have placed

upon adopting a historical perspective.
believe that ethnic and national
analyzed as ongoing processes;
group identification

Simply stated,

we

identities can only be

that

is, that the nature of

(and intergroup interaction) during any

time period is conditioned by events which occurred during
previous epochs.

Ethnic change cannot be studied when it

is isolated from history.

This point was repeatedly il l us 

trated during the course of our case studies.
for example,

One cannot,

understand the current social significance of

African-American ethnicity without linking it to such past
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phenomena as the Civil Rights Movement,
and the

the J i m Crow era,

institution of slavery.

The third component of our analytical t r i n i t y is a
recognition of the overriding importance of mater ial
interests

in the study of group identities and

relations.
mental

Throughout our analysis,

intergroup

we explored the fu n da 

link between ethnic identity and resource competition

between groups.
masking,

From our vantage point,

the assertion,

or alteration of group ties can be interpreted as

strategies employed to pursue specific material,
meta-material,
(e.g.,
means

interests

in a particular

as well as

intergroup arena

twentieth century Afrikaner ethnic mob ilization as a
for enhancing their economic and political

vis-a-vis other South African ethnic groups).
noted previously,

As we have

this is not to reduce ethnicity to an

epiphenomenon of economic life

(indeed, we have repeatedly

observed that while ethnic ideologies may emerge
material

position

life, the y are capable of assuming an

from

independent

social e xi ste nc e— and may in turn influence eco n om ic life),
but to underscore the general prim acy of material

forces

in

the s t u d y of ethnic relations.
While we have linked the evolution of et hni c

identities

to strategies employed in intergroup resource competition,
we also

found that social reality is much more complex tha n

attributing a single strategy (and,

hence,

entire group.

ethnic group s are i n t e r 

With few exceptions,

identity) to an

nally di ffe rentiated with re sp ec t to class
of production),

(i.e., relations

thus giving rise to subgroups with po t en 

tially diverse interests and strategies.

Throughout our

examination of the United States and South African case
studies,
class

we rep eatedly demonstrated the efficacy of the eth-

(i.e.,

objective social

ethnicity and class)

location in terms of both

as a useful analytical tool for under

standing the complexity of intergroup relations.
employed herein,

As

the notion of eth-class captures the

reality that ethnic groups contain class divisions

(and

vice-versa) and therefore cannot be studied as monolithic
entities
tions)

(as is too often done

but rather as separate

in the field of et hni c rela
"fractions" with unique group

interests and which may employ different
respect to ethnic

identities.

mobilization does occur,

"strategies" with

Consequently, when ethnic

it represents a temporary alliance

(due to a real or perceived co mp at ib il it y of interests)
among the eth-classes of a particular grou p

(e.g.,

the use

of "ethnic" strategies such as occupational networks and
political machines

in immigrant enclaves

century United States).

in the nineteenth

At the same time,

divergent

inter

ests among eth-classes may lead to strategies which are
quite different

(e.g., the different rates of assimilation

for elite, middle class, and working class
in the twentieth c e nt ury United States).

"White Ethnics"
Only by employing
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the concept of eth-class can we begin to unravel the complex
web of intergroup relations.
In general,
our model

we believe that the approach presented

is useful

ethnic phenomena.

in

in the analysis of a diverse array of
We have not provided a theoretical f o r 

mula, but rather a set of interrelated concepts,
tions, and methodological directives.
our case studies,

proposi

During the course of

we were able to employ our model to g e n 

erate explanations

for both the diversity of outcomes which

mark the ethnic history of the United States and the more
stable cleavages which divide South African society.

We

believe that a particular strength of our framework lies

in

its abili ty to account for ch an ge — historically a p r ob lem 
atic issue for the study of ethnic relations.
text of our framework,
dynamic nature;

well as national

intergroup interaction assumes a

that is,

shaped by external

In the c o n 

it is continually shaped and r e 

factors,

by the evolution of global as

forces and relations of production, and by

the process of eth-class struggle.

As a result,

constant reworking of group interests,
ability to achieve objectives.

we see a

strategies, and

Consequently,

we believe

that we have achieved our goal of developing a model useful
for explaining the evolution of ethnic identities.
Directions for Further Research
During our case studies, we asserted that one objective
was to use the findings to suggest future refinements for
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our theoretical m o d e l .
applied our
strokes.

framework,

Moreover,

Admittedly, as we developed and
we painted with broad analytical

both case studies were concerned with

intergroup relations

in large arenas over periods of more

than three centuries.

As a result, we believe that our

framework requires more detailed elaboration of the p r o 
cesses through which group identities evolve.
the emergence of African group identity,

which we addressed

in a few pages as part of a broad analysis,
focus of an

For example,

could be the

in-depth examination which would undoubtedly

yield further

insights

nationality.

Likewise,

into the nature of both ethnicity and
other d y n a m i c s - - e .g ., the

impact of

industrialization and the spread of market relations,

the

demographic balance between groups--could and should be
explored in more detail.
After completing the case studies,

we are left with a

lingering sense of uneasiness that our explanation of ethnic
change is at times too

idiosyn cra tic .

In other words,

although our model provides what we believe to be an ad e
quate basis
ties,

for the st ud y of the evolution of group identi

it does so by linking this process to a unique confi g

uration of elements and to the actions of specific groups
a particular

intergroup arena.

If we are serious about

developing a class-based theory of ethnicity,

then we need

more nomothetic explanations--for example, more general
statements of the conditions whi ch give rise to such out

in
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comes as assimilation,
tion.

ethnic merger, and group m o b i l i z a 

Towards this end, we believe that our model would

benefit from comparative application to the broadest p os
sible range of cas es — including what is happening nowadays
in the way of ethnic assertiveness
non-capitalist states.

in the U.S.S.R.

and other

Only then can we develop a su ff i

cient data base to enable us to make the general statements
necessary for refinement of our model.
Another matter which demands further elaboration is the
issues of level of analysis.

As we observed in Chapter

hu m an social behavior takes place across a range of
related levels from the world-system to the dyad,

I,

inter

with

interactions at any level closely linked to events occurring
on other levels.

Accordingly,

be able to articulate

a theory of ethnicity should

interrelationships between levels if

it is truly to account for the evolution of group id en ti
ties.

While we believe that our framework adequately co n

nects intergroup interaction within states to world-system
processes,

it became

increasingly clear to us during the

case studies that this

is but part of the picture,

that our

model needs to be extended to incorporate ethnic relations
at the regional and local levels, as well as the b u r e a u 
cratic or institutional level.

Where we did undertake such

a n al ys is - - e . g . , the examination of different trajectories of
intergroup relations

in the Northern,

Southern, and Western

United States--our ab il it y to explain ethnic change was
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greatly enhanced.

At the same time, we recognize that other

such phenomena remain unexplored;

for example, regional

variations

intergroup relations

in South Africa

{e.g.,

the Transvaal as compared to the Cape Province);

in

the role of

Hispanic ethnicity in the United States Southwest as opposed
to Florida;
Africa;

Indian vs. African conflict

urban vs. rural differences

Americans);

(e.g.,

South

among African-

and the reported greater development of African

ethnicity among Xhosa
in Natal.

in Durban,

Clearly,

in the Eastern Cape than among Zulus

such "lower-level" studies would const i

tute an important direction for

future research.

Thirdly, we believe that our theoretical framework
requires additional specification of the mechanisms through
which groups form strategies and mobilize
stands,

for action.

As it

in application of our model, we could be accus ed of

being t e l e o lo qi ca l: that is, we have explained group actions
in terms of material

interests without dir ect ly linking the

interests to the action,

but me re ly by establishing an ex

post facto correlation between actions and
ests.

presumed

in te r

We need to address more thoroughly such questions as:

What propels groups
to mobilize

(and the individuals wh o comprise them)

for action and what determines the specific form

and nature of this mobilization?
this would

involve linking our

On a theoretical

framework to theories of

social movements, as well as specifying the role of
and culture

level,

(in relation to material interests)

ideology

in gr ou p

mobilization

(cf. Touraine 1988).

This would then enable

us

to explain the timing and form of et hni c assertion (e.g.,
wh y the United States Civil Rights Movement emerged in the
1950s and 1960s, why it took the f o r m of demands for i n c l u 
sion, and why it gave rise to the development of a more
radical Black nationalism among so m e
case studies,

group members).

In our

ve would have to c on st ruc t a more detailed

exposition of the evolution of g r o u p strategies and action,
perhaps through the use of primary sources
of leaders,

intellectuals,

and other

enable us to explore the perceptions
mation of strategies.

Where we did

tracts from official reports

(e.g.,

key actors)

statements
which would

of actors and the f o r 
include quotes or e x 

(e.g.,

in the debate over the

homelands policy in our South A f ri ca n case study),

they

immeasurably added to the strength of our analysis.
this would entail exhaustive research,

While

it would provide

for

the fullest possible explanation of group action and ethnic
change.
Finally,

we recognize that the preliminary nature of

our framework has resulted in a nu m b e r of issues being o v e r 
looked or incompletely addressed.

We believe that these

issues are significant and would pr o v i d e fruitful ground for
further research and subsequent re f i n i n g of our approach.
While we do not claim to address all

possibilities, we wou ld

particularly like to emphasize the following issues:

1.

The evolution of ethnic identities in no n- ca pi ta l

ist societies.

This question is parti cul arl y int ere st 

ing following recent developments
Bulgaria, Rumania, and Tibet.
our framework— time-bound,

in the Soviet Union,

While we believe that

as are all frameworks— could

be applied di re c tl y to these societies during their
periods of capitalist development,

we also recognize

that post-revolutionary societies would have their own
lavs of motion and class structures,

which will

in turn

require new working hypotheses with regard to the e v o 
lution of ethnic and national
2.

Identities.1

The role of the non-materlal

in influencing the

shape and evolution of ethnic and national
Althoug h we have acknowledged that ideas,

identities.
ideologies,

and the social-psychological aspects of ethnicity may
in turn

influence economic life— and,

hence,

our a s s e r 

ted material basis of ethnic identity— it is clear that
our framework must be expanded
these processes

in order to account for

inasmuch as they par ticularly sustain

the ethnic component of the eth-class.
3.

Further specification of the impact of relations of

power and the role of the state upon intergroup inter
action.

While we made a first attempt at assessing the

role of the state

in intergroup relations and eth-class

struggle, we recognize that additional elaboration is
necess ar y (cf. C arn oy 1984;

Nash 1989)

if we are to
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develop a more complete framework for understanding
ethnic change.
4.

The evolution of ethnic and national identities in

other peripheral societies.

Although we have chosen

South Africa as our peripheral case st ud y (its r e l a 
tively l o n g — for the perip her y— period of incorporation
into the capitalist wor ld- ec ono my constitutes a greater
data base for analysis), we admit that

its movement

into the semiper iph er y and its post-1974 emergence as
a regional power disqualify it as an "ideal-typical"
peripheral society.

Consequently,

application of our

framework to more "traditional" peripheral societies
(e.g., Chad or Senegal) would enhance our understanding
of the impact of uneven capitalist development upon
group identities.
5.

Exploration of possible linkages between ethnicity,

eth-class,

and other bases for understanding group

a c t i o n - - e . g ., status-groups or "estates"
1984b).

(cf. Khleif

This could potentially involve reconsideration

of race beyond our casting of it as a subcategory of
e thn ici ty — particularly in light of our analytic e m p h a 
sis upon the Black-White and White-non White divisions
in our case studies of South Africa and the United
States — and greater specification of the role of
"racial"

ideologies

in intergroup relations.
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Conclusion
As we stated at the outset,

the goal of this work was

not to present a finished theory of ethnicity and n a t i o n 
ality,

but rather to provide a point of departure for fu r

ther inquiry.

This undertaking emerged as a result of our

dissatisfaction with existing approaches to the study of
ethnicity,

a judgement which we applied both to works within

the field of ethnic relations and to more general approaches
to the study of social behavior.
lay the groundwork

In response,

we sought to

for a class-based theory of ethnicity

which incorporated insights from the study of both of these
forms of group affiliation.

At the risk of seeming pr es ump 

tuous, we believe we can state that we have achieved this
objective,

that the concepts presented and demonstrated

in

this work provide a fruitful basis for understanding ethnic
relations.

What remains to be done

is to continue to pursue

this process on both the theoretical and the substantive
levels— to see what calls for conceptual refinement.

In

other words, we must continue to seek to answer the q u e s 
tion:

What causes ethnic and national

persist,

identities to emerge,

change._or dis ap pe ar ?

The potential rewards for this endeavor are great.

The

human propensity for using the communal bonds of ethnicity
and nationality for group mobilization remains as strong as
ever.

As we write these words, ethnic conflict flares

the streets of New York City;

in

in the seeming fragmentation
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of the Soviet Union;
divide Sri Lanka,

in the cleavages which continue to

Lebanon, and Palestine/Israel;

and in the

renewed struggle to restructure South African society.
if we explore

Onl y

issues of ethnicity and class ^nd their int er 

relationship can we hope to understand intergroup relations
in all their complexity.

And only through such unde rst an d

ing can we hope to develop strategies for the resolution of
intergroup conflict.

CHAPTER NOTE

CHAPTER VII
1.

We recognize that issues of the nature of po s t- re vo lu 
tionary societies and their links to the capitalist
world-economy remain ex tr eme ly controversial--both
within and outside of the world-system paradigm.
For a
sampling of positions on these issues, see Chas e- Dun n
(1982); Sweezy (1980); Koves (1981); Nyiri (1982);
Laibman (1978); and Mandel (1974; 1979).
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